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Contents

[[DOUBLE-LEFT-BOTTOM-RIGHT BOX ENDS: θ θR ]] [[DOUBLE-LEFT-BOTTOM-RIGHT BOX ENDS: θ=1–10

((+Riesser 1–16)) ]]

Hilferding. Finance Capital	[3–6]
The Electric Trust	[7–8]
Statistics of Issues	[9–10]
Riesser	[1–15]

HILFERDING, FINANCE CAPITAL

Hilferding, Finance Capital (“The Recent Phase in the Development of Capitalism”), Moscow, 1912.

[[BOX: German edition published in 1910 (Volume III of Marxist Studies). ]]

p. 13.	||| mishmash “According to E. Mach”, “the ‘Ego’ is only the focus in which the infinite threads of sensation converge.... || incorrect, not “in the same way” In exactly the same way money is the node in the network of social connections”....
p. 34.	[DITTO: || ] “Ever since Tooke the quantity theory (of money) has been quite rightly regarded as fallacious”....
	incorrect || p. 54, note and especially 54–55. Hilferding is wrong here, see Die Neue Zeit, 1912, 30th year, Vol. 1. (According to Hilferding, money enters into exchange without value.)
	incorrect || p. 71, note. “Only our perception gives things the form of space” (a Kantian)
	p. 90–91 (and 91, note).
	N.B. | How Marx predicted the domination of the banks over industry (N.B.) (Capital, II, p. 79).
(thous. million marks) (of which, acceptances by banks) 93, note. Σ of bills per annum: 1885—12.1 16 per cent 1905—25.5 31 ” ”
N.B.	[[TOP-LEFT-BOTTOM BOX END: __ 102 (and note). A large part of international trading transactions are through bills “accepted” by the banks. __ ]]
||| 105–06.	The role of the banks.
108.	Three functions of the banks: 1) intermediary in payments, 2) conversion of inactive into active capital, 3) aggregation of the income of all classes in money form and lending it to the capitalist class.
110,	note. Excellent study by Jeidels and its shortcomings.
112.	“International banker” countries: (1) France, Belgium, Holland (2) Great Britain (3) U.S.A. and Germany.
116:	The role of the banks in production ((chiefly from Jeidels)). 120 idem
154-55,	note. Steel Trust and its dividend. {{ 7% on privileged shares and 2% on ordinary shares: it holds back profits for years, and then suddenly, at a suitable moment, distributes them. }}
157.	A capital of five million controls 39 millions. “Tochtergesellschaft” translated “subsidiary company”.
159.	Seats on Supervisory Boards (60–70 million income from these throughout Germany)—using connections and acquaintances.
162.	Six banks—751 seats on Supervisory Boards (Jeidels).... In 1909 there were 12,000 such seats—197 persons held 2,918 seats. (Cf. ibidem Morgan in America.)
172.	Significance of “reconstructions”: (1) a profitable operation; (2) it makes companies dependent on the banks.
183	(at the end) and 184.—Replacement of bills of exchange by entries in the bank’s books.
199.	Pressure of big capital on the Stock Exchange (and a note: the example of Morgan in 1907).
211.	—— Banks replace the Stock Exchange....
222.	Nature and significance of time bargains.
N.B. || 262. Quotation from Capital, III, 2, pp. 144–45 (Russian translation) on the role of the banks versus socialism (N.B.).
274.	Heavy industry. Outflow of capital difficult (the path to monopoly).
(277-)	278: Tendency of the banks to monopoly.
281.	N.B.: Cunow on cartels in Die Neue Zeit, XXII, 2, p. 210.
285.	“Combination” = uniting extractive with manufacturing industry.
295:	Corporations and “outsiders” (N.B.)....
298:	No big industrial enterprise can exist without the help of the bank.
300–01.	Engels on the new type of protective tariffs and on cartels (Capital, III, 1, p. 95).
302–03:	Evolution of cartel forms (and 304 especially).
308.	Concentration of trade (cf. A. Lee in Die Neue Zeit, XXVII, 2, p. 654).
320,	note. Abolishing trade does not reduce the price of the product.
322–23:	Merchants—agents—salesmen (N.B.) (and 324).
331.	(Verbal imitation of Marx.)
336.	Example of founder’s profit: The Sugar Trust (N.B.) in America (70 per cent on the actually invested capital, 10 per cent on the “watered” = capital).
338–39:	Definition of finance capital (and 341): finance capital = “capital controlled by banks and employed by industrialists” (339).
346:	Cartels = “restriction of competition”.
353:	Connection of cartels with export of capital.
355:	Finance capital and “the organisation of social production”... (cf. 353 and 354).
358:	With the growth of combination, production for internal needs increases (but for commodity production).
362.	Marx on crises (III, 1, 219—20, Russian translation).
364.	Volume II includes “the most brilliant parts of a remarkable work” (the “merit” of Tugan-Baranovsky?! in a note).
382.	“Schemes” (of Volume II) and the significance of “proportionality” ((cf. 426 and + 427)).
447:	[[BOX-END, including "447:": Universal cartel is “economically possible” (“socially and politically unrealisable”)... it would abolish crises.... But “to expect the abolition of crises from individual cartels” = lack of understanding. ]]
Up to Section V: “The Economic Policy of Finance Capital”.

N.B.	|| p. 454, note. A quotation from Schulze-Gaevernitz (British Imperialism, p. 75): “Way back Sir Robert Peel said: ‘We are getting a second Ireland in each of our colonies.’” 474: Export of capital = “export of value intended to produce surplus-value abroad”. 487: In new countries, import of capital “arouses the resistance of peoples awakening to national || consciousness”.... “Capitalism itself gives subject peoples means of liberation”... “the movement towards independence”.... ||
487.	The problem of the national movement in dependent countries (the urge of “subject peoples” for “liberation”)....
488.	Acceleration of capitalist development in new countries....
491:	Struggle of “national groups of banks” for spheres of capital investment (Paish and others)....
493:	> advantages of capital investment in the colonies.
495.	The policy of finance capital (1.2.3.)
495:	“The policy of finance capital has a triple aim: ||| (colonies) first, creation of the widest possible economic territory, ||| (protectionism) which, second, must be protected by tariff walls against foreign competition, and be converted, third, ||| (monopolies) into a sphere of exploitation for national monopolist associations”...
[[BOX: N.B.: 484: polemic on immigration in Die Neue Zeit, 25th year, 2 (1907) ]]
505.	“The most important function of diplomacy now 15 that of agency of finance capital”....
506.	Karl Emil on German imperialism. Die Nate Zeit, XXVI, 1.
510.	The national state.
511.	Finance capital seeks domination, not freedom.
512–13.	The nation and imperialism.
513–14.	Oligarchy in place of democracy.
567.	“The reply of the proletariat to the economic policy of finance capital, to imperialism, ||| N.B. can only be socialism, not free trade.” The restoration of free trade = “a reactionary ideal” (N.B.)

[[QUADRUPLE BOX: Finance capital = bank capital dominating industry.

[is it not sufficient to say: “finance capital = bank capital”?]

Three main factors:

Definite degree of development and growth of big capital.... The role of the banks. (Concentration and socialisation.) | corporations in America. |

Monopoly capital (control of so large a part of a particular industry that competition is replaced by monopoly).... (( America and Germany )) | Table—and the example of Argentina |

Division of the world.... (Colonies and spheres of influence).... ]]

N.B. Hilferding: in Die Neue Zeit, 1912 (30th year, Vol. 1), p. 556... “the endeavour typical of every capitalist monopoly to make its economic monopoly indestructible by backing it with a monopoly of natural resources”....

THE ELECTRIC TRUST

The electrical industry trust:

“The Path of the Electric Trust” by Kurt Heinig (Berlin). (Die Neue Zeit, 1912) (June 28, 1912), 30th year, Vol. 2, p. 474.)

An excellent illustration of imperialism :

In 1907, an agreement was concluded between the A.E.G. (Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft) and the G.E.C. (General Electric Company)

A.E.G. Concern

G.E.C. Trust

on division of the world.

G.E.C.—U.S.A. and Canada.

A.E.G.—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey, the Balkans.

		Turnover (mill. marks)	No. of employees	Net profit (mill. marks)
G.E.C.(U.S.A.)	1907	252	28,000	35.4
	1910	298	32,000	45.6
A.E.G. (Germany)	1907	216	30,700	14.5
	1911	362	60,800	21.7
298+262=660 million marks

__ __ || Special (secret) agreements on “subsidiary companies”. “In addition, mutual exchange of inventions and experiments!” (p. 475). N.B. ||

The number of companies (mostly joint-stock companies) in which the A.E.G. “has a controlling interest” is 175–200 (p. 484). Of these, the six chief companies have a capital of about 750 million marks, while the total capital of all of these companies is probably about 1,1500 million marks.

The number of “manufacturing companies” is 16

[[TRIPLE-BOTTOM-LEFT-TOP BOX ENDS: production of rubber—cables—quartz lamps—insulators—railway signals—motor cars—typewriters—aircraft, etc. ]]

|| N.B. Production of raw material, etc., by the same enterprise is characteristic of modern industry.

¹) The number of direct A.E.G. agencies abroad = 34 (of which 12 are joint-stock companies)

1)	1. St. Petersburg and Warsaw	7. Rumania		Altogether in ten countries
		8. Vienna
	2. Lisbon	9. Milan
	3. Christiania	10. Copenhagen South-West Africa
	4. Stockholm
	5. Brussels
	6. Paris	(((colony?)))

The two firms work jointly

Amer- ica

Ger- many

General Electric Co. (G.E.C.)

Westinghouse Co.

Thomson-Houston Co. &arrow; &arrow; Edison Co.

(merges with the Edison Co.

in Europe it estab- lishes the firm: French Edison Co.

In Europe it establishes the firm: Union Electric Co. (Union-Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft)

merges with the A.E.G.

the French firm trans- fers its patents to the German firm:

Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft (A.E.G.) (=A.E.G.)

Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft

Siemens and Halske-Schuckert

The two firms work jointly

[[BOX-ENDS: denotes a merger = merger establishment of a new firm (to which arrow points) by the old one. ]] ||| N.B. ...“there are no other electrical companies in the world completely independent, at least, of these two (A.E.G. and G.E.C.)” (p. 474)....

1900–7; (1912) 1912–2. A.E.G.

Felten and Lahmeyer (1900) A.E.G.

Felten Lahmeyer and Guillaume Union A.E.G.

Siemens and Halske-Schuckert

Siemens and Halske-Schuckert Berg- mann

Siemens and Halske Schuckert and Co. Berg- mann

Kummer (quickly lost impor- tance) failed in 1900 (Riesser)

STATISTICS OF ISSUES

||| N.B. N.B. “These statistics—in contrast to the usual statistics of issues—comprise not the securities issued in the various countries, but the credits received by these countries. Thus, for example, the Russian || N.B. loan taken up in London and Paris is listed under Russia, not Great Britain and France.

Conrad’s Volkswirtschaftliche Chronik (1913, p. 783) Total issues for 1883–1912 (thousand million marks) 1883— 3.4 1893— 4.9 1903— 14.8 4.0 14.4 11.7 2.7 5.3 15.5 5.4 13.5 21.5 4.1 7.8 12.4 6.4 8.5 17.2 10.3 9.2 19.9 6.6 9.6 21.4 6.2 8.0 15.8 1892— 2.0 1902— 17.8 1912— 16.4 Σ= (My) 51.1 99.0 166.6	|||	Total Issues [[BOX: 53.0 ]] This is the total for the world. By countries, p. 782, for 1910, 1911 and 1912 Total for these three years (thousand million marks) Germany and colonies 7.2 Great Britain {{ and colonies 5.2 }} + South Africa 0.4 + Canada 3.0 (My) Σ 8.6 France and colonies 4.8 Austria-Hungary 2.1 Russia 3.2 Belgium 1.0 } —her Congo 0.3 (My) Σ 1.3 Holland and colonies 0.6 } Σ= =4.91 Luxemburg 0.01 Spain 0.6 Portugal and colonies 0.1 Denmark 0.2 Sweden 0.1 Norway 0.1 Switzerland 0.7 Italy 0.7 Rumania 0.4 Bulgaria 0.1 Serbia 0.2 Greece 0.5 Turkey 0.6 U.S.A. 10.6 *** rest of America 7.0 } 10.3 Egypt 0.2 Morocco 0.1 China 0.6 Japan 1.7 Persia 0.1 ΣΣ= 52.2 { 16.4 } 15.8 21.4 but exact ΣΣ= 53.6
thousand mill. marks U.S.A. 10.6 (includ- ing Egypt) Great Britain and colonies 8.8 Germany and colonies 7.2 (includ- ing Morocco) France and colonies 4.9 29.5 Russia 3.2 Austria-Hun- gary 2.1 Belgium and colonies 1.3 Japan 1.7 8.3 { My total: 4 big countries 29.5 4 secondary countries 8.3 rest of America 7.0 14 European countries 4.91 China+Persia 0.7 50.41

From the literature N.B.:

Harms’s Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv (six volumes already published).

(My) summary from Conrad’s Volkswirtschaftliche Chronik.

On the statistics of cartels:

Number of cartels ((in Germany)) (pp. 903–06)

newly established continued or enlarged dissolved

1913————38—————34——————15

1914————31—————38——————6

[[DOUBLE-BOX: My calculation increase or decrease of instances +72–15=57 +69–6=63 ]]

RIESSER, GERMAN BIG BANKS AND THEIR CONCENTRATION

Dr. Riesser, German Big Banks and Their Concentration in Connection with Germany’s Economic Development, 3rd edition, Jena, 1910.

(Some figures, but not all, added from the fourth edition, 1912.)

The German electrical industry prior to 1900 (before the 1900 crisis, caused largely by over-production in the electrical industry) (Riesser, 3rd edition, p. 542 et seq.) :

Seven groups (with 27 (sic!!) individual companies):

No. of banks behind each group Community of interests 1902–03. Fusion 1904 11— I. Siemens and Halske group (4 companies) 1903 merger: Siemens-Schuckert group 8— II. A.E.G. group (4 companies) 8— III. Schuckert group (4 companies) 1908 “Co-operation”–establishment of Elektro-Treuhand-Gesellschaft with a capital of 30,000,000 marks 6—IV. Union-Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft group (2 companies) 9— V. Helios group (“went into liquidation”:

p. 582., 4th edition) (5 companies) 8— VI. Lahmeyer group, in 1910 majority of shares held by A.E.G. (p. 583, 4th edition) (2 companies) 2—VII. Kummer group—failed in 1900 (7 companies) many repetitions 7 groups[Total companies = 28, and not 27 as given by Riesser, p. 542 (p. 582, 4th edition). On p. 568 he, too, says: 28 companies)

Results of concentration process (p. 568 et seq.).

“The most modern of our industries” is the electrical... seven groups, with a total of 28 companies belonging to concerns....	Now 2
Chemical industry... two chief groups (see below).	2
Mining industry—two syndicates (Steel Association; Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate)....	2
Shipping—two companies (Hamburg-America Steamship Co. (Hapag); and North- German Lloyd, “which are connected with each other and with an Anglo-American trust by a series of agreements”)....	2
Banking—five groups (“embracing in all 41 banks belonging to concerns”).	5
[[DOUBLE-BOX-END: 18 groups, my total ]]	13 my total

Increase in the number of common-interest associations between big and provincial banks (p. 505).

Growth of concentration (p. 542, 4th edition):

1881—	1		1908—	32	(41)
1895—	2		1911—	26	(46)
1902—	18

(Riesser, p. 547 et seq.)

German chemical industry =

(concentration)

Share capital (my totals) I {{{ Farbwerke, formerly Meister, Lucius & Brüning in Höchst- am-Main Leopold Cassella and Co. in Frankfurt-am-Main (( Share capital—20 loan capital—10 )) << million marks >> (( share capital—20 loan capital—10 )) (“Dual alliance”) 1904 “association” Exchange of shares, inter-locking directorships (“Triple alliance”) 1908 (exchange of shares) 20 20 3 Kalle & Co. (in Biebrich-on-Rhine (3.2) 43 II {{{ Badische Anilin-und Soda- Fabrik in Ludwigshafen (share capital 21 million marks). 1904 association Farbenfabrik, formerly Friedrich Bayer and Co. in Elberfeld (21 million marks). Aktiengesellschaft für Anilinfabrikation in Treptow near Berlin (share capital 9 million marks). 1905 “Triple alliance” 21 21

A “coming together” of groups I and II has already begun in the form of “agreements” on prices, etc.	43%
	43%	9
	14%
	100% profit	51

p. 560 et seq.: “Mining industry.”

Two names: August Thyssen and Hugo Stinnes. Their gigantic and growing role (in the coal and iron industries).

'|' ...“The common-interest agreement concluded on January 1, 1905 between the Gelsenkirchen Bergwerks, the Aachen Hütten-Verein Rote Erde and Thyssen’s Schalker Gruben und Hütten-Verein united in a joint enterprise a number of competing banks, viz. the Discontogesellschaft, the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank and the Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein, but, at the same time, further increased the power of Hugo Stinnes and August Thyssen, who became members of the ‘joint committee’ of the new association” (p. 563) (p. 603 in the fourth edition).

(p. 577) idem, p. 624, fourth edition.

1882—28 banks with 50 or> employees:				2,697 employees
–11.8% of the total
1895—66 banks with 50 or> employees:				7,802 employees
–21.6%
+ 189.3%		{	up to 5 employees+59.9%	}
			6–50 employees+34.5%

[[BOX: 1907 probably about 1/3 ]]
Deutsche Bank 1907—	4,439 bank employees (p. 578)
1908—	4,860 ” ”

“I estimate the number of bank officials in the six big Berlin banks at 18,000 at the end of 1910” (p. 625, fourth edition).

Riesser’s book ends with a polemic against the socialists, upholds the official view and preaches harmony (in general, Riesser is like that):

{{ ha-ha!! }} Even the predicted socialisation “has not materialised” (p. 585).

p. 582 (p. 629, fourth edition):

“Banks and the Stock Exchange” (Riesser’s italics):

“As regards the effect of the process of concentration on the functions and structure of the Stock Exchange, it is a fact that, with the influx of commissions to the big banks the latter to a certain extent take over the functions of the Stock exchange by counter-balancing purchase and sale commissions, handing over to the Stock Exchange only commissions that do not counter-balance one another. This applies equally to trade in securities, i.e., to the capital market, and discounting operations, i.e., to the money market.

“As a result, the Stock Exchange, already greatly disorganised by the Stock-Exchange laws, is increasingly deprived of the materials indispensable for correctly fixing current prices. It is thus further weakened, and this can have very dangerous consequences, especially at critical times, as bad examples have proved (note: in the recent period one can point to the day of the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war).

“It follows also that the Stock Exchange is steadily losing the feature which is absolutely essential for national economy as a whole and for the circulation of securities in particular—that of being not only a most exact measuring-rod, but also an ‘almost automatic regulator of the economic movements which converge on it’” (Note. Quotations from Riesser: The Need for Revision of the Stock-Exchange Law, Berlin, 1901), and that it is proving less and less able, N.B. || to express, and control, “through price fluctuations, general public opinion on the credit-worthiness and administration of the majority of states, municipalities, joint-stock companies and corporations.

|| “In this way, Stock-Exchange establishment and quotation of current prices, which previously gave, as far as this is attainable, a faithful picture of ‘economic processes nowhere else summed so reliably, and nowhere else so recognisable in their totality’, consequently, a picture of supply and demand, must now lose both in accuracy and in stability and reliability, which is extremely regrettable in the public interest.

“In addition, it is to be feared that this tendency, || which increasingly leads to exclusion of intermediaries (brokers, etc.), may produce an ever sharper contradiction between the banks and the Stock Exchange, and this may be very serious. This contradiction, moreover, would be expressed not only in a certain tension, already noticeable between the banks and other circles interested in the Stock Exchange, but also in the latter’s most fundamental field of activity, namely, the establishment of current prices.

|| “Actually, today even among experts the concepts bank and Stock Exchange, which some consider, quite wrongly, to be completely equivalent, [note: that is the view of Eschenbach in the Transactions of the Union for Social Politics of September 16, 1903: || Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, Vol. CXIII] are in many cases termed direct opposites, which is also quite wrong” (note: cf. Ernst Loeb in the Nationalzeitung of April 18, 1904, No. 244) (p. 583) (p. 630, fourth edition).

[4]

Riesser (3rd edition 1910), p. 499: Increase in capital of the biggest (in 1908) banks

	Germany	1870	1908	1911
1.	Deutsche Bank . . . . . . . . . .	15	200	200
2.	Dresdner Bank . . . . . . . . . .	9.6	180	200
3.	Discontogesellschaft . . . . . . . . . .	30	170	200
4.	Darmstädter Bank . . . . . . . . . .	25.8	154	160
	Σ (million marks) . . . . . . . . . .	80.4	704
	Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein . . . . . .	15.6	145	145
	Berliner Handels-gesellschaft . . . . . .	16.8	110	110
	ΣΣ=	112.8	959	1,015
	France	1870	1908
1.	Crédit Lyonnais . . . . . . . . . .	20	250
2.	Comptoir National . . . . . . . . . .	50	150
3.	Crédit industriel . . . . . . . . . .	15	100
4.	Société Générale . . . . . . . . . .	60	300
	Σ (million francs) . . . . . . . . . .	145	800
	[[BOX: =mill. marks	116	640 ]]
three biggest banks: Germany: 54.6 — 550 (marks) France: 130 — 700 (francs) (104 — 560 (marks)) two biggest banks: Germany: 24.6 — 380 (marks) France: 80 — 550 (francs) (64) — (440)

p. 367

[[BOX: idem p. 398 ]]

Letters	received	and	dispatched	(number)
1852	6,135		6,292
1870	85,800		87,513	(Discontogesellschaft)
1880	204,877		208,240	{big Berlin bank}
1890	341,318		452,166
1900	533,102		626,043

Development of Concentration Within Individual Big Banks nd Banking Concerns.

The eight big Berlin banks had :

At end of year	Branches (offices and branches) in Germany			Deposit banks and exchange offices			Commandite operations			Constant holdings in German joint-stock banks			Total establish- ments
	#			#			#			#			#
1895	16	18	(5)	14	23	(12)	11	13	(—)	1	2	(—)	42	56	(17)
1896	18	20	(5)	18	27	(12)	11	14	(—)	1	2	(—)	48	63	(17)
1900	21	25	(5)	40	53	(17)	11	12	(—)	8	9	(5)	80	99	(27)
1902	29	33	(7)	72	87	(35)	10	11	(—)	16	16	(5)	127	147	(47)
1905	42	46	(8)	110	149	(44)	8	12	(1)	34	34	(11)	194	241	(64)
1908	—	69	(10)	—	264	(73)	—	12	(2)	—	97	(31)	—	442	(116)
1911	104	104	(9)	276	276	(93)	7	7	(2)	63	63	(15)	450	450	(119)
p. 747 4th edition

[N.B. The 3rd edition deals with eight banks, the 4th edition with six.]

1. Figures from the 4thedition, p. 745 (for six banks: Darmstädter Bank; Berliner Handelsgesellschaft; Deutsche Bank; Discontogesellschaft; Dresdner Bank and Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein).

in brackets, figures for

the Deutsche Bank)

N.B. Deutsche Bank. Turnover:

(million marks)
1870	1875	1885	1895	1905	1908	1911
239	5,500	15,100	37,900	77,200	94,500	112,100

These eight banks include, firstly, five banks which form “groups”: Darmstädter Bank (Bank für Handel und Industrie), Deutsche Bank, Discontogesellschaft, Dresdner Bank and Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein,—and then the three following banks: Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, Commerz- und Disconto-Bank, National Bank für Deutschland. Here are these “groups” [common-interest associations] of the (five) banks and their “capital strength” (p. 484 et seq.).

p. 537			41 concern banks belonging to the five big-bank groups had, on December 31, 1908:					on October 1, 1911
on September 30, 1911
Swallowed up: Private bank offices banks Dm.B. — 8 — 3 D.B. — 45 — 30 D.G. — 61 — 11 Dr.B. — 2 — 1 116 45	{	[[BOX: p. 697 ]]41 banks in concerns of the five groups	{	branches . . . . . . . . . .		241	}	285
				agencies . . . . . . . . . .		325		377
				commandite banks . . . . . . . . . .		18		21
				deposit banks . . . . . . . . . .		102		126
				swallowed up {{	private bank offices	89		116
					banks	43		45
				common-interest associations based on possession and exchange of shares . .		16		20
[[ In all, the big banks and their concerns, taken together, had by December 31, 1908, swallowed up 164 private bank offices + 60 banks; N.B. (p. 500). ]]

In Great Britain in 1899 there were 12 banks with 100 or more branches; altogether there were 2,304 branches (“Niederlassung”).

In 1901 there were 21 banks with 100 or more branches; altogether there were 6,672 branches (p. 521) (p. 558).

| N.B. “At the beginning of 1905, a single bank, the London City and Midland Bank, had 447 branches, i.e., 257 more than the big Berlin banks and 52 provincial banks affiliated with them at the end of 1904; on December 31, 1907 (#), according to The Economist, the British Joint-stock banks, then numbering only 74 (exclusive of colonial and foreign banks), of which 35 had the right to issue banknotes, had not less than 6,809 branches and sub-branches” (522).

									Swallowed up
				banks (p. 520)			Mil- lion marks	Million marks	private bank offices	banks
1.	Group	D.B.	Deutsche Bank . .	12	929.5	1,266.4	786.8	1,045.4	31	21
2.	”	D.G.	Disconto- gesell- schaft. .	6		662.6	—	564.7	23	8
3.	”	Dr.B.	Dresdner Bank	8		321.3	—	285.7	7	1
4.	”	S.BV	Schasff- hausen- scher Bank- verein . .	4		209.9	—	278.5	11	6
5.	”	Dm.B. my ab- brevi- ations	Darmstäd- ter Bank (Bank für Handel und In- dustrie)	5		260.6	—	297.4	17	7
5.				35		2,720.7	ΣΣ	2,471.7	89	43
				{	2,750 million }		i. e. almost 2,500 mil-lion marks		p. 500
[[BOX-ENDS: N.B. This includes only share capital and reserves, i.e., only the banks’ own money, not borrowedmoney. ]]

p. 537			41 concern banks belonging to the five big-bank groups had, on December 31, 1908:					on October 1, 1911
on September 30, 1911
Swallowed up: Private bank offices banks Dm.B. — 8 — 3 D.B. — 45 — 30 D.G. — 61 — 11 Dr.B. — 2 — 1 116 45	{	[[BOX: p. 697 ]]41 banks in concerns of the five groups	{	branches . . . . . . . . . .		241	}	285
				agencies . . . . . . . . . .		325		377
				commandite banks . . . . . . . . . .		18		21
				deposit banks . . . . . . . . . .		102		126
				swallowed up {{	private bank offices	89		116
					banks	43		45
				common-interest associations based on possession and exchange of shares . .		16		20
[[ In all, the big banks and their concerns, taken together, had by December 31, 1908, swallowed up 164 private bank offices + 60 banks; N.B. (p. 500). ]]

In Great Britain in 1899 there were 12 banks with 100 or more branches; altogether there were 2,304 branches (“Niederlassung”).

In 1901 there were 21 banks with 100 or more branches; altogether there were 6,672 branches (p. 521) (p. 558).

| N.B. “At the beginning of 1905, a single bank, the London City and Midland Bank, had 447 branches, i.e., 257 more than the big Berlin banks and 52 provincial banks affiliated with them at the end of 1904; on December 31, 1907 (#), according to The Economist, the British Joint-stock banks, then numbering only 74 (exclusive of colonial and foreign banks), of which 35 had the right to issue banknotes, had not less than 6,809 branches and sub-branches” (522).

Riesser continued

(#) Fourth edition (p. 558): “On December 31, 1908, deposit banks in Great Britain and Ireland, numbering then 63, had not less than 6,801 branches and sub-branches. Towards the end of 1910 the number of branches was 7,151. At this time, four banks in England and Wales had more than 400 branches each, viz.:

London City and Midland Bank . .	689	(315 in 1900)
Lloyds Bank . . . . . . . . . .	589	(311 ” ” )
Barclay & Co . . . . . . . . . .	497	(269 ” ” )
Capital and Counties Bank . . . . .	447	(185 ” ” )

“Four other banks had more than 200 branches each and eleven (20, including Scottish and Irish) had more than 100 each” (p. 559). In France, the number of agencies and branches (p. 522) (p. 559) was:

	1894				1908
Banks	Paris and suburbs		Prov- inces	Paris and suburbs		Prov- inces	Abroad (and Algeria)
Crédit Lyonnais	27	—	96	62	—	175	20
Comptoir d’Escompte	15	—	24	49	—	150	—
Société Générale . .	37	—	141	88	—	637	2

As regards colonial banks (nearly all founded by the Berlin big banks), Riesser’s summary is as follows (additions for 1910 from the fourth edition, p. 375 :

N.B. || “At the end of the nineties there were only four German overseas banks; in 1903 there were six with 32 branches, and at the beginning of 1906 there were already 13, with not less than 100,000,000 marks and more than 70 branches.

“This, however, is relatively insignificant in comparison with the successes of other countries in this field: already in 1904, Great Britain, for example, had 32 (1910: 36) colonial banks with headquarters in London and 2,104 (1910: 3,358) with headquarters in the colonies, and also 18 (1907: 30) (1910: 36) other British banks abroad with 175 (2,091) branches. Already in 1904–05, France had 18 colonial and foreign banks with 104 branches; Holland had 16 overseas banks with 68 branches” (p. 346).

	[[BOX: 1910 ]]		[[BOX: 1904 ]]
N.B. |||	Thus:	Germany	13—	70
	72—5,449	Great Britain	50—	2,279
		France	18—	104
		Holland	16—	68

The first figure shows the number of colonial and foreign banks in general, the second—the number of their branches (or of individual banks in the colonies).

“Supplement VII” (p. 666 et seq.) contains a list of companies and banks in the big-bank “concerns”, from which I take foreign banks:

Sphere (location of branches)	(Number of bran- ches)	Location of bank	Name of bank	Capital million marks (etc.)	Berlin big bank which founded it or has holdings in it
	(—)	Amsterdam	Die Amsterdamsche Bank	6 florins	Darmstädter Bank
China, Japan, India, etc.	(12)	Shanghai	Deutsch-Asiatische Bank	7.5 taels	Darmstädter Bank+ Berliner Han- delsgesellschaft + Deutsche Bank + Discontogesellschaft + Dresdner Bank + Schaaffhausenscher Bank- verein
Italy	(33)	Milan	Banca Commerciale Italiana	105 lire	Darmstädter Bank + Berliner Han- delsgesellschaft + Deutsche Bank + Discontogesellschaft + Dresdner Bank
(? Belgium)	(—)	Brussels	Banque internatio- nale de Bruxelles	25 francs	Darmstädter Bank + Berliner Han- delsgesellschaft + Discontogesell- schaft +Schaaffhausenscher Bank- verein
(? Great Britain)	(—)	London	Bankers Trading Syndicate	£ 0.1	Darmstädter Bank
Rumania	(—)	Bucharest	Banka Marmorosch Blank	10 lei	Darmstädter Bank+ Berliner Han- delsgesellschaft
(? America)	(—)	?	Amerika-Bank	25 marks	Darmstäter Bank
(?Great Britain)	(—)	London	London and Hansea- tic Bank	£0.4	Common- und Disconto-Bank
(South America, etc.)	(22)	Berlin	Deutsche Über- seeische Bank	20 marks	Deutsche Bank
East Africa	(?)	Berlin	Aktiengesellschaft für Überseeische Bauunternehmungen	2 marks	Deutsche Bank
Central America	(?)	Berlin	Zentral Amerika- Bank	10 marks	Deutsche Bank
Mexico	(2)	Mexico	Mexikanische Bank für Handel und Industrie	16 pesos	Deutsche Bank
Polynesia	(2)	Hamburg	Deutsche Handels- und Plantagen- Gesellschaft der Südseeinseln	2 3/4 marks	Discontogesellschaft
New Guinea	(?)	(?)	Neu-Guinea-Kom- pagnie	6 marks	”
Brazil	(5)	Hamburg	Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland	10 marks	”
Chile and Central America	(9)	Hamburg	Bank für Chile und Deutschland	10 marks	Discontogesellschaft
Rumania	(2)	Bucharest	Banca generala Romana	10 lei	”
Belgium	(?)	Antwerp	Compagnie commer- belge	5 francs	”
German Africa	(15)	(?)	Deutsch-Afrika Bank	1 marks	”
Bulgaria	(?)	Sofia	Banque de Crédit	3 leva	”
German West Africa	(4)	Berlin	Deutsch-Westafri- kanische Bank	1 marks	Dresdner Bank
Asia Minor, Turkey, Salonica, etc.	(12)	Berlin	Deutsche Orientbank	16 marks	Dresdner Bank + National-Bank für Deutschland + Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein
South America	(3)	Berlin	Deutsch-Südameri- kanische Bank	20 marks	Dresdner Bank + Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein

Connection Between the Banks and Industrial Enterprises (p. 383)

(according to Jeidels) (1895–1903)

Number of industrial stock issues by years
	p. 307				Number of companies for which these stock issues were made		Bank offices at industrial enterprises (p.284)	[[BOX: (p.306) ]]	(p. 463) Number of industrialists on bank supervisory boards
p. 413	Σ for seven years
1895–1910	1904–1910
		My abbre- viations		Number of industrial stock issues	[[BOX: p. 414 1895–1910 ]]		(1903–04)	(1911)	(1908)	(1910) (p. 501)
424	204—	Dr. B.	Dresdner Bank	—220	—181	—368	—191	—504	—11	—8
361	174—	S. BV.	Schaaffhausenscher Bankverein . .	—187	—207	—364	—211	—290	—19	—17
312	142—	B. HG.	Berliner Handels- gesellschaft . .	—170	—149	—281	—95	—153	—15	—13
302	151—	D. G.	Discontogesell- schaft . . . . .	—151	—154	—290	—111	—362	—4	—2
456	306—	D. B.	Deutsche Bank . .	—150	—139	—419	—250	—488	—4	—5
314	166—	Dm. B.	Darmstädter Bank	—148	—140	—285	—161	—313	—4	—6

Number of overseas banks founded by the big banks (list in Riesser, p. 327 et seq.) (p. 354 et seq.)

(( Apparently incomplete data )) Σ			D.B.	D.G.	Dr. B.	Dm.B.	B.HG.	S.BV.	N. B. f. D.	Total
11		1880–89	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	11
22		1890–99	4	6	2	2	2	4	2	22
24	{{	1900–04	3	3	1	—	—	—	1	8
		1905,1906–08	2	3	5	1	1	3	1	16
Not the whole decade, up to 1908–09. [[BOLD-UPSIDEDOWN-BRACKET: } or { ]]

R. E. May (in Schmoller’s Jahrbuch, 1899, p.271 et seq.) (p. 83) distribution of national income in Germany			(p. 82) data of Finance Minister Rheinbaben Prussia 1908			(pp. 99–100) in Germany
Number of people (mill.)		Income thous. mill. marks	Number % of people (mill.)	Taxmill. marks	%	Number of joint-stock companies	Their capital (thous, mill. marks)
up to 900 marks	18 1/3	12 3/4	17.9=	47.22	0
900–3,000	3 2/3	6 1/2	16.2=	42.54	83.7= =34.26	1883—1,311	–3.9
>3,000	1/3	5 3/4	1.9=	5.50	66%	1896—3,712	–6.8
_-_-_-_ Σ=	_-_-_-_ 22 1/3	_-_-_-_ 25	_-_-_-_ 36.0	_-_-_-_ 95.26		1900—5,400	6.8 (7.8)
[[BOX: Gainfully em- ployed population		N. B. ]]	>9,500 marks 0.87% of population 43% of tax			1908—6,249	–9.4

Number of Industrial and Commercial Companies with Bank

on Supervisory Boards

Industries:

[[BOX: Riesser gives list, not table. Supplement IV ]] Banks	Mi __	Q __	Me __	MI __	C __	S __	TL __	Pa __	Pu __	F __	Td __	I __	Tn __	FC __	B __	HR __	R __	AP __	PC __	E __	Tot- al
	Mining, iron and steel, salt works										• Trade
		Quarrying										• Insurance
			Metalworking										• Transport
				Machines and instruments										• Foreign companies
					Chemical										• Building
						Soap, oil, etc.					Hotels & Restaurants •
							Textile and leather						Rubber •
								Paper					Art products •
									Pulp				Plantation companies •
										Food			Exhibitions •
Darmstädter Bank	9	4	2	15	3	2	5	2	1	7	24	3	9	6	—	—	—	—	—	—
Berliner Handels- gesellschaft	18	1	8	10	4	1	—	—	—	3	16	—	9	17	1	—	—	—	—	—
Commerz-und Disconto-Bank	1	2	2	7	1	—	1	—	—	3	7	2	3	1	1	1	—	—	—	—
Deutsche Bank	13	1	3	24	1	4	6	1	—	3	28	8	6	13	2	—	1	2	—	—	116
Discontogesell- schaft	13	2	2	8	5	2	—	—	—	1	29	2	4	21	—	—	—	—	2	1
6) Dresdner Bank	10	2	3	14	1	—	2	1	—	2	29	3	11	8	—	1	—	—	—	—
National-Bank für Deutschland	13	4	3	18	2	3	1	—	—	7	21	1	9	6	2	—	—	4	2	—
8)Schaaffhaus- enscher Bank- verein	18	2	4	15	2	1	4	—	—	1	20	1	16	6	3	—	—	1	—	—
[marx.org:]	Mi	Q	Me	MI	C	S	TL	Pa	Pu	F	Td	I	Tn	FC	B	HR	R	AP	PC	E
Total	95	18	27	111	19	13	19	4	1	27	174	21	67	78	9	2	1	7	4	1
	} 140 {			+111	} +83 {						+174	} +166 {			} +24 {						=698

||| income from banking operations

450 million francs. !!!

“According to Board of Trade estimates for 1898, Great Britain’s total income from bank and other operations amounted during that year to £18 million (i.e., about 432 million kronen)” (p. 399) (p. 431).... “‘Allegedly’ more than 6,000 million marks of European annual overseas trade payments go through Great Britain”.... [p. 431, 4th edition]

Britain’s annual income from shipping is 1,800 million marks; Germany’s is 200–300 million marks (p. 400) (p. 432 idem).

1907 poll on bank employees in Germany: replies from 1,247 firms with 24,146 employees (p. 579) (p. 626)

	Number	Age of employees (years)	Average salary (marks)	Average salary, all private employees
264 joint-stock banks	16,391	20–39	1,459–3,351	1,467–2,380
708 private banks	5,938	40–54	3,638–4,044	2,413–2,358
275 co-operative banks	1,817	55–70	3,899–2,592	2,264–1,879

“The number of clearing accounts increased from 3,245 in 1876 to 24,821 (24,982) in 1908 (1910), but, apart from state bank offices,

|| N.B.

they are mainly handled by big commercial and industrial houses, so that clearing operations by the State Bank have retained a somewhat plutocratic character” (122) (p. 131).

In 1907, the average amount of each account (State Bank) = 24,116 marks. Turnover = 260,600 million marks, 354,100 million in 1910 (p. 132). The postal cheque turnover (1909) = 23,847 owners of accounts and 49,853 in 1910, and their property = 94 million marks (p. 132).

Total Clearing House Transactions (p. 123) (thousand million marks)

	1884	1908	1910
Germany	12.1	45.9	54.3	[[BOX: In Germany cheques and cheque-clearing operations are less developed than endorsements ]]
France	3.3	21.3	23.7
Great Britain	118.5	260.1	299
U.S.A.	143.2	366.2	422

Total turnover of the State Bank in Germany

1908 = 305,250 million marks

1910 = 354,100 ” ”

Number of cartels in Germany

(p. 137) 1896 about 250

(p. 149) 1905 ” 385

[[FROM-385-LINE-TO-THIS-BOX:

involving about 12,000 firms ]]

Deposits (in all banks) and in savings banks, thousand million marks (pp. 162–63)

			Germany
including savings	}	9	. . . . . . .	1900 . . . .	about	10
bank deposits		13	. . . . . . .	1906 . . . .		15.5
		1909–15 1/2
Great Britain . . . . . . . . . .				(1903–05)	——	10.5
U.S.A . . . . . . . . . .				(1905)	——47 (59 in 1909)
France (only bank deposits) . . . .				(1905)	——	4
Germany (only bank deposits) . . .				1900	——	1
				1906	——	2.5
Great Britain (only bank deposits)				(1905)	——	6.25
U.S.A. (only bank deposits) . . .					——	15

[[BOX-ENDS:

||

N.B. “The above data show that, even now, German deposits are not of major importance, compared with those of Great Britain and the U.S.A., and appear equally to lag considerably behind those of France” (164) (idem 177). ]]

Riesser, p. 354 (p. 384):

“The progress of the preceding period (1848–70),

|| N.B.

which had not been exactly slow, compares with the rapidity with which the whole of Germany’s national economy, and with it German banking, progressed during this period (1870–1905) in about the same way as the speed of the mail coach in the good old days compares with the speed of the present-day automobile... which is whizzing past so fast that it endangers not only innocent pedestrians in its path, but also the occupants of the car”....

And alongside the above, in the very next sentence, Riesser, this bourgeois vulgarian (essentially an out-and-out philistine) and lackey of the money-bags, sees the of “public security” and “real progress” in the “greatest virtue” of the leader: moderation!!!

And on the next page (355—p. 385) he admits that banks are ... “enterprises which, by their very functions and development, ‘are not of a purely private-business character’, 1) but are more and more outgrowing the sphere of purely private-business regulation”.

---

1) From Riesser’s speech as president of the first all-German bankers’ congress in Frankfurt-am-Main, September 19–20, 1902

---

But this admission does not prevent this bourgeois idiot from writing:

“The other consequence, too, predicted by the socialists, of the process of concentration, that it is bound to lead finally to the socialisation of the means of production, which the socialists

||| !!ha ha!! “refuta-tion....”

aim at and which is to be realised in the ‘state hail of the future’, has not come true in Germany, and is hardly likely to come true later on” (p. 585) (p. 633).

(The Deutsche Bank alone has a turnover of 94,500 million marks (p. 361) (112,100 million in 1910, p. 391), has connections with a group of 12 banks, controls a capital of 1,000 million marks—the capital of this group and “affiliated” banks—has swallowed up 52 banks, has 116 branches, bank offices, etc., in Germany—has seats on the Supervisory Boards of 120 trading and industrial companies, etc. And this is not “socialisation”!!)

Deutsche Bank:
Own capital	=	200 million marks + 100 million reserves
turnover	=	94,500 million marks
gross profit	=	55 million marks	(1908) (p. 352)
	=	62.9 ” ”	(1910) (p. 382).

The number of bank employees in the Deutsche Bank was 4,860 (1908)—p. 578 ((in 1895, there were 7,802 employees in 66 banks with 50 or more employees, ibidem)).

In discussing merchant shipping and its development in Germany on p. 114 et seq., Riesser notes the following:

H.-A.P.A.-G. (Hamburg-America), capital (1908) 125 million marks (+ 76 million in bonds), 162 ships (value 185.9 million marks).

North German Lloyd, capital (1908) 125 million marks (+ 76 million in bonds), 127 ships (value 189.1 million marks). 125 + 76 = 201.

||

“In 1902–03, both these companies concluded essentially identical agreements with the International Mercantile Marine Co., founded by American bankers and shipowners on January 1, 1903, with a capital of 120 million dollars (= 480 million marks), and embracing nine American and British lines” (p. 115). This is the so-called Morgan trust.

[[DITTO: || ]]

Content of the agreement: division of profits and division of the world (German companies would not compete in Anglo-American freight traffic; agreement stipulated which ports were to be used by each, etc., etc.). A joint control committee was set up. The agreement was for twenty years (terminable after a year’s notice).

||

It was to be annulled in the event of war (p. 116, end) (p. 125, 4th edition). And this is not “socialisation”!!

“As regards the Reichsbank, according to the information given by the Bank Enquiry Commission (p. 179), on September 1, 1906, the number of German firms and individuals generally solvent in their dealings with bills of exchange was 70,480”:

viz.:

a)	merchants and trad- ing companies . . . .	29,020	=	41%	||	N.B. insignificant number solvent
b)	industrialists and indus- trial companies . . .	21,887	=	31
c)	agriculturists and agri- cultural craft and fac- tory enterprises . . .	9,589	=	14
d)	co-operatives of all kinds . . . . . . . . . .	883	=	1
e)	rentiers, artisans and similar craftsmen	9,101	=	13
		70,480		100
	[[BOX: p. 194 idem ]]

(Düsseldorfer) Stahlwerkverband founded March 30, 1904 (for three years and prolonged on April 30, 1907 for a further five years). Its output in 1904 was 7.9 million tons (p. 141) (p. 153).

|

On November 28, 1904, it concluded an agreement on export of rails between Great Britain 53.5%, Germany 28.83%, France and Belgium 17.67% (+ France 4.8–6.4%. ΣΣ = 104.8, 106.4%) (p. 147) (p. 159).

Railcartel	'||'	Now, after the United StatesSteel Corporation joined the cart-el, Germany’s share = 21%.		||	Division of the world
Cartel for sale of girders
(export of girders)—shares:
		Germany	73.45%
		France	11.50%
		Belgium	15.05%

.

“In February 1909 there was formed also the Internationaler Zinkhüttenverband (p. 159) at first until December 31, 1910, and afterwards prolonged, evidently for three years. There are three groups (according to the geographical location of the factories). Group A—all German and some Belgian plants, group B—ten Belgian, French and Spanish plants, and group C—British plants. Out of the total European output, about 513,000 tons in 1908, Germany’s share at that time was put at 226.9, Belgium’s—165, France’s and Spain’s together—55.8,

||

N.B. Great Britain’s—54.5. Member plants accounted for about 92 per cent of the total European output.

“Under recent arrangements member companies

N.B. |

can increase production at will, irrespective of fixed production quotas, with the proviso, however, that if stocks at a definite date (March 31, 1911, is the initial date) are 50,000 tons or more, then, under definite conditions, output must be cut by a certain percentage, in accordance with the company’s production quota” (p. 160, 4th edition).

Banks unite into groups (or consortiums) for especially large-scale undertakings:

I.	a)	Prussian Consortium—in 1909	28 banks	(p. 310).
	b)	State Loan Consortium—	29 ”	(p. 311).
	c)	Rothschild group—in 1909	13 ”	(p. 312)
		(including the three Rothschild firms—Vienna, Lon- don and Paris).
	2.	Group for Asiatic business operations, etc. etc.

N.B. |||

“The political patrol clashes are fought on the financial field. But the moment for these financial

||

clashes, the opponents, and the mode of fighting, are determined solely by the country’s responsible foreign policy leadership” (p. 402) (p. 434).

French capital in Tunisia and Morocco

” ” ” Russia

French capital in Italy (the beginning of political rap-

prochement through financial

rapprochement)

German ” ” Persia (struggle against Great Britain)

the struggle of European finance capital groups over

Chinese and Japanese loans

French and British capital in Portugal and Spain, etc. (p. 403).

{{ First edition of Riesser’s book, preface dated July 4, 1905 }}

Bills of exchange turnover in Germany (computed from the tax on bills) increased from 12,000 million marks in 1885 to 25,500 million marks in 1905, and to 31,500 million in 1907 (p. 228)—and to 33,400 million in 1910 (p. 246).

Germany’s national wealth (Mulhall 1895: 150,000 million) 130,000—216,000 million (Riesser): 200,000 million marks (p. 76) (Steinmann: 350,000).

Germany’s national income 25,000–30,000 million marks (p. 77).

France’s national wealth: Mulhall (1895)—198,000 million marks; Foville (1902)—161,000; Leroy-Beaulieu (1906)—205,000; Théry (1906)—161,000.

National income = 20,000 million marks (Leroy-Beaulieu) (p. 78).

Great Britain: 204,000 million marks (Giffen 1885)—235,000 (Mulhall 1895), 228,000 (Chiozza-Money 1908).

United States: national wealth = 430,000 million marks (1904, Census Bureau).

In Germany, “about 1,200 million marks, i.e., about 1/3 of the yearly savings of the nation, is annually invested in securities” (p. 81)—(p. 86 idem).

Source references in Riesser

(Those especially praised or especially important marked*.)

*Walther Lotz, The Technique of Securities Issues, 1890.

Alfred Lansburgh, German Banking, 1909.

*” ” “The Control of National Wealth Through the Banks”—in Die Bank, 1908.

Schumacher on concentration of banking, Schmoller’s Jahrbuch, XXXth year, No. 3.

Warschauer, “Supervisory Boards”, Conrad’s Jahrbücher (III; Vol. XXVII).

Theodore E. Burton, Financial Crisis, etc., New York, 1902.

*J. W. Gilbart, The History, etc., of Banking, London, 1901. Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, Vols. CX, CIX and others. (1900 crisis.) CXIII: “Lessons of the Crisis.”

W. Sombart, The German National Economy in the Nineteenth Century, 2nd edition, 1909.

L. Pohle, The Development of German Economic Life in the Nineteenth Century, 2nd edition, 1908.

A. Saucke, “Has ... Large-Scale Enterprise ... Increased in Industry?” Conrad’s Jahrbücher III, Vol. XXXI.

von Halle, The German National Economy at the Turn of the Century, 1902.

May on distribution of the national income, Schmoller’s Jahrbuch, 1899.

*Glier, “The American Iron Industry”, Schmoller’s Jahrbuch, 27thyear, No. 3; 28thyear.

*” idem, Conrad’s Jahrbücher, Vol. XXXV (1908).

Ed. Wagon, The Financial Development of German Joint-Stock Companies 1870–1900, Jena, 1903.

Jenks, “The Trusts”, Conrad’s Jahrbücher, 3rd series, Vol. I (1891).

Voelcker, “The German Metallurgical Industry”, Revue économique internationale, III, 4 (1904).

Kollmann, “The Steel Association”, Die Nation, 1905 (22ndyear).

Waldemar Müller, “The Organisation of Credit in Germany”, Bank-Archiv, 1909 (8th year).

Warschauer, Physiology of German Banks, 1903.

E. Jaffé, British Banks, 1905.

S. Buff, Cheque Turnover in Germany, 1907.

*Ad. Weber, The Rhine-Westphalian Banks and the Crisis, 1903.

” idem. Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, Vol. CX.

*Ditto. “Deposit Banks and Speculative Banks.”

**Otto Jeidels, “Relation of the German Big Banks to Industry”, Schmoller’s Jahrbuch (? “Studies” ?), 1905.

*W. Prion, “German Bill Discounting”, 1907, Schmoller’s Forschungen No. 127.

Fr. Leitner, Banking and Its Technique, 1903.

*Br. Buchwald, The Technique of Banking, 5th edition, 1909.

H. Sattler, Investment Banks, 1890. (Riesser does not praise it.)

N.B. [preface by A. Wagner. Riesser is very angry with state socialist Wagner!!]

Fr. Eulenburg, “Supervisory Boards”. Conrad’s Jahrbücher.

3rd series, Vol. XXXII.

” ” “The Present Crisis”... ibidem, 3rd series, Vol. XXIV.

*G. Diouritch, The Expansion of German Banks Abroad, Paris, 1909.

R. Rosendorff, “German Overseas Banks”. Blätter für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, etc., 3rd year, 1908.

A. P. Brüning, The Development of Foreign Banking, 1907.

R. Rosendorff, “The German Banks in Overseas Business”, Schmoller’s Jahrbuch, XXVIII, No. 4.

R. Steinbach, “Managerial Costs of the Berlin Big Banks”, Schmoller’s Jahrbuch, 29th year, No. 2.

E. Moll, The Profitability of the Joint-Stock Company, Jena, 1908.

C. Hegemann, The Development of the French Big Banks, Münster, 1908.

Ch. J. Bullock, “Concentration of Banking Interests”, The Atlantic Monthly, 1903, August.

H. Voelcker, “Forms of Combination and Interest Sharing in German Big Industry”, Schmoller’s Jahrbuch, Vol. XXXIII.

L. Eschwege, “Revolutionising Tendencies in the German Iron Industry”, Die Bank, 1909, April.

||

J. Cockburn Macdonald, “The Economic Effects of the Concentration of Capital in Few Hands”, The Institute of Bankers, 1900, October. N.B. (?).

N.B. ||

p. 70 et seq. (abbreviated)

Tabular survey of outstanding events affecting the development of German banking in the second epoch:

1871–72: end of the war. Five thousand million. “Stormy” advance....

“The beginning of industrial cartellisation”....

1873. Crisis.

1874–78. Depression.

1879–82. Economic boom. Promotion of bubble companies.

1879. Gold currency. (Union with Austria.)

1883–87. Depression (1887. Union with Italy.)

1888–90. Boom. Promotion of bubble companies. Speculation.

1891–94. Depression.

1891. Failure of many Berlin banks.

1895. Beginning of boom.

1890–97. Boom intensified. Rapid development of electrical industry.

1897. Formation of the Rhine-Westphalian Iron Syndicate.

1898–1900. Favourable business conditions.

1899. Climax of reconstructions, formation of new companies and issues of stock.

1900–01. Crisis. Drop in mining securities, failure of many banks. “Vigorous intervention of the big banks. Intensified concentration”... .

1901–02. “Prolonged and particularly marked demand for money” ... foundation of the United States Steel Corporation.

1902–06. “Revival.”

1904. Foundation of the Stahlwerkverband. Stormy development of concentration.

1907. American crisis. Bank rate increased to 7 1/2 per cent.

1908. End of acute crisis in America. “Revival.” Money liquidity.

1909. Intensified money liquidity, etc.

1910. Progressive improvement... (4th edition, p. 78).

[[BOX-ENDS: N.B. 1895–1900 “for the first time excess of immigration” N.B. (p. 75). ]]

N.B.

New literature

N.B. Dr.Max Augstin, The Development of Agriculture in the United States, Munich, 1914 (4 marks).

W. Wick, The Little Mercury, Zurich, 1914. (416 pp.) (“Commercial handbook”).

In the fourth edition, Riesser has this on foreign investments (capital invested abroad) (p. 426 et seq.):

Germany (1905), at least 24–25 thousand million marks (this now “undoubtedly” “greatly exceeded”, p. 436, end), including 16 thousand million marks in foreign securities....

“Of the total securities owned by France, estimated by Edmond Théry (Economic Progress in France... p. 307) at the end of 1906 at 100 thousand million francs, and Neymarck in 1906 at 97–100 thousand million francs (with a yield of 4 1/2 thousand million francs), at the end of 1908, according to Théry, about 38 1/2 thousand million wore in foreign securities.

“The estimates vary widely, of course, but an annual increment of at least 1,000 million francs is generally accepted. Henri Germain, former director of the Crédit Lyonnais, estimated this annual increase (in the years immediately preceding 1905) at 1,500 million francs; Paul Leroy-Beaulieu recently even put it at 2,500 million francs.

“The well-known British financial policy expert, Sir Edgar Speyer, in a lecture at the Institute of Bankers (‘Some Aspects of National Finance’) on June 7, 1900, estimated total British investments abroad at £2,500 million, i.e., about 50,000 million marks, with an annual yield of £110 million (✕); his estimate for the end of 1910, in a lecture in the Liberal Colonial Club, is £3,500 million, or about 70,000 million marks.

“This corresponds approximately to George Paish’s estimate for 1907–08, about £2,700 million, i.e., about 54,000 million marks, nearly equally divided between India and the colonies (£1,312 million), and other foreign countries (£1,381 million). The same author gives the figure of £3,192 million, or about 64,000 million marks, for the end of 1910, and in a lecture to the Royal Statistical Society he estimates the 1911 income from British investments abroad, on the basis of the yearly Reports of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, at approximately £180 million which, however, Sir Felix Schuster in a discussion on Speyer’s lecture of May 27, 1911, regards as too high” (p. 427).

(✕) “Incidentally, in this lecture he validly

N.B. '||'

emphasised that intensified export, increased issues of foreign securities and a big economic boom are only different manifestations of the same phenomenon.

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One section of the second lecture is headed: Export of British Capital, Chief Cause of the Empire’s Prosperity” (p. 428).