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Special pages :
Soldiers' and Workers' Juntas
Author(s) | Leon Trotsky |
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Written | 13 March 1931 |
A few words on the soldiers' juntas. Would you like to see them arise as independent organizations? This is a very serious question for which a definite line of conduct must be marked out at the very outset, leaving open, of course, the right to introduce corrections if experience indicates the need.
In Russia in 1905, matters did not reach the point of soldiers' soviets. The appearance of soldier deputies in the workers' soviets had an episodic character. In 1917 the soldiers' soviets played a gigantic role. In Petrograd the soldiers' soviet was combined with the workers' soviet from the very beginning. Moreover, the soldiers were the overwhelming majority. In Moscow, the workers' and peasants' soviets existed independently. But this was essentially for organizational reasons: the immense army consisted then of some ten to twelve million peasants.
In Spain we have a peacetime army inconsequential when compared with the population, or even when compared with the proletariat. Is the rise of independent soldiers' soviets inevitable under these conditions? From the standpoint of proletarian policy, we are interested in drawing the soldiers' delegates into the workers' juntas to the extent that the latter are created. Juntas composed only of soldiers could arise only at the culmination of the revolution, or after its victory. Workers' juntas might (and should!) arise earlier, on the basis of strikes, the boycott of the Cortes, or later, on the basis of participation in elections. We can therefore draw the soldier delegates into the workers' juntas long before soldiers' juntas can be created. But I go further: if we take the initiative in time and create workers' juntas and assure their influence on the army, then perhaps in consequence we will be able to prevent the rise of independent soldiers' juntas in danger of falling under the influence of careerist officers rather than of revolutionary workers. The small size and importance of the Spanish army speaks in favour of such a perspective. But, on the other hand, this small army has its independent revolutionary political traditions — more than in any other country. To a certain degree, this may interfere with the soldiers' representation through the workers' juntas.
You see that on this question I have not decided to express myself categorically; and I doubt if the comrades who are close to the situation can render a categorical decision here. I would rather put the question up for consideration; the sooner the broad circles of advanced workers begin to discuss the key questions, the easier it will be to solve them. At any rate, the course taken should be towards incorporating the soldiers' delegates into the workers' councils. If it should be only partially successful, even that much would be good. But precisely with this aim in mind, the moods in the army and in the various branches of service, the different types of arms, all should be studied in time and in great detail.
In conclusion, it would be a good idea to attempt collectively to make up a political chart of Spain with the aim of determining more precisely the relationship of forces in each region, and the relationship among the regions. Such a chart should also have the workers' districts, the revolutionary centres, the trade union and party organizations, the garrisons, the relationship of forces between the Reds and the Whites, the districts of peasant movements, etc. No matter how few in numbers the Oppositionists may be, nevertheless they can take the initiative in various places for such a study, collaborating with the best representatives of other workers' groups. Thus, the elements of the general staff of the revolution would be created. The central nucleus would give this work the necessary unity and cohesion. This preparatory, at first seemingly "academic," work will acquire a tremendous, perhaps even a decisive, significance in the future. In an epoch such as the one Spain is now passing through, the greatest of sins is to waste time.