On the Elements of Dual Power in the USSR

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An Explanation in a Circle of Friends

Is it correct to speak of dual power in the USSR?

We never speak of dual power but only of elements of dual power. …

Absolutely correct That is exactly what I had in mind. But even such a formulation raises doubts. Elements of dual power have always existed in the Soviet republic, from the first day of its existence. Why, then, do we speak of them only now? After all, the NEP was an official recognition of elements of dual power in the economy. Now, the relationship between capitalist and socialist economic tendencies has changed in favor of socialism. But this is just when we begin to speak of elements of dual power. Isn't this wrong? Couldn't it give rise to the idea that we consider the development of dual power and consequently the destruction of the dictatorship of the proletariat inevitable?

There is no question that in every class society it is possible to discover elements of the preceding regime as well as of that regime which is about to replace the existing one. The whole question, however, is: which class is supreme and to what extent it is supreme. The bourgeoisie acts when it is forced to. Significant economic and political concessions to the proletariat create important preconditions for the future in the womb of capitalist society. But to the extent that the bourgeoisie itself decides what to concede and what not to concede, to the extent that the power remains in its hands, to the extent that it relies with confidence on the bureaucratic apparatus and on the armed forces, to that extent there are no grounds for speaking of elements of dual power. The NEP was a conscious and strictly calculated concession by the proletarian power to the petty-bourgeois masses of the population. What to concede and how much to concede were decided by the proletarian dictatorship, primarily by the Communist Party, as the living leadership of the Soviets. In this basic point the position now is immeasurably less favorable, despite the great economic successes. Now there is no party leading the Soviet apparatus; in its turn, the Soviet apparatus is being pushed back by the bureaucratic apparatus, and the latter is riddled with elements of another class: the trials of the saboteurs were to open the eyes of the blind on this score. …

But weren't there in fact similar trials in the past? Weren’t there in fact various conspiracies? We recall the affair of the National Center, the trial of the SRs, etc. However, we didn't speak then of elements of dual power. …

That's absolutely true. But between the old trials and the new there is the deepest qualitative difference. Then, the question was about conspirators acting illegally and gathering forces for an armed overthrow, or of those who resorted to terrorist acts. In this, too, there were a few elements of dual power as in the past activities of the revolutionists in czarist Russia. The saboteurs of the last few years have acted quite differently. They occupied responsible posts of leadership in the economic apparatus. Their sabotage consisted in openly and publicly — with the approval of the Politburo — putting through programs which in essence were directed against socialist construction and the proletarian dictatorship. The Left Opposition exposed them. But the party apparatus, directed by the ruling Stalinist faction, smashed the Left Opposition in the course of a few years, trying to prove to the workers that the economic plans of the saboteurs were the purest embodiment of Leninism. If the saboteurs were the agents of the bourgeoisie, that signifies that the state apparatus which they — under their own supervision — directed to so significant a degree is not a reliable apparatus of the proletariat, but included within itself very important elements of the power of a different class. The significance of these elements is increased a hundredfold by the party apparatus smashing those proletarian revolutionists who exposed the saboteurs. At the time when the Ramzins not only legally but with authority put through their programs under the supervision of the Krzhizhanovskys, Ustryalov demanded that the Politburo arrest and exile those who acted against the Ramzins; and Stalin carried out Ustrialov's social law. Is it really not clear that we have before us elements of dual power in the very summits of the state apparatus?

Just the same, weren't the saboteurs punished and the policy changed?

Of course. If this hadn't happened then we would have to speak not of elements of dual power but of the centrist bureaucracy going over to the service of the bourgeoisie and of the destruction of the proletarian dictatorship as accomplished fact. That is the view of Korsch, Urbahns, and Pfemfert; but it is not ours. However, it would be basically incorrect to think that a shift of the centrist policy to the left signifies the liquidation of the political elements of dual power. The artificial speedup of the rates of industrialization and collectivization can be just as much an act of sabotage as their artificial slowing-down. Symptoms of this are plain to be seen. Meanwhile, the party is being crushed still more, the apparatus still further demoralized. To what extent is not only the state but also the party apparatus riddled with Bessedovskys, Dmitrievskys, Agabekovs — in general, class enemies — who stifle the Rakovskys and expel the Ryazanovs? To what extent will this apparatus prove to be a weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat at the decisive moment? Who can answer this question? No one! But this means that the state apparatus of the proletarian dictatorship has assumed a contradictory character, that is, is riddled with elements of dual power.

Does this not mean then that we are heading in the direction of increasing dual power?

It is impossible to answer that by guessing. This is a problem of the correlation of forces. It will be put to the test and decided in the process of the struggle itself. The Left Opposition will not occupy the last place in that struggle Its numbers are few but after all it consists of cadres who are highly qualified and keenly tempered. Crystallization around these cadres could take place very rapidly in a critical moment.

What does the slogan of a Coalition Central Committee mean? Could this not be understood in the sense of an unprincipled bloc of three factions? In what measure is this slogan applicable to the European parties?

Let's begin with the last question: to put forward the slogan of a Coalition CC in Germany or France would be simply ludicrous. The Left Opposition is demanding a place for itself not in the CC but in the party. The composition of the CC will be determined by the party on the basis of democratic centralism. In the USSR, the position is essentially different. There is no party there: it is dissolved into millions entered on party and youth lists and artificially kept in a state of atomization and ideological weakness. In the moment of political crisis the party apparatus could be poised on the brink of chaos and itself begin to disintegrate rapidly. How can we find a way out in such a situation? How do we reach the party? Meanwhile, party elements, great in numbers and very valuable, although dissolved into the nonparty millions, still exist and in the hour of danger will be prepared to respond. Under such conditions a Coalition CC would be in essence an organizational commission for the reconstruction of the party. The question is not about some principled slogan or other but about one of the possible organizational ways out from a completely artificial and unique situation. But, of course, this is only a purely hypothetical formula.

How do you regard the slogan "Workers' and Peasants' Government"f

In general, it is a negative one, and especially for Germany. Even in Russia where the agrarian question played a decisive role and where we had a revolutionary peasant movement, we did not put forward the slogan even in 1917. We spoke of a government of the proletariat and the village poor, that is, semi-proletarians led by the proletariat Through this the class character of the government was fully defined. True, subsequently we called the Soviet government worker and peasant. But by this time the dictatorship of the proletariat was already a fact, the Communist Party was in power, and consequently the name Workers' and Peasants' Government could not give rise to any ambiguity or grounds for alarm. But let's turn to Germany: to put forward here the slogan of a workers' and peasants' government, as it were putting the proletariat and the peasantry on the same footing, is completely incongruous. Where, in Germany, is there a revolutionary peasant movement? In politics it is impossible to operate with imaginary or hypothetical quantities. When we speak of a workers' government then we can explain to a farm laborer that we are referring to that kind of government which will protect him against exploiters even if they are peasants. When we speak of a workers' and peasants' government then we confuse the farm laborer, the agricultural worker, who in Germany is a thousand times more important to us than the abstract "peasant" or the "middle peasant" who is hostile to us. We can only reach the peasant poor in Germany through the agricultural workers. We can only neutralize the intermediary layers of peasants by rallying the proletariat under the slogan of a workers' government.

Are the references to Lenin in support of the slogan a 'Workers' and Peasants' Government” correct?

Totally incorrect. The slogan itself was put forward, as far as I remember, between the Fourth and Fifth Congresses of the Comintern as a weapon in the struggle against "Trotskyism." The formation of the famous Krestintern took place under this slogan. The secretary of the Krestintern, Teodorovich, formulated a new Marxist slogan, "The liberation of the peasants must be the work of the peasants themselves." To this epigonic ideology the slogan of a workers' and peasants' government fully corresponds; it has nothing in common with Leninism.