| Category | Template | Form |
|---|---|---|
| Text | Text | Text |
| Author | Author | Author |
| Collection | Collection | Collection |
| Keywords | Keywords | Keywords |
| Subpage | Subpage | Subpage |
| Template | Form |
|---|---|
| BrowseTexts | BrowseTexts |
| BrowseAuthors | BrowseAuthors |
| BrowseLetters | BrowseLetters |
Template:GalleryAuthorsPreviewSmall
Special pages :
Letter to Marceau Pivert, December 22, 1938
| Author(s) | Leon Trotsky |
|---|---|
| Written | 22 December 1938 |
Dear Comrade Pivert:
I confess that it is not without hesitation that I have decided to write you this letter. Not solely because our political opinions are far from coinciding, but above all because even the idea of my addressing a political militant of France from a country far away over a matter which concerns France can seem out of place. Nevertheless, I have rejected these doubts. The situation is so critical, the fate of the proletariat of France and of all Europe, to a considerable degree of the entire world, depends to such a measure upon the next development of events in France, the fundamental elements of the situation are so clear, even from a great distance, that I consider it inadmissible not to make an attempt to explain myself to you when all is not yet lost.
The development in France during the last three or four years has proceeded much slower than could have been expected in 1934-1935 when I wrote the brochure, Whither France? Living reality is always richer in possibilities, in turns, in complications than the theoretical prognostication. But the general course of events has not brought, despite all, anything new in principle different from our conception. I do not wish now to stop over this, since I have devoted to this question my last article, The Decisive Hour Draws Near, which I hope will appear soon in French (in any case I enclose a copy with this letter). The development manifestly nears its denouĂ©ment. This denouĂ©ment cannot bring anything but the establishment of a fascist dictatorship, at the beginning of pre-fascist (Bonapartist), military type, or the victory of the proletariat. I do not think that we are in disagreement with you over this. I do not think moreover that there is disagreement in regard to the delay: a year or two, in my opinion, is the maximum which remains until the âdefinitiveâ denouĂ©ment that is irretrievable for many years.
What can save the situation in France is the creation of a genuine revolutionary vanguard of several thousand men, clearly understanding the situation, completely free from the influence of bourgeois and petty bourgeois public opinion (âsocialistâ, âcommunistâ, âanarcho-syndicalistâ, etc.) and ready to go to the end. Such a vanguard will know how to find the road to the masses. In the last ten or fifteen years we have seen more than once how under the blows of great events great traditional parties and their groupings have fallen in dust, such as the Iron Front (without iron), the Popular Front (without people), etc. What neither breaks nor falls in dust is only what has been welded by clear, precise, intransigent revolutionary ideas.
I do not have the possibility of closely following the activity of your party, I do not know its internal composition, and that is why I abstain from pronouncing an evaluation. But I do know the other parties of the London Bureau, which have existed for well more than a year. I ask myself: your party, can it grapple with vast tasks hand in hand with Fenner Brockway, Walcher, Sneevliet, Brandler and other venerable invalids, who not only have not demonstrated in anything their capacity to orient themselves in revolutionary events, but on the contrary have demonstrated many times over their absolute incapacity for revolutionary action and in the following years, their not less absolute incapacity for learning what were their own errors. The best group among them was the POUM. But is it not now clear that the POUMâs fear of the petty bourgeois public opinion of the Second and Third Internationals and above all of the anarchists was one of the principal causes of the collapse of the Spanish revolution?
One of two things. Either the French proletariat, betrayed and enfeebled by Blum, Thorez, Jouhaux, and company, will be taken by surprise and erased without resistance, like the proletariat of Germany, of Austria, and of Czechoslovakia ... But it is useless to make calculations on the basis of this variant â servile prostration does not require any strategy. Or in the period which remains the vanguard of the French proletariat will again lift its head, gathering around it the masses and finding itself as capable of resisting as of attacking. But this variant supposes such an invigoration of the hopes of the masses, of their confidence in themselves, of their ardor, of their hate against the enemy, that all that is mean, mediocre, misshapen will be cast aside and dissipated in the gale. Only revolutionaries willing to go to the end are capable of directing a genuine insurrection of the masses, for the masses discern surpassingly well waverings from the spirit of resolute decision. For the insurrection of the masses firm leadership is necessary. And without insurrection catastrophe is inevitable, and that with but short delay.
I do not see any other road to the immediate formation of a revolutionary vanguard in France than the unification of your party and the section of the Fourth International. I understand that the two organizations are conducting negotiations over the fusion and the idea is far from me of interfering with the negotiations or of giving concrete advice from here. I approach the question from a more general point of view. The fact that the negotiations are lasting a long time and dragging out seems to me to be an extremely alarming circumstance, the symptom of discordance between the objective situation and the state of feeling even among the most advanced ranks of the working class. I should be happy to learn that I am mistaken.
You carry a great responsibility, Comrade Pivert, strongly similar to the responsibility which weighed on Andres Nin in the first years of the Spanish revolution. You can give events a great impulse forward. But you can also play the fatal role of brake. In moments of acute political crisis personal initiative is capable of exercising a great influence upon the course of events. It is solely necessary to decide firmly one thing: to go to the end!
I hope that you will appreciate at their true value the motives which have guided me in writing you this letter and I warmly wish you success on the road of the proletarian revolution.
Leon TROTSKY
COYOACAN, D.F., Dec. 22, 1938