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Contents

ι

Liefmann, Holding and Financing Companies.	[1–13]
Die Neue Zeit, 1911 (on war N.B.) and 1912 (inter alia, on a United Statesof Europe).	[15–20]
Finanz-Archiv: 1915.	[21]
Statistics of Issues. Eggenschwyler.Crohn (on Argentina N.B.)	[23]
Paish.	[25–26]
Mülhaupt: The Milk Cartel.	[27–30]
Associations of capitalists on the war.	[31–34]
Crammond, Great Britain and Germany.	[35–36]
Sale, Japan versus Great Britain.	[37–38]

LIEFMANN, HOLDING AND FINANCING COMPANIES

Professor Dr. Robert Liefmann, Holding and Financing Companies, Jena, 1909 (A Study of Modern Capitalism and Securities) (x + 495).

[cf. especially p. 11 of the extracts]

((The author is a double-dyed idiot, who makes a great fuss about definitions—very stupid ones—all revolving around the word “substitution”. His factual data, however, mostly quite raw, are valuable. Opponent of the labour theory of value, etc., etc.))

[[TRIPLE-LEFT-BOX-END: pp. 104–449: “Descriptive part.” The theoretical part == nonsense ]]

p. 9: Against Sombart for following “wholly in the wake” of the Ricardo-Marx labour theory of value.

number of shareholders ||

p. 33: “In Prussia, the number of share-holders is only 2 per cent of the population.” There are more in Britain and America. “According to the estimate for Prussia in the 1909 Bill for taxation of joint-stock companies, the average shareholding in Prussia is not even 10,000 marks. These holdings are distributed among approximately 700,000 persons. All such estimates, however, are very unreliable” (34).

“There are no general statistical data at the present time on the spread of stock capital.... Philippovich (Outline, 7th edition, p. 164) estimates that 40 per cent of the British national wealth is in ‘securities’ (i.e., stocks and, mortgages). Schmoller (statistical supplements to the Minutes of the Stock-Exchange Enquiry Commission, 1892–93) estimated in 1892 that about one-quarter of total Prussian capital, nearly 16,000–20,000 million marks, was invested in securities. Sombart (The German National Economy in the Nineteenth Century, p. 224) puts the stock capital of Germany in 1900 at 31,000–32,000 million marks” (37). “Today this figure is definitely too low; German stock capital should be put at 45,000–50,000 million marks, which nevertheless is only about one-fifth of the country’s national wealth, estimated at 250,000 million marks” (37).

In America (✕) the national wealth in 1904 was 107,000 million dollars. About one-third was stock capital. “For Great Britain he (✕) gives the stock capital as 26,000 million dollars, for France—19,500 million dollars. The figure for the whole of Europe is about 75,000 million dollars” (38).

|| N.B.

(✕) Charles A. Conant, “The Concentration of Capital in New York and Those Who Manage It”, Bankers’ Magazine, November 1907 (quoted, p. 38).

Thus:
Stock capital	America	35	thousand million	dollars			|||
	Great Britain	26	” ”	”	}} 58.0
	France	19.5	” ”	”		75
	Germany	12.5	” ”	”		–58
		93.0	difference			17
	✕	5 =	465,000 million	francs
	[but Neymarck reckons 600,000 million]

44: ...“extraordinary interweaving of all economic interests”.

51: The Union (mining, etc., joint-stock company in Dortmund) ((see also Stillich α pp. 38 and 41 )). Formed in 1872.

|| 170%

“Share capital was issued to the amount of nearly 40 million marks in 1872 and the market price rose to 170 per cent after it had paid a 12 per cent dividend for a year. After that, however, no dividends were paid until 1880,

(12%–0%)

and already in 1875 the first of the reconstructions had to be undertaken, which since then were repeated in almost every period of unfavourable market conditions....

|||| N.B.

And every time the chief sufferers were the original shareholders.”

“Even companies founded with other aims than these (‘speculation in stocks’) in fact

||| N.B.

often go over more or less exclusively to speculation in stocks. This may happen partly because the shareholders do not pay enough attention to the activity of their directors,

||| N.B.

and partly because in this respect they are deceived by the latter” (67).

71: In different countries, different types of companies predominate:

In America—control over other companies.

” Germany—take-over (Übernahme) companies.

” France—capital investment companies.

” Holland (“as a rentier state”, p. 71)—ditto.

Belgium—à la Germany.

Great Britain—investment trusts....

Jeidels, Relation of the German Big Banks to Industry, Leipzig, 1905.

Dr. Riesser, On the History of the Development of the German Big Banks, with Special Reference to Concentration Trends, 1906.

p. 117—one of many examples of shareholding by the Belgian Société générale (December 31, 1906—shares and bonds amounting to 198 million francs, a host of companies).

p. 136–37. One example:

an example of speculation |||	The London and Colonial Finance Corporation, “with a paid-up capital of only £21,745 in 1890 obtained a net profit of £80,567 == 370 per cent of capital and paid a 100 per cent dividend.”
good example ||	Capital investment company (Kapital- anlagegesellschaft)—
	—Aktiengesellschaft für rheinish-westphälishe Industrie. Founded October 1871(p. 156).
	Dividend:			1872—	35%	–35!!
	N.B. __ __ __			1873—1883—	0	–0
				1884—1895—	3–9%
	N.B.		||	1896–1899—	10–21%
		||		1900—	60%	60	||| !!
				1901–02—	0	0
				1905–06—	40%	40
				1907–08—	6–4%

Dr. Emil Wolff, The Practice of Financing, etc., Berlin, 1905.

Francis Cooper, Financing an Enterprise, Two vols., New York, 1906.

Edward Carroll, Principles and Practice of Finance, 1902 (New York).

W. Lotz, “The Technique of Securities Issues”. In Schmoller’s Jahrbuch, 1890, p. 393 et seq.

“Thus nothing has come of using capital investment companies ‘to ensure small owners the profitability of the big’ (✕)” (163).

[[UPPER-LEFT-BOX-CORNER: p. 64: “Louis Hagen, the Cologne banker, sat on the Supervisory Boards of 35 firms; the Deutsche Bank, according to Jeidels (✕ ✕), had its directors on the Supervisory Boards in 101 companies, and its own Supervisory Board members in 120 companies” (p. 64).

|| N.B.

(✕) Jörgens, pp. 45–46.

(✕✕) Jeidels, Relation of the German Big Banks to Industry, 1905.

Various companies repeatedly issue stock for one and the same assets.

Example (American)... “their (railway companies’) assets appear repeated five times over in the stock of the companies directly or indirectly controlling them” (182).

|| N.B. five times repeated!!

Ch. A. Conant, “The Tendencies of Modern Banking” (Bankers’ Magazine, 1905).

The Northern Pacific Railway Co. Capital = 80 million dollars of foundation shares. Struggle between Harriman and Hill. Hill acquired foundation shares to the amount of 15 million.

|| 1,000% and crisis

“This ‘raid’ forced up the market price of Northern Pacific shares nearly 1,000 per cent.... On May 9, 1901, there was a crisis on the Stock Exchange, ruining a large number of smallholders, while the chief participants, according to Harriman’s testimony, suffered no losses through this manipulation” (184).

“With the further development of stock capitalism,

(my italics) N.B. |||

the methods of fleecing the public of large sums of money and diverting it into one’s own pockets have become more subtle. Today the method

Liefmann’s italics |

is to form, and graft on one another new companies, to which one and the same material assets are sold or leased; these assets pass from one company to another” (180).

The Standard Oil Company was founded in 1900.

“It has an authorised capital of $150,000,000.

N.B. || N.B.

It issued $100,000,000 common and $106,000,000 preferred stock. From 1900 to 1907 the following dividends were paid on the latter:

[[DITTO: N.B. || N.B. ]]

48, 48, 45, 44, 36, 40, 40, 40 per cent in the respective years, i.e., in all $367,000,000. From 1882 to 1907, out of total net profits amounting to $889,000,000, $606,000,000 were distributed in dividends and the rest went to reserve capital” (212).

N.B. ||

“In 1907 the various works of the United States Steel Corporation employed no less than 210,180 people (1908—165,211).... The largest enterprise in the German mining industry, Gelsenkirchener Bergwerksgesellschaft, in 1908, had a staff of 46,048 workers and office employees, and 43,293 in 1907” (p. 218).

(new technique 500% dividend.... ||

Internationale Bohrgesellschaft (in Erkelenz).... “Founded in order to apply the drilling method invented by engineer Anton Raky... (235)... the company paid a 500 per cent dividend in each of the years 1905–06 and 1906–07” (236).

“In fact, experience shows that it is sufficient to own about 40 per cent of the voting shares of a company in order in normal times to direct its affairs” (258). Further, there are also (especially in America) “non-voting shares” (259), bonds, etc., and if these are shares of a company controlling a number of

||

other companies, then “he [the capitalist], with his own capital of five million dollars can control a capital 40–50 times as great” (259).

|| N.B.

...and even “an amount of capital” “80—100 times as great” (as he owns) (260)....

“In Germany and other leading countries the trade in metals, other than iron, especially copper and zinc, also rare metals, is extremely concentrated” (301)... “small number of firms” (mostly in private hands)....

...“very many German gas works of the earlier period were built by British firms and with British capital”... (321)....

...“only a comparatively few people have achieved virtuosity in this sphere” (355)—in financial matters, etc.

|| ha-ha!!

...“The Swiss Credit Institute administers it [the Zurich Electrical Development Bank] for the ‘Bank’ is not an institution or office but, like all companies of the kind, is, so to speak, a large portfolio in which its securities and a few business books are kept” (376)....

Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft (A.E.G.)
—shares	—	100 million marks
bonds	—	37 ” ”
“securities owned”	—	23 million marks, etc.

||

South African gold mines. “The huge profits, particularly in the late eighties and early nineties prompted British capital, and also, especially, French, as well as German, Belgian and Dutch, to acquire shares in the mines.... Share prices

N.B. ||

jacked up, reaching their peak in the ‘boom’, which ended in 1895. The decline in mining securities was further increased by the Transvaal war”... (414).

N.B. |||

“The more developed an economic system is,

N.B. [[DITTO: ||| ]]

the more it resorts to risky enterprises, or enterprises in other countries, to those which need a great deal of time to develop, or finally, to those which are only of local importance.

N.B. ||

Hence, special financing companies have been established in these fields, for enterprises requiring a long time for development, for example, railway and mining enterprises”... (etc.) (434).

[[DITTO: || ]]

[The more developed, the more risky... N.B.]

N.B. ||

Schulze-Gaevernitz repeats this almost word-for-word in an article “Banking”, p. 21. (Book III. Principles of Social Economics, Section V, Part II.)

“Especially if, as in the case of American controlling companies, real activity is centred in the subordinate companies, the parent company being no more than the owner of their stock,

N.B. |||

and the share holders learn nothing of the activities of the subordinate companies, then it is clear that all legal regulations to assure maximum public control over the company’s enterprises can be made unworkable. That danger can arise in all companies based on the substitution of stock, indeed in all cases

N.B. |||

when one company has considerable holdings in another” (439).

“At the end of 1904, 3.8 per cent of all limited liability companies had a capital of over one million marks, 9.1 per cent had a capital of over 500,000 marks each. The 3.8 per cent, however, represented 45.2 per cent of the total capital of all limited liability companies, and the 9.1 per cent accounted for 60.5 per cent of this capital” (459).

(In Germany? Apparently.)

460: Author’s proposal: to oblige companies to “declare” in their accounts amounts of securities which are >1/20 “of the paid-up share capital”.

((Idiotic red-tape-ism!))

N.B. |||

“In all probability mankind will see further important technical revolutions in the near future which will also affect the organisation of the economic system”.... Electricity and aviation.... “As a general rule, in such periods of radical economic change,

||| N.B.

speculation develops on a large scale”, and judging by previous experience a considerable role will doubtlessly be played by the principle of stock substitution and by the holding and financing companies for carrying out necessary large-scale capital transactions” (465–66)....

But, he says ... joint-stock capitalism has passed its “period of youth”. The public has become wiser.... And with big technical inventions, “Gründungsschwindel” (flotation of bubble companies) “hardly”, etc.... (466–67)... ((“Harmonist”))

...“the essence of trade is in general the substitution of demand”... (475).

((Ha-ha! “Theoretician”!))

...“commerce is an occupation having for its object the collection, storage and supply of goods” (476). ((In bold-face italics. Idiot!))

[[TRIPLE-BOX: Nil in theory ]]

End.

DIE NEUE ZEIT, 1911 (ON WAR N.B.) AND 1912 (INTER ALIA, ON A UNITED STATES OF EUROPE)

Die Neue Zeit, 30th year (1912)

[N.B. Also an article on the history of private fortunes in America.]

30th year, 1 (October 1911–1912)

articles by Varga (p. 660), Hilferding (p. 773) and Kautsky (p. 837 et seq.) on gold, commodities, money.

Otto Bauer on the same subject in 2nd volume, 30th year.

N.B. also, p. 1, “Bandit Politics” (October 6, 1911)—an article by Kautsky on the war in Tripoli, ending with the words:

!! |||

“It (our electoral struggle) can overnight turn into a struggle for power” (p. 5).

||

30th year, 2 (1912)

an article by Pannekoek (“Mass Action and Revolution”) (p. 541 et seq.) and one by Kautsky, “New Tactics” (August 2, 1912 et seq.) with vile passages about ministries, etc. (a vile opportunist article). [N.B. prior to Basle.] Radek, “Concerning Our Struggle Against Imperialism” (p. 233).

[Also a polemic between Lensch and Kautsky on disarmament. N.B.

[Also articles by Eckstein against Pannekoek

[Pannekoek’s article: “The Nature of Our Present-Day Demands”, p. 810.

Deals specially with the “feasibility” of the demands.

|||

“Why, in fact, does the programme contain demands for political democracy, a militia, democratisation of the judicial system, etc., all of them unrealisable under capitalism, but no demands for the right to work or a ban on the introduction of labour-saving machinery, likewise unrealisable under capitalism?” Two kinds of impossibility: “economically impossible” and “politically precluded” (811). The present-day demands are “not in an absolute sense” unrealisable under capitalism (812).

Die Neue Zeit, 1911, 2 (29th year).

pp. 248 and 276. Minor “polemic” between Karl Kautsky and Leipziger Volkszeitung (Rosa Luxemburg) over a United States of Europe—remarks which do not touch on the essence of the matter, but are indicative of the polemic that is being conducted in Leipziger Volkszeitung.

Leipziger Volkszeitung attacked also Ledebour for his statement:

“We put ... to capitalist society ... the demand ... that they [the statesmen] prepare to unite Europe in a United States of Europe in the interests of Europe’s capitalist development, in order that later on Europe shall not be completely ruined in world competition” (p. 276).

This, it says, is the same argument Calwer used in urging a customs union against America.

Kautsky retorts: no, it is not the same. In Ledebour’s statement there is not a word about a customs struggle, only about a United States of Europe, “an idea which ... is not necessarily spearheaded against the U.S.A.” (277). ((Consequently, an idea of peaceful competition!))

Karl Kautsky, p. 248, says that both Parvus and Johann Philipp Becker are (or were) in favour of a United States of Europe.

Ibidem, pp. 943–44 (September 29, 1911), report of an article by H. Quelch (in The Social-Democrat, 1911, August), who says that the capitalists, too, favour peace (capital, he says, is already international): capital can already create a “United States of the World” (N.B.: sic! “of the world”), but this world-wide trust would oppress the workers still more. “Capitalist world peace... the all-powerful international police, nowhere any right of political asylum... peace and tranquillity would prevail in this slave state”... (p. 944).

From the war Quelch (contrary to Karl Kautsky) expects not revolution, but economic prosperity, deliverance from the “pressure of production”.

Die Neue Zeit, 1911, 2 (29th year, 2nd volume), No. 30, April 28, 1911 (pp. 97–107).

Karl Kautsky, “War and Peace”.

Karl Kautsky pronounces in favour of peace propaganda and for United States of Europe (§ 3 of the article is in fact headed: “A United States of Europe”).

Karl Kautsky is against the proposal to decide beforehand to reply to war by a strike (here there is a passage he quoted in 1915, that the people (“the population”), the “crowd”, would itself kill opponents of the war if it considered the frontiers in danger, if it feared invasion—p. 104, etc., etc.).

But, in quoting such passages from this 1911 article, Kautsky in 1915 did not quote the following passages:

1) In § 1: “Dynastic War and People’s War.” N.B. ((My emphasis.))

...“In the eighteenth century the princes regarded the states merely as their domains....

...“In the same way the capitalists of the various nations of Europe (and of the U.S.A.) now regard the various nationalities outside European civilisation as

||

their domains, and the antagonisms between the various capitalist governments arise merely from the endeavour to enlarge or round off these domains—the

|||

colonies and ‘spheres of influence’. Just like the dynastic antagonisms of the eighteenth century. And today the welfare of the peoples of Europe is no more related to this than two centuries ago”... (p. 99).

2) “The conviction is growing that a European war

||

is bound, by natural necessity, to end in social revolution. This is a strong, perhaps the strongest, motive for the ruling classes to preserve peace and demand disarmament” (p. 100).

||

3) “War is followed by revolution with inevitable certainty, not as the product of a Social-Democratic plan, but due to the iron logic of things. The statesmen themselves now reckon with the possibility of this outcome” (p. 106).

...“Whether the revolution arises from the competition in armaments or from war—it will in any case be an international phenomenon” (p. 106)....

...“Even if the revolution does not arise from reaction against the burden of armaments or against the horrors of war, but from other causes, and if at the outset it is not international, but restricted to a single state, it cannot remain so for long under present conditions. It [the revolution] is bound to spread to other states”... (107). And from this Karl Kautsky deduces the United States of Europe “and its eventual expansion into the United States of the civilised world”.

p. 105: Karl Kautsky defines the United States of Europe as an alliance “with a common trade policy” (++ a single parliament, etc., a single army).

||| &funnyreverses;

In § 1 of the article (p. 97), Karl Kautsky describes “the change in the world situation” (“during the last two decades”).... “Industrial capital has become finance capital, it has united with the landowner-monopolists”.... “Social reform has come to a complete standstill”....

||| &funnys;

“Nevertheless [despite all the difficulties of realising the United States of Europe] the effort to peacefully unite the European states in a federative community is by no means hopeless. Its prospects are bound up with those of the revolution” (K. Kautsky’s italics, p. 106).

ie Neue Zeit, 1911, 2, p. 96: an account of Otto Bauer’s article in the symposium Der Kampf (1911, No. 3): “World war is its [capitalism’s] last word.... If the Turkish revolution leads to a European war, the inevitable result will be a European revolution.”

Die Neue Zeit, 1911, 2, p. 179.

An article by Rothstein on the congress in Coventry (1911), where the British Socialist Party adopted a resolution in favour of “the maintenance of an adequate fleet for national defence”.

||

...“Thereby the Party Congress not only retreated from international Social-Democracy, but actually joined the worst jingoists” (p. 182)....

against Hyndman’s propaganda

||

“However aggressive Germany may be, her aggression concerns matters of as little importance for the British people as the gold-mines in the Transvaal.... But if, on the other hand, the actions of the British ruling classes, as expressed in the policy of encirclement (etc.) directed against Germany, are approved or permitted, then there really can come a time

N.B. ||

when even the proletariat will find itself compelled to take up arms and, by defending the country, do the job of the capitalist class”... (p. 183).

Die Neue Zeit, 1911, 1, article by Askew on British colonial policy in Egypt.

FINANZ-ARCHIV: 1915

Finanz-Archiv, 32nd year, 1915.

“French Capital in Russia” (125–33).

Index to Finanz-Archiv, 32nd year (Almost nil.)

Finanz-Archiv, 31st year, 1914.

“Colonial Debts and Colonial Loans.”

In 1901 there were colonial securities totalling £600 million == 12,000 million marks on the London Stock Exchanges (p. 8). These are mainly British colonies.

In 1897–1907 (p. 16), France gave the colonies loans of not less than 400 million francs.

Belgium > 250 million francs.

Germany—(1911)—about 137.4 million marks (p. 28). 137.4 ✕ 1.25 == 171,750,000 francs.

Millions of francs: 15,000; 400; 250; 171.75.

STATISTICS OF ISSUES. EGGENSCHWYLER. CROHN (ON ARGENTINA)

Walter Eggenschwyler (Zurich). “Statistical Data on the Problem: War, Progress of Production and Movement of Prices.” Schmoller’s Jahrbuch, 1915, No. 4.

(Author gives only annual figures)

	Public issues, world total (thous. million marks)		Average per year	Minimum	Maximum
1871–1880 . . . . .	76.1÷10	==	7.61	1.7	15.6
1881–1890 . . . . .	64.5÷10	==	6.45	3.3	12.7
1891–1900 . . . . .	98.0÷10	==	9.8	2.5	17.8
1901–1909 . . . . .	136.1÷9	==	15.1	7.9	21.5

Size of issues (total) (author gives only annual figures):

	Great Britain (million marks)	France (millionfrancs)	==	(my calcula- tion) 80% (mill. marks)	Germany (million marks)
1903–07 . . . .	13,187	18,469	==	14,775	16,630
	÷5==2,637
1908–12 . . . .	21,309	23,122	==	18,497	19,783
	÷5==4,262
Σ (for 10 years)	34,496	41,591		33,272	36,413
	÷10==3,449			÷10==	3,641

Ibidem (No. 2). H. F. Crohn, “Argentina in the Anglo-German Economic Struggle” (cf. p. 114 in Zollinger on the typicality of Argentina)....

An excellent illustration of imperialism!!

WALTER ZOLLINGER, BALANCE-SHEET OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF SECURITIES

Walter Zollinger, Balance-Sheet of International Transfers of Securities, 1914.

(p. 106) He cites following totals from Neymarck (Bulletin de l’institut international de statistique, Vol. XIX, Book II, 1912).

Figures in francs
1871–	80	76.1	thousand	million
1881–	90	64.5	”	”
1891–	1900	100.4	”	”
1901–	1910	197.8	”	”
(Σ==438.8)

(Ibidem) Total of Securities

(thousand million francs)
(1910 maximum)		other countries in 1902 (32)
Great Britain . . . . . . . . . . . .	142	Holland . . . . . . . . . .	10
United States . . . . . .	132	Belgium . . . . . . . . . .	6
France . . . . . . . . . .	110	Spain . . . . . . . . . .	6
Germany . . . . . . . . . .	95	Switzerland . . . . . . . . . .	5
Russia . . . . . . . . . .	31	Denmark . . . . . . . . . .	3
Austria-Hungary . . . .	24	Sweden, Norway, Rumania, etc . . .	2
Italy . . . . . . . . . .	14
Japan . . . . . . . . . .	12	Σ	==32
Other countries . . . . .	40
Σ	==600

CALMES, “RECENT LITERATURE ON CAPITAL INVESTMENT”

Albert Calmes (Professor of the Academy, Frankfurt-am-Main), “Recent Literature on Capital Investment”, Jahrbücher für Nationaloekonomie, III series, Vol. 47 (Vol. 102), 1914, p. 522.

He praises the book of the Swiss.

N.B. ||

A. Meyer, Capital Investment, Zurich, 1912 (p. 525: the general part, he says, is “excellent”).

[[DITTO: N.B. || ]]

Fr. Ehrensperger, Modern Capital Investment, Berne, 1911.

Fr. Böttger, Investment of Money and Management of Capital, Leipzig? (193 pp.) (“he treats in more detail” “the reading of balance-sheets”, p. 525).

Henry Loewenfeld, The Art of Capital Investment. (All about investment), Berlin, 1911 (“Leitmotive”: “geographical distribution of capital investments”).

Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, The Art of Investing and Managing One’s Capital, Paris, 1912 (451 pp.)—(highly praised).

Calmes, Vol. 105 (1915, No. 5), examines the new literature on financing.

N.B. |||

See also, in Jahrbücher, III series, Vol. 39, 1910, article by Moos on “capital investment” in France and Great Britain.

ARTICLE BY PAISH IN THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY, JANUARY 1911

British capital invested in Indian, colonial and foreign loans and companies, and the income derived therefrom in 1907–08 (Paish, p. 168):

[[BOX: My summary in three main groups: A, B, C ]]				Capital	Income
						Per
				(£000)	(idem)	cent
A)	Loans (government and muni- cipal) . . . . . . . . . .			757,460	29,938	3.9
B)	Railways . . . . . . . . . .			1,198,991	52,839	4.4
C)	{	Banks, etc . . . . . . .		366,022	21,870
		Mines . . . . . . . . . .		243,386	26,145
		Oil, etc . . . . . . . . . .		127,879	8,999
C)				737,287	57,014	7.7
Total				2,693,738	139,791	5.2

Author divides table not into three (A, B, C), but into very many groups.

A)	%	==3.2%	—	4.7%
B)		==3.8	—	4.7%
C)		==3.3	—	30.5%

1910 (£000)

British Colonies

	• Canada and Newfoundland									(my) Σ
		• Australian Commonwealth
			• New Zealand
				• Total for Australasia [[BOLD-COLUMN-BOX]]
					• Africa[:] South
						• [Africa:] West
	India and Ceylon •
	Straits Settlements and Malay States •
	Miscellaneous British possessions •
A)	92,948	198,365	64,721	263,086	115,080	8,541	182,517	7,943	6,969	677,084
B)	223,740	2,951	761	3,712	9,354	—	136,519	—	1,717	375,042
C)										503,026
Σ	(*) 373,541	301,521	78,529	380,050	351,368	29,498	365,399	22,037	33,259	(*) 1,555,152
	(*) Note: Paish’s total == 1,554,152, because for Canada he gives 372,541 in the summary table (p. 186), but 373,541 in the main table (p. 180).

	United States	Cuba	Philippines	Japan	China	Miscellaneous foreign countries
A)	7,896	2,282	—	42,784	22,477	818
B)	586,227	17,387	7,902	8,910	—	4,521
C)	93,955	3,031	300
Σ	688,078	22,700	8,202	53,705	26,809	61,907

	Argentina	Mexico	Brazil	Chile	Uru- guay	Peru	Misc. American countries
A)	38,339	8,276	40,221	17,071	9,860	81	3,838
B)	186,126	54,306	29,961	12,646	21,194	6,476	11,681
C)
Σ	269,808	87,335	94,440	46,375	35,255	31,987	22,517

	Russia	Turkey	Egypt	Spain	Italy	Portugal	France	Germany	Other Euro- pean coun- tries	Σ	but without Egypt
A)	19,109	9,650	14,044	1,885	4,164	1,336	—	1,351	22,870	74,409	60,365
B)	2,013	6,146	1,916	5,473	3,284	4,432	—	—	495	23,759	21,843
C)			27,793				7,071			90,199	62,408
Σ	38,388	18,320	43,753	18,808	11,513	8,134	7,071	6,061	36,319	188,367	144,614

Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. LXXIV, January 1911.

Paish’s article (and its discussion in the Statistical Society (article pp. 167–87; discussion, pp. 187–200)) shows that the author was very cautious and careful.

He excluded conversions—taking not nominal, but issue prices of securities—and to avoid duplication took income from securities, etc. The value of his data is therefore infinitely greater than that of the baseless “data” on France and Germany.

His main work relates to 1907–08.

£000,000
	1907–08	1908–09 and 1910	1910
colonies:	1,312	+228	1,554
foreign countries	1,381	+288	1,637
Total	2,693	+516	3,191

|| N.B.

N.B. Alfred Neymarck, Modern Finances, Vols. VI and VII. French Savings and Securities 1872–1910. 2 vols. 8°ree;. Paris, 1911.

MÜLHAUPT, THE MILK CARTEL

Dr.Engelbert Mülhaupt, The Milk Cartel. A Study of Cartels and Milk Prices, Karlsruhe, 1912.

BadenHigher School Economic Studies, New Series, No. 9.

Avery interesting and business-like little book, describing extremely interesting phenomena.

{

Literature sources N.B.: Ph. Arnold in Conrad’s Jahrbücher, Vol. 41, 1911, and in the article “Statistics of the Kingdom of Bavaria”, Vol. 41 (1910).

[[DITTO:{

]] Dictionary of Political Science, Vol. 6 (3rd edition) (“The Milk Industry”).

[[DITTO:{

]] Nachimson, “The Milk War”, Die Neue Zeit, 1911 (29 th year), Vol. 2 (p. 668 et seq.).

Themonopoly position of the farms (a region 50–100 km. around the big towns) and the growth of co-operatives are factors in favour of cartels in this field.

Followingthe invention of the centrifuge, co-operative dairy associations sprang up like mushrooms after a warm spring rain:

		{{	Number of agricultural co-operatives (p. 24):		}}
1870—	1		1890—	3,000
1903—	2,245 with 181,325 members		1900—	13,600
1909—	3,039 ” 270,692 ” (p. 5)		1910—	24,900

{{

according to Petersilie, German Co-operative Statistics, Berlin, 1911. }}

Thegrowth of prices for concentrated fodder, etc. (++ 13–50 per cent, 1896–1906, p. 7) etc., did not result in a growth of prices, until the strong cartel movement about 1900 (p. 7).

The enormous importance of large-scale production (storage, etc.) of milk (in relation to cheapness, hygiene, etc., etc.) favours cartels.

Berlin requires daily	1 million litres of milk
Hamburg with environs	0.5 ” ” ” ”
Vienna	0.9 ” ” ” ”
Munich	0.25 (p. 16) ” ” ”
	etc.

[[BOX: Milk contains 9,000 bacteria per cubic centimetre (centimetres?? or millimetres?) immediately after milking; 12,000 after 2–3 hours; 120,000 after 9 hours; millions after 24 hours (page?). ]]

Deliveryis mostly by railway (50–100 km. from the town). Virtual monopoly position of peasants in nearby areas engaged in milk production.

“Theco-operative movement has trained the farmer for the cartel” (25).

Thehistory of some milk cartels.

TheBerlin Milk Cartel. Founded June 1900. A fierce struggle against wholesale traders (the public supported the traders).

||

Bolle (the biggest Berlin milk firm—sells 45 million litres per annum; capital 10,000,000 marks; dividend 8 per cent, p. 91) in 1903 made peace with the milk cartel. (In a short time, Bolle became a millionaire; as also Pfund in Dresden, who sells 21 million litres).

Milksyndicates always improve hygienic conditions.

Butthe present one was badly off financially and went bankrupt on February 27, 1907.

Hamburg.Founded in June 1900. During ten years it gave its members 10.3 million marks (p. 53), raised their price (from 11.2 to 14.1 pfennigs), and concluded an agreement with the big traders.

Frankfurt-am-Main.When was it founded?? In 1911 it was very powerful.

Itconcluded an agreement with the traders. Afterwards it demanded that they raise the price from 16 pfennigs to 17.

“Overthis pfennig a three months’ bitter war broke out between the farmers and the traders, who were supported both by the Social-Democratic and liberal workers’ unions, and by the trade union association” (p. 54). The traders gave way.

“Thestruggle ended with traders, to the great astonishment of the consumers, forming an alliance with Vereinigte Landwirte [the United Farmers, a cartel], by which the latter were pledged not to deliver milk to traders who did not join in the price increase” (p. 55). ||large-scale production!!

In Vienna there is a huge syndicate. It lowered sales costs from 7.67 hellers per litre in 1900 (turnover 0.56 million kronen) to 3.775 hollers in 1910 (turnover 6.74 million kronen) (p. 57).

Influenceof cartels on the producers?

Pricesrose by an average of 2 pfennigs in 1900–10 (compared with 1890–1900) (p. 61).

Theprice rise was caused by the cartel (otherwise higher production costs would not have increased the price).

“Whatother explanation is there for the striking fact that prices began to rise precisely in the years when the milk cartel appeared on the scene?” (63).

“Lastly,what other explanation, save the existence of cartels, is there for the fact that the highest price increases were in the richest milk areas: Switzerland and Württemberg?” (64).

Biggersales of milk worsen both food for cattle (p. 66) and food for the population (67).

Consumptionof milk in Switzerland

	Litres per capita per day
1903–05	—1.01
1906–09	—0.98 (p. 68)

Samein Germany.

Effecton trade? Profits declined from 7–8 pfennigs per litre to 6–7 pfg. (72),—gradual squeezing out of trade.

Onconsumers? Better quality, hygiene, etc.

Bestof all in Basle, where the consumers’ association and peasants’ milk association directly confront each other. The milk trade is run by the city in an exemplary way, but as regards prices the consumer is dependent on the peasants!!

“According to Professor Kasdorf, the average daily milk yield of a cow is 5 litres in Austria, 8–10 litres in Germany, and 12 litres in Denmark” (p. 83).

Milk production on Archduke Friedrich’s big farm near Vienna:

1853—	3.00 litres per cow
1850—	4.67
1890—	6.27
1900—	6.86 (p. 84)
1910—	8.00

Small-scaletrade in milk still prevails (in Munich in 1910 there were 1,609 dairy shops, including

250	selling up to	50 litres
1,310	(81.4%) up to	150 litres)

conditions generally unhygienic; no safeguards against contamination when the milk is poured, etc.

N.B.||

and “an incredible waste of time, labour and capital” (87), delivery, unsold milk, 2–3 suppliers to a single house, etc., etc.

“Thesocial effects of the milk cartel” (Chapter V)—the

!!! |||

prospect is for an “armed peace” (95) between the town and countryside, an outright war between consumers and sellers, as in Basle.

InBasle, the consumer depends a wholly (as regards price) on the cartel of peasant milk producers.

{{

Peasant dairy cartels are best of all organised in Switzerland—and the price of milk is the highest of all!! the power of these cartels being greatest of all!!

}}

“Thegeneral consumers’ association (in Basle)

||

finds its hands completely bound in face of the price policy of the producers’ cartel” (p. 77).

||| N.B.

“Evenin Switzerland, where direct relations between peasants and workers are closer than in other countries, there have been hard-fought battles and bitter price struggles between them” (p. 95)

CAPITALIST ASSOCIATIONS ON THE WAR

Capitalist Associations on the war

N.B.

Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik (Edgar Jaffé) (Vol. 41, No. 1), 1915, September. Pp. 296–97—“Employer Organisations on the War”.

...“Consequently [employer organisations] are thinking in terms of the rise and development of a special German type; that is what the war is about. That view, in fact,

|| N.B.

fully coincides with the employers’ interests. They are aware of a certain danger to themselves if it were to be said after the war: vestra res agitur (the matter concerns you), your skin and your interests are at stake! The war is being waged to decide who shall hold sway on the world market!” (Deutsche Arbeitgeberzeitung, February 7, 1915). In that event, obviously, all socio-political tendencies, all efforts to cover war expenditure out of employer profits would find ready acceptance. If, however, the war is being waged in the interests of civilisation, to defend a type of civilisation and not profit interests, then it falls to Society as a whole to bear the burdens of war, and it will not be possible to single out a class whose interests are pro-eminently promoted by the war.

||

The employers regard the effects of the war, insofar as they extend to the internal political situation, as predominantly favourable.

||

This applies especially to its effect on the Socialist Party,

||

and in this respect they praise “fate as educator”. For the war has led to unity of the nation and has cut the ground from under the most attractive socialist theories. (Ibid., August 2, 1915.) In this war the nation has for the first time really become a nation (to borrow Treitschke’s expression)—and this is in itself justification for the war.... For centuries to come, war will still be the sole form of settling disputes between states,

||

and it is a form to be welcomed, for the war has halted the trend towards democracy: “We have reached the limit of feebleness, the brink of degeneration and debility. From the final extreme, however, from sinking into the abyss, we have been saved by fate, which evidently has set our German people a special goal.” (Ibid., August 16, 1914.)

“The meaning of the war in general is thus consistently being sought in a transformation of the soul; its serious economic and political implications are belittled; its serious political and economic consequences are rejected”.

“The German Government’s further measures, it is correctly pointed out, were likewise directed at regulating consumption, whereas the aim of socialism is socialisation of the means of production. (Ibid., February 28, 1915.) All these measures will therefore be discontinued with the coming of peace. These views are, on the whole, in the interests of the employers. And the antagonism between the class interests of the employers and the workers probably

||

finds its most salient expression also in the contrasting way the war is reflected in their ideologies.

||

But the contrast is of a manifold nature. The socialists of the opportunist, revisionist trend see the war as an economic war. They take the view that the war is imperialist and even defend the right of every nation to imperialism. From that they deduce a community of interests between employers and workers within the nation, and that line,

|

followed consistently, leads to their becoming a radical bourgeois reform party. On the other hand, the radical trend in the socialist workers’ movement, while regarding the war as imperialist (at any rate, with reservations),

||

negates this development—it demands intensification of the class struggle as a consequence of the war and emphasis on the proletarian standpoint, even during the war. The employers, however, as we have seen, deny that the war is an imperialist one. They do not want to be told: Tua res agitur (it is your concern). They reject both the positive, affirmative imperialist view of the revisionist socialists and the critical attitude of radical socialism.

||| well said!

They seek salvation in the “civilisation meaning” of the war, an interpretation that does not hold any class responsible for the war, and does not accuse any class of especially benefiting from it.

||| how nice!

A grotesque picture: while the governments everywhere uphold the imperialist theory or, at least” (how nice!!)

[[DITTO: ||| ]] [[BOX: gem! ]]

“contend that for the other side the economic interest is decisive, the chief representatives of economic interests retire behind the general civilisation meaning of the war. As a result, they come into contact with views to be found also in the camp of radical socialism; they regard the war as economically only an interim phase; all war-time phenomena, all measures taken by the state, stem from the present situation and will disappear together with the war. The employers’ views on the war, too, however much they may appear to have a central idea, should therefore be regarded exclusively as (class) ideology” (pp. 295–97). (End of article.)

Note, pp. 293–94:

N.B. ||

“A theoretical article in Deutsche Arbeitgeberzeitung (August 15, 1915) in which tendencies towards a new (democratic) orientation in home policy are most emphatically rejected, is highly indicative....

...“First of all, Social-Democracy has still more to ‘re-learn’:

N.B.! |

it will ‘above all have to show, after the war as well, whether the process of transformation to which it refers has really become part of its flesh and blood. Only if this has been decisively demonstrated for a fairly lengthy period will one he able to say, with due caution, whether some of these changes in Germany’s home policy are possible’.” ...“In any case, so far there are no prerequisites for a future

||

home policy (as urged by the Left parties). ...On the contrary, ‘the harsh school of war provides us with the strongest possible arguments against further democratisation of our state system’” ...(p. 294).

CRAMMOND, GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY

Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 1914, July (Vol. LXXVII, Part VIII) (pp. 777–807).

Edgar Crammond, “The Economic Relations of the British and German Empires”.

Together the two empires account for 39 per cent of international trade (1911: 26.9 per cent Great Britain ++ 12.5 per cent Germany) and 53 per cent of the world’s mercantile shipping.

		Germany	Great Britain
Population	1872	41.23 (million)	31.87 (million)
	1888	48.17 ”	36.88 ”
	1910	64.92 ” (1911)	45.22 ”
++(1872–1910)		+23.69	+13.34
Births per 1,000		29.5 (1911)	24.4
Deaths ” ”		18.2	14.8
Urban population		57.4% (1905)	71.3% (1901)
Value of mineral production (1911)		£102,000,000	124,500,000

		United States	Germany	Great Britain
		(million tons)
Coal output	{{ 1911	450.2	234.5	276.2
	{{ 1886	103.1	73.7	160.0
		+347.1	++160.8	++116.2
		+336.6%	++218.1%	+72.6%
Ditto, crude steel	{{ 1910	26.5	13.7	6.1
	{{ 1886	2.6	0.9	2.4
		+23.9	12.7	3.7
		+910.3%	++1,335 %	++154.3%

		Germany	Great Britain
		(million)
Export of cotton goods	{{ 1887:	£10.0	72.0
	{{ 1912:	£24.3	122.2
Bank deposits:		£468.0	1,053.0
(1912–13) savings banks		839.0	221.1
	(My) Σ=	1,307.0	1,274.0
Net tonnage of shipping	1880:	1.2 million	6.6 million
	1911:	3.0 ”	11.7 ”
		++1.8	++5.1
		++156 %	++77.7%
Total tonnage of vessels entered and cleared on foreign trade	1880:	13.0 mill. tons (of which 39.1% German vessels)	49.7 (of which 72.2% British vessels)
	1911:	49.5 (50.4% German vessels) ++	138.9 (59% British vessels) –

Shipbuilding:		Germany	Great Britain
annual output	1898–1904:	240,800 tons	898,000
	1913:	618,800	2,203,000
Tonnage of vessels	1892:	809,000 tons	8,102,000
that passed the Suez Canal	1912:	4,241,000	17,611,000
Percentage of all vessels that passed the Suez Canal	{{ 1892:	7.4%	74.5%
	{{ 1912:	15.1%	62.9%
Gross income of railways	1888:	£58.4 million	72.9
	1910:	£149.5 ”	127.2
		++156%	++74.3%
Foreign trade	1888:	£323.6 million	558.1
(exports + imports)	1912:	£982.6	1,120.1
		++ 204%	++100.7%
		++£659.0 million	++£562.0 million
Expenditure on army and navy (1912)		£70.0 million	102.4
National wealth:		£15,000 ”	25,000 (*)
National income (Helfferich, for Germany)		£2,000 ”	3,400
Capital investment abroad		£1,000 ”	3,800
		==6.6% (of nation- al wealth)	(==23%)
Income from capital invested abroad (1912)		£50.0 million	185.0
Income from shipping		£30.0 ”	100.0
National income (Germany, according to Helfferich)	{{ 1896:	£1,075 ”	1,430
	{{ 1912:	£2,000 ”	2,140
Annual increase of national wealth (last 18 years for Germany) (and last 28 years for Great Britain)		==£272.0 ”	£230.0 million
figures for the last five years are approximately the same.
(*) For the whole Empire. For Great Britain alone, without Colonies == 16,500.

.

SALE, JAPAN VERSUS GREAT BRITAIN

A very interesting article in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. LXXIV, 1911, April.

Charles W. Sale, “Some Statistics of Japan”, pp. 467–534.

The comparison with the United Kingdom is especially instructive:

	Japan	United Kingdom
Area (square miles)	147,648	121,390
Population (1910)	49,587,000	44,538,000
” per square mile	335	367
Birth-rate (per 1,000)	31.30	27.95
Death-rate ( ” ” )	20.70	16.89
Increase ( ” ” )	++10.60	++11.06
Grain, green crops, etc.	12,894,000 (acres)	12,437,000==16%
	13.6%
Grasses and pastures	3,006,000 3.2%	34,565,000==44%
Forests	55,083,000=58.0	3,070,000==4%
Price of land (+cattle, etc.)	£1,299 million	£1,220==11%
	==57% of total na- tional wealth
Production (1907)
rice, wheat, barley, oats	==372.8 million bushels	307.3
Potatoes	3.9 (mill. tons)	5.2
Turnips, swedes	very little	36.3 (mill. tons)
Radishes	2.3 (mill. tons)	—
Hay	very little	15.6 ” ”
Net imports of drink, food and tobacco	£3.46 (million)	£212.4 million
Cattle (1908)	1.3 ( ” )	11.7 ”
Horses (1908)	1.5 (million)	2.1 (million)
Sheep	87,000(==0.08 mill.)	31.3 ”
Pigs	0.28 (million)	4.0 ”
Number of coal miners underground (1908)	126,999	796,329
Coal raised (in tons)	14.8 (mill.)	261.5
Tons of coal per miner per annum	117	328
Value sterling	6.5 (mill.)	116.6
” per ton	8s. 9d.	8s. 11d.
Tons of coal exported	2.86 (mill.)	62.55
Value per ton exported	12s. 11d.	12s. 8d.
Railways (1908) in miles	5,020	23,280
Passengers (million)	146.9	1,265.1

5,

		Japan	United Kingdom
Goods traffic (million tons)		25.4	499.9
Earnings (per mile of rail- way)		£1,690	4,854
Expenses ( ” ” )		868	3,133
Net earnings (”)		++822	+1,721
Steamships (100 tons and upward gross)		1,146,977	18,059,037
Shipping entered at Chinese ports (1,000 tons)	{{ 1902:	7,350 (13.6%)	26,950 (49.9%)
	{{ 1909:	18,949 (21.8%)	34,027 (39.2%)
Total value of product of textile factories (1907)		£37.77 (mill.)	247.27
{{ Operatives		355,000	808,398
{{ Value per operative		£ 106	£306
Imports ++ exports (including re- exports)	{{ 1889:	£20.99 (mill.)	744.0
	{{ 1909:	82.35	1,094.0
dem per capita	1899:	10s. 6d.	£19. 19s. 10d.
	1909:	£1. 12s. 10d.	£22. 5s. 8d.
National expenditure (1909)		£64.9 (mill.)	152.3
Post Office savings (1909)
Number of depositors		8.66 (mill.)	11.1
Amount (£ mill.)		£10.8 (mill.)	160.6
” (per capita)		£1. 5s. 1d.	£14. 11s. 7d.
Value of agricultural prod- ucts		£126 (mill.)	174.8
Number of farm labourers (including peasant pro- prietors)		11.50 (mill.)	2.05

|

“With less than a fifth the number of labourers, the product in the United Kingdom is larger, and 40 per cent greater in value” (p. 488)....

Agriculture in Japan has special features, it accounts for 60 per cent of the population (p. 481). Out of a total number of households of 9,250,000, 3,748,000 are engaged exclusively in agriculture; 1,662,000 combine other occupations with agriculture. Other farmers = 70,000. Land-owners == 43,000. Σ == 5,523,000.

The land is very heavily taxed. Agriculture is on an extremely small scale:

							Per cent of farms (p. 482)
Area of farms: less than 1 1/4 acres (5 tan)							37.26
from	1 1/4	to	2 1/2	acres	(5 tan-1	cho)	32.61
”	2 1/2	”	5	”	(1–2	” )	19.62
”	5	”	12 1/4	”	(2–5	” )	9.37
over 12 1/4 acres (5 cho) . . . . . . . . . .							1.14
							100.00

The productivity of agricultural labour is extremely low, chiefly owning to the small scale of agriculture and the absence of machines.

In Japan, the production of rice requires 110 days’ labour per acre.

In Texas and Louisiana, the production of rice per acre requires one man for two days ++ a team for 1 1/2 days.

(American Economic Association Journal,

1904, November)

ARTICLE: “FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE WAR DEBTS OF EUROPE”

The Economist, February 13, 1915. Article: “Financial Arrangements and the War Debts of Europe”....

...“The more one looks into the financial and political future of Europe after the war the darker and more obscure do its problems appear. But that is all the more reason why independent men with knowledge and penetration and foresight should exercise their minds upon the political economy of this war. Never has there been such a collision of forces, never so much destruction in so short a time. Never has it been so difficult or so necessary to measure the calamity, to count the costs, to foresee and provide against the consequences to human society. Philanthropists profess to hope that the peace settlement will bring with it a great international reduction of armies and armaments, which will enable the nations to support their new war debt, and so to avoid the bankruptcy court. No doubt the fear of bankruptcy will count for something; otherwise the peace settlement might be expected to breed another series of preparations for another series of wars.

N.B. ||

But those who know the forces which really control the diplomacy of Europe see no Utopias. The outlook is for bloody revolutions and fierce wars between labour and capital, or between the masses and the governing classes of Continental Europe”. (End of article.)