Tasks of the Spanish Communists

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Dear Comrades:

I warmly salute the appearance of the first issue of your newspaper. The Spanish Communist Opposition enters the arena at a particularly favourable and decisive moment.

The Spanish crisis is unfolding at this time with remarkable regularity, which affords the proletarian vanguard a certain amount of time to prepare itself. However, it is doubtful whether this period will last very long.

The Primo de Rivera dictatorship has fallen without a revolution, from internal exhaustion. In the beginning, in other words, the question was decided by the sickness of the old society and not by the revolutionary forces of a new society. This is not simply an accident. On the one hand, the dictatorial regime, in the eyes of the bourgeois classes, was no longer justified by the urgent need to smash the revolutionary masses; at the same time, this regime came into conflict with the economic, financial, political, and cultural needs of the bourgeoisie. But up to the last moment, the bourgeoisie avoided a showdown struggle with all its might. It allowed the dictatorship to rot and fall like wormy fruit.

Afterwards, the different classes, represented by their various political groups, were obliged to take clear-cut positions before the masses. And here we observe a paradox. The same bourgeois parties that because of their conservatism had refused to conduct a serious struggle, no matter how small, against the military dictatorship, now have put all the blame for that dictatorship on the monarchy and declared themselves republicans. As though the dictatorship had been hanging by a thread from the balcony of the royal palace the whole time, and as though it had not been kept up at all by the support, sometimes passive, sometimes active, of the most substantial layers of the bourgeoisie who, with all their strength, paralysed the activity of the petty bourgeoisie and trampled underfoot the workers of city and countryside.

And what is the result? While not only the workers, the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the young intellectuals, but also almost all of the big bourgeoisie either are or call themselves republicans, the monarchy continues to exist and to function. If Primo did hang only by a thread from the monarchy, then by what thread did the monarchy hang, in such a "republican" country? At first glance, it appears to be an insoluble riddle. But the answer is not so complicated. The same bourgeoisie that was "tolerating" Primo de Rivera was actually supporting him, as today it supports the monarchy by the only means available, that is, by calling itself republican and thus adapting itself to the psychology of the petty bourgeoisie, the better to deceive and paralyse it.

For a bystander, this scene, despite its high drama, is not without its comical side. The monarchy is sitting on the back of the republican bourgeoisie, which is in no hurry to throw it off. The bourgeoisie, slipping stealthily among the restless masses with its precious load, answers the protests, complaints, and curses in the voice of a slapstick comedian: "Look at this creature on my back! It is my sworn enemy. I will list its crimes for you: pay attention!" etc., etc. And when the crowd, amused by this spectacle, begins to laugh, the bourgeoisie takes advantage of this favourable occasion to carry its load a little further on. If this is what is meant by struggling against the monarchy, then what is meant by a struggle in support of it?

The spirited demonstrations of the students are only an attempt by the younger generation of the bourgeoisie, and especially of the petty bourgeoisie, to find a solution to the instability into which the country fell after its supposed liberation from Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, of which the basic elements are still totally preserved. When the bourgeoisie consciously and obstinately refuses to resolve the problems that flow from the crisis of bourgeois society, and when the proletariat is not yet ready to assume this task, then it is often the students who come forward. During the development of the first Russian revolution [1905], we observed this phenomenon more than once, and we have always appreciated its symptomatic significance. Such revolutionary or semi-revolutionary student activity means that bourgeois society is going through a profound crisis. The petty-bourgeois youth, sensing that an explosive force is building up among the masses, try in their own way to find a way out of the impasse and to push the political developments forward.

The bourgeoisie regards the student movement half-approvingly, half-warningly; if the youth deal a few blows to the monarchical bureaucracy, that's not so bad, as long as the "kids" don't go too far and don't arouse the toiling masses.

By backing up the student movement, the Spanish workers have shown an entirely correct revolutionary instinct. Of course, they must act under their own banner and under the leadership of their own proletarian organization. It is Spanish communism that must guarantee this process and for that a correct policy is indispensable. That is why the appearance of your newspaper, as I said before, coincides with an extraordinarily important and critical moment in the development of the whole crisis; to be more precise, it coincides with a moment when the revolutionary crisis is being transformed into a revolution.

The workers' strike movement, their struggle against industrial reorganization and unemployment, takes on a totally different, incomparably more profound importance in the context of the extreme discontent of the petty-bourgeois masses and of the sharp crisis in the system as a whole. The workers' struggle must be closely linked to all the questions that flow from the national crisis. The fact that the workers demonstrated with the students is the first step, though still an insufficient and hesitant one, on the proletarian vanguard's road of struggle toward revolutionary hegemony.

Taking this road presupposes that the communists will struggle resolutely, audaciously, and energetically for democratic slogans. Not to understand this would be to commit the greatest sectarian mistake. At the present stage of the revolution, the proletariat distinguishes itself in the field of political slogans from all the "leftist" petty-bourgeois groupings not by rejecting democracy (as the Anarchists and syndicalists do) but by struggling resolutely and openly for it, at the same time mercilessly denouncing the hesitations of the petty bourgeoisie.

By advancing democratic slogans, the proletariat is not in any way suggesting that Spain is heading toward a bourgeois revolution. Only barren pedants full of pat, ready-made formulas could pose the question this way.. Spain has left the stage of bourgeois revolution far behind.

If the revolutionary crisis is transformed into a revolution, it will inevitably pass beyond bourgeois limits, and in the event of victory the power will have to come into the hands of the proletariat. But in this epoch, the proletariat can lead the revolution — that is, group the broadest masses of the workers and the oppressed around itself and become their leader — only on the condition that it now unreservedly puts forth all the democratic demands, in conjunction with its own class demands.

First of all, these slogans will be of decisive importance for the peasantry. The peasantry cannot give the proletariat its confidence a priori by accepting the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a verbal pledge. The peasantry, being a large oppressed class, at a certain stage inevitably sees in the democratic slogan the possibility for the oppressed to overthrow the oppressors. The peasantry will inevitably link the slogan of political democracy with the slogan of the radical redistribution of the land. The proletariat will openly support both demands. At the proper time, the communists will explain to the proletarian vanguard the road by which these demands can be achieved, thus sowing the seeds for the future soviet system.

Even on national questions, the proletariat defends the democratic slogans to the hilt, declaring that it is ready to support by revolutionary means the right of different national groups to self-determination, even to the point of separation.

But does the proletarian vanguard itself raise the slogan of the secession of Catalonia? If it is the will of the majority, yes; but how can this will be expressed? Obviously, by means of a free plebiscite, or an assembly of Catalan representatives, or by the parties that are clearly supported by the Catalan masses, or even by a Catalan national revolt. Again we see, let us note in passing, what reactionary pedantry it would be for the proletariat to renounce democratic slogans. Meanwhile, as long as the national minority has not expressed its will, the proletariat itself will not adopt the slogan of separation, but it pledges openly, in advance, its complete and sincere support to this slogan in the event that it should express the will of Catalonia.

It is useless to say that the Catalan workers do not have the final word to say on this question. If they came to the conclusion that it would be unwise to divide their forces in the present crisis, which opens such sweeping opportunities to the Spanish proletariat, the Catalan workers would have to aim their propaganda toward maintaining Catalonia as a part of Spain, on one or another basis. As for me, I believe that political judgement suggests such a solution. Such a solution would be acceptable for the time being even to the most fervent separatists, since it is completely obvious that in the event of the victory of the revolution, it would be ever so much easier than it is today for Catalonia, as well as for other regions, to achieve the right of self-determination.

By supporting all really democratic and revolutionary movements of the popular masses, the communist vanguard will be leading an uncompromising struggle against the so-called republican bourgeoisie, unmasking its double-dealing, its treachery, and its reactionary character, and resisting its attempts to subject the toiling masses to its influence.

The communists never relinquish their freedom of political action under any conditions. It must not be forgotten that during a revolution temptations of this sort are very great: the tragic history of the Chinese revolution is irrefutable testimony to this, i * But while safeguarding the full independence of their organization and their propaganda, the communists nonetheless practice, in the broadest fashion, the policy of the united front, for which the revolution offers a vast field.

The Left Opposition begins the application of the united-front policy with the official Communist Party. The bureaucrats must not be allowed to create the impression that the Left Opposition is hostile to the workers who follow the banner of the official Communist Party. On the contrary, the Opposition is ready to take part in all the revolutionary activity of the proletariat and to struggle side by side with those workers. If the bureaucrats refuse to act together with the Opposition, then they must bear the full responsibility for this refusal in the eyes of the working class.

The continuation of the Spanish crisis means the revolutionary awakening of millions among the toiling masses. Nothing indicates that they will suddenly enlist under the banner of communism. Instead, they will probably first reinforce the party of the radical petty bourgeoisie, that is to say, primarily the Socialist Party, especially its left wing, as was the case, for example, with the German Independents during the 1918-1919 revolution. That is how the broad and real radicalization of the masses will be expressed, and not in a growth of "social fascism." Fascism could triumph anew — and this time in a more "social" than "military" form, i. e., like the "social fascism" of Mussolini — only as a consequence of the defeat of the revolution and the disillusionment of the betrayed masses who had believed in it. But in the face of the steady development of recent events, a defeat can take place only as a consequence of extraordinary errors on the part of the communist leadership.

Verbal radicalism and sectarianism in combination with an opportunist assessment of class forces, a policy of zig-zags, bureaucratic leadership — in a word, everything that goes to make up the essence of Stalinism — are the very things that can reinforce the position of the Social Democracy, the most dangerous enemy of the proletariat, as the experience of the German and Italian revolutionists showed with particular clarity.

Social Democracy must be politically discredited in the eyes of the masses. But this cannot be achieved by means of insults. The masses trust only their own collective experience. They must be given the opportunity during the preparatory period of the revolution to compare in action the communist policies with those of the Social Democrats.

The struggle to win over the masses will unquestionably create the conditions for this, if the communists insist in full view of the masses on a united front with the Social Democrats. Liebknecht had many areas of agreement with the Independents, especially with their left wing. There was an outright bloc between the Bolsheviks and the Left Social Revolutionaries. And right up to the insurrection we reached a series of specific agreements with the Menshevik-Internationalists and made dozens of proposals for a united front. We lost nothing from this policy. But, of course, what was involved was not a united front like the Anglo-Russian Committee, which meant that at the time of. a revolutionary general strike the Stalinists blocked with the strikebreakers. And of course it did not involve a united front in the spirit of the Kuomintang, when, under the false slogan of a union of workers and peasants, a bourgeois dictatorship over the workers and peasants was ensured.

Such are the tasks and perspectives as they seem from the sidelines. I am sharply aware to what degree the above comments are lacking in concreteness. It is quite probable and even likely that I have left out a number of extremely important circumstances. You will see for yourselves. Armed with Marxist theory and Leninist revolutionary method, you will find your road by yourselves. You will know how to grasp the thoughts and sentiments of the working class and give them clear political expression. The purpose of my letter is only to recapitulate in a general way the principles of revolutionary strategy that have been confirmed by the experience of three Russian revolutions.

Warm regards and my best wishes for success.

Yours,

L. Trotsky