Circular letter to a friend, May 9, 1928

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We Cannot Follow a Short-Range Policy

Dear Friend:

From here we cannot conduct a short-range policy, speaking out episodically on individual, even if vital, questions. A certain small advantage does result from the enormous "inconveniences" of our situation. That is, we can speak only in generalizations, about the situation as a whole. We must send a declaration to the Sixth Comintern Congress – collectively, insofar as that is possible – presenting our positions on current international and domestic policy.

The purpose of this declaration is to "say what is." There must not be any exaggerating, or any disregard of the present official attempts to get out of the quagmire. But also there cannot be any diplomatizing, lying, falsifying, or corrupt politicking in the spirit of Zinoviev-Kamenev-Pyatakov, no self-indulgently officious, thoroughly irresponsible Pontius Pilate-like washing of the hands, in the spirit of Krestinsky, and no Smerdyakov-like groveling in the spirit of Antonov-Ovseenko. Of course, there is no need for me to mention this. What we must speak is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

It is necessary to present the domestic questions from an international point of view. No domestic policy can be of any help without a correct and tenacious course toward the international proletarian revolution. In fact, a correct domestic policy is not even conceivable without a correct, well-thought-out international policy. We must squarely pose the question of all the disastrous mistakes made by the Comintern, beginning in 1923 – Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, England, and China. All the authority accumulated over several decades and reinforced by the October Revolution has been directed toward disrupting revolution. At first this was done only episodically, through thoughtlessness, short-sightedness, and superficial thinking, but more recently this has been done as part of a new system which elevates those three qualities to the level of "theory."

As long ago as 1851 Engels wrote: "If the revolutionary party lets decisive moments pass, without having its say, or if it intervenes and doesn't win, then it can be considered ruined for a certain length of time." In our case revolutionary moments have systematically been missed, and what is worse there have been "interventions" directed against the objective logic of revolutionary developments. The decisive moments that have been missed were in Germany and Bulgaria. Opportunist intervention that ran counter to the course of development took place in England and China. Adventuristic intervention that was opposed to the logic of development occurred in Estonia and Canton. I cite only the most outstanding examples. In this way, it is possible, as Engels expressed it, "to ruin the party for a certain length of time." Under the powerful impulses of the age of imperialism, the masses again move to the left and toward us. But when the situation reaches a decisive pitch, we opportunistically disrupt it; later on we try adventuristically to repair the irreparable. We end up, like the Danaids, eternally trying to fill a sieve with water.

Let me give just one illustration. It is very fresh and truly staggering. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party – opposed to us – was declared to be irreproachable. Then suddenly it turned out to be Menshevik. It was deposed. A new, genuinely Bolshevik one was put in – and all this behind the scenes. After Canton comes a new surprise: the "irreproachable" Central Committee, in its second edition, turns out to be an advocate of "permanent revolution." Kaleidoscopic changes of leadership, without any proper kind of ideological life, without any critical assessment of experience, and without any continuity or revolutionary maturing process.

The question of a fully rounded discussion and theoretical elaboration of all aspects of the Chinese revolution is in no way less important than the evaluation of the present domestic economic turn. Once again, not even the "finest" domestic policy will bring victory if the revolution is disrupted by an erroneous international strategy and, most importantly, if the International does not learn from its mistakes. But the latter is not possible as long as the concealment of mistakes is made a matter of government prestige, backed up by the resources of the state. This is a life-and-death question for the international proletarian revolution.

Concerning the essence of the line in China. The slogan of a bourgeois-democratic coalition dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry has already become a reactionary slogan for China. This is far clearer and more apparent than it was for Russia after the February revolution. Tomorrow this slogan will inevitably become a new trap for the Chinese party and a screen for a new Kuomintang at a higher stage in the revolution's development.

The question of so-called workers' and peasants' parties in India, Japan, and so on, is no less important. These are all embryos of a new Kuomintang.

The decisions on domestic matters (in regard to the kulak, etc.) and the decisions of the recent ECCI represent an inconsistent and contradictory step; but all the same they are unquestionably a step in our direction, that is, toward the correct path. This must be stated plainly and distinctly. But, in the first place, we must not overstate the size of this step. After the experiences we have gone through, we must be more cautious than ever when a turn comes, giving no unnecessary credit in advance. In the second place, we must briefly explain the causes, the mechanics, and the ideology behind this turn.

Why is this necessary? Because what is most important to us is what stands out in the minds of the vanguard, or the vanguard of the vanguard. It is not only what you do, but how you conceive of what you do. Political empiricism (narrow pedantry, pragmatism) is the mortal enemy of Bolshevism. No indulgence to empiricism. No indulgence to epigonism, which strains at gnats but swallows camels. (They have made the party, the country, and the whole world repeat by rote what so-and-so said in 1904 about the revolution and its permanence; meanwhile they slept through the entire vast Chinese revolution of 1925-27; has there ever in history been such pernicious epigonism?)

Why did the changes in our attitude toward the kulak in our country, toward MacDonald and Purcell in England, toward Blum in France, and toward the Kuomintang in China – all happen to come so fortuitously at the same time? Where can we look for the source of any objective need for this change? In Shanghai? In London? In Paris? In these places the objective necessity for doing away with opportunist policies was evident long ago. Nevertheless … this necessity was felt in Moscow. Who created it? Surely we did, as "the only conscious expression of the unconscious process." If we had not been present, the current economic difficulties would have resulted in an enormous victory for the Ustryalovs.

Why were we crushed organizationally? We have already answered that question. The defeat was the culmination of an enormous shift in the worldwide balance of forces that took place over the last several years, specifically from 1923 to 1928.

More than once in history the vanguard has, through its own defeat, ensured the taking of a step forward or at least delayed a retreat or a slide downward. Thus, the Paris Commune, aside from its central importance as a landmark in the proletarian struggle for power, ensured the establishment of the republic in France. The Moscow insurrection in December 1905 ensured the convocation of the state Duma. In different conditions, and in a different sense, only because we paid a very heavy price but succeeded in raising all the most important questions on a nationwide and on a world scale, have the brakes been put on the backsliding process and a serious step to the left been taken at the present stage. All the less reason do we have to ignore this step or underestimate it.

We predicted that the tail would strike at the head and cause a realignment of forces (see in particular, the debate at the February 1927 Central Committee plenum).

And here, somehow, by accident, a trifle has been revealed: the state grain procurement is in the hands of those who want to live in peace with all classes. Where did these worthy builders of socialism in one country come from, and how did they acquire such strength? It is these elements that constitute the rightist, Ustryalovist tail (or more accurately, the party segment of this tail), which is hitting at the centrist head, trying to make it drop the leftist capers, which are not in the program. The tail will, show itself further, for it has a powerful following within our country and, especially, beyond our borders, in the capitalist world. We are necessary to the party (to its proletarian-Bolshevik core) precisely in order to deal with this "tail."

On the other hand, the fact that a shift has taken place – that is, that it has proved to be possible within the AUCP and the Comintern and is capable of becoming (no more than that for now) the initial phase in a new course – this fact proves the correctness of another orientation of ours as well: that is, the unity of the party and the Comintern, the struggle for a Bolshevik line on the basis of genuine party-mindedness, the kind which is not afraid, whenever necessary, to place the essence of the matter higher than any form. In this we are correct against the second-party tendencies, both here and abroad.

I will not dwell on the theoretical (economic, class) evaluation of the indicated official shift. On the whole, what was said on this score by Comrade Preobrazhensky is correct. However, in this area I think we must emphasize as strongly as possible that the kulak question is not decided by groupings in the countryside or, in general, by rural politics. This issue is directly subordinate to the question of the commanding heights of our economy, above all, industry. Farsighted management of the state economy, including first and foremost its relation to peasant agriculture – that is the key question. Even in the capitalist system one large corporation may prosper, depending on its organization and management, while another is ruined. That giant corporation of corporations – the state economy – can also be ruined by short-sighted, unprincipled, uninspired management. Over and above the kulak question stands the question of industrialization (that's what Zinoviev didn't understand, not only in 1923, but also in 1927). And superseding both is the question of a correct leadership in the Comintern, and the training of cadres capable of overthrowing the world bourgeoisie.

Are we ready to support the present official turn? We are, unconditionally, and with all our forces and resources. Do we think that this turn increases the chances of reforming the party without great upheavals? We do. Are we ready to assist in precisely this process? We are, completely and to the utmost of our ability.

Charges that we broke the promise given at the Fifteenth Congress are rude and disloyal nonsense. We spoke honestly and sincerely of our willingness to renounce factional methods. In doing so we assumed with certainty that the above-mentioned tail would strike at the above-mentioned head and cause a change in the party, which would make it possible to defend a correct line without factional convulsions. But how can one speak of "non-factionalism" when we have been expelled from the party? "Non-factionalism" in this case is tantamount to renunciation of the party. Only a vile bureaucrat is capable of making such demands of a Bolshevik. Pyatakov thoughtfully explains to us that our position is "contradictory." That, you see, is why he has made his suicidal dive into the depths. It cannot be denied that for a drowned man, all contradictions disappear. But "the dead corpse of a drowned person," to use one of Chekhov's choice phrases, is hardly a fitting leader for a revolutionary struggle. The contradiction in our position is a living, historical contradiction, which can be overcome only through action, based on correct knowledge of the objective course of events.

In our letter to the Comintern, do we demand our reinstatement in the party? Absolutely. Do we promise to observe discipline and not form a faction? We do. Now, with the indicated official change of policy, one we helped bring about, we have many more possibilities and chances of keeping our promise than we had half a year or a year ago.

It goes without saying that the tone of the letter must be completely calm, so that the real state of affairs may be clearly seen; namely, that the epigones' policy of petty tyranny has not embittered us in the least – true politics knows no spite. We see higher and farther than that, and our very definite attitude toward narrow pedantry, opportunism, disloyalty, and treachery does not in the least obscure our attitude toward the historical Bolshevik Party and the historical tasks of the world working class.