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Special pages :
Fr. Paulsen. Introduction to Philosophy
Publisher: Progress Publishers
First Published: 1930 in Lenin Miscellany XII
1899
Highly characteristic is the frank formulation of the
question in the introduction: the task of modern philos- ophy is âto reconcile the religious world outlook and the scientific explanation of natureâ (p. IV[1]). Sic! And this idea is developed most circumstantially: there is said to be a struggle on two frontsâagainst materialism and âJe- suitismâ (both Catholic and Protestant). Materialism, of course, is understood (described?) as rein mechanisch, physikalisch u.s.w.[2]
rests on Kant and is the representative of âidealistic mon- ism.â Up to p. 10 ...âPeace between science and faith...â And p. 11: âThe real corner-stone of Kantâs philoso- phyâ (to create this peace) ...âis to give to both their due: to knowledge against the scepticism of Hume, to faith a- gainst its dogmatic negation in materialismâthat is the sum-total of his undertaking.â (12) âWhat is capable of disappointing this hopefulâ (the hope of this peace) âexpectation is the absolutely anti-religious | |||||
radicalism that is at present becoming widespread in the
broad mass of the population.... Thus atheism now ap- pearsâ (as formerly among the bourgeoisie) âas an article of faith of Social-Democracyâ (pp. 14-15). âIt is the cat- | |||||
echism turned inside out. And like the old dogmatism,
this new, negative dogmatism, too, is hostile to science, | ? | ||||
insofar as by its dogmas it puts fetters on the spirit of
criticism and doubt.â (He recalls the term Antipfaffen[3] and assures us that Christianity has no predilection for the rich, that it (Christianity) will go through the same struggle towards which Europe is advancing.) Refuting materialism and defending the theory of All- beseelung[4] (which he interprets in an idealist sense), Paulsen ignores: 1) that he is not refuting materialism, but merely some arguments of some materialists; 2) that he contradicts himself in interpreting modern psychology in an idealist sense.
a certain action, and hence in its general essence coincides with an unconscious will.â
so unĂźberbrĂźckbar[7] as it previously seemed to the author, p. 90 u. ff.[8])
bearer of des Weltgeistes?[10] (because man and his brain are the highest development of mind, as the author himself admits. | |||||
When Paulsen criticises materialistsâhe counterposes
the highest forms of mind to matter. When he defends idealism and interprets modern psychology idealisticallyâ he approximates the lowest forms of mind to Kräfte,[11] etc. That is the Achilles heel of his philosophy). | NB | ||||
Cf. especially pp. 106-107, where Paulsen opposes
the view that matter is something dead. The author seems to dispose too lightly of the con- cept that Gedanke ist Bewegung.[12] His arguments a- mount only to âordinary common sense: senseless,â âthought is not motion, but thoughtâ (87). Perhaps heat, too, is not motion, but heat?? Quite stupid are the authorâs arguments that a physiol- ogist will not cease to speak about thoughts, instead of movements equivalent to these thoughts? And no one will ever cease to speak about heat. One who has fallen in love does not speak to âhis lady- love about the corresponding vascular-motor process.... That is obviously nonsenseâ (86-87). Precisely what is done by Herr Paulsen! And if we experience a lack of heat, we do not speak about heat being a form of motion, but of how to get some coal. Paulsen considers that the statement that thought is Be- wegung[13], is sinnlos.[14] But he himself is against dualism, and speaks about the âequivalentâ (140 and 143)ââthe physical equivalent of the psychicalâ (or Begleiterschein- ung[15]). Is not that the same begriffliche Konfusion[16] for which he contemptuously abuses BĂźchner? When Paulsen declares that his parallelism is ânot localâ but âidealâ (p. 146), his dualist character shows still more clearly. That is no explanation of the matter, nor a theory, but a simple verbal trick. |
- â Paulsen, Fr., Einleitung in die Philosophie, Berlin, 1899.âEd.
- â purely mechanical, physical, etc.âEd.
- â anti-clericalismâEd.
- â universal soul embodimentâEd.
- â â Š Contra p. 86: âMotion has absolutely nothing of thought in it....â
- â soul processes and forceâEd.
- â incompatibleâEd.
- â und folgendeâet seq.âEd.
- â universeâEd.
- â universal spiritâEd.
- â forcesâEd.
- â thought is motionâEd.
- â motionâEd.
- â senselessâEd.
- â accompanying phenomenonâEd.
- â conceptual confusionâEd.