Battle

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In a letter to Marx of September 18, 1857 Engels promised to send him "Battle", "Battery" and, time permitting, other articles beginning with B in accordance with Dana's request (see Note 49). However, by that time only the first of these articles was ready, and Marx sent it off to New York on September 22, 1857, together with the articles "Blum", "Bourrienne" and "Bennigsen". Marx's notebook contains an entry on the dispatch of these articles on that day.

The encounter of two hostile bodies of troops is called a battle, when these bodies form the main armies of either party, or at least, are acting independently on their own separate seat of war. Before the introduction of gunpowder, all battles were decided by actual hand-to-hand fight. With the Greeks and Macedonians, the charge of the close phalanx bristling with spears, followed up by a short engagement with the sword, brought about the decision.

With the Romans, the attack of the legion disposed in three lines, admitted of a renewal of the charge by the second line, and of decisive manoeuvring with the third. The Roman line advanced up to within 10 or 15 yards of the enemy, darted their pila, very heavy” javelins, into him, and then closed sword in hand. If the first line was checked, the second advanced through the intervals of the first, and if still the resistance was not overcome, the third line, or reserve, broke in upon the enemy’s centre, or fell upon one of his wings. During the middle ages, charges of steel-clad cavalry of the knights had to decide general actions, until the introduction of artillery and small fire-arms restored the preponderance of infantry. From that time the superior number and construction of fire-arms with an army was the chief element in battle, until, in the 18th century, the whole of the armies of Europe had provided their infantry with muskets, and were about on a par as to the quality of their fire-arms. It was then the number of shots fired in a given time, with average precision, which became the decisive element. The infantry was drawn up in long lines, three deep; it was drilled with the minutest care, to insure steadiness and rapid firing, up to 5 times in a minute; the long lines advanced slowly against each other, firing all the while, and supported by artillery firing grape; finally, the losses incurred by one party caused the troops to waver, and this moment was seized by the other party for an advance with the bayonet, which generally proved decisive. If one of the two armies, before the beginning of the battle, had already taken up its position, the other attempted generally to attack it under an acute angle, so as to outflank, and there to envelop, one of his wings; that wing, and the nearest portion of the centre, were thus thrown into disorder by superior forces, and crowded together in deep masses, upon which the attacking party played with his heavy artillery. This was the favorite manoeuvre of Frederick the Great, especially successful at Leuthen.[1] Sometimes, too, the cavalry was let loose upon the wavering infantry of the enemy, and in many instances with signal success; but upon the whole, the quick fire of the infantry lines gave the decision—and this fire was so effective, that it has rendered the battles of this period the bloodiest of modern times. Frederick the Great lost, at Kolin, 12,000 men out of 18,000, and at Kunersdorf, 17,000 out of 30,000,[2] while in the bloodiest battle of all Napoleon’s campaigns, at Borodino,[3] the Russians lost not quite one-half of their troops in killed and wounded.

The French revolution and Napoleon completely changed the aspect of battles. The army was organized in divisions of about 10,000 men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery mixed; it fought no longer in line exclusively, but in column and in skirmishing order also. In this formation it was no longer necessary to select open plains alone for battle-fields; woods, villages, farm-yards, any intersected ground was rather welcome than otherwise. Since this new formation has been adopted by all armies, a battle has become a very different thing from what it was in the 18th century. Then, although the army was generally disposed in three lines, one attack, or at most two or three attacks, in rapid succession, decided its fate; now, the engagement may last a whole day, and even two or three days, attacks, counter-attacks, and manoeuvres succeeding each other, with varying success, all the time through. A battle, at the present day, is generally engaged by the advanced guard of the attacking party sending skirmishers out with their supports. As soon as they find serious resistance, which generally happens at some ground favorable for defence, the light artillery, covered by skirmishers and small bodies of cavalry, advances, and the main body of the advanced guard takes position. A cannonade generally follows, and a deal of ammunition is wasted, in order to facilitate reconnoitring, and to induce the enemy to show his strength. In the mean time, division afjer division arrives, and is shown into its fighting position, according to the knowledge so far obtained of the measures of the enemy. On the points favoring an attack, skirmishers are sent forward, and supported where necessary by lines and artillery; flank attacks are prepared, troops are concentrated for the attack of important posts in front of the main position of the enemy, who makes his arrangements accordingly. Some manoeuvring takes place, in order to threaten defensive positions, or to menace a threatening attack with a counter-charge. Gradually the army draws nearer to the enemy, the points of attack are finally fixed, and the masses advance from the covered positions they hitherto occupied. The fire of infantry in line, and of artillery, now prevails, directed upon the points to be attacked; the advance of the troops destined for the charge follows, a cavalry charge on a small scale occasionally intervening. The struggle for important posts has now set in; they are taken and retaken, fresh troops being sent forward in turns by either party. The intervals between such posts now become the battle-field for deployed lines of infantry, and for occasional bayonet charges, which, however, scarcely at any time result in actual hand-to-hand fight, while in villages, farm-yards, intrenchments, &c, the bayonet is often enough actually used. In this open ground, too, the cavalry darts forward whenever opportunities offer themselves, while the artillery continues to play and to advance to new positions. While thus the battle is oscillating, the intentions, the dispositions, and, above all, the strength of the two contending armies are becoming more apparent; more and more troops are engaged, and it soon is shown which party has the strongest body of intact forces in reserve for the final and decisive attack. Either the attacking party has so far been successful, and may now venture to launch his reserve upon the centre or flank of the defending party, or the attack has been so far repulsed and cannot be sustained by fresh troops, in which case the defending party may bring his reserves forward, and by a powerful charge, convert the repulse into a defeat. In most cases, the decisive attack is directed against some part of the enemy’s front, in order to break through his line. As much artillery as possible is concentrated upon the chosen point; infantry advances in close masses, and as soon as its charge .has proved successful, cavalry dashes into the opening thus made, deploying right and left, taking in flank and rear the enemy’s line, and, as the expression is, rolling it up toward its two wings. Such an attack, to be actually decisive, must, however, be undertaken with a large force, and not before the enemy has engaged his last reserves; otherwise, the losses incurred would be out of all proportion to the very meagre results to be obtained, and might even cause the loss of the battle. In most cases, a commander will rather break off a battle taking a decidedly unfavorable turn, than engage his last reserves, and wait for the decisive charge of his opponent; and with the present organization and tactics, this may in most cases be done with a comparatively moderate loss, as the enemy after a well-contested battle, is generally in a shattered condition also. The reserves and artillery take a fresh position to the rear, under cover of which the troops are gradually disengaged and retire. It then depends upon the vivacity of the pursuit, whether the retreat be made in good order or not. The enemy will send his cavalry against the troops trying to disengage themselves; and cavalry must, therefore, be at hand to assist them. But if the cavalry of the retiring party be routed and his infantry attained before it is out of reach, then the rout becomes general, and the rear-guard, in its new defensive position, will have hard work before it unless night is approaching, which is generally the case.

Such is the average routine of a modern battle, supposing the parties to be pretty equal in strength and leadership; with a decided superiority on one side, the affair is much abridged, and combinations take place, the variations of which are innumerable; but under all circumstances, modern battles between civilized armies will, on the whole, bear the character above described.

  1. At the battle of Leuthen (Lutynia), Silesia, on December 5, 1757, during the Seven Years’ War, the army of Frederick II of Prussia defeated the Austrians. The Seven Years’ War (1756-63)—a war of Britain and Prussia against Austria, France, Russia, Saxony and Sweden. In 1756 and 1757 the Prussians won a number of victories over Austrian and French troops, but the results achieved were nullified by the Russian successes in Prussia (1757-60). As a result of the war France ceded many of its colonies (including Canada and almost all its possessions in the East Indies) to Britain, while Prussia, Austria and Saxony had largely to recognise the pre-war frontiers.
  2. At the battle of Kolin (Bohemia) on June 18, 1757, during the Seven Years’ War, the army of Frederick II of Prussia was routed by the Austrians. At Kunersdorf (Prussia, east of Frankfort on the Oder) the Russian and Austrian armies under the general command of Pyotr Saltykov inflicted a heavy defeat on Frederick II’s army on August 12, 1759. As the result of their victories, the Russians temporarily occupied Berlin in 1760.
  3. See this volume, pp. 251-55.— Ed.