Volunteer Officers

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“Lieutenant A. B., dishonourably discharged; Second Lieutenant C. D., struck off the list; Captain E. F., dismissed the United States service,”—such are a few specimens of the latest items of military news we receive by wholesale from America.

The United States have had a very large volunteer army in the field for the last eight months; they have spared neither trouble nor expense to make this army efficient; and, moreover, it has had the advantage of being posted, almost all that time, in sight of the outposts of an enemy who never dared to attack it in a mass or pursue it after a defeat.[1]

These favourable circumstances ought to make up, to a very large extent, for the disadvantages under which the United States volunteers were organised; for the poor support they got from a very small army of the line, forming their nucleus; and for the want of experienced adjutants and drill instructors. For we must not forget that in America there were many men both fit and ready to assist in the organisation of the volunteers—partly German officers and soldiers who had undergone regular training and seen service in the campaigns of 1848-49, partly English soldiers emigrated during the last ten years.

Now, if under these circumstances a regular weeding of the officers becomes necessary, there must be some weakness inherent, not to the volunteer system in itself, but to the system of officering volunteers by men chosen indiscriminately by themselves from among themselves. It is only after an eight months’ campaign in the face of the enemy that the United States Government ventures to call upon volunteer officers to qualify themselves, in some degree, for the duties they undertook to perform when they accepted their commissions; and see what an amount of voluntary or forced resignations, what a heap of dismissals, more or less dishonourable, is the consequence. No doubt, if the United States army of the Potomac were opposed to a force steadied and kept together by a due proportion of professional soldiers, it would have been dispersed long ago, in spite of its numbers and of the undoubted individual bravery of the men composing it.

These facts may well serve as a lesson to the volunteers of England. Some of our readers may recollect that, from the very starting of the Volunteer Journal,[2] we maintained that the officers were the weak point of the volunteer system, and insisted upon an examination, after a certain time, calling upon the officers to prove that they were at least in a fair way of becoming fit for performing the duties they had undertaken. Most of the gentlemen who had taken upon themselves to command and to instruct men in a line of business of which they were as perfectly ignorant at the time as the men themselves — most of these gentlemen scorned the idea. That was the time when all Government assistance and Government interference were equally scorned. But since then the call upon the pockets of these same gentlemen has been heavy enough to make them apply for pecuniary assistance from Government; and, as Governments run, this means, at the same time, a call for Government interference. Moreover, a two years’ experience has brought out pretty plainly the defects of the present system of officering volunteer corps; and we are now informed by a metropolitan commanding officer,[3] and apparently upon authority, that before long the volunteer officers will be called upon to prove their fitness for command before a board of examination.

We heartily wish this to be the case. The fact is, the English volunteer officers, too, do require weeding to a certain extent. Look at a line regiment at drill, and compare it to a volunteer battalion. What it takes the volunteers an hour and a half to go through, the line men go through in less than half an hour. We have seen a deal of square-forming by some of the best volunteer regiments in the country, and we cannot help saying they must be wretched cavalry that would not have cut them up each time before they had their flanks ready for firing. That was not the fault of the men. They appeared to know their duty as well as could be expected, and to do it sometimes even as mechanically as you see in a line regiment. But the men had to wait for the company officers, who appeared to hesitate about the word of command to be given, and about the moment when they ought to give it. Thus, hesitation and sometimes confusion was thrown into a formation which, above all others, requires a promptness, both of command and of execution, imparted by long practice only. Now, if this be the case after two years’ practice, is this not a proof that there are plenty of volunteer officers holding responsible situations which they are not fit to hold?

Again, the commanders of battalions have lately received some very high praise from the hands of highly competent authority.[4] It was said that they appeared to be up to their work, while the company officers were not always so. We are not at all inclined, as will have been seen above, to dispute the latter statement; but we must say that if the high authority alluded to had seen the lieutenant-colonels and majors, not at a great review, but at plain battalion drill, the opinion given would probably have been slightly different. At a great review, no field officer in command of a battalion, if not perfectly up to his work, would attempt to act on his own responsibility.

He has his adjutant—who knows what he is about—for a prompter; and he is prompted by him accordingly, and goes through his work creditably, while the poor captain has to bungle through his performance without any prompter at all. But look at the same field officer at battalion drill. There he has no vigilant general’s eye watching him; there he reigns supreme; and there the adjutant, often enough, has to take the post assigned to him by the Queen’s[5] ‘ regulations, and must keep his advice to himself until asked for it, or until the mess is complete. This is the place where you see the volunteer field officer in his true light. He is there to instruct his men in battalion drill; but not being himself perfect in that science, he profits of their being there to instruct himself in it. As the old saying goes, docendo discimus[6]! But if the teacher is not well on his legs in the art he has to teach, blunders and confusion are apt to occur, and, unfortunately, do occur often enough. It will not contribute either to the proficiency in drill of a volunteer battalion, or to its confidence in its commander, if the men find out that battalion drill, for them, means nothing but giving their field officer in command an opportunity of learning his drill himself, while they are tossed about here and there, without any purpose even, and expected to rectify, by their superior knowledge, the blunders of their superior officer.

We do not mean to say that commanding officers of volunteers have not put themselves to some trouble to learn their duty; but we do mean to say that if company officers cannot be manufactured out of civilians as easily as private soldiers, field officers are far more difficult to manufacture. We must come to the conclusion, on the mere ground of battalion drill experience, that none but professional soldiers are fit to command battalions. And if we consider that drill is but one part of a field officer’s duty, that the commander of a battalion, being liable to be detached for independent duty, where he has to act on his own responsibility, requires a knowledge of higher tactics, we must say that we should be very sorry to see the lives of 600 or 1,000 men entrusted to the guidance of such civilians as now form the great majority of commanders of battalions.

Depend upon it, if the English volunteers ever will have to face an enemy, it will not be under the favourable circumstances which now permit the American Government to clear the ranks of their volunteer officers from the most incapable subjects. If the English volunteers are called out, it will be to fight, not a volunteer army like themselves, but the most highly disciplined and most active army in Europe. The very first engagements will be decisive; and, depend upon it, if any hesitation or confusion arises, either by the wrong commands of the colonels, or by the uncertainty of the captains, that will be taken advantage of at once. There will be no time for weeding when once before the enemy, and therefore we hope it will be done while there is time.

  1. ↑ Engels refers to the military operations between the armies of the Union (the North) and the Confederacy (the South) during the first eight months of the American Civil War, started in April 1861 by the open revolt of the slave-owning South against the American Union. The main cause of the war was the struggle between two social systems—the capitalist system of wage labour in the North and the slave system in the South. The war, which had the character of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, passed through two stages: constitutional war for the preservation of the Union and revolutionary war for the abolition of slavery. The emancipation of Negro slaves proclaimed by the Lincoln Administration in September 1862 was a turning point in the war. Workers, farmers and the Negro population played a decisive role in the defeat of the slave-owners of the South and the termination of the war in April 1865 in favour of the North. The causes and nature of the events in America are analysed in articles published in the Vienna newspaper Die Presse (see present edition, Vol. 19). p. 521
  2. ↑ See this volume, pp. 415-16.— Ed.
  3. ↑ Colonel Money.— Ed.
  4. ↑ The reference is probably to General George Wetherall.— Ed.
  5. ↑ Victoria.— Ed.
  6. ↑ We learn by teaching.— Ed.