Bidassoa

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In a letter to Marx dated January 25, 1858 Engels wrote that he had “to do some preliminary research on ‘Bidassoa’”. On February 12 Marx drew a bill on the editorial board of the New-York Daily Tribune on account of the fee for a few articles beginning with B, including “Bidassoa” (see Note 305). At that time Engels was still working on the article, and it was not received by Marx in London till about February 22-23 (see his letter to Engels of March 2, 1858, present edition, Vol. 40). There is no entry in Marx’s notebook on the dispatch of the article to New York.

The main source used by Engels when writing “Bidassoa” was Napier’s History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814 (vols. I-VI, London, 1828-40).

Bidassoa, a small river of the Basque provinces of Spain, noted for the battles fought upon its banks, between the French under Soult and the English, Spaniards, and Portuguese, under Wellington. After the defeat of Vittoria in 1813, Soult collected his troops in a position, the right of which rested on the sea opposite Fuenterrabia, having the Bidassoa in front, while the centre and left extended across several ridges of hills toward St. Jean de Luz. From this position he once attempted to relieve the blockaded garrison of Pampeluna, but was repulsed. San Sebastian, besieged by Wellington, was now hard pressed, and Soult resolved to raise the siege. From his position of the lower Bidassoa it was but 9 miles to Oyarzun, a village on the road to San Sebastian; and if he could reach that village the siege must be raised. Accordingly, toward the end of Aug. 1813, he concentrated 2 columns on the Bidassoa. The one on the left, under Gen. Clausel, consisting of 20,000 men and 29 guns, took a position on a ridge of hills opposite Vera (a place beyond which the upper course of the river was in the hands of the allies), while Gen. Reille with 18,000 men, and a reserve of 7,000 under Foy, took his station lower down, near the road from Bayonne to Irun. The French intrenched camp to the rear was held by d’Erlon with 2 divisions, to ward off any turning movement of the allied right.

Wellington had been informed of Soult’s plan, and had taken every precaution. The extreme left of his position, sheltered in front by the tidal estuary of the Bidassoa, was well intrenched, though but slightly occupied; the centre, formed by the extremely strong and rugged ridges of San Marcial, was strengthened with field-works, and held by Freire’s Spaniards, the 1st British division standing as a reserve on their left rear near the Irun road. The right wing, on the rocky descents of the Pefia de Haya mountain, was held by Longa’s Spaniards and the 4th Anglo-Portuguese division; Inglis’s brigade of the 7th division connecting it with the light division at Vera, and with the troops detached still further to the right among the hills. Soult’s plan was, that Reille should take San Marcial (which he intended forming into a bridge-head for ulterior operations), and drive the allies toward their right, into the ravines of Pena de Haya, thus clearing the high road for Foy, who was to advance along it straight on Oyarzun, while Clausel, after leaving a division to observe Vera, should pass the Bidassoa a little below that place, and drive whatever troops opposed him up the Pena de Haya, thus seconding and flanking Reille’s attack.

On the morning of Aug. 31, Reille’s troops forded the river in several columns, carried the first ridge of San Marcial with a rush, and advanced toward the higher and commanding ridges of that group of hills. But in this difficult ground his troops, imperfectly managed, got into disorder; skirmishers and supports became mingled, and in some places crowded together in disordered groups, when the Spanish columns rushed down the hill and drove them back to the river. A second attack was at first more successful, and brought the French up to the Spanish position; but then its force was spent, and another advance of the Spaniards drove them back into the Bidassoa in great disorder. Soult having learned in the mean time that Clausel had made good his attack, slowly conquering ground on Pena de Haya, and driving Portuguese, Spaniards, and British before him, was just forming columns out of Reille’s reserves and Foy’s troops for a third and final attack, when news came that d’Erlon had been attacked in his camp by strong forces. Wellington, as soon as the concentration of the French on the lower Bidassoa left no longer any doubt of the real point of attack, had ordered all troops in the hills on his extreme right to attack whatever was before them. This attack, though repulsed, was very serious, and might possibly be renewed. At the same time, a portion of the British light division was drawn up on the left bank of the Bidassoa so as to flank Clausel’s advance. Soult now gave up the intended attack, and drew Reille’s troops back across the Bidassoa. Those of Clausel were not extricated till late in the night, and after a severe struggle to force the bridge at Vera, the fords having become impassable by a heavy fall of rain on the same day, the allies took San Sebastian, except the citadel, by storm, and this latter post surrendered on Sept. 9.

The second battle of the Bidassoa took place Oct. 7, when Wellington forced the passage of that river. Souk’s position was about the same as before; Foy held the intrenched camp of St. Jean de Luz, d’Erlon held Urdax and the camp of Ainhoa, Clausel was posted on a ridge connecting Urdax with the lower Bidassoa, and Reille stood along that river from Clausel’s right down to the sea. The whole front was intrenched, and the French were still employed in strengthening their works. The British right stood opposed to Foy and d’Erlon; the centre, composed of Giron’s Spaniards and the light division, with Longa’s Spaniards and the 4th division in reserve, in all 20,000 men, faced Clausel; while on the lower Bidassoa Freire’s Spaniards, the 1st and 5th AngloPortuguese divisions, and the unattached brigade of Aylmer and Wilson, in all 24,000 men, were ready to attack Reille. Wellington prepared every thing for a surprise. His troops were drawn up well sheltered from the view of the enemy during the night before Oct. 7, and the tents of his camp were not struck. Beside, he had been informed by smugglers of the locality of 3 fords in the tidal estuary of the Bidassoa, all passable at low water, and unknown to the French, who considered themselves perfectly safe on that side.

On the morning of the 7th, while the French reserves were encamped far to the rear, and of the one division placed in 1st line many men were told off to work at the redoubts, the 5th British division and Aylmer’s brigade forded the tidal estuary, and marched toward the intrenched camp called the Sansculottes. As soon as they had passed to the other side, the guns from San Marcial opened, and 5 more columns advanced to ford the river. They had formed on the right bank before the French could offer any resistance; in fact, the surprise completely succeeded; the French battalions, as they arrived singly and irregularly, were defeated, and the whole line, including the key of the position, the hill of Croix de Bouquets, was taken before any reserves could arrive. The camp of Biriatu and Bildox, connecting Reille with Clausel, was turned by Freire’s taking the Mandale hill, and abandoned. Reille’s troops retreated in disorder until they were stopped at Urogne by Soult, who arrived in haste with the reserves from Espelette. While still there, he was informed of an attack on Urdax; but he was not a moment in doubt about the real point of attack, and marched on the lower Bidassoa, where he arrived too late to restore the battle. The British centre, in the mean time, had attacked Clausel, and gradually forced his positions by both front and flank attacks. Toward evening he was confined to the highest point of the ridge, the Grande Rhune, and that hill he abandoned next day. The loss of the French was about 1,400, that of the allies about 1,600 killed and wounded. The surprise was so well managed that the real defence of the French positions had to be made by 10,000 men only, who, on being vigorously attacked by 33,000 allies, were driven from them before any reserves could come to their support.