French Armaments

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This article was first intended for the New-York Daily Tribune, but when Nodal asked Engels to write an article for The Volunteer Journal Engels revised it for that periodical. It was preceded by the editorial remark: “By the Author of ‘The History of the Rifle’.” p. 465

According to the Almanach de Gotha, which is as good an authority on the subject as can be found anywhere, the war footing of the French army for 1860-61 has been fixed as follows:—

1. Infantry: Guards—12 battalions of Grenadiers, 16 ditto of Voltigeurs, 2 of Zouaves, 1 of Chasseurs; in all 31 battalions. Line—103 regiments of 4 battalions, in all 412 battalions; 3 regiments of Zouaves, 2 of the Foreign Legion, 3 of Turcos (or native Algerian rifles), at 3 battalions each, 24 battalions; Chasseurs, 20 battalions; Zephyrs, or light African (disciplinary) battalions, 3; Pompiers (firemen) of Paris, 1 battalion. In all 491 battalions; or in time of war............................. Men 515,037

2. Cavalry: 6 regiments, or 37 squadrons, of the Guard;. 58 regiments, or 358 squadrons, of the Line; in all 395 squadrons............................................................... 100,221

3. Artillery: 22 regiments—227 batteries (of which 146 are batteries of 6 guns—876 guns are field artillery).................................................................... 66,007

4. Engineers..................................................................... 15,443

5. Train: Sanitary troops, commissariat.......................... 24,561

6. Gendarmes.................................................................. 24,172

7. Staffs, invalids, military schools, &c........................... 17,324

Total............................................................................ 762,765

This is the war footing. The peace establishment is as follows:—

Infantry............................................................................... 255,248

Cavalry................................................................................. 61,023

Artillery................................................................................ 39,023

Engineers.............................................................................. 7,467

Train, &c............................................................................... 11,489

Gendarmes, invalids, &c..................................................... 41,496

............................................................................................415,746 men.

In January, 1859, a short time before the Italian war broke out, the Constitutionnel published an official status of the French army, showing a war establishment of 568,000 men, with a peace establishment of 433,000. How, then, has it been possible within two years to augment the war footing by 200,000 men, while the peace footing has been actually reduced?

Again, the annual contingent of able-bodied young men disposable for the army is about 160,000. Of these, under Louis Philippe, between 40,000 and 60,000 were actually enrolled, and found sufficient to keep the army up, in spite of the losses in Algeria. Later on, 80,000, and even 100,000 and more, have been enrolled; the Empire which is peace consumed twice the amount of food for powder than the constitutional monarchy or the republic had required. The time of service is seven years; but, even supposing that of late 100,000 men had been enrolled annually (which is above the average), this would, for seven years, give 700,000 men only; and deducting from these the losses during campaigns and from other causes, there would be scarcely as many as 600,000 men. How, then, are the remaining 163,000 found?

The answer to these two questions is comprised in the late acts of the French Emperor. Before the Italian war, the regiments, hitherto formed in three battalions of eight companies each, are formed in four battalions of six companies each; thus, by merely changing the distribution of the 24 companies of a regiment, four battalions are got instead of three. The size of a battalion has a maximum; above 1,000 men it becomes too strong for one man to command it with his voice, and too unwieldy for quick manoeuvring.

But the size of a company is far more variable; whether 100 or 250 men, is a matter of choice, not of necessity. By forming the fourth battalions in the way indicated, with the same number of officers and sergeants, the regiment was enabled to muster 4,000 instead of 3,000 strong, as soon as the men were found. During the war, the regiments went out in the strength of three fighting battalions, the fourth forming the depot. Thus, in the fourth battalions of the 100 regiments of the line, the means were found to place 100,000 men more than the old cadres could employ. After the war, the fourth battalions were dissolved, but they have been reinstated again a short time ago. Three more infantry regiments (101st, 102nd, 103rd) have been formed, offering room for 17,000 men more. These new formations account for 112,000 men; and the 51,000 men which remain to be accounted for may constitute the figure to which the army in January, 1859, in consequence of previous losses, was short of its full war complement. This would show that there are cadres now, in the French infantry alone, sufficient to organise the enormous number of men stated above, without any recourse to new formations. But where are the men to be found who are to fill up these cadres?

The regular enrolments of the last seven years will have left on the rolls from 550,000 to 600,000 men. The annual contingent available is about 160,000 men. One year’s levy would leave but 50,000 men short, in the worst case; and in case of need, there are the young men who, during the last six years, have been entirely liberated from service by drawing favourable lots at the conscription. These might be made available to the tune of some 300,000 at least, but as long habit has made such men consider themselves freed for ever from the obligation to serve, as they are partly married, partly scattered all over the country and hard to find, such a measure would be both unpopular and difficult to carry out.

How, then, does Louis Napoleon make up for the deficiency?

By introducing a modification of the Prussian reserve system. Of the 160,000 men available every year, a portion, say one-half, is taken to fill up the vacancies of the standing army. The remainder is enrolled on the reserve list; they are embodied and drilled, the first year two months, the second and third years one month each; they remain liable to be called out for seven years in all, same as the line. Now, we have some reason to believe that if the military surgeons are not over strict in passing the men, and in time of war they get often exceedingly lenient, the annual contingent of 160,000 able-bodied men might, by a stretch, be raised to 200,000; but that we will for the present leave out of the question. In seven years, 160,000 men annually would give an army of 1,112,000 men, and deducting a good round number for losses, there would be fully one million of soldiers. Thus we see that by the new reserve system lately introduced, Louis Napoleon’s troops will in a couple of years outgrow the organised bodies ready to receive them. That eventuality, however, is also provided for. In future the four battalions of a regiment are all to be fighting battalions; a fifth battalion is now forming under the name of battalion of instruction, and under the pretext of drilling the men put on the reserve list. This new organisation finds room for 103,000 men more, raising the number of men which can be usefully employed by existing corps or cadres to 863,000 men.

Not satisfied with this, the French Government propose to form one more regiment of guards and 17 of infantry of the line; these 18 regiments represent 90 more battalions, or 90,000 men.

Thus, before this year is out, we are sure, from what is known even now, that the French army will be so organised as to be able to stow away comfortably in its battalions, squadrons, and batteries, not less than 953,000 men. And as to finding the men to fill up these organisations, we have seen that up to 700,000 men can be found even this year, without falling back upon men liberated in former years; but, if the universal liability to service, either in the line or reserve, be once acknowledged, it will be easy enough to apply the same principle to the men liberated in the last six years (Napoleon has done the same over and over again in his time); and then there can be no doubt that the full 953,000 men will be soon together.

Here, then, we have the man who unintentionally caused the volunteer movement, responding to it by quietly and noiselessly organising an army of a million of men, and at the same time laying down twenty iron-cased frigates on the stocks, maybe to escort a fraction of that army across the Channel.