Declaration of the Eighty-four

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To the Politburo of the Central Committee of the AUCP(B):

Comrades:

The big mistakes made or tolerated by the leadership on the Chinese revolution have contributed to a grave defeat. We can escape this situation only by following the road mapped out by Lenin. The extremely abnormal conditions in which we are discussing the questions related to the Chinese revolution create a great deal of tension in the party. The one-sided “discussion” carried out in Pravda and Bolshevik is a systematic distortion of the Opposition’s views (thus they attribute to the Opposition the demand to break with the Kuomintang). This demonstrates the desire of the leading group of the Central Committee to hide its blunders behind a campaign against the Opposition. As a result, the attention of the party is oriented in the wrong direction.

Finally, and with respect to the erroneous line of the Central Committee on the essential questions of party policy, our Bolshevik-Leninist duty demands that we address ourselves, through this declaration, to the Central Committee.

1. It is not enough to say that we have undergone an enormous defeat in China; we must look at how and why it happened.

Although we already have in China a powerful working class; although the proletariat of Shanghai in a most difficult situation was able to rise up and take over the city; although the Chinese proletariat receives powerful support from the rebellious peasantry; in short, although there were all the conditions for the victory of a “Chinese 1905” (Lenin), the result is that the Chinese workers pulled the fat out of the fire for the bourgeoisie, in much the same way as the European workers were condemned to do in the revolutions of 1848.

All the conditions were there for arming the Chinese workers (above all in Shanghai and Hankow). Nevertheless, the heroic proletariat of Shanghai found itself disarmed and the workers of Hankow are just as disarmed at the present time, even though Hankow is in the hands of the “left” Kuomintang.

“The line” in China, in fact, translates as follows: We must not arm the workers, or organize revolutionary strikes, or incite the peasants against the landowners, or publish a Communist daily paper, or criticize the bourgeois gentlemen of the right wing of the Kuomintang, and the petty bourgeois of the “left” Kuomintang, or build Communist cells in Jiǎng Jièshí’s army, or call for the formation of soviets, so as not to “drive off” the bourgeoisie or “scare off” the petty bourgeoisie, or disturb the government of the “bloc of four classes.”

By way of reply, and in order to thank us for such a policy, the Chinese national bourgeoisie, as might have been expected, waits for the right moment, then guns down the workers and appeals for aid from the imperialist powers of Japan today, America tomorrow, and England the day after.

The defeat in China has left the Communist parties of the whole world, and broad circles of the AUCP, in tremendous disarray. Only yesterday they were told that the national army in China was really the revolutionary Red Army, that Jiǎng Jièshí was their revolutionary commander, and that China was today (or, at the very latest, tomorrow) taking the “non-capitalist” road of development. But now, in struggle against the real Leninist line of Bolshevism, lame articles and speeches are published saying that in China there is no industry at all, no railways, that China is almost at the early stages of feudalism, that the Chinese are illiterate, etc., that it is too early to put forward the program of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, or for the creation of soviets. Instead of correcting our mistakes, we compound them.

A defeat in China could have direct repercussions on the future of the USSR. If the imperialists unite for a long enough period of time to “pacify” China, they will then march against us, the USSR. The defeat of the Chinese revolution could bring war against the USSR much, much closer. At the present time the party is unable to examine the Chinese problem — a crucial one for it as the first party of the Communist International. A principled discussion of the problems of the Chinese revolution is forbidden. Meanwhile, a violent, unilateral “discussion” is already being conducted by the leading group. This discussion is more precisely a campaign against the Opposition, with the aim of hiding the incorrect line of the dominant wing of the Central Committee.

2. The General Strike of the past year in England, which was betrayed and sold out by the General Council, ended in defeat, as did the miners’ strike. Despite a massive shift to the left by millions of workers, and despite the fact that the treachery and wrongness of reformism have never before been so exposed to the light, the organized revolutionary wing of the English workers’ movement has gained very little influence.

The main cause of this was indecisive, halfhearted, and inconsistent leadership on our part. The financial aid given the English miners by the Russian workers was magnificent. But the tactic of the Central Committee with regard to the Anglo-Russian Committee was completely wrong.

We upheld the authority of the traitors of the General Council during the period that was most critical for them, the weeks and months of the General Strike and the miners’ strike. We helped them stay in control. We ended up capitulating to them at the recent Berlin conference, by recognizing the General Council as the only representative of the English proletariat (and even as the sole representative of their point of view) and by endorsing the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of the English workers’ movement

Against the background of the events in China, the decisions of the recent conference of the Anglo-Russian Committee take on a sinister character. In the entire international press, Tomsky and the other representatives of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) have declared that the Berlin conference had a “cordial character,” that all decisions were made “unanimously,” and that these decisions represent a so-called “victory” for the world proletariat, etc.

This is a falsehood and a lie, and can only lead the English proletariat to new defeats.

The Berlin conference did not say a word about the bandit role played by British imperialism in China, and did not even demand the withdrawal of imperialist troops. At the very moment that a direct war was being launched against the Chinese revolution, the Committee maintained a criminal silence, or, to put it differently, did exactly what the British bourgeoisie needed.

Can anyone doubt for a minute that those who now openly betray the interests of the English proletariat before the eyes of the whole world, even on so serious a question as the freedom of the union movement in England, will tomorrow, in the event of war against the USSR, play the same base and treacherous role as these gentlemen did in 1914?

Between the wrong line followed in China and the wrong line on the question of the Anglo-Russian Committee there is the closest inner connection. The same line pervades all the policies of the Communist International. In Germany, hundreds of left proletarians, the vanguard, have been expelled, for the simple reason that they solidarized with the Russian Opposition. The right-wing elements have more and more influence in all our parties. The crudest right-wing errors (in Germany, Poland, France, and elsewhere) remain uncorrected; yet the slightest voice of criticism from the left meets with expulsion. Thus, the prestige of the AUCP and the October Revolution is used to shift the Communist parties to the right, away from the Leninist line. All this, taken as a whole, prevents the Comintern from preparing for and carrying out the struggle against war in the Leninist manner.

3. No Marxist can dispute that the wrong political line in China and on the Anglo-Russian Committee is no accident. It is an extension and completion of the wrong line in domestic policy.

The economy of the Soviet Union has in general completed its period of reconstruction. During this period, we have registered substantial economic gains. Industry, agriculture, and other branches of the economy are about to reach prewar levels, or have surpassed them. The cooperatives have also registered gains. These advances are the best proof of the correctness of Lenin’s New Economic Policy, and the best reply to the enemies of the October Revolution.

The land of proletarian dictatorship has shown itself entirely capable of socialist construction; it has scored some preliminary successes in this sphere, thereby contributing, along with the proletariat of other countries, to the definitive victory of socialism throughout the world.

However, simultaneously with these solid successes, major difficulties have become evident as a product of the economic reconstruction period. These difficulties, which spring from the insufficient development of our productive forces, i.e,, our general economic backwardness, are made worse by the fact that they are hidden from the ranks of the party as a whole. Instead of a Marxist analysis of the real position of the proletarian dictatorship, a false, petty-bourgeois theory is brought forward of “socialism in one country,” which has absolutely nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism.

This crude reversal of Marxism makes it more difficult for the party to see the class content of the economic processes which are now taking place. And yet it is precisely the class shifts unfavorable to the proletariat and the difficult situation for the broad masses of the population that constitute the negative features of the stage of the revolution that we are now passing through.

The questions of wages and unemployment are taking on an increasingly sharp character.

Incorrect policies are hastening the growth of forces hostile to the proletarian dictatorship: kulaks, NEPmen, and bureaucrats. This makes it impossible to use the material resources of the country as much as we want to and should for industry and the public sector as a whole. The lagging of heavy industry behind the demands of the national economy (the goods famine, high prices, unemployment) and of the entire Soviet system (national defense) strengthens the capitalist elements in our economy — especially in the countryside.

Wages have stopped rising; there is even a tendency to lower them for certain groups of workers. Instead of the practice followed up to now of increasing wages in accordance with increases in labor productivity, it is now being asserted as a general rule that wages can rise only on condition that the intensity of labor goes up (see paragraph two of the resolution of the Congress of Soviets, based on Kuibyshev’s report). This means that from now on workers in the USSR can improve their material situation not in proportion to our economic growth and technological improvements but only as a result of greater physical exertion, a greater expenditure of muscle power. This is the first time the question has been posed this way. Meanwhile the intensity of labor has at present reached the prewar level on the whole and in some cases has even surpassed it. This policy violates the interests of the working class.

Unemployment is growing, at the expense not only of peasants who have come in from the countryside but also of the traditional layer of industrial workers. The actual unemployment is greater than that on the books. The expansion of the army of unemployed worsens the economic situation of the working class as a whole.

The housing conditions of the workers in many places continue to deteriorate in terms of overcrowding and the restriction of tenants’ rights.

The reduction in the number of adolescents hired [under the bronya system of guaranteed employment for a certain percentage of youth newly entering the labor force] and the introduction of unpaid apprenticeships mean an abrupt worsening of conditions for working class youth.

The dangers flowing from all this are clear, because the relationship between our party and the working class is decisive for the future of the workers’ state.

Lowering the prices of manufactured goods has been accomplished only to a very small degree. Despite the Opposition’s voting at the plenum in February of this year in favor of the resolution to lower prices, all the official propaganda has been geared to accusing the Opposition of not wanting to lower prices. Such propaganda leads the party astray and distracts its attention from the fundamental issues in our economic policy. The problem of lowering prices is not helped one bit by this kind of thing. Meanwhile there is growing discontent and impatience among consumers in city and countryside alike.

Differentiation among the peasantry is proceeding at an increasing rate. From the slogan “Enrich yourselves” and the call for the kulak to “grow over into socialism,” the dominant core of the Central Committee has arrived at the point where they maintain complete silence about the differentiation among the peasants and play down this process, on the one hand, and on the other, they place their bets in practice on the “strong peasant.”

On the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution we have a situation in which more than three million agricultural workers play an extremely restricted role in the soviets, the cooperatives, and the Communist Party cells; and the poor peasants are still given inadequate attention and assistance. The resolution of the last Congress of Soviets on agriculture says not one word on the differentiation in the countryside, and so is silent on the essential question of the economic and political development of the countryside. All of this weakens our support in the countryside and impedes the alliance of the working class and poor peasants with the middle peasants.

This alliance can be developed and reinforced only by a systematic struggle against the exploitative aspirations of the kulaks. We tend to underestimate the growth and importance of the kulak. Such a policy is fraught with dangers that are accumulating and can suddenly explode. Nevertheless, the official apparatus of the party and the soviets strikes out at the left, thus leaving the door wide open to the real danger, the class danger from the right.

The proposal to exempt from the agricultural tax 50 percent of peasant households — that is, the poor and badly-off peasants — is bitterly attacked, although the political and economic conditions of the countryside justify the measure completely. A few tens of millions of rubles out of a budget of five billion is of altogether minimal importance, whereas to take this sum from the poorer peasant households is to accelerate the process of differentiation and weaken the position of the proletarian dictatorship in the countryside. “To come to an agreement with the middle peasant - while not for a moment renouncing the struggle against the kulak and at the same time firmly relying solely on the poor peasant” — that is what our policy in the countryside ought to be.

Last September we read an appeal signed by three comrades occupying extremely important posts (Rykov, Stalin, and Kuibyshev) which said that the Opposition, that is, a part of our own party and a part of our Central Committee, wanted to “rob” the peasantry. Instead of that, the appeal promised to follow a “regime of economy” to reduce nonproductive expenditure by 300 to 400 million rubles a year. In reality this bureaucratically distorted struggle to economize has led to new blows against the workers and has shown no tangible positive results.

The rationalization of industry has not been carried out according to an overall, considered plan, and has meant that more and more new categories of workers are being driven into the ranks of the jobless, without any accompanying drop in production costs.

It is necessary to reverse all decisions of the last two years that have worsened the situation for the workers, and to emphasize forcefully that without a planned and systematic improvement — even if at first it is only a slow improvement — in the conditions of the working class, this “main productive force” (Marx), it is impossible, in the present situation, to salvage either the economy or the construction of socialism.

The fundamental prerequisite for solving the problems facing the party at present in the sphere of economic construction, with the highly complicated and confused class relations within the country and the mounting threat of a hostile attack upon the USSR from without, and with the delay of the international proletarian revolution, is the revival of democracy within the party and reinforcement of the real, living, and effective links between the party and the working class.

We need iron discipline in the party, as in Lenin’s time. But we also need democracy in the party, as in Lenin’s time. The whole party, from top to bottom, in Bolshevik fashion, must be ideologically and organizationally a strongly welded collectivity, with real, rather than official, participation as a united force in the solution of all the questions facing the party, the working class, and the whole country.

The internal regime established for the party in recent times has caused an immense decline in the activity of the party, this leading force of the proletarian revolution. For the broad layers of rank-and-file members the opportunities for discussing and helping to solve the essential problems of the revolution in a fully conscious way have been restricted and minimized in the extreme. This could not help but affect the attitude of the working class toward the party and the level of activism of the working class as a whole — and it has affected them in the most negative way.

The regime established in the party has been carried over in full into the unions. The Russian working class, having behind it the experience of three revolutions which it made under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and of Lenin, a class which has cemented the foundations of Soviet power with the blood of its finest sons, which has accomplished miracles of heroism and organization, has all the requirements for putting its creative and organizational abilities to use in the broadest way. But at present the established regime obstructs the development of activism by the workers and prevents them from setting about the construction of socialism to the fullest extent.

The proletarian dictatorship is being weakened in its very class base. At the Eleventh Congress Lenin told the party that the principal task of our economic work is to know how to pick the right people; but the present line runs directly counter to his advice. In practice, in many cases, the most conscientious and most qualified party workers, who show initiative in economic questions, are being driven from the factories, and they are replaced almost always by elements who do not work for socialism but who make themselves the obedient servants of their immediate supervisors. The flagrantly incorrect aspects of the party’s internal regime thus affect the most vital interests of the masses in all their millions.

4. The international situation is becoming more and more tense. The danger of war is increasing. The central task of the AUCP and the entire vanguard of the world proletariat is to avert war (or at least put it off as long as possible), to support and defend at all costs the policy of peace, which only our party and the Soviet power are capable of carrying out in full.

The cause of the USSR is the cause of the world proletariat. To turn aside the danger of a new war threatening the USSR is the most important task of the international proletariat. But we cannot do that by participating in a bloc with the traitors of the General Council. No serious struggle to prevent war is possible in alliance with Purcell and Citrine. To make approaches toward the Social Democratic and unaffiliated workers and involve them in the struggle against war is possible only by going over the heads of their traitorous leaders, and by struggling against them.

We insist that the CC assist the coming plenum of the enlarged Executive of the Comintern to study seriously, in detail, without bias, and relying on documents, the recent events in China (and that they involve in this work the comrades who have defended our point of view). In addition, the ECCI must consider the questions of China and the Anglo-Russian Committee in their fullest aspects, and the press of our party find the international Communist press must provide the opportunity for these problems to be discussed fully and in detail (with all due observance, of course, of the necessary secrecy).

The strengthening of the USSR internationally requires the strengthening of the revolutionary proletarian line within the USSR. We are weakened by the delay in raising wages, the deterioration of the workers’ housing conditions, and the growing unemployment. We are weakened by the incorrect policy toward the poor peasants. We are weakened by the errors in our economic policy. We are weakened by the defeat of the British workers and of the Chinese revolution. We are weakened by a bad internal administration within the party.

All of our party’s policies suffer from the rightward direction they have been given. If the new blow being prepared against the left, against the Opposition, is carried out, it will give a completely free hand to the elements of the right, the non-proletarians and anti-proletarian elements, which are partly inside our party but for the most part outside it. The blow to the left will have the inevitable consequence of the triumph of Ustryalovism. Ustryalov has long been calling for such a blow against the Opposition in the name of a “neo-NEP.” Ustryalov is the most logical, most principled, and most uncompromising enemy of Bolshevism. The self-satisfied administrators, officials who are after their bosses’ jobs, petty-bourgeois elements who have made their way into positions of authority and who look down on the masses — they all feel the ground growing firmer and firmer beneath their feet and they raise their heads higher and higher. These are all neo-NEP elements. Behind them stand the Ustryalovite specialists. And in the last row are the NEPman and the kulak, the latter under the shingle “strong peasant.” This is where the real danger is coming from.

In domestic matters the class shifts have not become so plainly evident as in foreign policy, because the domestic processes have developed much more slowly than the General Strike in England or the revolution in China. But the essential trends of official policy are the same in both areas, and the slower the pace at which they develop domestically, the more seriously and strongly they may come to the fore.

Lenin defined the Soviet state as a workers’ state with bureaucratic deformations in a country with a predominantly peasant population. He said this in early 1921. This definition is more appropriate today than ever before. During the years of NEP, the new bourgeoisie of the city and the countryside has grown into a real force. In this situation, to deliver a blow against the Opposition means nothing other than to try, under the cover of hypocritical cries for unity (“The initiators of a split always cry the loudest for unity,” said Engels), to discredit and destroy the proletarian> Leninist, left wing of our party. Such destruction would mean the swift, inevitable reinforcement of the right wing of the AUCP and the equally inevitable prospect of the subordination of the proletariat’s interests to those of other classes.

5. We always need party unity, especially in the present circumstances. In the school of Lenin we all learned that Bolsheviks must direct their efforts toward unity on the basis of a revolutionary and proletarian political line. During the most adverse historical conditions — throughout the years of illegality; then in 1917, when, in the midst of a world war, we fought for power; in 1918, when, in an unprecedentedly difficult situation, we examined the question of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk; and in the subsequent years under Lenin — the party openly discussed disputed issues and found the correct road to a real unity, not an artificial one. That saved us in situations that were much more serious than the present one.

The main danger is that the actual content of the differences is being hidden from the party and the working class. Every attempt to lay the disputed issues before the party is denounced as an attack on party unity. The wrong line is imposed from above by mechanical means. Thus artificial unity is officially created and “everything is fine.” In reality, this state of affairs weakens the position of the party in the working class and the position of the working class in its struggle against class enemies. Such a situation, which creates tremendous obstacles to the political development of our party and to a correct Leninist leadership, must inevitably result in extremely serious dangers for our party at the first sharp turn, or at the first severe blow, whether domestically or internationally.

We see these dangers clearly and consider it our duty to forewarn the CC, precisely to rally the party ranks on the basis of a Leninist policy in both international and domestic questions.

★ ★ ★

How to eliminate the differences and rectify the class line, without in any way harming the unity of the party?

The way we always did in Lenin’s time.

We propose that the CC decide as follows:

1. Call a plenum of the CC no later than three months before the Fifteenth Party Congress for a preliminary discussion of all the questions confronting the Fifteenth Congress.

2. This plenum must do its utmost to work out unanimous decisions, which will best assure maximum unity and a genuine elimination of the conflict within the party.

3. The plenum must instruct the delegation of the AUCP to the Comintern to take the initiative in carrying out a number of measures in the ECCI to readmit those expelled comrades who request it and who are still supporters of the Comintern’s platform and to create full unity in the fraternal parties, (This would obviously not include such elements as Katz and Korsch.)

4. If nevertheless at this plenum some differences of principle come to light, they will have to be formulated and published in good time. Each comrade must have the opportunity to defend his point of view before the party, in the press and at meetings, as in Lenin’s time.

5. The debate must be conducted in a strictly comradely and businesslike framework, without venom or exaggeration.

6. The draft theses of the CC, of local organizations, and of individual party members or groups of members must be published in Pravda (or in the supplement to Pravda) as well as in local party newspapers, beginning about two or three months before the congress.

7. The party publishing houses must guarantee the timely publication of pamphlets, books, collections of articles, etc., written by comrades who want to express their points of view to the party, even if they are not those of the party majority.

8. The main slogan for the preparation of the congress must be unity — the genuine Leninist unity of the AUCP.

P.S. — Our declaration has naturally been delayed while we collected signatures, and we are obliged to submit it [to the CC] at a time when the leadership is waging a campaign against Zinoviev on the pretext that he spoke on May 9 at a so-called non-party meeting. Those of us who heard Zinoviev’s speech, or who have been able to read a transcript of it, are prepared to place our signatures, without hesitation, at the bottom of the speech. In a restrained way, with irreproachable adherence to party principles, he expressed the alarm felt by broad circles of the party over the arbitrary Martynovist line in Pravda. Zinoviev’s speech of course was simply a pretext to start attacking him. As is evident from our entire document, the direct preparation for this campaign against the Opposition began with the first news of the defeat of the Chinese revolution.

As far as we can tell, the immediate aim of the campaign against Zinoviev is to remove him from the Central Committee, before the congress and without a congress, in order to get rid of one of the critics of the party’s incorrect line during the period of preparations for the congress and at the congress. The same thing could be repeated tomorrow with other Opposition members of the CC. Such procedures can only hurt the party.

The measure taken under the pressure of the Political Bureau to forbid the participation of Zinoviev in the plenum of the Comintern has no precedent in the history of the Communist International. They have removed one of the founders of the Comintern, its first president — elected on the nomination of Lenin. This removal of Zinoviev, who is still a member of the Executive Committee, at a time when the most important problems of the international workers’ movement were under examination, can only be explained by a lack of political courage on the part of those who prefer administrative measures to ideological debate.

Besides its political significance, this action is also a crude violation of the formal rights of Zinoviev, a member of the Executive Committee elected unanimously at the Fifth World Congress. The road of removal and slander of Leninists is not the road of unity for the Communist International.

It is highly probable that this declaration will serve as a pretext to accuse us of factional activity. Above all, the functionaries who are ready for anything and those “men of letters” of the “new” school — the so-called “youth” — will spare no effort. But this declaration is aimed directly at them, among others. Some of them will be the first to abandon the cause of the proletariat in time of danger. In issuing this declaration, we are doing our duty as revolutionaries and as party members as it has always been understood among the ranks of the real Bolshevik-Leninists.

Under this declaration we have collected in a very short time dozens of signatures of Old Bolsheviks. We do not doubt for a minute that other Old Bolsheviks who are widely dispersed in the USSR as well as abroad would have added their signatures to this declaration if they had known about it We do not doubt for a moment that the point of view expressed here is shared by a large section of our party, especially its working class section. Whoever knows the real mood among the working class party members Cunows that this is true.

Aleksandrov, A.N. (party member since 1917); Avramson, A.B. (1914); Alsky, A.S. (1917); Arshavsky, Z. (1915); Beloborodov, A.G. (1907); Belyais, Yan Yanovich (1912); Budzinskaya, R.L. (1914); Babakhan, N. (1917); Visnevskaya (1905); Vorobev, V. (1914); Valentinov, G. (1915); Vilensky (Sibiryakov) (1903); Vujović (member of the ECCI; member of the Yugoslav party since 1912); Vrachev, I. Yak. (1917); Vasilev, Iv. (1904); Vardin, II. (1907); Gertik, Artem (1902); Gertsberg (March 1917); Gessen, S.M. (member of the ECCI elected at the Fifth Congress; member of the AUCP since 1916); Guralsky; Gordon, Nik. (1903); Yemelyanov, N.A. (1899); Yelkovich, N.A. (1917); Yevdokimov, G. Yer. (1903; member of the CC); Yezhov, P.S. (March 1917); Zhuk, Aleks. Vas. (1904); Zinoviev, G.E.; Zorin, S. (May 1917); Zaks-Gladnev (1906); Ivanov, V.I. (1915); Kospersky, I. (March 1917); Katta, M, (1917); Kuklin (1903); Kanatchikova (1914); Kostritsky, I.; Kovalenko, P. (date illegible); Korolev, A. (1916); Kavtaradze (1903); Kozlova-Passek (September 1917); Lelevich, A.G. (1917); Lobashev, G. (1917); Lafshits, B. (1915); Lazko, M. (1905); Lizdin (1892; member of the CCC); Muralov, N.I. (1903; member of the CCC); Minichev (1911); Maleta, V. (1916); Maltsev, B. (1917); Maten, G. (May 1917); Naumov, I.K. (1913); Nazimov, A. Ye. (July 1917); Ostrovskaya, N. (1905); Peterson, A. (1917; member of the CCC); Pozdeeva (1917); Primakov, V. (1914); Pyatakov, Yu, L. (1910; member of the CC); Psalmopevnev (1916); Ravich, O.N. (1903); Radek, K. (1902); Rem. M.S.; Serebryakov, L.P. (1905); Smirnov, Iv. Nik. (1899); Sergeev, A.N. (1914); Sokolov, A.A. (1914); Safarov, G. (1908); Smilga, I.T. (1907; member of the CC); Samsonov, M. (1903); Sosnovsky, L. (1903); Sarkis (1917); Sadovskaya (September 1917); Ter-Vaganyan (1912); Tumanov (April 1917); Trotsky, L.D.; Fedorov, Gr. (1907); Fonbershtein (1917); Foshkin, F.P. (September 1917); Kharitonov, M.M. (1905); Tsaturov, A.A.; Sharov, Ya. (1904); Shurygin, A.S. (1914); Shepsheleva, M.I.; Shuster, A. (1912); Tsibulsky, Z.S. (1904); Eltsin, B. (1898).