On the State of the Left Opposition

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The most important result of the trip to Copenhagen undoubtedly was the gathering of Oppositionists from many countries. The original intention was to call together a dozen comrades from points nearest Denmark in order to take the necessary safety measures. In point of fact, however, twenty-four comrades (of whom two were delayed) arrived, among them the most responsible functionaries of several sections. Including sympathizers, a total of thirty.

If Stalin informed the capitalist police by radio of a "Trotskyist" conference in Copenhagen, that was a lie. Since it came about by accident, the trip to Copenhagen necessarily caught the Left Opposition by surprise. The preparatory work for the conference was still in its early stages. There could be no question of accepting a platform or programmatic theses in Copenhagen. Even the European sections were far from completely represented, and not all the comrades who arrived had plenary powers. Unfortunately a conference did not take place and under the circumstances could not have taken place.

It is needless to say, however, that the comrades who came there took full advantage of the opportunity to get to know each other and to discuss in private consultations the most urgent and burning problems. The unforeseen, hastily improvised meeting of two dozen Bolshevik-Leninists from seven European countries will undoubtedly be recorded as an important achievement in the history of our international faction.

The Left Opposition has grown considerably. The cadres of functionaries know the history of the Left Opposition in the various countries, orient themselves freely in theoretical and political questions, and embody all together, and each separately, considerable political experience. The consultations, which lasted several days, solidly fused the comrades together, a fact which will have fruitful effects on all our future work. Without falling victim to official optimism, we can say with assurance that all who participated in the consultation took home from it a fresh supply of strength and confidence.

The Spanish Section

One question threw a shadow over the consultation: the state of the Spanish Opposition. If we could observe certain nuances within the International Left Opposition with regard to the sicknesses and mistakes of the Spanish Opposition, these nuances fell completely into the background in the course of our meeting before the feeling of common concern. All the participants were completely in accord with the view that we must have an open and complete discussion with the Spanish comrades and that this discussion must not be limited this time to the leaders of the Opposition. Only if all the members of the sections become familiar with the questions in dispute can the Spanish Opposition be brought on the right road.

It would be criminal to close our eyes any further to the real situation or to palliate it If we do not succeed in obtaining clarity completely and in time through an open discussion on all disputed questions, and too many of them have piled up, then the thrust of events may divide us into different camps.

Unfortunately the Spanish section was not represented at the meeting. At the last minute certain obviously accidental circumstances proved an obstacle, but I take the liberty of expressing my certainty that the leading Spanish comrades, if they locked themselves less into their environment and showed more interest in their international organization, would have found the way to Copenhagen without difficulty.

But that is precisely the chief misfortune of the Spanish Opposition. Its leaders have persistently kept their organization away from the internal life and the internal struggles of the other sections, and thereby have shut it off from access to irreplaceable international experience. Insofar as the Spanish section through its official position was after all compelled to involve itself in international questions, its leaders, bound up neither with the experience of the other sections nor with the public opinion of their organization, let themselves be guided by personal connections, sympathies, and antipathies. All too often, we must say it openly, they substituted petty-bourgeois psychologizing and sentimentalizing in place of a Marxist analysis of the situation and the differences of opinion. So it was in the case of the Catalonian Federation (Maurín), where the hopes of several comrades from Barcelona in "friendly personal relations" for a long time took the place of principled struggle against petty-bourgeois nationalism, and thereby put a brake on the development of the Left Opposition in the most decisive period. So it was in the case of Landau, whom Comunismo surprisingly listed as a collaborator after Landau had shown his utter inadequacy, had remained in the minority, and finally had left the Left Opposition. So it was in the differences of opinion within the French section, where the Spanish comrades privately agreed that Rosmer's ideas and methods were worthless but in public supported Rosmer, indirectly if not directly, on the ground that Rosmer "appealed to them" more than his opponents. So it was in the question of Mill,whom the leading Spanish comrades thought it possible to choose as their representative on the International Secretariat after Mill's political worthlessness had been completely shown. In all these cases, we have not heard from Madrid or Barcelona even a sound of principled grounding or political explanation.

The same features revealed themselves in no less sharp and painful a form in the inner life of the Spanish organization. The crisis which broke out in its leadership caught not only the International Opposition but also the Spanish section by surprise. The members of the Central Committee resigned, one after the other. The whole leadership was concentrated de facto in the hands of Lacroix alone. Then, just as surprisingly, it appeared that Comrade Lacroix was outside of the Central Committee, in fact for a time outside of the Opposition, with the leadership transferred to Barcelona. Why? What do the differences of opinion consist of? What are the grounds of the crisis? Nobody knows, at least nobody outside of the narrow circle of the initiated. Such a regime is absolutely impermissible in a revolutionary organization and can bring it only defeats. By refraining from participation in the struggle over principled questions, by substituting personal evaluations for political differences of opinion, the Spanish comrades themselves fall victims to inevitable personal conflicts and "palace revolutions."

Such subjective arbitrariness in politics would be completely impossible if the Central Committee of the Spanish section worked under the control of their own organization. But this is not the case. In their own defense, several leaders of the Spanish Opposition pointed more than once to the insufficiently high theoretical and political level of the Spanish Oppositionists. Obviously an objection that will not hold water! The level of a revolutionary organization rises all the faster, the more immediately it is brought into the discussion of all questions, the less the leaders try to think, act, and behave as guardians for the organization.

The first condition for party democracy consists of all-sided information. The beginning must be the international documents on the Spanish Opposition: the Spanish Central Committee must obligate itself to circulate these documents among all members of the Opposition; every Spanish Bolshevik-Leninist must study, think through, and judge not only the experience with Mill but also the essence of the crisis of the Spanish Central Committee itself Through this the Spanish Oppositionists will learn much more than through a dozen abstract articles on democratic centralism and the correct relation to "human beings."

The Bordigists

At the consultation the question of the Italian Prometeo group (Bordigists) was subjected to a thoroughgoing discussion. It was not a case of a principled estimation of this faction. The experience of many years has proved that the differences between the Prometeo group and the International Left Opposition are completely irreconcilable. On such questions as the revolutionary application of democratic slogans or the policy of the united front, the Bordigists are in agreement not with us but with the Stalinists (insofar as the Stalinists pass through an ultraleft and not an opportunistic phase). To take upon ourselves so much as a shadow of responsibility for the tactical views of the Bordigists would mean for the International Opposition, and in the first instance for our German section, to hang a stone around its neck. Unity by no means signifies absolute salvation. Under certain circumstances an open and honest split, i.e., one carried through on a principled basis, proves to be necessary not only to free the hands of both sides, but also to prepare the possibility for real, and not fictitious, unification in the future.

No one at the consultation denied that the Bordigists represent a serious revolutionary group which must not be placed on the same level as the rotten cliques of Landau and Co. But it is a fact that the conditions of emigre existence permit this group to safely hold onto views that we, on the basis of our collective international experience, hold to be sectarian and most profoundly injurious. Association with the Bordigists for three years has shown absolutely no positive results. The Bolshevik-Leninists, in the form of the New Italian Opposition, have not succeeded in penetrating the Bordigists in spite of numerous attempts. On the other hand, the Bordigists have not been able to win over anyone within the International Left Opposition. This fact is most instructive. If in spite of constant contact between two factions there is no kind of fusion of ideas, i. e., no reciprocal interpenetration and influence, then there remains only the conclusion that we have before us two different and sharply distinguished groupings. In common work they can only paralyze each other.

From the Marxist standpoint the fact that the Bordigists have no one who shares their views outside of Italy, and thereby represent a purely national sect, casts an annihilating verdict on the value of this group. The policy of the international revolution cannot be carried out "in one country." The Bordigists feel this themselves. Just for this reason they hang on tightly to the signboard of the International Left Opposition; their fictitious membership helps them mask their own national isolation. But we cannot have the slightest reason to keep up the mask. On the contrary, here, as in so many other cases, we must proclaim openly that which is. This follows also from the well-known interview of the Bordigist faction itself.

Where criticism of ideas does not help, the test of events is needed. Instead of obstructing each other, paralyzing each other, and complicating profound differences of opinion with daily friction and organizational quarreling, it is incomparably better to separate in time, peacefully and without enmity, and thus leave the examination of the two lines to the further course of revolutionary struggle.

To wait for the official conference in order to finally separate from the Bordigists would be superfluous and harmful formalism. In view of the unusual difficulties to which the International Left Opposition is exposed, we cannot state with assurance whether the conference will be able to meet in the next immediate period. In Germany it is possible that serious events can develop before we succeed in calling the conference together. It would be inexcusable to leave hanging in midair a question which is so ripe and clear to everybody.

The consultation had sufficient authority in the sense of reflecting the true views of the International Left It expressed itself in favor of immediate liquidation of the fictitious tie between the Bordigists and the Bolshevik-Leninists. We hope that the national sections will express their agreement with the view of the consultation and thereby transform it into a final decision.

The French Section

The major part of the preparatory work for the consultation lay as usual upon the French League, which was broadly represented in Copenhagen. If the French sections in the Second and Third Internationals display features of national limitedness, the French section of the Left Opposition, on the contrary, is marked by very great international initiative. The League took an active part in making contact with almost all the other sections and contributed to their development by illuminating all questions of the International in the pages of its organs.

The internal development of the League itself in the meantime has proceeded until very recently under great difficulties. All attempts to assimilate the numerous old split-up groups, which are especially numerous in France, have led to nothing. The latest attempt of this kind was wrecked by the resistance of Treint Certainly it is to be deplored that Treint has recently shown a lack of political perspective, i.e., the ability to distinguish the important from the unimportant, the episodic from the permanent, as well as a lack of the necessary persistence to work his way into the organization and occupy that place in it which would correspond to his indisputably positive qualities. Only the further growth of the League itself, and first of all the expansion and consolidation of its base among the workers, will create the conditions for the utilization and assimilation of such obstinate and undisciplined elements as Treint As far as the present Treint group is concerned, it is just as fruitless and hopeless as the groups of Rosmer, Souvarine, Landau, Spartakos, Weisbord, etc. All accidental formations of this kind, without having an independent principled basis under their feet are condemned by their very existence to remain outside of the workers' movement. They have the same relation to revolutionary politics as amateur theater to art, i.e., they serve exclusively for the diversion of the participants themselves and their nearest relatives.

The League itself in any case has passed the period of uninterrupted internal struggle and has worked out an indispensable unity of ideas and methods. Without wishing to minimize this achievement in the least, we must still remember that with so narrow a base in the working class political unity cannot be distinguished by great permanence. Security against a relapse into the destructive inner disease can lie on only one road: to direct all attention, all efforts, below, to the workers in the party, in the trade unions, and in the shops.

The leading comrades of the League are well aware of the fact that they must concentrate in the next period on the social questions in France and the French labor movement This refers to theoretical as well as practical work. The League, which has welded together valuable cadres, must now acquire at all costs a solid proletarian foundation.

Again on "Faction” and "Second Party”

In the British section the question under discussion is whether one ought to limit oneself to internal work within the Communist Party or create independent ties with workers outside of the party. This question, which at various times has arisen before all the sections, is not one of principle. The attempt to derive the scope and character of our activity from the concept of "faction" would be purely doctrinaire. The transition from "propaganda," i.e., the education of cadres, to "agitation," i.e., the influencing of the masses through cadres, has always provoked difficulties and differences of opinion within young revolutionary organizations, without their being faced by the dilemma "faction or party?" The decision of the question must depend on the real forces and situation. But since all our sections, including the youngest, the British, have taken over very valuable cadres from the party, we must endeavor as quickly as possible to find our own points of support in the workers' organizations, naturally without giving up even for a minute the struggle for the unification of the Communist ranks.

The inclination of certain comrades (as in France) to interpret the role of the faction in such a sense that the Opposition must not take a single step outside of party limits is completely false. Our actual relation to the Comintern finds its expression not in abstaining from independent action, but in the content and the direction of such action. It would be ridiculous to behave as if we belonged, in fact, to the official organizations of the Comintern. We must carry out such policies as will open the gates of the Comintern to us. For this, we must become stronger, which cannot be achieved if we tie our hands as against the Stalinist bureaucracy by artificial and false discipline. We must turn to the workers where they are, we must go to the youth, teach them the ABC of communism, build cells in factories and trade unions. But this work must be carried on in such ,a manner that ordinary Communists can see that for us it is a question not of building a new party, but of reviving the Communist International.

Urbahns constantly proclaims a new party in Germany, only to call for votes at election time for the Communist Party, which in his words has "finally disintegrated." Who can understand this? The contradiction is all the more blatant since Urbahns, in former years, when he had not yet broken with the International Left and had not yet proclaimed a second party, set up independent lists of candidates at elections of all kinds. With such startling "maneuvers," Urbahns knows how to blockade the road to the existing Communist Party as well as to a new and unknown one. It is no wonder that in a few years he has completely destroyed his organization, whose best elements have come over to the ranks of our German section. But nothing can influence this strategist, who shouts with all the more determination for a new party the less the ground remains under his feet.

Our Belgian comrades, who are consistently strengthening their position, on the eve of the last elections to Parliament proposed to the official party to set up lists of candidates in common, at the same time being prepared to occupy the uncertain positions on these lists. The political purpose of the proposal consisted in supporting the official Communist candidacies with the votes of those workers who have confidence only in the Opposition. That was a perfectly correct tactical step, whose meaning is easily explained to every Communist worker. Although the party rejected the proposal, the Belgian Opposition called upon the workers to vote for the official candidates. Needless to say this second step was just as correct as the first If the official party could not obtain the votes of many a worker who trusted Lesoil but not Jacquemotte, that was not the fault of the Opposition but of the official party.

Our Spanish comrades, in this field too, have not utilized the experiences of the International Left. At their last conference they most unexpectedly declared themselves in favor of independent participation in the elections. From what has been said above, it is sufficiently clear that on this question as well we are not inclined to fetishism. Under certain circumstances, the Left Opposition can and must put up its own candidates. But this must come not as a result of a false hunt for "independence," but out of the real relation of forces and must be correspondingly made clear in the course of the agitational work; it is not a question of snatching elective offices away from the official party but of raising the banner of communism where the party is not in a position to do so. It is clear that under the present relation of forces independent Oppositional candidacies can have only the character of an exception and not of the rule.

But perhaps the peculiar conditions in Spain justify the tactics of the Spanish Opposition, Le., the course, in effect, toward a second party? Let us assume this is so. Why then don't the Spanish comrades attempt to explain these conditions to us and enrich us with their experience? Surely they do not believe that Spanish conditions cannot be understood outside of the borders of Spain? For in the latter case we would have to ask, "Why do we have an international organization at all?"

The German Section

In the discussion of the report of the German section, the question of our relation to the RGO occupied first place. We hope to make our position on this exceptionally important question clear in the near future in a separate article. The differences of opinion in the leadership arose — or at least became evident — in connection with the strike of the transit services in Berlin. Whether the dispute has a purely episodic character, or whether deeper differences are hidden under it, is hard to judge as yet In any case, all the participants in the consultation were inclined to think that the leading German comrades were too hasty in bringing the question onto the pages of Die Permanente Revolution and giving the discussion an unnecessarily sharp character.

Naturally in the presence of serious and lasting differences of opinion an open discussion is inevitable and indispensable Although it weakens the organization temporarily, it is immeasurably more fruitful than an organizational struggle behind the scenes or half-concealed "allusions" in the press, which bring no results to anybody and only poison the atmosphere But we must still regard it as completely impermissible to enter the path of public discussion without actual political necessity. Die Permanente Revolution is an organ intended first of all to influence circles outside of the organization. The discussion can and must be opened in an organ destined exclusively for internal distribution (a bulletin, discussion paper, etc.). The interests of internal democracy are not in the least hurt by this; at the same time unnecessary weapons are not placed in the hands of opponents and enemies. We must not forget for a moment the unusual, we can boldly say historically unprecedented, difficulties under which the Left Opposition labors. Suffice it to recall that the Stalinist staff over the radio denounced the "Trotskyist conference" in Copenhagen to the capitalist police. Such a situation lays double and triple responsibilities on the leaders of the Opposition. The experience of preceding internal strife, which all too often took on the character of personal bickering, has seriously weakened the authority of the German Opposition, and this burdensome inheritance has not yet completely disappeared. All the greater is the duty to be concerned about the maintenance of the unity of the organization and the solidarity of the leadership, and to avoid as much as possible such methods of discussion as will artificially sharpen the differences of opinion and tend to poison the atmosphere.

The reports of the German comrades, as well as the composition of the delegation, have proven beyond a doubt that in the ranks of the German section there exists a serious cadre of working-class Communists who are adequately qualified politically and at the same time are connected with mass organizations. That is a very great achievement from which we must start and build further. In the first place, we must assure a composition of the leadership which is more proletarian and more bound up with the masses.

Thanks to the special conditions of its origin, the Left Opposition was composed during a certain period (the period of decay) of individuals and little grouplets, predominantly of intellectual or semi-intellectual character, without clear political views and without roots in the working class. Accustomed neither to serious work nor to responsibility, closely tied up to nothing and nobody, political nomads without baggage, who carried some cheap formulas, smart critical phrases, and practice in intrigue from town to town and from country to country, such "Oppositionists" — Landau is their most complete representative — for a long time put a brake on the development of the Opposition and compromised it in the eyes of the thinking workers. The cleansing of the Opposition of "Landauism" has taken no little time in the last four years, and the success in this field, as well as in others, is indisputable. But the real victory over the spirit of intrigue and petty quarreling is conceivable only through the creation of a leadership out of firm proletarians who are linked with the masses and feel themselves to be the masters in their own organization. Our German section is completely ripe for such serious internal reform. All that remains is to wish that the coming conference of the German Opposition will be called and will be carried through under these auspices.

The Left Opposition in the USSR

In the past year very important changes took place in the status of the Russian Opposition. Their general direction can be characterized by the word "ascent"

Many hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of former capitulators, particularly workers, have returned to the path of the Opposition; these are the elements which in the spring of 1928 honestly but prematurely believed in the principled change of the official course. The places of exile and imprisonment are constantly being filled with such "backsliders." It is unnecessary to say how much this fact strengthens the authority of those Oppositionists who never abandoned their banner for a single hour.

Among the older generation of Bolsheviks, including those who only yesterday were ardent Stalinists, can be observed the complete decay of the authority of Stalin and his group and a decided turn toward greater attention and estimation of the Left Opposition. It is most significant that precisely the Old Bolsheviks, who took an active part in the life of the party under Lenin but later let themselves be scared by the specter of "Trotskyism," now, after their experience with the Stalinist regime, begin to discover where the truth lies. That is a very important symptom!

But incomparably more important is the process which is going on among the workers, especially the youth. Just as in its time the czarist bureaucracy called all dissatisfied workers, protesters, and strikers "socialists," sent them to prison or to Siberia, and made it possible for them to meet real socialists there, so the Stalinist bureaucracy now arrests and exiles in ever-increasing numbers dissatisfied and protesting workers, declaring them "Trotskyists" and pushing them onto the road of the Left Opposition.

As far as the illegal organization of the Bolshevik-Leninists in the USSR is concerned, only the first steps have been taken toward its reorganization. Whereas in the West most of the Oppositionist sections have important and well-knit cadres which have not yet conquered the necessary mass base, in the USSR, on the contrary, where there is a powerful base, the cadres of the Left Opposition are still exposed to die merciless blows of the apparatus which make the creation of a centralized leadership more difficult But the clear and indisputable growth of the influence of the Left Opposition, the broadening of the circle of its adherents in the working class, the influx of sympathy even on the part of the apparatus, are the best assurance that the restoration of a centralized organization is a matter of the immediate future.

All foreign sections have the possibility of collaborating directly and indirectly in the renewal and strengthening of the organization of the Russian Bolshevik-Leninists. We must make contact with Soviet citizens living abroad, particularly with young students; all opportunities and possibilities for the sending of Oppositionist literature, especially the Russian Biulleten, to the USSR must be utilized; contacts must be made with foreign workers traveling to the USSR or living there; foreign tourists must be utilized to transmit literature, to maintain correspondence, to collect political information; contact must be made with Russian sailors in port cities, with a view to direct political influence on them as well as to transmit literature. All these kinds of work naturally require exceptional attentiveness and caution; the intermediaries must be carefully chosen so that police agents, class enemies, or Stalinist provocateurs are not mixed in among them. Systematic work in the directions indicated above can be of inestimable value to our comrades in the USSR And it is scarcely necessary to explain the importance to all sections of the Left Opposition the rapid growth of the Bolshevik-Leninists in the USSR will assume!

The Historic Role of the Left Opposition

In a previous letter the thought was expressed that under certain historical circumstances the proletariat can conquer even under a left-centrist leadership. Many comrades were inclined, I have been informed, to interpret this thought in the sense of minimizing the role of the Left Opposition and of mitigating the mistakes and sins of bureaucratic centrism. Needless to say how far I am from such an interpretation.

The strategy of the party is an exceedingly important element of the proletarian revolution. But it is by no means the only factor. With an exceptionally favorable relation of forces the proletariat can come to power even under a non-Marxist leadership. This was the case for example in the Paris Commune and, in a period which lies closer to us, in Hungary. The depth of the disintegration of the enemy camp, its political demoralization, the worthlessness of its leaders, can assure decisive superiority to the proletariat for a certain time even if its own leadership is weak.

But in the first place, there is nothing to guarantee such a "fortunate" coincidence of circumstances; it represents the exception rather than the rule. Second, the victory obtained under such conditions remains, as the same two examples — Paris and Hungary — prove, exceedingly unstable. To weaken the struggle against Stalinism on the ground that under certain conditions even the Stalinist leadership would prove unable to prevent the victory of the proletariat (as the leadership of Thälmanncould not prevent the growth in the number of Communist voters) would be to stand all of Marxist politics on its head.

The theoretical possibility of a victory under centrist leadership must be understood, besides, not mechanically but dialectically. Neither the official party as a whole nor even its apparatus represents something immovable and unchangeable. If the original attitude of Neumann-Remmele-Thälmann,"First the fascists, then we," had remained in force, it is entirely possible that the fascists might be in power today. Weak as the resistance was which the party developed later, still it created the perspectives of a civil war, frightened the big bourgeoisie, and compelled Hitler to enter upon the "constitutional" road which has obviously weakened him. At the same time, it is completely indisputable that in the party's change of position the decisive role was played by the Left Opposition, if only through the fact that it posed the problem of fascism clearly and sharply before the working class. To change this course of ours, to adapt ourselves to the prejudices of the Stalinists instead of appealing to the judgment of the Communists, would mean to imitate the desperate centrists of the SAP, who pass over from Rosenfeld to Thälmann, then burn their fingers and pass over to somebody else. …

If what has been said above is true of Germany, where the extraordinary pressure of circumstances temporarily overcomes the Stalinists' policies of failure, what shall we say of those countries where the official Communist Party is in a condition of constant decay, as in France or in Great Britain? (The British Communist Party has dropped in ten months from fifteen thousand to three thousand dues-paying members.)

We all agree that to counterpose the adventuristic slogan of a second party to the existing party, as the Stalinists accuse us, would mean to block our way to the Communist workers themselves. But to blur our difference with centrism in the name of facilitating "unity" would mean not only to commit political suicide, but also to cover up, strengthen,' and nourish all the negative features of bureaucratic centrism, and by that fact alone help the reactionary currents within it against the revolutionary tendencies.

If recent years have proven anything, it has been the principled correctness of the Left Opposition, its fitness to survive, its right to a great historical role. The accidental, unprepared consultation in Copenhagen has shown that the cadres of the Opposition have fully grasped its mission and see their road clearly. We can firmly hope that the consultation will give a serious impulsion to the further development of the sections.

P. S. Because of the great distance, our Greek section could not take part in the consultation. But on the way, many comrades were able to meet with a substantial number of Athenian Bolshevik-Leninists and obtained a very favorable impression of them. Suffice it to say that the Greek organization has assumed the task of changing their paper, the Pali ton Takseon,into a daily newspaper in the nearest future. How far from this are the other sections unfortunately!

For similar reasons — the great distance and for many, too, material and police difficulties — representatives of the American League, the Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, Swiss, Polish Oppositionists, and other groups could not take part in the consultation.

The calling of a real conference, which will include representatives of all sections of the International Left Opposition, therefore remains a matter for the future.