From Parliament (March 21, 1855)

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London, March 21. At yesterday's sitting of the House of Lords, Lord Lyndhurst, the old colleague of Liverpool and Castlereagh, brought in his long-expected motion "on the position of Prussia with reference to the Vienna Conference". Two circumstances, he said, had lately imparted new interest to this question: The message of the dying Emperor of Russia to the Prussian Court, and the manifesto of Alexander II, in which he promises to consummate the policies of Peter, Catherine, Alexander, and his father. How Russia herself regarded Prussian policies can be seen from the following excerpt from a secret despatch which Pozzo di Borgo sent to Nesselrode shortly before the outbreak of the war of 1828-29. It reads in part:

"Suppose then that Russia should undertake alone to put in execution those coersive means against Turkey, there is every reason to believe that Prussia would not in any manner oppose Russia. But, on the contrary, her attitude at once unfettered and friendly, would operate as a powerful check on other States and bring them to submit to results suited to the dignity and interests of Russia. It will be necessary to let the Cabinet of Berlin, to a certain extent, into our confidence, and to convince it that the part we assign to Prussia will contribute to increase the happy intimacy between the two Sovereigns and the two Courts."

Was it possible, Lord Lyndhurst exclaimed, to anticipate in a more prophetic spirit the line which the Prussian Court has taken in the past six or twelve months? It was true that Prussia had joined in signing the protocols of December 5, January 13 and April 9. The purpose of these protocols had been to bring about the evacuation of the Danubian principalities and to obtain guarantees for the protection of the Sultan's independence and the integrity of Turkey. Had the Prussian Court acted in this spirit? On the occasion of the loan of 30 million taler for military operations Baron Manteuffel had declared that in these protocols Prussia had expressed her view on Russia's policy, namely that a great injustice had been committed; but she did not consider herself obliged to go further and take an active part. Was this the language of a great nation? And was Prussia not expressly committed to the protection of Turkey by the Agreements of 1840 and 1841? Baron Manteuffel had added that Germany's independence and German interests were not involved in the dispute and Prussia was therefore not obliged to make any sacrifices. Baron Manteuffel himself had, however, stated the opposite in another document. Besides, once the Tsar seized Constantinople, it would be superfluous to talk any more of German independence and German interests. They would then succumb to an overwhelming power. After Lord Lyndhurst had alluded to the dismissal of War Minister Bonin, to the recall of Ambassador Bunsen from London and to the rejection of an address of the Prussian Chambers in reply to a speech from the throne, he came to the "second act of this political drama". After a considerable time had elapsed Austria had deemed it proper to demand of Russia that she evacuate the Danubian principalities. This demand was drafted and sent to Berlin for signature. Counter-proposals were sent from Berlin to Vienna, which were completely inadequate but caused delay in as much as they had to be communicated to the Allies for examination. In the meantime Russia had evacuated the principalities, but retained one part under occupation for military reasons, declaring that she wished to keep entirely on the defensive. Prussia had thereupon withdrawn from the confederation, because Russia had satisfied all reasonable claims. From this moment on Prussia had made every effort to thwart Austria's plans. For this purpose she had, to a great extent with success, made proposals to the Federal Diet and to the individual German states. At the same time Russia had publicly thanked two German states for their refusal to join the Allies. He (Lyndhurst) was now coming to the third and last act of the drama. The Allies had arranged for a conference to be held on August 8 in Vienna to decide what should be demanded of Russia as a basis for any provisional negotiations. Prussia had been informed of the meeting in the usual manner and repeatedly. Prussia had not expressly refused to attend, but in fact did not appear at the conference. In consequence of her absence the Allies, instead of drafting a Protocol, had signed a Note laying down the four points as a basis for future negotiations. The four points had then been submitted to Russia for her acceptance, but she had refused to accept them. Prussia for her part published and circulated a document in which she raised objections to the four points. She also continued to hinder, both at the Federal Diet and at the individual German courts, the adhesion of the small German states to the Allies. After the conclusion of the Agreement of December 2 Prussia was informed that room had been left for her accession. She refused to accede but declared that she was ready to conclude similar agreements with France and England separately. From the moment that these latter accepted this proposal, Prussia had in various negotiations and divers proposals demanded innumerable modifications, which France and England would certainly have to reject. When he (Lyndhurst) was speaking of Prussia, he was referring to the official Prussia. He knew that the vast majority of the Prussian nation was anti-Russian. It was incomprehensible that Prussia, after refusing to accede to the Agreement of December 2, could demand to be invited to the Vienna negotiations. He hoped the Allied Powers would not admit a Prussian envoy on any pretext: for if they did, Russia would have two votes at the Vienna Congress instead of one. Prussian diplomacy had not changed since Frederick the Great. He recalled 1794, the time just before and after the battle of Austerlitz, etc.

Lord Clarendon: He would confine himself to filling in a few gaps in respect of the' communications which had taken place between England and Prussia. After the Russian Government had rejected the conditions of the Allies a conference of the respective plenipotentiaries had been called, which, however, could not be held since the representative of the Prussian Government would not attend. It was true that later the Prussian Ambassador in London had informed him [Clarendon] that his Government would give the requested permission to its plenipotentiary in Vienna. He (Clarendon) had declared, however: "It was too late." The correspondence between Prussia and Austria had helped Russia. Before the signing of the Agreement of December 2 Prussia had already been invited to accede, but in vain. Prussia had demanded to be admitted unconditionally to the new conference because it was a continuation of the earlier conference, which had not yet been concluded and from which she had by no means withdrawn. With respect to the latter, the British Government referred to the fact that at an earlier occasion no conference could be held because Prussia would not attend, although repeatedly asked. Moreover, the new conference was not at all a continuation of the old one, for, when in October and November Austria requested France and England to resume it, she received the reply that the time for protocols and conferences had passed, but that if Austria would enter into a military commitment with them, they would see whether peace was realisable. This had led to the Agreement of December 2. Later, they had been prepared to enter into special treaties with Prussia.

"But, to admit Prussia to claim all the privileges without incurring any of the risks—to admit her unconditionally to a conference that might end in peace, but which might lead to war on a more extended sphere—without her telling us what were her intentions or her policy—without entering into any engagement with us, either immediate or prospective—without knowing whether she entered on the conference as a neutral, as a foe, or as a friend—was utterly impossible."

The special missions sent later by Prussia had been received with equal friendliness in London and Paris, but so far had not led to anything. He did not, however, regard the negotiations as broken off. Only three days ago new proposals had been made. Unfortunately, the Vienna conferences had opened, however, while Prussia remained excluded by her own action. A great power like Prussia should not restrict itself to the narrow German confines. They had repeatedly remonstrated against this attitude. The constant reply was that Prussia's policy was peace. In fact her policy was neither "European nor German nor Russian", more likely to thwart Austria than to keep Russia in check. In spite of all this Prussia could not long remain in isolation when important European interests were at stake. She could not side with Russia in opposition to national feeling in Prussia and Germany. She knew well that on Russia's side against Austria she would become dependent on the former. She did not want to take Austria's side. On the contrary, she had taken an unfriendly attitude to Austria.

"I say, therefore, that Prussia is in an insular and in a false position [...]. This may be satisfactory to her enemies, but it is deeply regretted by her allies, and by the noble-minded and patriotic of her own population."

He declared finally that every effort would be made to win Prussia's co-operation.

In the Lower House Lord William Graham asked the Prime Minister

"whether the Austrian Ambassador had called upon Lord Clarendon for any explanation of the words [...] used by Sir Robert Peel, when he was re-elected that no settlement of the Eastern question would be satisfactory unless Hungary and Poland were restored?"

Lord Palmerston, instead of giving some reply to this question, began by congratulating himself on Sir Robert Peel's having accepted a post in his administration. Concerning Hungary, Austria had long known that England would regard its separation from the imperial state as a great calamity for Europe, since the imperial state as a totality in the centre of Europe was an essential element in the balance of powers. Concerning Poland (considerable laughter was here caused by a little pause in Palmerston's reply and the peculiar manner in which he resumed his speech) it was his opinion that the Kingdom of Poland, as now constituted and as now possessed, was a constant threat to Germany. Nevertheless, stipulations concerning a re-organisation of Poland formed no part of the points now being negotiated in Vienna. England and France had, however, reserved the right, according to circumstances and the events of war, to add to the four points, on the basis of which the negotiations were now being conducted, further stipulations which appeared to them essential for the future security of Europe.