On the Foreign Policy of the Stalinist Bureaucracy

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In the East the Soviet government is prepared to sell its rights in the Chinese Eastern Railroad. In the West it is renewing the old German-Soviet treaty over Hitler's signature. In the two opposite directions of its foreign policy, the Stalin-Molotov government is bowing before imperialism and fascism.

The abandonment of the Chinese Eastern Railroad does not signify simply the loss for the workers' state of an important economic and strategic position, but the direct transfer into the hands of Japanese imperialism of an important instrument which the next day will be directed against China and also against the Soviet Union.

Stalin's agreement with Hitler strengthens the position of Hitler and cannot help reacting painfully on the morale of the German workers. "If the powerful workers' state is obliged to seek friendship with fascist Germany, that means the position of the Nazis is solid.” This is what every thinking German worker inevitably says to himself. At the same moment that the bureaucracy of the Comintern presents the Hitler victory as a passing incident and puts on the agenda a general strike and insurrection (on paper), the Soviet bureaucracy finds it indispensable to establish "normal" relations with the fascist dictatorship in Germany. The actions of Litvinov-Khinchuk characterize much more exactly the viewpoint of the Stalinists than the cheap literature of Manuilsky-Kuusinen.

A revolt has taken place in European revolutionary circles over the latest moves of the Stalinist bureaucracy in foreign policy, not only in the opposition groups, by the way, but also in the official parties. The word "treason" is found more often, if not in the articles then at least in letters and conversations.

Such protestations are not difficult to understand psychologically; but we cannot associate ourselves with them politically. The question of the relations between the Soviet state and imperialism is, in its essence, a question of the relationship of forces. After the Chinese revolution in the East and the powerful vanguard of the European proletariat in the West were crushed, the relationship of forces became brusquely modified to the detriment of the Soviet state. To this must be added the disastrous domestic policy, the weakening of the bonds between the proletariat and the peasantry, the party and the proletariat, the apparatus and the party, the apparatus and the personal dictator. Every one of these political causes forces the centrist bureaucrats to batter down the Opposition and to beat a retreat before the Mikado and Hitler.

The Stalinist bureaucracy is wholly responsible for this opportunist and adventurist policy. But the consequences of this policy no longer depend on their wishes. It is impossible to withdraw at will from an unfavorable relationship of forces. What policy towards fascist Germany could be expected of the Soviet government? A severing of relations? Boycott? These measures would not make any sense except as preludes for military operations. We put forward this kind of perspective two years ago, not isolated from but in direct connection with a radical change of policy in the USSR and in Germany, that is to say, counting on a reinforcement of the workers' state and of the German proletariat. Developments took the opposite road. Today, when the German workers are crushed, when the Soviet state has been weakened, the course toward revolutionary war would be the^ purest type of adventurism.

Without such a course, that is, without direct preparations for revolutionary war and insurrection in Germany, breaking off diplomatic relations and an economic boycott would only be impotent and pitiable gestures. The absence of Russian orders from Germany would, it is true, increase somewhat the number of the unemployed there. But has there been a lack of unemployed for a revolutionary situation up to now? What was lacking was a revolutionary party and a correct policy. That is doubly lacking at present. We cannot avoid examining the question as to whom economic reprisals would benefit in Germany now: the fascists or the proletariat It is clear that the conjunctural problem is not solved by Soviet orders. On the other hand, the severing of economic connections with Germany would hit the Soviet economy heavily and consequently the workers' state even more.

We repeat: The Stalinist faction bears a direct and immediate responsibility for the collapse of the Chinese revolution, for the destruction of the German proletariat, and for the weakening of the workers' state. The struggle against it must be conducted along this fundamental line. It is necessary to rid the world labor movement of the leprosy of Stalinism. But it is necessary to fight against the roots of the malady and not against the symptoms of its inevitable consequences.

As Marxists we remain on the ground of revolutionary realism in the struggle against bureaucratic centrism. If the Left Opposition were at the head of the Soviet state today, in its immediate practical actions it would have to start from the existing relationship of forces resulting from ten years of epigone Stalinist policy. It would be compelled, in particular, to maintain diplomatic and economic connections with Hitler's Germany. At the same time it would prepare for retaliation. This is a great task, requiring time — a task that cannot be solved by a spectacular gesture but demands a radical change of policy in every field.