The Sino-Soviet Conflict and the Position of the Belgian Oppositionists

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I think it is necessary to provide a special answer to the article of Comrade Van Overstraeten in Le Communiste, number 25, for three reasons: a) the question itself is of decisive importance for defining the Opposition’s road; b) the Belgian Opposition occupies a high place in our international ranks; c) Comrade Van Overstraeten rightly occupies a leading place in the Belgian Opposition.

At a time when in Germany as in France or in Czechoslovakia the Left Opposition can and must be only a faction, the Belgian Opposition can become an independent party in direct opposition to the Belgian social democracy. It is the direct duty of the international Opposition to help the Belgian Opposition occupy the place which rightly belongs to it, and, above all, to help it publish its weekly paper.

Hence all the more important for the international Opposition as a whole is the political line of our Belgian friends in every specific question. The mistake by Contre le Courant had only symptomatic significance. A mistake by Le Communiste can have political significance. That is why I think it necessary to consider separately Comrade Van Overstraeten’s position on the Sino-Soviet conflict. I shall do it as briefly as possible, in the form of a few separate points, since I have already developed the main considerations on this question in my pamphlet “Defense of the Soviet Republic and the Opposition.”

1. Van Overstraeten writes, “The assertion that Thermidor has been accomplished would be, in our view, a monstrous absurdity. It would lead not only to the worst mistakes. It would be a complete break with any possibility whatsoever of revolutionary activity.”

That is a principle important to the highest degree which separates us irreconcilably from the ultralefts. Here there is complete solidarity between Van Overstraeten and us.

But Van Overstraeten is not right in thinking the question of Thermidor has no direct connection with the appraisal of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Comrade Patri (in La Lutte de classes) has perfectly correctly exposed the fundamental mistake of Louzon who understands imperialism not in the manner of Marx and Lenin but of — Dühring. From the Marxist point of view imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism and is conceivable only on a capitalist base. For Louzon, imperialism is a policy of “intervention" and “conquest"' in general, independent of the regime, of the conditions and aims for which these “interventions” and “conquests” are carried out. That is why the class definition of the Soviet regime is a fundamental postulate in the whole argument. Louzon, who is a formalist, does not see this. But Van Overstraeten is a Marxist. The aid he brings to Louzon on this question is a clear misunderstanding.

2. Comrade Van Overstraeten supports Louzon in another of his mistakes. Concerning my demonstration that keeping the Chinese Eastern Railroad in the hands of the Soviets is important not only for the security of the Russian Revolution but also for the development of the Chinese revolution, Van Overstraeten writes, “R. Louzon says correctly that such a kind of action really places on the USSR the elementary duty of merciless struggle for the liberation of the whole of Manchuria from every kind of reactionary oppression."

In other words, either the Soviet republic should voluntarily give up the railroad to Manchuria’s worst oppressor or it is obliged at a single blow to liberate Manchuria from every kind of oppression. This alternative corresponds to nothing. If the Soviet republic were strong enough it would clearly be obliged to come to the help of the oppressed masses of Manchuria and of the whole of China, with weapons in hand. But the Soviet republic is not strong enough to do so.

However, this lack of strength does not impose on it the diametrically opposite political obligation to give up the railroad voluntarily to Manchuria’s reactionary oppressor and to the agent of Japan who, it is relevant to recall, is opposed, actually, to the unification of China, even under the rule of Chiang Kai-shek.

3. Van Overstraeten writes, “An offer simply to return the Eastern Railroad would directly show the Chinese masses the entire falsity of the charge of red imperialism brought by Chiang Kai-shek against the Soviet Union.”

Here the return of the railroad to the enemy is considered from the point of view of propaganda and of the best methods for unmasking Chiang Kai-shek. But if the argument is extended, it follows that by surrendering all its arms to its bourgeois neighbors Soviet Russia would refute better than in any other way the charge of red militarism. The best way of showing you are not preparing to attack anyone is to cut your throat.

4. Van Overstraeten formulates my “mistake” in the following way: “He [Trotsky] substitutes the fictitious defense of the revolutionary interests of the Manchurian proletariat for the real defense of the economic interests of the USSR.”

Here two false ideas are joined. Firstly, I have nowhere considered the question from the standpoint of the fundamental interests of the Manchurian proletariat. For me, it is a matter of the interests of the Russian and Chinese revolutions as a whole. Manchuria is one of the main and most solid bridgeheads of the Chinese counterrevolution. Even Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang could not make itself master of the situation in Manchuria — neither formally nor factually — except by waging war against the Northerners. In the event of such a war breaking out, the railroad would be in Chang Tso-lin’s hands, a formidable weapon even against the bourgeois unification of China. In the event of a new, i.e., a third Chinese revolution, Manchuria would play the fatal role that the Don and Kuban played in the Russian Revolution, or the Vendée in the French Revolution. It goes without saying that the railroad would also be included in that role.

The second error in the lines quoted is that for some reason it speaks only of the economic interests of the Soviet republic in the East, which in reality play a tertiary role. We are dealing with the situation of the USSR in international encirclement. Imperialism is probing the resilience of the Soviet republic at different points. Each “probe” of this kind poses or can pose the question: Is it worthwhile undertaking a war for the Chinese railroad? Is it worthwhile for Mongolia? Or for Karelia? Is it for Minsk and Byelorussia? Or is it for Georgia? Is it worthwhile undertaking a war over the repayment of American debts? Is it for the restoration to the Americans of their former factories? Is it for the recognition of the rights of the Russo-Asiatic Bank? And so on. Only a formalist can make principled distinctions between these questions. In essence, they are practical variants of one and the same question: Is it necessary, in the present case, to give battle or is it more advantageous to withdraw before imperialism’s attack? Circumstances can dictate retreat (and they did dictate it, often). But, then, it is necessary to call the abandonment of a position a compulsory, partial capitulation and not cover oneself with the principle of “national self-determination,” i.e., without making a virtue of necessity, as the Germans say.

5. Van Overstraeten sees my main mistake in the fact that I pose “the question of the defense of the USSR even before giving an answer to the question of the defense of peace.”

Here, unfortunately, Van Overstraeten gets completely lost in pacifism. Defense of peace in general does not exist, certainly if we do not count the belated discoveries of Briand on the need to educate children in the spirit of love for neighbors (and for German reparations). For the revolutionary proletariat the Sino-Soviet conflict poses the question not of the defense of peace in general — which peace? on what conditions? in whose interest? — but precisely of the defense of the Soviet republic. This is the main criterion. Only afterwards does the second question arise: How to ensure the defense of the Soviet republic in the present concrete circumstances: by hostilities or by temporary retreat in order to protect oneself against an attack? This question is resolved in approximately the same way as the trade unions resolve the question of whether to make concessions to the capitalists cutting wages or whether to call a strike. If it is headed by revolutionists, the trade union resolves the strike question according to the total situation which determines the relation of forces of the two sides, but in no way according to the principle of preserving “industrial peace.” If one approaches the Sino-Soviet conflict with a Marxist criterion, it is impossible not to recognize that the defense of peace in general is as unacceptable as the defense of industrial peace, for in both cases it is a question of class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, on national or international scales.

If Van Overstraeten had simply said, “Better to pull out from the Chinese Eastern Railroad but preserve peace,” one could understand the position. Certainly the question would still be open whether this concession would not sharpen the appetites of our (many) enemies and whether it would not aggravate the situation still further. But that is a practical question of simple analysis which has nothing at all to do with the philosophy of Soviet “imperialism.” What would then be involved would not be doing one’s pseudo-duty with regards to Chinese pseudo-independence, but of buying off the enemy. That would mean, not putting the defense of peace above the defense of the Soviet Union, but only considering that in the given conditions the defense of the Soviet Union can be better assured by conceding a part of its property to the class enemy.

After the crushing of the Chinese revolution, given the strengthening of stability in Europe, war is particularly disadvantageous for the Soviet republic. Of that there can be no doubt. But the enemy camp also finds it difficult to decide on war. Chiang Kai-shek can undertake it only with the active intervention of world imperialism. Now, for this last, the attitude of the proletariat, even of individual sections of the proletariat, is of immense importance. He who shouts: give up to the Japanese agent Chang Tso-lin or to the counterrevolutionary Chiang Kai-shek the railroad which belongs to the Soviet republic; he who conceals the meaning of the slogan “Hands off China”; he who, directly or indirectly, supports the charge of red imperialism, thereby modifies the relation of forces to the advantage of Chang Tso-lin, Chiang Kai-shek, and world imperialism, and consequently, in the present circumstances, in practice increases the chances of military conflict.

6. In the first weeks following the seizure of the railroad, the newspaper reports, like the statements of the representatives of the Soviet government, allowed one to think with enough certainty that there would be a peaceful settlement of the conflict. However, its prolonged character not only complicates the situation extremely, but allows one to think that a third force whose role we know only too little as yet is taking a part in the game. Has Soviet diplomacy maneuvered well or badly? — that is the fundamental question. To solve it we do not have at our disposal all the necessary elements. But if it has committed tactical mistakes, which is very likely, it is not in the sense of an imperialist breach of China’s national rights, but in the sense of a factual appreciation of the situation. If, as I'Humanité firmly forecasts in an article of September 25, war will break out this fall, the consequence can be regarded as incalculable. We don’t know the source of l'Humanité's information. But the Opposition must be firmly prepared for this kind of sharp turn, too.

Van Overstraeten ends his article with two slogans: “For the defense of the Soviet Union!” “Against Stalinism!” The two slogans are completely correct. The Russian Opposition has always posed the question in this way. But that also means precisely that, in the event of war, the Oppositionists will be entirely and without reservation on the side of the Soviet republic. And they must, as of now, before the working masses, implacably set themselves off from all those who, on this cardinal question, adopt an ambiguous position.