Philosophical Tendencies of Bureaucratism

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We now have for ourselves favorable conditions for examining the question of the philosophical tendencies of bureaucratism. Of course the bureaucracy was never an independent class. In the last analysis it always served one or the other of the fundamental classes in society – but only in the last analysis and in its own special way – that is, allowing as little injury to itself as possible. If it is true that fairly often one sector or layer of a class will wage a bitter struggle for its share of the income and power, how much truer this is of the bureaucracy, which constitutes the most organized and centralized sector of civil society and which at the same time towers over and above society, including the class which it serves.

The labor bureaucracy does not constitute an exception to this general definition of that social grouping which rules and administers and is therefore privileged. The methods and habits of administration, which is of course the main social function of bureaucracy and the source of its preeminence, inevitably leave a very powerful imprint on its entire way of thinking. It is no accident that such terms as bureaucratic and formalistic apply not only to a system of management or administration but also to a definite mode of human thought. The characteristics of this type of thinking extend far beyond government departments alone. They are to be found in philosophy as well. It would be a highly gratifying task to trace the strand of bureaucratic thought down through the history of philosophy, beginning with the rise of the monarchical police state, which gathered around itself the intellectual forces of the country in which it arose. But that is a separate topic. What interests us here is a partial question, but one of great current importance – the tendency toward bureaucratic degeneration in the realm of theory, just as much as in the party, the trade unions, and the state. We can already say in an a priori way that since being determines consciousness, bureaucratism was bound to make devastating gains in the realm of theory as it has in all others.

The most appropriate system of thought for a bureaucracy is the theory of multiple causality, a multiplicity of "factors." This theory arises on the broadest basis out of the social division of labor itself, in particular the separation of mental from manual labor. It is only by this route that humanity emerges from the chaos of primitive monism. But the perfected form of multiple-factor theory, which transforms human society, and in its wake the entire world, into the product of the interplay (or what we might call the interdepartmental relations) of various factors or administrative forces, each of which is assigned its own special province or area of jurisdiction – this kind of system can be elevated to the status of "pearl of creation" only if there is present a bureaucratic hierarchy which, with all its ministries and departments, has raised itself over and above society.

A bureaucratic system, as experience has shown, needs a single individual to crown the system. Bureaucracy originally arises under monarchy and therefore has its historically inherited point of support at the top. But even in republican countries bureaucratism has more than once given rise to Caesarism., Bonapartism, or the personal dictatorship of fascism, whenever the balance of forces between the fundamental classes has opened up the possibility of a single individual gaining supreme power, or establishing himself as the crown of the system.

The theory of self-contained factors both in society and in nature ultimately needs to be crowned by one-man rule just as an oligarchy of powerful ministers does. In practical matters there arises an unavoidable question: Who in the final analysis will guide and coordinate the activity of the various more or less autonomous, nonresponsible ministers if there is no superminister or superbureaucrat? By the same token, on the theoretical plane, the same kind of question arises in regard to the theory of factors both for society and for nature. Who after all put these factors in their places? And entrusted them with the necessary powers of jurisdiction? In a word, if in politics bureaucratism requires a tsar or dictator, however poor in quality, then in theory the pluralism of factors requires a god, however lightweight that divinity may be. The French royalists, not without a touch of wit, accused the bureaucratic system of the Third Republic of having a "hole at the top." Things developed in such a way that for more than half a century bourgeois France was necessarily ruled by a bureaucracy concealed behind a parliamentary system, that is, with a hole at the top. The same thing holds true for philosophy, especially social and historical philosophy. Philosophy by no means always finds within itself the courage to fill the hole at the top with the superfactor of divinity. Instead it grants the world the opportunity of being ruled by the methods of enlightened oligarchy.

In essence the multiple-factor theory cannot get along without a deity. It simply disperses the divine omnipotence among the various lesser rulers with more or less equal powers – economics, politics, law, morality, science, religion, aesthetics, etc. Each of these factors has its own subagents, whose number increases or decreases depending on what is convenient for the administrative authority – that is to say, for the given level of theoretical cognition. At any rate power and authority proceed from the top down, from the "factors" to the facts. That is what gives this theoretical system its idealist character. Each factor, which in essence is nothing but a generalized term for a group of similar or homogeneous facts, is granted special immanent powers – powers supposedly inherent to said factor – to govern the body of facts under its imagined jurisdiction. Exactly like some governing bureaucrat, including one of the republican type, each factor partakes of the necessary grace, even if secularized, to administer the affairs of the department entrusted to it. Carried to its ultimate conclusion, the factor theory is a particular variety, and a very widespread one, of immanent idealism.

The breakdown of nature into subsidiary factors was a necessary rung in the ladder by which human consciousness rose from primitive chaos. Actually, however, the question of the interplay of factors, their jurisdictions, and their origins only raises the most fundamental questions of philosophy [without answering them]. The road must either ascend toward the act of Creation and a Creator or descend toward the earth's crust, of which human beings are a product – that is, to nature and to matter. Materialism does not simply reject factors, just as dialectics does not simply reject logic. Materialism makes use of factors as a system of classification of phenomena which have arisen historically – no matter how specifically their spiritual essence may have been "delimited" – out of the underlying productive forces and relations of society and from the natural, historical, i.e., material, foundations of nature.

[The following is an example of how the immanent-idealist outlook of the bureaucrats is expressed on the particular question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.]

What is the dictatorship of the proletariat? It is an organized correlation between classes in a certain form. These classes, however, do not remain immobile but change materially and psychologically, consequently changing the relationship of forces between them, that is, strengthening or weakening the dictatorship of the proletariat. That is what the dictatorship is for a Marxist. But for a bureaucrat the dictatorship is an autonomous, self-sufficient factor, or metaphysical category, that stands over and above actual class relations and bears within itself all the necessary guarantees. On top of that, every bureaucrat is inclined to see the dictatorship as a guardian angel hovering over his desk.

Erected upon this metaphysical conception of the dictatorship are all the arguments to the effect that since we have a dictatorship of the proletariat, the peasantry could not be experiencing a differentiation, the kulaks could not be growing stronger, and if the kulaks are growing stronger, that means they will grow over into socialism. In a word the dictatorship is transformed from a class relationship into a self-sufficient principle in relation to which economic phenomena are merely some sort of emanation. Of course none of the bureaucrats carry this system of theirs through to the end. They are too empirical for that and too closely tied to their own past. But their thinking moves along these exact lines and the theoretical sources of their errors must be sought along this path.

Marxism transcended the theory of factors to arrive at historical monism. The process that we now observe is regressive in character, because it represents a movement away from Marxism toward a metaphysical oligarchy of factors.

[The movement away from Marxism in the realm of theory was especially clearly expressed in Stalin's writings. For example, the following excerpt from Stalin's Problems of Leninism, written in 1924 and reissued in 1928.]

"The importance of theory. Some think that Leninism is the primacy of practice before theory in the sense that it is merely the translation of Marxist theses into deeds, their 'execution.' As for theory, it is alleged that Leninism is rather unconcerned about it." ["Foundations of Leninism," in the 1928 Russian ed., p. 89; the translation in Stalin's English-language Works is much more polished than the Russian original, its grammar in particular – Trans.]

This passage is a veritable Stalin microcosm. It represents equally his theoretical depth, his polemical sharpness, and his honesty toward his opponents. When Stalin said "some think," he was talking about me at a time when he had not yet decided to name me by name. All the professors, journalists, and reviewers had not yet been hand-picked sufficiently and Stalin had not yet assured himself the last word or in many cases the only word. He needed to attribute to me the absurd statement that Leninism was unconcerned about theory. How could he do that? By saying "some think" that Leninism is only "the translation of Marxist theses into deeds," only "execution." This is Stalin's translation of my words: "Leninism is Marxism in action." As he would have it, my formulation implied that Leninism was "unconcerned" about Marxism. But how is it possible for someone to translate Marxist theory into deeds while remaining "unconcerned" about Marxist theory? Stalin's own attitude toward theory cannot be called "unconcerned" for the sole reason that it is the indifference of the maneuverer. But for that very reason it never occurs to anyone to say that Stalin translates theory into deeds. What Stalin translates into deeds are the promptings of the party bureaucracy, which in turn refract subterranean impulses from class forces. Leninism is Marxism in action – that is, theory that has taken on flesh and blood. That formulation could be described as lack of concern with theory only by someone who was choking on his own spite. For Stalin that is the normal situation. The outer appearance of bureaucratic colorlessness in his articles and speeches barely conceals the all-consuming hatred that he feels for anything that surpasses his own level. By the same token, Stalin's so-called thought, like a scorpion, often strikes its own head with its poisoned tail.

What is meant by the assertion "Leninism is the primacy of practice before theory"? Here even the grammar is wrong. One should say, "primacy over theory …" or "in relation to theory." The issue of course is not grammar, which in general leads a very hand-to-mouth existence in the pages of Stalin's Problems of Leninism. What interests us is the philosophical content of the sentence. The author argues against the idea that Leninism proceeds from the primacy of practice over theory. But after all, that is the essence of materialism. Even if we use the antiquated philosophical term primacy, it must be said that practice has the same indisputable primacy over theory as being over consciousness, matter over spirit, and the whole over the part. For theory arises out of practice, engendered by practical needs, and constitutes a more or less incomplete or imperfect generalization upon practice.

In that case, are the empiricists not right – they who guide themselves by "direct" practice as the highest court of authority? Are they not, then, the most consistent materialists? No, they represent a caricature of materialism. To be guided by theory is to be guided by generalizations based on all the preceding practical experience of humanity in order to cope as successfully as possible with one or another practical problem of the present day. Thus, through theory we discover precisely the primacy of practice-as-a-whole over particular aspects of practice.

Asserting the primacy of economics over politics, Bakunin rejected the political struggle. He did not understand that politics is generalized [or concentrated] economics and that consequently it is impossible to resolve the most important – that is, the most general – economic problems while avoiding generalization through politics.

Now we can appraise Stalin's philosophical thesis [given above] on the importance of theory. He stands the true relation between theory and practice on its head. He equates the practical implementation of theory with disregard for theory, he attributes an obviously absurd idea to his opponent and does so with the worst intentions, speculating on the worst instincts of the poorly informed reader. This totally contradictory, self-devouring thesis finds itself, on top of everything else, in total disarray grammatically. It is for these reasons that we call it a microcosm.

What sort of definition of Leninism does Stalin counterpose to mine? Here is the definition that unites Stalin with Zinoviev and Bukharin and which has found its way into every [official Soviet] textbook: [This is from Stalin's Problems of Leninism, page 74.] "Leninism is the Marxism of the age of imperialism and proletarian revolution. More exactly Leninism is the theory and tactics of proletarian revolution in general and the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular."

The lack of substance of that definition and at the same time its contradictory nature betray themselves if we simply ask ourselves, what is Marxism? Let us review once again its main elements.

First of all, the dialectical method. Marx was not its originator and of course never pretended to be. Engels felt that it was the merit of Marx that he revived and defended dialectics at a time of epigonism in philosophy and of narrow empiricism in the positive sciences. Engels in the "Old Preface" to Anti-Dühringsaid the following: "It is the merit of Marx that, in contrast to the 'peevish, arrogant, mediocre epigonoi (epigones) who now talk large in cultured Germany,' he was the first to have brought to the fore again the forgotten dialectical method" [See Marx and Engels, Selected Works in Three Volumes (Moscow: Progress Publishers), vol. 3, p. 64]. Marx was able to accomplish this only by freeing dialectics from idealist captivity. Here there is an enigma: How is it possible to separate dialectics from idealism in such a mechanical way? The answer to the enigma in turn lies in the dialectics of the cognitive process itself. Whenever primitive religion or magic acquired new knowledge about some force of natural law, it immediately numbered that law or force among its own powers. In the same way cognitive thought, having extracted the laws of dialectics from the material process, attributed dialectics to itself; at the same time, through Hegelian philosophy, it assumed absolute omnipotence for itself. The shaman rightly noted the widespread belief that rain falls from the clouds. But he was wrong to think that by imitating one or another characteristic of a cloud, he could cause the rain to fall. Hegel erred in making dialectics an immanent attribute of absolute Spirit. But he was right that dialectics holds sway in all processes of the universe, including human society.

Basing himself on all preceding materialist philosophy and on the unconscious materialism of the natural sciences, Marx led dialectics out of the barren wastelands of idealism and turned its face toward matter, its mother.

It is in this sense that dialectics, restored to its rights by Marx and materialized by him, constitutes the foundation of the Marxist view of the world, the fundamental method of Marxist analysis.

The second most important component of Marxism is historical materialism, that is, the application of materialist dialectics to the structure of human society and its historical development. It would be wrong to dissolve historical materialism into dialectical materialism, of which it is an application. For historical materialism to be applied to human history, a very great creative act by cognitive thought was necessary. That act opened up a new epoch in the history of humanity itself, the class dynamics of which it reflected in itself.

It can be said with full justification that Darwinism is a brilliant application – though one that, philosophically, was not thoroughly thought out – of materialist dialectics to the question of the development of the organic world in all its multiplicity and variety. Historical materialism falls into the same category. It is an application of materialist dialectics to a distinct, although enormous, part of the universe. The immediate practical importance of historical materialism is at this time immeasurably greater, since for the first time it provides the vanguard class with the opportunity of approaching the question of human destiny in a fully conscious way. Only the full victory of historical materialism in practice – that is, the establishment of a technically and scientifically powerful socialist society – will open up the practical possibility of a thorough application of the laws of Darwinism to the human species itself, with the aim of modifying or overcoming the biological contradictions lodged in human beings.

The third component part of Marxism is its systemization of the laws of capitalist economy. Marx's Capital is an application of historical materialism to the realm of human economics at a particular stage of its development, just as historical materialism as a whole is an application of materialist dialectics to the realm of human history.

The Russian subjectivists – that is, the empiricists of the idealist school and their epigones – fully acknowledged the competence and authority of Marxism in the field of capitalist economics, but they denied that it could be properly applied to other spheres of human endeavor. This kind of disjunction is based on a crude fetishization of the distinct, homogeneous historical factors (economics, politics, law, science, art, religion) which weave the fabric of history through their interaction and combination, just as chemical compounds are formed by the combination of distinct, homogeneous elements. But even aside from the fact that materialist dialectics also triumphed in chemistry over the empirical conservatism of Mendeleyev by demonstrating the transmutability of elements – even leaving that aside, historical factors have nothing in common with elements so far as stability and homogeneity are concerned. The capitalist economy of the present day rests upon a foundation of technology which has assimilated to itself the fruits of all preceding scientific thought. Capitalist commodity circulation is conceivable only within a framework of definite legal norms. In Europe these were established through the assimilation of Roman law and its subsequent adaptation to the needs of the capitalist economy. The historical and theoretical economics of Marx shows that the development of the productive forces at a definite, exactly describable phase destroys certain economic forms with other forms and in the process disrupts law, morals, views, beliefs; it shows also that the introduction of a system of productive forces of a new and higher type creates for its own needs – always through people, through the agency of human beings – new social, legal, political, and all other norms, in the framework of which this stage provides itself with the dynamic equilibrium it requires. Thus, pure economics is a fiction. Throughout the length and breadth of Marx's study [of capital] he points out with full clarity the connecting belts, gearwheels, and other transmitting mechanisms leading downward from the economic relations to the productive forces and to nature itself, to the earth's crust, of which human beings are a product; but also leading upward, toward the so-called superstructural apparatuses and ideological forms which have always drawn their nourishment from economics. All people eat bread; most prefer it with butter. In other words there is constant interaction between the economy and the superstructure.

Thus only a talentless eclecticism is capable of making a false distinction between Darwinism and historical materialism. But at the same time it would be absolutely wrong to simply dissolve the economic system of Marx into his sociological – or, to use the old terminology, his historico-philosophical – theory. In relation to historical materialism Marx and Engels established the fundamental methods for sociological research and provided models on a high scientific level, though they were only episodic in scope and of pamphlet size: works primarily devoted to revolutionary crises or revolutionary periods in history – for example, Engels's essay on the peasant war in Germany, the writings of both men on the period 1848-51 in France, the Paris Commune, and so on. These writings are brilliant illustrations rather than exhaustive applications of the doctrine of historical materialism. Only in the field of economic relations did Marx provide a more thorough application of his method in theoretical respects, although it is still technically deficient. He did this in a book that is one of the most accomplished products of cognitive thought in human history – Capital. That is why Marxist economics must be singled out as a separate, third component of Marxism.

Nowadays one can often read references to Marxist psychology, Marxist natural science, and so on. All this represents wish rather than reality, as do the various speeches about proletarian culture and proletarian literature. More often than not these conceal pretensions based on nothing solid whatsoever. It would make no sense at all to include Darwinism or Mendeleyev's table of elements as part of Marxism, despite the connection that exists between them. There can be no doubt that a conscious application of materialist dialectics to natural science, with a scientific understanding of the influence of class society upon the aims, methods, and objectives of scientific research, would enrich natural science and restructure it in many respects, revealing new links and connections and giving natural science a place of new importance in our understanding of the world. When such epoch-making works in scientific fields appear, it will perhaps be possible to speak, for example, of Marxist biology, Marxist psychology, etc. Although it is most likely that such a new system will have a new name. Marxism does not pretend to be an absolute system. It is aware of its own historically transitory significance. Only a conscious application of materialist dialectics to all fields of science can and will prepare the elements necessary for the transcending of Marxism, which dialectically will at the same time be the triumph of Marxism. From the seed grain grows a stalk upon which a new head of wheat grows at the cost of the death of the seed grain.

In itself Marxism is a historical product and it must be grasped that way. This historical Marxism includes within itself the three basic components we have mentioned: materialist dialectics, historical materialism, and the theoretical and critical analysis of capitalist economics. We have these three elements in mind when we speak of Marxism, that is, when we speak of it in a valid way.

Perhaps the system of historical materialism has changed? If so, where does this change find its expression? In the eclectic system of Bukharin, which is offered up in the guise of historical materialism? No, certainly not that. Although Bukharin revises Marxism in practice, he does not have the courage to openly admit the attempt at creating a new historico-philosophical theory adequately suited to the new epoch, the age of imperialism. In the final analysis Bukharin's scholasticism is adequate only to its own creator. Lukacs made a more audacious attempt in principle to go beyond historical materialism. He ventured to announce that beginning with the October Revolution, which represented the leap from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom, historical materialism had outlived itself and had ceased to be adequate to the age of proletarian revolutions. However, together with Lenin we had a good laugh over this new discovery, which was, to say the least, premature.

But if Stalin, Zinoviev, and Bukharin have not taken up Lukacs's theory – which incidentally, its author has long since repudiated – what exactly do they have in mind?

It remains to be said that the third element of Marxism, its economic system, is the only area in which historical development since the time of Marx and Engels has introduced not only new factual material but also some qualitatively new forms. We have in mind the new stage of concentration and centralization of production, circulation, and credit, the new relations between banks and industry, and the new role of finance capital and the monopolistic organizations of finance capital. But we cannot speak in this connection of some special Marxism of the age of imperialism. The only thing that can be said here – and with full justification – is that Marx's Capital has need of a supplementary chapter, or an entire supplementary volume, that would fit the new formations of the imperialist epoch into the overall system. It should not be forgotten that a substantial part of this work has been done – for example, by Hilferding in his book on finance capital, written incidentally not without the influence of that salutary nudge provided by the 1905 revolution to Marxist thought in the West. However, it would never occur to anyone to include Hilferding's Finance Capital as a part of Leninism, even if the ever-so-poisonous elements of pseudo-Marxism in Hilferding's work were removed from it – those pseudo-Marxist elements which out of geographic politeness are called "Austro-Marxism." It of course never entered Lenin's head that his superb pamphlet on imperialism constituted any kind of theoretical expression of Leninism as a special type of Marxism of the imperialist epoch. One can only imagine the juicy epithets with which Lenin would have awarded the authors of such an assertion.

If, then, we find no new materialist dialectics, no new historical materialism, and no new theory of value for the "age of imperialism and proletarian revolution," what content should we invest in the Stalinist definition of Leninism, which has been canonized as an official definition? The canonization of this idea, incidentally, proves nothing, for the canonization of theoretical statements is usually necessary only when, as Thomas Aquinas said, one must have faith precisely because of the absurdity of things.

Backward movements within the framework of Marxism have already occurred dozens of times. All regressions to pre-Marxist theoretical views to this very day have in fact been served up in the guise of criticism, renewal, and augmentation – regressions to views that were conscientiously overcome in battle by Marxism. But revisionism is by no means always so open. And even openrevisionism must be prepared by preliminary sapping, carried out most often under the pressure of empirical needs, not of theoretically grounded aims.

In essence the singling out of Leninism as a special kind of Marxism peculiar to the age of imperialism was necessary for the revision of Marxism, something Lenin in fact fought against throughout his life. Inasmuch as the central idea of this latest revision of Marxism was the reactionary idea of national socialism (the theory of building socialism in one country), it was necessary to demonstrate or at least proclaim that Leninism had taken a new position on this central question of Marxist theory and politics in opposition to the Marxism of the preimperialist era. We have already heard that Lenin supposedly discovered the law of uneven development, that there could have been no question of such a thing in the time of Marx and Engels. That is precisely the absurdity that the Thomas Aquinases of our day call on us to have faith in. What remains absolutely unexplained however is why Lenin nowhere and in no way demarcated himself on this central question from Marx and Engels and never counterposed his own "Marxism of the imperialist era" to "Marxism plain and simple." Incidentally, Lenin had a much more solid knowledge of Marx than any of the epigones have – as well as an organic intolerance for inadequate statements or lack of clarity on questions of theory. A higher honesty of theoretical conscientiousness, which in isolated cases might have seemed pedantic to an insufficiently thoughtful person, was typical of Lenin. He kept his ideological accounts current with Marx with the same meticulous care evident in his own powerful thinking and in his gratitude as a pupil. And yet on the central question of the international character of the socialist revolution Lenin supposedly never noticed his own break with the preimperialist form of Marxism or, still worse, noticed it but kept it to himself – apparently in the hope that Stalin would explain this secret to a grateful humanity in good time. And Stalin did so, creating in a few unimpressive-sounding lines the Marxism of the age of imperialism, lines which became the screening for the helter-skelter revision of Marx and Lenin of which we have been the witnesses during the past six years.

One must go back to the Middle Ages to find analogous examples of the rise of an entire new ideological system on the basis of a few lines of text which have been misinterpreted or incorrectly copied. Thus the Old Believers let themselves be burned alive for the sake of some miscopied lines from the Bible.

In the history of nineteenth-century Russian social thought we find the case of a group of progressive intellectuals who erroneously interpreted Hegel's words "All that is real is rational" to mean that everything that exists is rational and who, therefore, adopted an extremely conservative point of view. But these examples pale into insignificance – the first because of its antiquity, the second because of the very small number of people involved – in comparison with the present case, in which an organization that has a following of millions uses the hoisting machinery of the apparatus to bring in a totally new point of view, which in fact is based on a childish misinterpretation of two quotations [from Lenin; see Challenge 1926-27, p. 57].

But if things were actually determined by wrongly copied texts or illiterate reading of texts it might be appropriate to fall into total despair about the future of humanity. Actually however the real causal forces behind the examples we have cited go much deeper. The Old Believers had solid enough material reasons for breaking with the official church and the monarchical police state. In the case of the radical intelligentsia of the 1840s, it didn't have enough strength to fight the tsarist regime and therefore before it reached the point where it decided to arm itself with terrorist bombs – which was done no earlier than the following generation – it tried to reconcile its newly awakened political conscience with the existing realities, if only by means of some poorly digested Hegelianism.

Lastly the urge, somehow or other, to cut the umbilical cord binding the Soviet republic to the international revolution – that urge arose out of the existing conditions and developments, out of the defeats of the international revolution and the domestic pressure from native proprietary tendencies. The bureaucratic theoreticians selected the quotations in the same way that priests of all religions select holy texts applicable to existing circumstances. If in relation to texts bureaucratism is forced to make falsifications that would put most priests to shame, the fault again lies with the circumstances.

But as we have already seen from the quotation cited above, our theoretician has another definition of Leninism as well which he considers "more precise" – that is, "Leninism is the theory and tactics of proletarian revolution in general, and the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular." However, this more precisely phrased definition still further compromises a definition that was hopeless already.

If Leninism is a "theory of the proletarian revolution in general," then what is Marxism? Marx and Engels announced themselves to the world in full voice in 1847, in the Communist Manifesto. What else is that immortal document if not the manifesto of "the proletarian revolution in general"? One might say with full justification that the entire subsequent theoretical activity of these two great friends was merely a commentary on the manifesto. Using the slogan of "objectivism," the academic Marxists attempted to separate Marxism's theoretical contribution to science from its revolutionary conclusions. The epigones of the Second International tried to transform Marx into a garden-variety evolutionist. Throughout his life Lenin fought against both these types in the name of genuine Marxism, that is, "the theory of proletarian revolution in general, and the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular." What in the world is meant, then, by the counterposing of Leninist theory to Marxism?

In search of grounds for counterposing Leninism to Marxism – of course with all sorts of meaningless qualifying phrases and reservations, Stalin turns to a historical criterion:

"Marx and Engels trod the boards in a prerevolutionary period (we have in mind the proletarian revolution), when there was not yet a developed imperialism, in the period of the preparation of the proletariat for the revolution, in the period when the proletarian revolution was not yet a direct practical inevitability. On the other hand, Lenin, the disciple of Marx and Engels, trod the boards in the period of fully developed imperialism, in the period of unfolding proletarian revolution" ("Foundations of Leninism," Russian ed., 1928, p. 74).

Even if we leave aside the dazzling style of these lines – with Marx and Lenin "treading the boards" like some provincial actors – still it must be acknowledged that this excursion into history is extremely unintelligible in general. That Marx was active in the nineteenth century and not the twentieth is true. But surely the essence of all of Marx and Engels's activity was that they theoretically anticipated and prepared the way for the age of proletarian revolution. If this is set aside, we end up with nothing but academic Marxism, that is, the most repulsive caricature. The full importance of Marx's work becomes evident from the fact that the age of proletarian revolution, which arrived later than he and Engels had expected, did not require any revision of Marxism but on the contrary required its purification from the rust of epigonism which had developed in the meantime. But Stalin would have it that Marxism, unlike Leninism, was the theoretical reflection of a nonrevolutionary period.

It is not accidental that we find this conception in Stalin. It follows from the entire psychology of the empiricist who lives off the land. For him theory only "reflects" the age and serves the tasks of the day. In the chapter of "Foundations of Leninism" especially devoted to theory – and what a chapter! – Stalin treads the boards this way:

"Theory can be transformed into a tremendous power of the working class movement if it takes shape in inseparable connection with revolutionary practice" (from the 1928 Russian ed., p. 89; emphasis added).

Obviously the theory of Marx, which took shape "in inseparable connection" with the practice of a "prerevolutionary age," is bound to seem outdated in relation to Stalin's "revolutionary practice." He absolutely fails to understand that theory – genuine theory or theory on a large scale – does not at all take shape in direct connection with the practical tasks of the day. Rather it is the consolidation and generalization of all human practical activity and experience, embracing different historical periods in their materially determined sequence. It is only because theory is not inseparably linked with the practical tasks contemporary to it, but rises above them, that it has the gift of seeing ahead, that is, is able to prepare to link itself with future practical activity and to train people who will be equal to future practical tasks. The theory of Marx raised itself like a giant watchtower above the revolutionary practical work of the Lassalleans contemporary to Marx, just as it did above the practical activity of all the organizations of the First International. The Second International assimilated only a few elements of Marxism for its own practical needs, by no means always the most essential. Only the age of historical catastrophes extending throughout the capitalist system opened up the possibility of putting into practice the fundamental conclusions of Marxism. It was only this point that made people more receptive – and not all people, not by far – to an understanding of Marxism as a whole.

The Stalinist history of Marxism and Leninism belongs to the same "school of history" of which Marx said, in the words of the Old Testament, that it always sees only the hind part of everything that is accomplished. Stalin's suggestion concerning a prerevolutionary theory of Marxism and a revolutionary theory of Leninism is in fact a philosophy of history adopted by theoretical tail-endism, which simply runs errands for the practical tasks of the day.

When Stalin speaks of "theories," he has in mind those which are created by order of the Secretariat "in inseparable connection with" the "practice," the practical needs and tasks, of the centrist apparatus leadership in a period of political backsliding.

Circling in every way around this porridge, which is too hot for him and which he did not cook himself – truly the best word for this theoretical slop is that favorite word of Lenin's, porridge – by zigzags and circumventions Stalin makes his stealthy approach to the idea that Leninism is "more revolutionary" than Marxism. Proceeding with his attempt to counterpose Leninism to Marxism, Stalin writes: "The exceptionally combative and exceptionally revolutionary character of Leninism is usually noted." Who has noted it? That remains unclear. Stalin simply says that it is "usually" noted. This kind of prudence passes over into cowardice. What does "exceptionally revolutionary" mean? Who knows? But what does Stalin himself "note" on this point? He says: "This is absolutely correct. But (!) this particular quality (a small 'particularity' in comparison to Marxism) is explained by two causes": the struggle against the opportunism of the Second International, and the proletarian revolution (Ibid. p. 74).

This is how Stalin attached himself – not very courageously, perhaps; nevertheless, he did it – to the conclusion that the "special feature" of Leninism is its "exceptionally" revolutionary character in comparison to Marxism. If this were true, then one should openly abandon Marxism as an obsolete theory, just as science in due course rejected the phlogiston theory, vitalism, and so forth, leaving them as nothing more than material for the history of human thought. But in fact the idea that Leninism is "more revolutionary" than Marxism is an out-and-out travesty against Leninism, Marxism, and the concept of what is revolutionary.

In our analysis of Stalin's second and "more precise" definition of Leninism we have until now left aside the word tactics. The full formula, as the reader will recall, goes like this: "Leninism is the Marxism of the age of imperialism and proletarian revolution. More precisely, Leninism is the theory and tactics of proletarian revolution in general, the theory and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular." Tactics are the practical application of theory to the specific conditions of class struggle. The link between theory and current practice is made through tactics. Theory, despite what Stalin says, does not take shape in inseparable connection with current practice. Not at all. It rises above it and only because of that has the capacity to direct tactics by indicating, in addition to the present tasks, points of orientation in the past and perspectives for the future. The complex line of tactics in the present – Marxist tactics, that is; not tail-endist ones – is determined not by a single point [in the present] but by a multiplicity of points in both past and future.

If Marxism, which arose in a prerevolutionary period, was by no means "prerevolutionary" theory but, on the contrary, rose above its own age to become the theory of proletarian revolution, then tactics – that is, the application of Marxism to specific combat conditions – by its very essence could not rise above its own age, that is, the ripeness of objective conditions. From the point of view of tactics – it would be more accurate to say, from the point of view of revolutionary strategy – the activity of Lenin differs in a colossal way from the activity of Marx and Marx's earlier disciples, just as the age of Lenin differs from that of Marx. The revolutionary leader Marx lived and died as theoretical adviser to the young parties of the proletariat and as the herald of its future decisive battles. Lenin led the proletariat to the conquest of power, made that victory secure through his leadership, and provided leadership to the first workers' state in the history of humanity and to an International whose immediate task is to bring about the worldwide dictatorship of the proletariat. The titanic work of this supreme revolutionary strategist can with full justification be placed on the same high level as the work of the supreme titan of proletarian theory.

The attempt to weigh and compare mechanically the theoretical and practical elements in the work of Marx and Lenin is pitiful, sterile, and ultimately stupid. Marx created not only theory but also an International. Lenin not only led a great revolution but did important theoretical work. So it would seem that the difference between them was simply that they "trod the boards" in different eras, as a result of which Marxism is simply revolutionary, whereas Leninism is "exceptionally revolutionary." All this we have heard already.

Marx accomplished a good deal as a leader of the First International. But that was not the main achievement of his life.

Marx would have remained Marx even without the Communist League and the First International. His theoretical feat is not coincidental in any sense with his revolutionary practical activity. He rises immeasurably higher than that by having created the theoretical basis for all the subsequent practical activity of Lenin and a number of generations yet to come.

Lenin's theoretical work had an essentially auxiliary character in relation to his own revolutionary practical activity. The scope of his theoretical work corresponded to the world-historical importance of his practice. But Lenin did not create a theory of Leninism. He applied the theory of Marxism to the revolutionary tasks of the new historical era. As early as the Third Party Congress [1905], where the first building blocks of the Bolshevik Party were laid, Lenin himself said that he considered it most justified that he be called a publicist, rather than a theoretician, of Social Democracy. This is something more than the "modesty" of a young leader who had already produced a number of extremely valuable works. If we remember that there are all kinds of "publicists," Lenin correctly defined his historical significance in these words. The work of a publicist, in his conception, is the theoretical and political application of the already existing theory to pave the way for a particular living revolutionary movement.

Even Lenin's most "abstract" work, whose theme was farthest from the issues of the day – his work on empirio-criticism – was stimulated by the immediate needs of internal party struggle. This book may be placed on the shelf next to Engels's Anti-Dühring as an application of the same method and the same critical techniques to partly new material from the natural sciences, aimed against new opponents. No less, but also no more than that. Here there is neither a new system nor a new method. It is totally and completely the system and method of Marxism.

The bureaucrats of pseudo-Leninism, the sycophants and slanderers, once again start howling that we are "belittling" Lenin's accomplishment. These types shout the louder about the precepts of the mentor, the more brazenly they trample them into the mud of eclecticism and opportunism. Letting the slanderers go on with their slander, we will defend Leninism, we will explain it, and we will continue Lenin's work.

Leninist theoretical work, as we have said, had an auxiliary character in relation to his own practical work. But his practical work was on a scale that for the first time required the application of Marxist theory in its full dimensions.

Theory is the generalization of all preceding practice and has an auxiliary character in relation to all subsequent practice. We have already clarified the point that theory does not take shape in direct dependence upon current practical activity, nor is it of auxiliary importance in relation to any or all practical activity. "It all depends." For the Stalinist practice of unprincipled zigzags, what is "necessary and sufficient" is an eclectic mixture of poorly digested fragments of Marxism, Menshevism, and Narodism. Leninist practice made full use of all of Marx's theory for the first time in history. It is along this line that the two great historical figures should be weighed. Stalin's comment to the effect that each of them successfully "trod the boards" of theory and practice in their respective periods, one in a revolutionary way and the other in an "exceptionally" revolutionary way, will forever remain an ugly anecdote from the history of ideological epigonism. Both Marx and Lenin joined the ranks of the immortals without a permission slip from Stalin.

However, unless these two great figures were counterposed, it would have been impossible for Stalin to single Leninism out as an independent theory. Such counterposition is the basis of all classification. We have already said that the only serious justification for such a counterpositioning – a justification which is at the same time a most devastating condemnation – is the national-socialist revision of the Marxist "theory of proletarian revolution in general and theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular." The one who expressed himself most daringly about the obsoleteness of Marxism was Stalin – at least during the first few "honeymoon" months of his new theory, when the Opposition had not yet pricked this overblown cow's bladder with the sharp needle of its criticism.