The World Situation and Perspectives

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EDITORS NOTE: One of the last interviews on the war situation given by Trotsky was that to Julius Klyman, staff correspondent of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch in January 1940 and again in March. The interview was published in three sections in the Post-Dispatch issues of March 10, 17 and 24 of the same year.

As usual, Trotsky did not content himself with informal verbal answers to the list of broad questions presented by Klyman. He dictated his answers to a secretary and carefully revised them. They are a remarkable example of the bold and yet unpretentious way in which Trotsky analyzed the course of events while they were still transpiring. We publish his answers in two parts, the second of which will appear in our next issue. – Editor, Fourth International, 1942

Question: What is your opinion of the German-Russian alliance? Did Stalin have to make it? If so, what could he earlier have done to avoid it? Russia, in going into the Baltic states and Finland, contended it was compelled to do so to properly defend itself against aggression. Do you believe there was any likelihood of Nazi aggression? Do you believe there was any likelihood of an attack by the capitalist democracies?

Answer: Foreign policy is an extension and development of domestic policy. In order to understand correctly the Kremlin foreign policy, it is always necessary to take into account two factors: on the one hand, the position of the USSR in capitalist encirclement and, on the other, the position of the ruling bureaucracy within the Soviet society. The bureaucracy defends the USSR. But above all it defends itself inside the USSR. The internal position of the bureaucracy is incomparably more vulnerable than the international position of the USSR The bureaucracy is merciless against its disarmed adversaries inside the country. But it is extremely cautious and sometimes even cowardly before its well-armed external enemies. If the Kremlin enjoyed the support of the popular masses and had confidence in the solidity of the Red Army, it could assume a more independent position in relation to both imperialist camps. However, reality is different. The isolation of the totalitarian bureaucracy in its own country threw it into the arms of the nearest, the most aggressive, and therefore the most dangerous imperialism.

Already in 1934 Hitler said to Rauschning: "I can conclude an agreement with Soviet Russia whenever I wish." He had categorical assurances on this account from the Kremlin itself. The former chief of the foreign GPU agency, General Krivitsky, revealed extremely interesting details of the relations between Moscow and Berlin. But, for the sensitive reader of the Soviet press, the Kremlin's real plans have been no secret since 1933. Above all Stalin was afraid of a great war. In order to escape it, he became an irreplaceable aid to Hitler.

However it would be incorrect to conclude that the five-year campaign of Moscow in favor of a "united front of the democracies" and "collective security" (1935-39) was a pure swindle as is represented now by the same Krivitsky who saw from the quarters of the GPU only one side of the Moscow policy, not perceiving it in its entirety. While Hitler spurned the extended hand, Stalin was (compelled to prepare seriously the other alternative, that is, an alliance with the Imperialist democracies. The Comintern naturally did not understand what was involved; it simply made "democratic" noises, carrying out the instructions.

On the other hand, Hitler could not turn his face toward Moscow while he needed the friendly neutrality of England. The specter of Bolshevism was necessary, above all, in order to prevent the British Conservatives from eyeing with suspicion the rearmament of Germany. Baldwin and Chamberlain went even further; they directly aided Hitler in forming Greater Germany as a powerful base in Central Europe for worldwide aggression.

Hitler's turn toward Moscow in the middle of the past year had a substantial basis. From Great Britain Hitler had received all that was possible. One could not expect Chamberlain to grant Hitler Egypt and India in addition to Czechoslovakia. Further expansion of German imperialism could be directed only against Great Britain itself. The Polish question became a turning point Italy stepped cautiously aside. Count Ciano explained in December 1939 that the Italo-German military alliance, signed ten months before, excluded the entrance of the totalitarian allies into a war within the next three years. However, Germany, under the pressure of its own armaments, could not wait. Hitler assured his Anglo-Saxon cousin that the annexation of Poland was on the road to the East and only to the East. But his conservative adversaries grew tired of being duped. War became inevitable. Under these conditions Hitler had no choice: he played his last trump, an alliance with Moscow. Stalin finally attained the handshake of which he had dreamt unceasingly for six years.

Frequent assurances in the democratic press that Stalin deliberately sought to provoke a world war by his alliance with Hitler are to be considered absurd. The Soviet bureaucracy fears a great war more than any ruling class in the world: It has little to win but everything to lose. Counting on the world revolution? But even if the thoroughly conservative oligarchy of the Kremlin were striving for the revolution, it knows very well that war does not begin with revolution, but ends with it, and that the Moscow bureaucracy itself will be thrown into an abyss before the revolution comes in the capitalist countries.

During the Moscow negotiations of the past year, the delegates of Great Britain and France played a rather pitiful role. "Do you see these gentlemen?" the German agents asked the rulers of the Kremlin: "If we divide Poland together, they will not so much as move their little finger." While signing the agreement Stalin, with his political limitations, could expect that there would not be any great war. In any case, he bought himself the possibility of escaping for the next period the necessity of involvement in a war. And nobody knows what is beyond the "next period."

The invasions of Poland and of the Baltic countries were the inevitable result of the alliance with Germany. It would be rather childish to think that the collaboration of Stalin and Hitler is founded on mutual confidence; these gentlemen understand each other too well. During the Moscow negotiations last summer, the German danger could and had to appear not only very real but also quite immediate. Not without Ribbentrop's influence, as was said, the Kremlin supposed that England and France would not make a move against the accomplished fact of the subjugation of Poland and that consequently Hitler might gain a free hand for further expansion toward the East Under these conditions the alliance with Germany was completed by material guarantees taken by Russia against its ally. Quite probably the initiative even in this sphere belonged to the dynamic partner, that is Hitler, who proposed to the cautious and temporizing Stalin that he take guarantees by force of arms.

Naturally, the occupation of Eastern Poland and the formation of military bases in the Baltic did not create absolute obstacles for the German offensive; the experience of the last war (1914-18) testifies sufficiently to this. However, the moving of the border to the west and the control over the eastern Baltic coast represent indubitable strategic advantages. Thus in his alliance with Hitler and on Hitler's initiative, Stalin decided to take "guarantees" against Hitler.

Not less important were the considerations of internal policy. After five years of uninterrupted agitation against fascism, after the elimination of the Old Guard Bolsheviks and of the general staff for their alleged alliance with the Nazis, the unexpected alliance with Hitler was extremely unpopular in the country. It was necessary to justify it with immediate and brilliant successes. The annexation of the Western Ukraine and White Russia and the peaceful conquest of strategic positions in the Baltic states were designed to prove to the population the wisdom of the foreign policy of "the father of nations." Finland upset these plans a bit.

Question: Do you, as the former head of the Red Armies, feel it was necessary for the Soviets to move into the Baltic states, Finland, and Poland, to better defend themselves against aggression? Do you believe that a socialist state is justified in extending socialism to a neighbor state by force of arms?

Answer: It cannot be doubted that control over the military bases on the Baltic coast represents strategical advantages. But this alone cannot determine the question of invasion of neighboring states. The defense of an isolated workers' state depends much more on the support of the laboring masses all over the world than on two or three supplementary strategical points. This is proven incontrovertibly by the history of foreign intervention in our civil war of 1918-20.

Robespierre said that people do not like missionaries with bayonets. Naturally that does not exclude the right and duty to give military aid from without to peoples rebelling against oppression. For example in 1919 when the Entente strangled the Hungarian revolution, we naturally had the right to help Hungary by military measures. This aid would have been understood and justified by the laboring masses of the world. Unfortunately we were too weak. … At present the Kremlin is much stronger from a military point of view. However, it has lost the confidence of the masses both inside the country and abroad.

If there were Soviet democracy in the USSR; if the technological progress were accompanied by the increase of socialist equality; if the bureaucracy were withering away, giving place to the self-government of the masses, Moscow would represent such a tremendous power of attraction, particularly for its nearest neighbors, that the present world catastrophe would inevitably throw the masses of Poland (not only Ukrainians and White Russians but also Poles and Jews) as well as the masses of the Baltic border states on to the road of union with the USSR.

At present this important pre-condition for revolutionary intervention exists, if at all, in a very small degree. The strangling of the peoples of the USSR, particularly of the national minorities, by police methods, repelled the majority of the toiling masses of the neighboring countries from Moscow. The invasion of the Red Army is seen by the populations not as an act of liberation but as an act of violence, and thereby facilitates the mobilization of world public opinion against the USSR by the imperialist powers. That is why it will bring in the last instance more harm than advantages to the USSR.

Question: What is your opinion of the Finnish campaign from the military standpoint: as to strategy, equipment, leadership, both military and political, the matter of keeping up communications and the general training of the Red troops? What is likely to be the result of the Finnish campaign?

Answer: As far as I can judge, the strategical plan abstractly considered was sufficiently correct; but it underestimated Finland's power to resist and it ignored such details as the Finnish winter, conditions of transportation, supplies and sanitation. In his satirical verse on the Crimean campaign of 1855 the young officer Leo Tolstoy wrote:

Easily written on paper,

But the gullies forgotten.

And we had to march in them.

Stalin's decapitated and demoralized general staff repeats textually the strategists of Nicholas L

On November 15 I wrote to the editor of one of the most widely read American weeklies: "During the next period, Stalin will remain Hitler's satellite. During the coming winter he will in all probability make no moves. With Finland, he will conclude a compromise." Facts showed that my prognosis was incorrect on this final point. The error was provoked by the fact that I ascribed to the Kremlin more political and military sense than it demonstrated in reality. Finnish resistance, it is true, placed the prestige of the Kremlin at stake not only in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but also in the Balkans and Japan. Having said A, Stalin was compelled to say B. But even from the point of view of his own ends and methods, he didn't have to attack Finland immediately. A more patient policy could never have compromised the Kremlin as much as have its shameful defeats in the course of eleven weeks.

Moscow discovers now that no one expected a rapid victory and makes references to the frost and blizzards. Astonishing argument* If Stalin and Voroshilov cannot read military maps, they can, one should expect, read the calendar; the Finnish climate could not have been a secret to them. Stalin is capable of utilizing energetically a situation that has ripened without his active participation, when the advantages are without question and the risk at a minimum. He is a man of the apparatus. War and revolution are not his element. When foresight and initiative are necessary, Stalin knows only defeat. Such was the case in China, Germany, and Spain. Such is the case in Finland.

Not the physical climate of Finland is decisive, but the political climate of the USSR. In the Russian Bulletin edited by me, I published in September 1938 an article in which I subjected to an analysis the causes of the weakening and direct decomposition of the Red Army. It clarifies sufficiently, according to my opinion, both the present failures of the Red Army and the growing difficulties in industry. All the contradictions and defects of the regime always find a concentrated expression in the army. The enmity between the laboring masses and the bureaucracy corrodes the army from within. Personal independence, free investigation, and free criticism are no less necessary for the army than for the economy. Meanwhile the Red Army officers are put under the control of political police in the form of careerist commissars. Independent and talented commanders are being exterminated; the others are destined to constant fear. In such an artificial organism as the army where preciseness of rights and duties is inevitable, nobody in reality knows what is permissible and what is taboo. The thieves and chiselers operate behind a patriotic front of denunciations. Honest people become disheartened. Alcoholism spreads more and more widely. Chaos reigns in the military supplies.

Parades celebrated on Red Square are one thing, the war is quite another. The planned "military stroll" into Finland converted itself into a merciless accounting of all aspects of the totalitarian regime. It uncovered the bankruptcy of the leadership and the inadequacy of the high commanding staff appointed because of its servility rather than for its talent and knowledge. Besides, the war uncovered an extreme lack of proportion in the different branches of Soviet economy, in particular the poor state of transportation and various kinds of military supplies, especially of provisions and clothing. The Kremlin constructed, not without success; tanks and planes, but neglected sanitation, gloves, and boots. The living man who stands behind all machines was completely forgotten by the bureaucracy.

The question of whether the defense of "one's own" from foreign invasion or an offensive against another country is involved, has an immense and in some cases decisive importance for the mood of the army and nation. For an offensive revolutionary war a genuine enthusiasm, extremely high confidence in the leadership, and great skill in the soldier are necessary. Nothing of this was shown in the war Stalin undertook without technical and moral preparation.

The final result of the struggle is predetermined by the relation of forces. The half million of the Red Army will strangle the Finnish army in the end if the Soviet-Finnish war does not resolve itself in the next few weeks into a general European war, or if Stalin does not find himself forced to compromise, i.e., to retreat through fear of British, French, Swedish intervention. Possibly the shift in the military situation will come about even before these lines appear in the press. In the first case the Kremlin, as has occurred already during the ephemeral successes in the beginning of December, will try to supplement the military aggression by a civil war inside Finland. In order to include Finland in the framework of the USSR—and such is now the obvious aim of the Kremlin — it is necessary to sovietize her, i.e,, carry through an expropriation of the higher layer of landowners and capitalists. To accomplish such a revolution in the relations of property is impossible without a civil war. The Kremlin will do everything in order to attract to its side the Finnish industrial workers and the lower stratum of the farmers. Once the Moscow oligarchy finds itself compelled to play with the fire of war and revolution, it will try at least to warm its hands. It will undoubtedly achieve certain successes in this way.

But one thing can be said now with assurance: no subsequent successes can blot out from world consciousness what has happened so far. The Finnish adventure already has provoked a radical re-evaluation of the specific weight of the Red Army which had been extraordinarily idealized by some foreign journalists devoted —we suppose disinterestedly — to the Kremlin. All partisans of a crusade against the Soviets will find in the military failures of the Kremlin a serious argument. Undoubtedly the impertinence of Japan will increase and that may create difficulties along the road toward a Soviet-Japanese agreement which actually constitutes one of the main tasks of the Kremlin. Already one can assert that if exaggeration of the offensive capacities of the Red Army characterized the former period, now begins a period of underestimation of its defensive strength.

It is possible to foresee also other consequences of the Soviet-Finnish war. The monstrous centralization of the entire industry and commerce from top to bottom, such as the compulsory collectivization of agriculture, was determined not by the needs of socialism but by the greed of the bureaucracy to have everything without exception in its hands. This repugnant and by no means necessary violence against the economy and the man, that disclosed itself clearly enough in the Moscow "sabotage" trials, found its cruel punishment in the Finnish snow drifts. It is quite possible, consequently, that under the influence of military failures the bureaucracy will be compelled to make an economic retreat, It is possible to expect the reestablishment of a kind of NEP, that is, of the controlled market economy on the new, higher economic level. Whether the bureaucracy will succeed in saving itself by these measures is another matter.

Question: What would be the wisest action for Stalin to take today in Romania, considering the possible political, social, and military implications?

Answer: I think that the Kremlin itself, particularly after the Finnish experience, will consider in the next period as "wisest” not to touch Romania Stalin can move against the Balkans only in agreement with Hitler, only in order to aid Hitler—at least as long as Hitler's strength is not undermined and this is not at all near. At present Hitler needs peace in the Balkans in order to obtain raw materials and to maintain his ambiguous friendship with Italy.

From both a military and a political point of view, Romania is another edition of Poland, if not worse. The same semi-feudal oppression of peasants, the same cynical persecution of national minorities, the same mixture of lightmindedness, impertinence, and cowardliness inside the ruling stratum personified by the king himself. However, if the initiative of the new Entente compels Hitler and Stalin to upset the unstable peace of the Balkans, the Red Army will enter Romania with slogans of agrarian revolution and probably with greater success than in Finland.

Question: What can or must Stalin do in the Balkans generally, in the light of present events? In Persia? In Afghanistan?

Answer: The Soviet armed forces have to be ready to defend a vast area with insufficient means of communication. The world situation dictates the necessity not of dispersing the army in separate adventures but of maintaining it in powerful concentrations. If, however, Great Britain and France — with some cooperation from Germany— consider it necessary to undertake a war against the Soviet Union, the situation will be radically changed. In this case it is not excluded that the Soviet cavalry may try to invade India through Afghanistan: technically the task is not unrealizable. The former sergeant-major of the czarist army, Budenny, may be destined by history to ride a white horse in the role of "Liberator" of India. But this is in any case a rather distant perspective.

Question: Considering Russia's vastness and its numerous borders and actual and potential enemies, what is its immediate future?

Answer: The invasion of Finland indubitably provokes a silent condemnation by the majority of the population in the USSR. However at the same time the minority understands and the majority feels that behind the Finnish question, as behind the question of the errors and crimes of the Kremlin, stands the problem of the existence of the USSR. Its defeat in the world war would signify the crushing not only of the totalitarian bureaucracy but also of the planned state economy; it would convert the country into a colonial booty for the imperialist states. The peoples of the USSR themselves have to crush the hated bureaucracy; they cannot bestow this task on either Hitler or Chamberlain. The question is whether, as a result of the present war, the entire world economy will be reconstructed on a planned scale, or whether the first attempt of this reconstruction will be crushed in a sanguinary convulsion, and imperialism will receive a new lease on life until the third world war, which can become the tomb of civilization.

Question: The Soviets are generally credited with having made a strong defense and having, in effect, defeated the Japanese at Changkufeng in the summer of 1938. Do you believe this was a test case of Soviet arms and, if so, do you believe it caused Hitler to look in other directions than the Ukraine?

Answer: The Red Army, as was said above, is incomparably more powerful on the defensive than on the offensive. Besides, the popular masses, particularly in the Far East, understand well what Japanese domination would mean for them. However, it would be incorrect, following the Kremlin and the foreign correspondents attached to it, to overestimate the importance of the fighting at Changkufeng.

In the past years I have referred several times to the fact that the Japanese army is the army of a decomposing regime and has many traits resembling the czarist army on the eve of the revolution. Conservative governments and general staffs overrate the army and navy of the Mikado in the same way they overrated the army and navy of the czar. The Japanese can be successful only against backward and half-disarmed China. They will not endure a long war against a serious adversary. The success of the Red Army near Changkufeng thus has a limited significance for its evaluation. I don't think that this episode had any influence on Hitler's strategical plans. His turn to Moscow was determined by much nearer and more powerful factors.

Question: Concerning the Communist Party of the Soviet Union — what do you think of the rank and file of the party? You have said that the leadership of the party does not follow Marxist-Leninist lines. Do you believe, if that leadership were removed, that the party would proceed in the socialization of Russia, and to what extent do you believe Russia already has been socialized? Is it possible for the Russian people to change leadership now without violence? If a change in the leadership were made, would it lay Russia open to attack from other powers? Would it risk the loss of what the people have gained?

Answer: Our differences with the leadership of the so-called Communist Party of the USSR ceased a long time ago to carry a theoretical character. The "Marxist-Leninist" line is not at all the issue now. We accuse the ruling clique of having transformed itself into a new aristocracy, oppressing and robbing the masses. The bureaucracy answers with accusations that we are agents of Hitler (yesterday) or agents of Chamberlain and Wall Street (as of today). All this bears very little resemblance to theoretical differences between Marxists.

It is about time that serious people cast aside the spectacles which the professional "friends of the USSR" put on the nose of radical public opinion. It is about time to understand that the present Soviet oligarchy has nothing in common with the old Bolshevik Party which was a party of the oppressed. Degeneration of the ruling party, supplemented by bloody purges, was the result of the backwardness of the country and the isolation of the revolution. It is true that the social upheaval brought important economic successes. Nevertheless the productivity of labor in the USSR is five, eight, and ten times lower than in the United States. The immense bureaucracy devours a lion's share of the modest national income. The second part is consumed by the armed forces. As before the people are compelled to fight for a piece of bread. The bureaucracy plays the role of distributor of goods and retains the choicest morsels for itself The higher layer of the bureaucracy lives approximately the same kind of life as the well-to-do bourgeois of the United States and other capitalist countries.

Twelve to fifteen millions of the privileged — these are the "people" who organize the parades, demonstrations, and ovations which create such an enormous impression on liberal and radical tourists. But apart from this "pays legal" as was once said in France, there exist one hundred and sixty millions who are profoundly discontented.

What is the evidence? If the bureaucracy had the confidence of the people, it would strive to maintain at least its own constitution; in reality it tramples it underfoot. Antagonism between the bureaucracy and the people is measured by the increasing severity of the totalitarian rule.

Nobody can say with certainty — not even themselves — what is wanted by the two millions of Communists who are doomed to silence by the Kremlin with even greater brutality than the rest of the population. However there can be no basis for doubting that the overwhelming majority of the Communists and the population do not wish the return of capitalism, particularly now when capitalism has thrown humanity into a new war.

The bureaucracy can be crushed only by a new political revolution that will preserve the nationalized means of production and the planned economy and will establish on this basis a Soviet democracy of a much higher type. This profound transformation would increase immensely the authority of the Soviet Union among the laboring masses all over the world and would make practically impossible a war of the imperialist countries against it.

Question; If you had been the leader of the Soviet state, what would have been your international policy from the time Hitler came into power in Germany thereby adding German fascism to Italian fascism to form a fascist bloc in Europe?

Answer: I consider this question internally contradictory. I could not have been the "leader" of the present Soviet state: only Stalin is fit for this role. I did not lose power personally and accidentally, but due to the fact that the revolutionary epoch was superseded by a reactionary one. After prolonged efforts and innumerable victims, the masses, tired and disillusioned, retreated. The vanguard became isolated. A new, privileged caste concentrated the power in its hands and Stalin, who before played a secondary role, became its leader. The reaction inside the USSR proceeded parallel to the reaction over the entire world. In 1923 the German bourgeoisie strangled the unfolding proletarian revolution. In the same year the campaign against the so-called "Trotskyists" began in the Soviet Union. In 1928; the Chinese revolution was strangled. At the end of 1928 the "Trotskyist Opposition" was excluded from the party. In 1933 Hitler takes power and in 1934 he carries through his purge. In 1935 begin the tremendous purges in the USSR, trials against the Opposition, liquidation of the Old Guard Bolsheviks and of the revolutionary staff of officers. Such are the main milestones which show the indissoluble connection between the strengthening of the bureaucracy in the USSR and the growth of world reaction.

The pressure of world imperialism upon the Soviet bureaucracy, the pressure of the bureaucracy upon the people, the pressure of the backward masses upon the vanguard, such are the causes of the defeat of the revolutionary faction which I represented. That is why I cannot answer the question what I would have done if I had been in Stalin's place. I cannot be in his place I can be only in my place My program is the program of the Fourth International, which can come to power only under the conditions of a new revolutionary epoch. I recall, by the way, that at the beginning of the last war, the Third International was incomparably weaker than the Fourth is now.

Question: What do you believe will be the outcome of the European war — politically, economically, socially and territorially?

Answer: In order to formulate an opinion about the possible outcome of the war, it is necessary to first answer the question whether it will be possible shortly to pacify the unfurled fury through a compromise or whether the war will develop its devastation and destruction to the end. I don't believe for a minute that the pacifist attempts of the neutrals (including the mysterious mission of Mr. Sumner Welles) will meet success in the more or less near future. The contradictions between the two camps are irreconcilable. As great as may be Hitler's conquests in Europe, they will not solve the problem of German capitalism; on the contrary they only aggravate it The Austrian, Czech, and Polish industries were added to the German; all of them suffered from narrowness of national borders and lack of. raw materials. Further, in order to retain the new territories, a constant tension of military forces is unavoidable. Hitler can capitalize on his European successes only on a world scale. In order to do this he must crush France and England. Hitler cannot stop. Consequently the Allies cannot stop either if they do not wish to commit voluntary suicide. The humanitarian lamentations and references to reason will not help. The war will last until it exhausts all the resources of civilization or until it breaks its head on the revolution.

Question: How will Europe and the world look after the war?

Answer: The peace programs of both camps of this war are not only reactionary but also fantastic, that is, unrealizable. The British government dreams of the establishment of a moderate, conservative monarchy in Germany, of the restoration of the Hapsburgs in Austria-Hungary and of an agreement of all European states on the question of raw materials and markets. London would act correctly if it first found the secret of a peaceful agreement with Ireland about Ulster, and with India. Meanwhile we see terrorist acts, executions, passive and active resistance, sanguinary pacifications. Is it possible to expect that a victorious England will renounce its colonial rights in favor of Germany? Fundamentally England proposes, if victorious, a new edition of the League of Nations with all its old antagonisms but without the old illusions.

With France it is even worse. Its economic specific weight is in evident contradiction with its world position and with the extent of its colonial empire. France seeks a way out of this contradiction in the dismemberment of Germany. As if it were possible to turn the clock of history back to the epoch preceding 1870! The unification of the German nation was an inseparable result of its capitalist development. In order to dismember the present Germany it would be necessary to break the backbone of German technique, destroy the German factories, and exterminate a significant part of the population. It is easier to say than to do.

The program of freedom and independence for small nations proclaimed by the Allies sounds very attractive but is entirely devoid of content. Under an unlimited domination of imperialist interests on a world scale, the independence of small and weak states has as little reality as the independence of small industrial and commercial enterprises under the domination of trusts and corporations (in this respect see the statistics of the United States).

At the same time that France wishes to dismember Germany, the latter wants on the contrary to unify Europe, naturally under its heel. Concurrently, the colonies of the European states would have to be subjected to German rule. Such is the program;, of the most dynamic and aggressive imperialism. The task of the economic unification of Europe is in itself progressive. However the entire problem is who is to unify, how, and what for? One cannot believe for one minute that the European nations will accept being locked in the barracks of National Socialism. Pax Germanica would mean unavoidably a new series of bloody convulsions.

Such are the two "peace" programs; on the one hand the Balkanization of Germany and thereby of Europe; on the other the transformation of Europe and then of the entire world into a totalitarian barracks. The present war is being waged for the sake of these two programs.

Question,: What, in your opinion, is the way out? Who and how and by whom can real peace be achieved?

Answer: First of all, I recall that in the past war, which was fundamentally a rehearsal for the present, not only did none of the governments materialize their peace program but neither did they survive for long the conclusion of the peace treaty. Into an abyss fell three old and solid firms: the Romanovs, the Hapsburgs, and the Hohenzollerns, with a suite of smaller dynasties. Clemenceau and Lloyd George were swept from power. Wilson ended his days as a victim of his crushed hopes and illusions. Before his death Clemenceau foresaw the coming war. Lloyd George was doomed to see a new catastrophe with his own eyes.

None of the present governments will survive this war. The programs which are now proclaimed will soon be forgotten just as will their authors. The only program that the ruling classes will maintain is: Save their own skins.

The capitalist system is in a blind alley. Without an entire reconstruction of the economic system on a European and a world scale our civilization is doomed. The struggle of blind forces and unbridled interests must be replaced by the rule of reason, of plan, of conscious organization.

For Europe economic unification is a question of life and death. The accomplishment of this task belongs, however, not to the present governments but to the popular masses, led by the proletariat. Europe must become Socialist United States if it is not to become the cemetery of the old culture. A socialist Europe will proclaim the full independence of the colonies, establish friendly economic relations with them and, step by step, without the slightest violence, by means of example and collaboration, introduce them into a world socialist federation. The USSR liberated from its own ruling caste will join the European federation, which will help it to reach a higher level. The economy of the unified Europe will function as one whole. The question of state borders will provoke as few difficulties as now the question of administrative divisions inside a country. Borders inside the new Europe will be determined in relation to language, and national culture by free decisions of the populations involved.

Will this seem utopian to the "realistic" politicians? To cannibals in their time the giving up of human flesh was utopian.

Question: Does dictatorship of the proletariat necessarily mean the surrender of the civil rights as embodied in the Bill of Rights of the United States, and of course, including freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion? Do you believe that there is a middle ground between capitalism, as we know it in the United States, and communism, as you would envision it in the United States?

Question: You have said that the Kremlin fears war because that war is likely to be followed by another revolution of the masses. Would you elaborate on this?

Answer: Permit me to answer these two questions together. Will the United States enter the revolutionary road? When and how? In order to approach the theme correctly I will begin with a preliminary question: Will the United States intervene in the war?

In his recent prophetical speech combining the language of Wall Street with the language of the Apocalypse, Mr. Hoover predicted that on the fields of gory Europe two horsemen will triumph in the end: hunger and pestilence. The former president recommended that the United States remain aloof from the European insanity in order at the last moment to tip the scale with their economic might. This recommendation is not original. All great powers not yet involved in the war would like to use their unexhausted resources when accounts are settled. Such is the policy of Italy. Such is the policy of the Soviet Union in spite of the war with Finland. Such is the policy of Japan in spite of the undeclared war against China. Such is, in fact, the present policy of the United States. But will it be possible to maintain this policy for long?

If the war develops to the end; if the German army has successes—and it will have really great successes; if the specter of German rule over Europe will arise as a real danger; the government of the United States will then have to decide: to remain aloof, permitting Hitler to assimilate new conquests, multiply the German technique on the raw materials from the conquered colonies and prepare German domination over the entire planet; or to intervene in the course of the war to help clip the wings of German imperialism. I, least of all, am fit to give advice to the present governments; I am simply trying to analyze the objective situation and to draw conclusions from this analysis. I think that before the indicated alternative even the former head of the American Relief Administration will reject his own program of neutrality: it is impossible to possess with impunity the most powerful industry, more than two-thirds of the world's gold reserve, and ten millions of unemployed.

Once the United States, as I think, Intervenes in the war, possibly even this year, they will have to bear all its consequences. The more serious of them is the explosive character of the further political development.

Question: What do you understand by this?

Answer: On February 10, President Roosevelt warned the American Youth Congress against radicalism, advising it to improve the existing institutions, little by little, year by year. Such a procedure undoubtedly would be the best, most advantageous, most economical, if … it were realizable. Unfortunately, "the existing institutions" in the entire world are not improving year by year but deteriorating. The democratic institutions become not perfected but decomposed and cede their place to fascism. And this is not due to an accident or to the light-mindedness of the youth. Capitalist monopolies, having corroded the middle classes, are devouring the democracies. Monopolies themselves were a result of private ownership of the means of production. Private ownership, having once been the source of progress, came into contradiction with modern technique and is now the cause of crises, wars, national persecutions, and reactionary dictatorships. The liquidation of the private ownership of the means of production is the central historical task of our epoch and will guarantee the birth of a new, more harmonious society. The act of birth, daily observation teaches us, is never a "gradual" process but a biological revolution.

You ask whether an intermediate organization between capitalism and communism is possible. German and Italian fascism were attempts of such an organization. But In reality fascism only brought the most repulsive characteristics of capitalism to a most beastly expression. Another sample of the intermediate system was the New Deal. Did this experiment succeed? I think not; first the number of unemployed has seven zeros; the Sixty Families are more powerful than ever before. And most important there is not the slightest hope that an organic improvement is possible on this road. The market, banks, stock exchange, trusts decide and the government only adjusts itself to them by means of belated palliatives. History teaches us that revolution is prepared on this road.

It would be a great mistake to think the socialist revolution in Europe or America will be accomplished after the pattern of backward Russia. The fundamental tendencies will, of course, be similar. But the forms, methods, the "temperature" of the struggle, all this has, in each case, a national character. By anticipation it is possible to establish the following law: The more countries in which the capitalist system is broken, the weaker will be the resistance offered by the ruling classes in other countries, the less sharp a character the socialist revolution will assume, the less violent forms the proletarian dictatorship will have, the shorter it will be, the sooner the society will be reborn on the basis of a new, more full, more perfect and humane democracy. In any case, no revolution can infringe on the Bill of Rights as much as imperialist war and the fascism which it will engender.

Socialism would have no value if it should not bring with it, not only the juridical inviolability but also the full safe-guarding of all the interests of the human personality. Mankind would not tolerate a totalitarian abomination of the Kremlin pattern. The political regime of the USSR is not a new society, but the worst caricature of the old. With the might of the techniques and organizational methods of the United States; with the high well-being which planned economy could assure there to all citizens, the socialist regime in your country would signify from the beginning the rise of independence, initiative and creative power of the human personality.

Question: You have asserted that a privileged class in Russia today rules the Soviet Union. Who are they and how are they privileged? Would you compare these people to persons in the United States?

Answer: The regime of bourgeois democracy came into being through a series of revolutions; it is sufficient to recall the history of France. Some of these revolutions had a social character, that is, they liquidated the feudal ownership in favor of the bourgeois; others had a purely political character, that is, while maintaining the bourgeois forms of ownership, they changed the system of governing. The proletarian revolution, at least in a backward and isolated country, is also more complicated than it was possible to imagine a priori. The October Revolution had a social and political character; it changed the economic basis of society and constructed a new state system. In general and on the whole the new economic base is preserved in the USSR, though in a deteriorated form. The political system on the contrary has entirely degenerated: the beginnings of Soviet democracy were strangled by the totalitarian bureaucracy. Under these conditions a political revolution under the banner of a new democracy on the basis of the planned economy is a historical inevitability.

Question: What do you think of Litvinov's future with the USSR since the Kremlin’s change of policy from collective security to cooperation with Germany?

Answer: I have never considered the future of Mr. Litvinov. He wasn't an independent figure, but an intelligent and able functionary of the diplomatic corps. Was he familiarized with the fact that under the cover of speeches about the "united front of the democracies" the negotiations with Hitler were conducted? I am not certain about this but it is quite possible. In any case it would not contradict Litvinov's political physiognomy. Whether he will be preserved for some new appointment or whether he will be physically liquidated as a scapegoat for some of Stalin's failures, is a question important for Litvinov himself, but not of political interest

Question: Do you think probable an alliance of capitalist countries against the USSR?

Answer: Recently the ex-Kaiser Wilhelm raised his program: "The parties in the war should cease operations and unify their forces in order to aid Finland. They should make a united front to cleanse the world and civilization of Bolshevism." Nobody, of course, is obliged to take the ex-Kaiser too seriously. But in this case he expresses with commendable frankness what others think and prepare. Mussolini does not hide his designs in this respect London and Paris strive to acquire the friendship of Mussolini at the expense of the USSR. Washington sends its plenipotentiary to Rome. The president of the United States, according to his own words, does not wish to remain neutral in the Soviet-Finnish War: he defends Finland and religion. Sumner Welles has the task of consulting England, France, Italy, and Germany, but not the Soviet Union; this means consultation—against the Soviet Union. Consequently there is no lack of forces striving to prepare a crusade against the USSR. "The defense of Finland” is the mathematical center around which the corresponding forces group themselves.

The difficulty of this tendency consists in the fact that only Hitler can wage a serious war against the USSR. Japan could play thereby a supplementary role. However at present the German armed forces are directed against the West In this sense the program of the ex-Kaiser is not for the immediate future. But if the war lasts (and the war will last); if the United States intervenes (and it will intervene); if Hitler encounters insuperable difficulties on his road (and he will inevitably encounter them); then the program of the ex-Kaiser will surely be placed on the order of the day.

From what I said above, you will see clearly where I stand in relation to this grouping of forces: on the side of the USSR entirely and unconditionally, before all—against imperialisms of all labels; after that—against the Kremlin oligarchy which facilitates with its foreign policy the preparation of the march against the USSR and with its domestic policy debilitates the Red Army.