Fragments on the USSR

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One conclusion flows inevitably from the Soviet-Finnish conflict. No one in the Kremlin foresaw anything, intoxicated as they were by their own bragging and by the successes which had fallen to Stalin as crumbs from Hitler’s table. In the Kremlin, nothing was foreseen and no preparations were made. The initiative for the Kremlin’s successes belonged totally and completely to Germany. Hitler nudged Stalin carefully and slowly at first against Poland and later against the Baltic. The resistance in Finland which may not have begun without direct assistance from Germany — by way of Italy — forced the Kremlin to make a decision on the spot.

Now we see the same characteristics and the same results in the diplomatic and military arena. Stalin was able to succeed in the Baltic because of a favorable military and diplomatic combination of forces. But where initiative and foresight were called for [in Finland], his policy brought the Soviet Union nothing but humiliation.

It was the same in Germany, where the key to the internal defeat was to a large degree in the hands of the Comintern, and the leadership of Stalin paved the way for Hitler’s victory.

It was the same in Spain, where the Kremlin took into its hands the leadership of the civil war and doomed the Spanish people to the worst disasters. No one, neither Hitler nor Mussolini, rendered such service to General Franco as Stalin did.

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The Kremlin’s fear of an attack by Nazi Germany can be gauged by the colossal efforts and sacrifices expended on the defensive lines along the USSR’s western borders.

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The initial task of Bolshevism was the international socialist revolution. There could, of course, be no question of a backward and poor country, as Russia was and the Soviet Union still is, being able militarily to impose a socialist overturn on other peoples. It was a question of a revolution being made by the proletariat of the advanced countries. For the Soviet government, the task was, on the one hand, to help the development of these revolutions and, on the other, to hold its own ground until the victory of the proletariat in the other countries. The fundamental line of the international policy of the Soviet Union was to exploit the contradictions of the other countries in order to hold out. An aggressive military policy was unthinkable.

Bolshevism started from the understanding that within the borders of one country, and moreover a backward one, it was impossible to construct socialism, and that socialism, like capitalism before it, must encompass the whole world. The road to the world socialist revolution does not at all consist in the military expansion of the one state in which the revolution conquered earlier than in the others.

In the fall of 1924, Stalin first arrived at the conclusion that socialism could be built in a single country. This theory subsequently acquired enormous importance, in the internal as well as foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Over the people rose a powerful bureaucracy which concentrated in its hands all the power and the lion’s share of the national income. Stalin advanced the slogan: We want no foreign soil, but we will give up none of our own. This purely conservative foreign-policy slogan fully corresponded to the material position of the ruling bureaucracy: it felt too weak for foreign war but strong enough for internal rule.

The only immediate danger was from Japan, and it was only dangerous to certain parts of the territory and not by any means a threat to the existence of the state. Moscow bought its way out of the Japanese danger with concessions. In the West, the USSR was shielded by a Poland which, although hostile, was weak and by a semi-friendly weak Germany.

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In 1924 in Toward Socialism or Capitalism?, five years before the appearance of the Biulleten, we tried to explain to the present masters of the Kremlin that the strength and vitality of a social order is determined by the productivity of labor. We demanded therefore the working out of various coefficients of labor productivity in the USSR and in capitalist countries as a fundamental criterion for clarifying whether the danger in the USSR from the capitalist direction was diminishing or growing, in economic as well as military respects; it is impossible to separate these two dangers. Stalin answered us by saying that socialist development does not depend on the tempo of development or consequently on the tempo of the growth of productivity of labor. Statistics operate exclusively by global figures and by themselves do not inspire great confidence. In the bookThe Revolution Betrayed, we again tried to explain the full significance of the relative productivity of labor and of the relative per capita income. All such calculations, exposing the low level of labor productivity in the USSR, are considered sabotage and suppressed in the harshest way. But economic nature, if you drive it out the door, will only come back through the window. Amid the convulsive fits and starts [of Stalinist economic policy], the popular masses cannot emerge from poverty. At the last congress [1939], Stalin was forced to make an attempt to explain this fact. He could think of nothing to say except that we are backward. We must catch up with the capitalist countries. More and more new sacrifices are necessary; in order to justify these sacrifices, Stalin was forced to give for the first time the ratios of the national per capita income. However, these bald ratios tell nothing. The dynamic is decisive. It is necessary to compare year by year the movement of labor productivity in the USSR and the capitalist countries in order to determine whether the present economic system in the USSR has justified itself or not. Only in this way can one decide the extent of the military viability of the state.

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The most prominent military figure is now the head of the general staff, Shaposhnikov. The revolution found him a ranking czarist general. His main feature is a characterless submissiveness. He adapted himself to all his bosses and survived them all. An exceptional case — a former czarist general who has become now a member of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party.

Budenny was a daring leader of guerrilla cavalry on a big scale. He was awarded the rank of marshal and forced to betray all his associates. The cavalry general grew fat, but his military qualities remained the same. He needs to be led by a farsighted and well-educated military chief. He was absolutely incapable of providing such leadership himself. Thus, the entire course of things has been determined by Stalin… .

One could not, of course, have expected that Voroshilovwould correct Stalin.

It is generally impossible to speak seriously of Voroshilov either as a political figure or as a military chief. The qualities of a great administrator, the ability to thoughtfully combine in his head the diverse factors of a situation and foresee their future interaction, is totally alien to him. Now, having grown heavier with the years, lulled by official flattery, accustomed to his high post, the former daring guerrilla fighter is hardly distinguishable from the czarist war ministers of old.

It is still less possible to expect criticism and argument from the general staff: all of them remember too well the fate of Tukhachevsky and his colleagues.

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It would be wrong to think that Litvinov obstructed Stalin’s policies. He did not make policy but he undoubtedly embarrassed the present Politburo. He knew too well the better times and the specific weight of every member of the Politburo. He knew foreign life and foreign languages. At Politburo meetings, he could resort to arguments that the Politburo members could not answer and they did not always feel up to the mark facing him. Stalin more than once found himself in this position. Litvinov, like many others, fell victim to his own superiority over the Politburo members. His removal had no influence on the course of policy.

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[In the Red Army] the problem of shifting to a militia systemplayed an enormous role in our work as well as in our military conceptions. We considered the question one of principle. We believed that only a socialist state could allow itself to shift over to a militia system. “If we are carrying out this shift gradually,” I wrote in May 1923, “it is not out of political apprehensions but for reasons of an organizational and technical nature: it is a new undertaking — one of immeasurable importance — and we do not want to advance to a second stage without securing the first.” All this great work came to nothing. The militia was abolished in favor of a standing army. The reasoning was purely political: The bureaucracy ceased to have any confidence in an army scattered among the people, merged with the people. It needed a purely barracks army, isolated from the people.

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In the Red Army an order has been given to achieve success, at all costs, by February 23, the anniversary of the formation of the army. Such an order has been seen more than once in the past: “Make such and such a flight on the occasion of the new party congress. Regardless of climatic conditions, make a high-altitude flight on the leader’s birthday,” etc. Dozens of flight accidents have been caused by the fact that flights were made not in accordance with atmospheric conditions but according to the dictates of the official calendar.

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Referring to a communique from its foreign office Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), the newspaper of the People’s Commissariat of Defense, said February 18:

“The works of Trotsky occupy a very highly respected place in Italian libraries despite the fact that all books by Jewish authors have been removed from libraries. When asked by a visitor at the Milan public library, ‘Isn’t Trotsky a Jew?’ the librarian answered: /

“‘Yes, but for his services he has been declared an honorary Aryan.”’

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In the Soviet Union, there are several million privileged families, privileged to varying degrees. This is quite enough for carrying out the official programs and assuring applause for double-dealing [i.e., the Stalin-Hitler pact],

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In Lenin’s time, the presidents of all the Soviet republics entering the union had equal rights with the presidents of the top Soviet institutions. Now, Kalinin alone is president of the Supreme Soviet. In this change the overall policy shifts with respect to the national republics is rather clearly symbolized. Of autonomy there remains not a trace. The Kremlin decides everything for everyone.

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A victory of the imperialist states over the Soviet Union would mean the collapse not only of the totalitarian bureaucracy, but also the collapse of the forms of property established by the October Revolution [and] could therefore have only a temporary character.

Just as after the Great French Revolution it was impossible to restore feudal relations in full measure for any extended period, so after the October Revolution full capitalist relations are impossible for any extended period. On the contrary, the new forms of property will spread more and more widely to other countries.

The case is somewhat different, to be sure, with geographic boundaries. They can and will be subject to change. One may suppose that in the process of war centrifugal and separatist national tendencies will develop, or more correctly, will come to light.

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When Italy attacked Ethiopia [in 1935], I was fully on the side of the latter, despite the Ethiopian negus for whom I have no sympathy. What mattered was to oppose imperialism’s seizure of this new territory. In the same way now I decisively oppose the imperialist camp and support independence for the USSR, despite the negus in the Kremlin.