Prospect in France and England (1855)

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Ünder the heading "Prospect in France and England" this article (minus the first sentence) was included in The Eastern Question. The opening sentence was presumably contributed by the editors of the New York Daily Tribune in an attempt to provide some sort of explanation for the long absence of articles signed by Marx. At the time, most of Marx's articles were published as editorials. It may be assumed that in this particular case the editors printed the article under Marx's name as they did not want to be identified with the revolutionary proletarian attitude clearly expressed in the article.

London, Tuesday, April 10, 1855

Allow me once more to resume my long-interrupted correspondence with the Tribune. Yesterday and to-day will most likely be the first two decisive days in the Vienna Conferences, as they were to open on the 9th in the presence of Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys, and as, at the same time, the Russian Embassador was expected to have received his instructions relative to the Third and Fourth Points. The journey of Drouyn de Lhuys was at first puffed up on every Stock Exchange as a certain symptom of peace; for such an eminent diplomatist, it was said, surely would not go to take personal part in these debates unless he were sure of success. As to the "eminence" of this diplomatist, it is of a very mythical cast, and exists principally in the paid newspaper articles by which he magnifies himself into a second Talleyrand, as though his long career under Louis Philippe had not long since established his "eminent" mediocrity. But the real reason of his journey is this: Lord John Russell has managed within a few weeks, through his notorious ignorance of the French language, to embroil the Allies in concessions which he never intended to make, and which it will take extraordinary efforts to retrieve. Lord John's French is of the real John Bull species, such as "Milord" speaks in Fra Diavolo, and other theatrical pieces formerly popular in France; it begins with "Monsieur l'Aubergiste," and ends with "Très bien;" and if he understands but one-half of what is said to him, he is revenged in the consciousness that other people understand still less of what he utters. It was for this very reason that his friend and rival, Lord Palmerston, sent him to Vienna, considering that a couple of blunders on that stage would be sufficient finally to demolish poor little John. And so it has turned out. Half the time he could not make out what was going on, and a quick and unexpected interpolation from Gorchakoff or Buol was sure to draw an embarrassed "Très bien" from the unfortunate diplomatic debut-ant. In this way Russia, and to some degree Austria, lay claim that several points are settled, at least so far as England is concerned, which poor Lord John never intended to concede. Palmerston, of course, would have no objection to this, as long as the blame falls exclusively upon his hapless colleague. But Louis Bonaparte cannot afford to be cheated into peace that way. To put a stop to this sort of diplomacy, the French Government at once resolved to bring matters to an issue. They fixed upon an ultimatum, with which Drouyn de Lhuys went to London, got the adhesion of the British Government, and then took it with him to Vienna. Thus, at present, he may be considered the joint representative of France and England, and there is no doubt that he will use his position to the best interest of his master. And as the only, the exclusive interest of Louis Bonaparte is not to conclude peace until he has reaped fresh glory and fresh advantages for France, and until the war has served to the full its purpose, as a "moyen de gouvernement," Drouyn's mission, far from being peaceful, will turn out, on the contrary, to have for its object to secure a continuance of the war under the most decent pretext available.

With the middle-classes both of France and England this war is decidedly unpopular. With the French bourgeoisie it was so from the beginning, because this class was ever since the 2d of December in full opposition against the government of the "savior of society." In England, the middle-class was divided. The great bulk had transferred their national hatred from the French to the Russians; and although John Bull can do a little annexation business himself now and then in India, he has no idea of allowing other people to do the same in other neighborhoods in an uncomfortable proximity to himself or his possessions. Russia was the country which in this respect had long since attracted his anxious notice. The enormously increasing British trade to the Levant, and through Trebizond to Inner Asia, makes the free navigation of the Dardanelles a point of the highest importance to England. The growing value of the Danubian countries as granaries forbids England to allow their gradual absorption into Russia, and the closing of the navigation of the Danube by the same power. Russian grain forms already a too important item in British consumption, and an annexation of the corn-producing frontier-countries by Russia would make Great Britain entirely dependent upon her and the United States, while it would establish these two countries as the regulators of the corn-market of the world. Besides, there are always some vague and alarming rumors afloat about Russian progress in Central Asia, got up by interested Indian politicians or terrified visionaries, and credited by the general geographical ignorance of the British public. Thus, when Russia began her aggression upon Turkey, the national hatred broke forth in a blaze, and never, perhaps, was a war as popular as this. The peace-party was for a moment interdicted from speaking; even the mass of its own members went along with the popular current. Whoever knew the character of the English must have felt certain that this warlike enthusiasm could be but of short duration, at least so far as the middle-class was concerned; as soon as the effects of the war should become taxable upon their pockets, mercantile sense was sure to overcome national pride, and the loss of immediate individual profits was sure to outweigh the certainty of losing, gradually, great national advantages. The Peelites, adverse to the war, not so much out of a real love of peace, as from a narrowness and timidity of mind which holds in horror all great crises and all decisive action, did their best to hasten the great moment when every British merchant and manufacturer could calculate to a farthing what the war would cost him, individually, per annum. Mr. Gladstone, scorning the vulgar idea of a loan, at once doubled the income-tax and stopped financial reform. The result came to light at once. The peace-party raised their heads again. John Bright dared popular feeling with his own well-known spirit and tenacity, until he succeeded in bringing the manufacturing districts round to him. In London the feeling is still more in favor of the war, but the progress of the peace-party is visible, even here; besides, it must be recollected that the peace-society never, at any time, commanded any mentionable influence in the capital. Its agitation, however, is increasing in all parts of the country, and another year of doubled taxation, with a loan for this is now considered to be unavoidable—will break down whatever is left of warlike spirit among the manufacturing and trading classes.

With the mass of the people in both countries, the case is entirely different. The peasantry in France have, ever since 1789, been the great supporters of war and warlike glory. They are sure, this time, not to feel much of the pressure of the war; for the conscription, in a country where the land is infinitesimally subdivided among small proprietors, not only frees the agricultural districts from surplus labor, but also gives to some 20,000 young men, every year, the opportunity of earning a round sum of money, by engaging to serve as substitutes. A protracted war only would be severely felt. As to war-taxes, the Emperor cannot impose them upon the peasantry, without risking his crown and his life. His only means of maintaining Bonapartism among them, is to buy them up by freedom from war-taxation; and thus, for some years to come, they may be exempted from this sort of pressure. In England, the case is similar. Agricultural labor is generally over-supplied, and furnishes the mass of the soldiery, which only at a later period of the war receives a strong admixture of the rowdy-class from the towns. Trade being tolerably good, and a good many agricultural improvements being carried out, when the war began, the quota of agricultural recruits was, in this instance, supplied more sparingly than before, and the town-element is decidedly preponderant in the present militia. But even what has been withdrawn has kept wages up, and the sympathy of the villagers is always accompanying soldiers who came from among them, and who are now transformed into heroes. Taxation, in its direct shape, does not touch the small farmers and laborers, and until an increase of indirect imposts can reach them, sensibly, several years of war must have passed. Among these people, the war-enthusiasm is as strong as ever, and there is not a village where is not to be found some new beer-shop with the sign of "The Heroes of the Alma," or some such motto, and where are not, in almost every house, wonderful prints of Alma, Inkermann, the charge at Balaklava, portraits of Lord Raglan and others, to adorn the walls. But if in France, the great preponderance of the small farmers (four-fifths of the population), and their peculiar relation to Louis Napoleon, give to their opinions a great deal of importance, in England the one-third of the population forming the countrypeople has scarcely any influence, except as a tail and chorus to the aristocratic landed proprietors.

The industrial working population has, in both countries, almost the same peculiar position with regard to this war. Both British and French proletarians are filled with an honorable national spirit, though they are more or less free from the antiquated national prejudices common, in either country, to the peasantry. They have little immediate interest in the war, save that if the victories of their countrymen flatter their national pride, the conduct of the war, foolhardy and presumptuous as regards France, timid and stupid as regards England, offers them a fair opportunity of agitating against the existing governments and governing classes. But the main point, with them, is this: that this war, coinciding with a commercial crisis, only the first developments of which have, as yet, been seen, conducted by hands and heads unequal to the task, gaining at the same time European dimensions, will and must bring about events which will enable the proletarian class to resume that position which they lost, in France, by the battle of June, 1848, and that not only as far as France is concerned, but for all Central Europe, England included.

In France, indeed, there can be no doubt that every fresh revolutionary storm must bring, sooner or later, the working-class to power; in England, things are fast approaching a similar state. There is an aristocracy willing to carry on the war, but unfit to do so, and completely put to the blush by last winter's mismanagement. There is a middle class, unwilling to carry on that war which cannot be put a stop to, sacrificing everything to peace, and thereby proclaiming their own incapacity to govern England. If events turn out the one, with its different fractions, and do not admit the other, there remain but two classes on which power can devolve: the petty Bourgeoisie, the small trading class, whose want of energy and decision has shown itself on every occasion when it was called upon to come from words to deeds--and the working-class, which has been constantly reproached with showing far too much energy and decision when proceeding to action as a class.

Which of these classes will be the one to carry England through the present struggle, and the complications about to arise from it?