Artillery News from America

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This article, intended for the Allgemeine Militär-Zeitung, was not published in that paper. Each of the two sections of the manuscript bears the superscription " F. E.", in keeping with the paper's practice of giving only the contributors' initials. In all probability, Engels wrote the article in September 1863, since he mentions military events in the USA which took place in late August and news of which could not have reached Europe until the next month. In Europe , an armed conflict was brewing between the states of the German Confederation and Denmark in which other European powers could get involved, including the Bonapartist Second Empire, which was claiming the left bank of the Rhine. The first section of the article is, in content, a sequel to Engels' article "The American Civil War and the Ironclads and Rams" , published in Die Presse at the beginning of July 1862 (this volume, pp. 213-15). p. 289

That the American Civil War, given the inventive spirit of the nation and the high technical level of engineering in America, would lead to great advances and usher in a new epoch in the technical side of warfare was only to be expected. The battle between Monitor and Merrimac, to which the Allgemeine MilitärZeitung again returned, has justified this expectation. We now have some new facts to put on record.

I

Although the final outcome was in favour of the turret ship, the battle between the Monitor and the Merrimac still did nothing to decide the question of which class of battleships was superior: turret ships or broadside battery ships. A short while ago, however, a battle took place which will, to all appearances, settle the matter once and for all, and which we are all the more pleased to examine since it is, to our knowledge, hardly known in England and France, and not at all in Germany.

The Confederates had had a commercial steamer of Scottish construction, the Fingal, armoured with 4-inch deal, 4-inch oak and 4-inch iron, in the harbour of Savannah. The iron plating consisted of two layers of 6” wide and 2” thick slabs, the bottom layer horizontal and the top layer vertical, secured with strong bolts. After the fashion of the Merrimac the armour plating was laid aslant or roof-like over the ship’, though flattened out on top, so that the ship resembled a lopped-off pyramid. It carried 4 six-inch broadside and two 7-inch pjvot cannons (fore and aft).

The Atlanta, as the ship was called, came sailing down the Savannah River early one morning and soon ran into the two blockade ships, two turret ships, the Weehawken and the Nahant, which immediately headed for her. (For our description of the battle, we follow the report in the New York Harper’s Weekly of July 11.) The Atlanta opened the engagement by firing three shots at the Weehawken, which came closer without firing and then replied with solid shells of 440 lbs (English) from her 15-inch Dahlgren gun.* The first shot went right through both sides of the Atlanta and laid low about 40 men partly with the splinters, partly with shock. Among the latter was a lieutenant, who afterwards said that he had not been able to stand up for ten minutes. The second shot smashed through the iron cover of a gun port, killing or injuring 17 men. The third shell smashed the upper section of the armoured bridge on the upper deck, killing both pilots and knocking down the two helmsmen. The fourth hit the edge, where the side of the ship meets the deck, and seems to have bounced off without causing any damage. The fifth went through the funnel just as the Atlanta was hoisting the white flag to surrender,

• The Dahlgren gun is a comparatively short gun of some 12-14 calibre length. Its external shape was determined by Dahlgren (now admiral in command of Charleston) in the following way: at equal distances from one another, holes of rifle calibre were drilled perpendicularly on the axis of the bore from the outside, and loaded with rifle bullets, while the gun was loaded and fired as usual. The initial velocity of the individual bullets was established in the normal way and taken as a measure of the pressure of the explosion gases at the corresponding spot on the wall of the gun barrel. The corresponding abscissas were drawn on the axis of the bore as ordinates, and the curve connecting these indicated the external shape of the gun. Guns constructed on this principle are very thick at the breech and in the region of the trunnions, and only taper sharply towards the muzzle. They look rather like a soda water bottle. They are smoothbored and are cast hollow, over a hollow plug through which cold water runs during cooling. This cooling from inside gives the guns such strength—even in cast iron—that it is possible to cast guns of 15” and even 20” bore which are able to withstand 500 shots with a powerful charge without danger. Initially intended only for hollow shells, they have subsequently been strengthened so that solid shells can be fired from them, too. These reinforced guns are called Columbiads.

before the Nahant, which had just arrived on the scene, could even fire a single shot. In a quarter of an hour it was all over.

Yesterday the writer of this article visited the English Channel fleet lying in Liverpool harbour. There were the Warrior, the Black Prince, the Royal Oak, the Defence, the Resistance—all of them battleships with broadside guns (smoothbore 68-pounders, 8” calibre and 110 lb Armstrong, 7” calibre) armoured with 18-24” timber and 472-5” iron; undeniably the most beautiful and powerful armoured fleet now afloat, which, its draught permitting, could steam unmolested in between any European coastal forts, as these are at present armed, and into the harbour behind them. But how would the best of these ships fare against one of these American turret ships with its 440 lb gun? To judge by the trials made by the English themselves, a much smaller calibre is sufficient to pierce their sides; what havoc would a 440 lb shell not wreak in their innards? One single hit on the waterline would be bound to sink the ship, since a leak like that cannot be plugged. At the sight of these splendid ships, each one of which must have cost close on £1 million sterling, including the experiments, one cannot help thinking that all of them were already condemned and completely outdated.

Henceforth, it would seem to be an absolute necessity to equip battleships with the heaviest calibres that a ship can carry. These guns, however, cannot be broadside guns; the largest ship can only carry a few of them, and these have to be positioned in the middle of the ship. But this is only possible with turret ships, and for this reason turret ships will, from now on, constitute the decisive strength of any navy.

True, the turret ships built hitherto have only been seaworthy in a certain qualified sense. This was because they were constructed in America for a specific purpose: for operations in shallow coastal waters. If they are built bigger and given a greater draught they will certainly prove at least as seaworthy as the broadside battleships, which still leave much to be desired on this score. But, even if we restrict ourselves to the experience we have at present, the following points are quite definite:

1) Turret ships with heavy guns (10-15” calibre) are incomparably the strongest ships both for defence proper and for offensive operations on neighbouring coasts.

2) Armoured battleships with 272-5” iron plating and broadside guns of 8” calibre can be of great advantage for operations over a longer distance, against coasts, if one has coaling stations, and, above all, if one does not have to fight against turret ships.

3) For true mobile tactics on the open sea wooden ships continue to be the only ones suitable. They alone are able to hold enough provisions, coal and ammunition to carry their own base of operations around with them for several months; they alone are able to carry out the necessary repairs after a battle themselves. In India and China, for instance, armour-plated ships of any kind would be helpless, even in the hands of the English.

What are the conclusions as far as Germany is concerned?

1) Learn to cast guns of American calibre and build turret ships. Two such ships in the Elbe or Weser will keep the entire North Sea coast clear. Four of them in the Baltic will bring the sea under our control and, if necessary, force Copenhagen to capitulate; then no one will take the present Danish Navy seriously anylonger. Even if improvements are introduced making really seaworthy turret ships possible, the old ones will still remain the best harbour defence there is. They are cheap in any case.

2) Broadside armoured ships of 6-7,000 tons like the English and French ones each cost as much as six turret ships, while two turret ships are sufficient to beat one of them. They are not worth the money. On the other hand, very fast screw steamers of moderate dimensions armoured with 2 1/2-3” of thç very best (e.g. Styrian) iron plating and with a few guns, but heavy ones, can be of considerable service against the existing navies. They are able to evade the large, unwieldy armoured frigates and are well able to cope with a wooden ship of the line.

3) For long-distance operations wooden ships—both sailing vessels and screw steamers—are indispensable. We already have the Chinese station; it is bound to become more important every year. As long as we have no coaling station there, sailing vessels are the only ones that can be used; for the time being, they are sufficient too. Stations in the West Indies, on the east and west coasts of North and South America and in the Levant have long been needed; everywhere German trade must be protected and respect won for the name of Germany. Twenty-five per cent steamers to seventy-five per cent sailing vessels would be enough there. At home, however, many large wooden ships are of no use; in fact, there is now no point whatever in having ships larger than 60-gun frigates, as the present-day ships of the line are outdated while those of the future have yet to be invented.

II

According to established practice, when laying siege to fortified ramparts the breach batteries were placed on the crest of the glacis, about fifty paces from the wall that was to be bombarded. When Montalembert’s casemated works with uncovered stone walls were proposed, and especially when such uncovered masonry was used in many places in Germany, there was much discussion whether or not such stone walls could be breached even at a distance; as far as actual experiments are concerned, however, the only one known to us is that of Wellington in 1823, when a detached wall covered by a contregarde was breached at 500 and 600 paces by indirect hits. The Crimean War only proved that stone-built coastal forts were safe against ships; Bomarsund only proved that the Russian government had been dreadfully swindled by the building contractors. The Italian War proved nothing, since it never came to siege operations. Until then one could assume that, with the artillery means available at the time, the uncovered stone walls of casemates could, in certain circumstances, make possible such superior firepower against siege batteries that it was worth its expense. The trials at Juliers have proved that rifled guns with percussion shells, even of a light calibre, are able to breach brick fortifications at 1,200 paces, even by an indirect hit. And in America things are now happening that have quite different lessons to teach us.

During the attack on Port Pulaski (outside Savannah) General Gillmore (indisputably the foremost living American artilleryman) had only heavy Columbiads, smoothbore guns up to 15” calibre for solid shells and powerful charges. He set up his batteries 1,200 paces away and turned the casemated fortification made of strong masonry into a heap of rubble in just a few days. Nevertheless, this experiment convinced him that at greater distances his guns would not be able to knock down stone-wall fortifications. Unfortunately, we have no data as to the charges, since all American reports are framed in an extremely superficial way; but it is obvious that 1/3 shot heavy charges are quite out of the question with such guns.

Gillmore therefore demanded rifled guns of heavy calibre for the assault on Charleston, and got them. They were so-called Parrott guns, breech-loading guns with 4-7 grooves according to the calibre. The rifling is flat and has less twist than the Armstrong guns. The guns are of cast iron with a wrought-iron ring welded on above the breech which reaches as far as the trunnions, and are the same shape as the ordinary guns. Hundredweight for hundredweight they are said to cost exactly one quarter of what the heavy English Armstrongs cost. The shells were cylindro-ogival and had a coating of soft metal to be pressed into the rifling.

With these guns Gillmore attacked Fort Wagner (see the plan of Charleston recently printed in the Allgemeine Militär-Zeitunga).

But this fortification, built out of light sand from the dunes, stood up to it. The bombproof covered shelters kept the garrison safe and several assaults were repulsed. It was necessary to mount a proper attack, and for this the heavy guns were too good. Gillmore therefore had them drawn up in three new batteries which he had set up against Fort Sumter, the latter lying in the middle of the harbour entrance. These batteries, one of which was in the swamp, were 3,300 to 4,200 yards (4,000 to 5,000 paces) away from Fort Sumter.

Fort Sumter was built on an artificial island of special, very hard brick. The walls were 6-7’ thick, at the base up to 12’, the casemate arches and buttresses 8-9’ thick. It had two floors of casemates and one floor of guns on the roof, which fired from the barbette. Its shape was that of a truncated lunette; it was chiefly the gorge and one of the flanks that were exposed to Gillmore’s batteries. The fort contained 140 gun emplacements.

The bombardment lasted for 8 days, from 16 to 23 August; from time to time the navy joined in, though without much success. But the rifled 200-pounders did their job. The gorge and flank walls fell first, and then the fronts taken à revers. At the end of the bombardment the fort was, as Gillmore put it, a shapeless mass of ruins. All in all 7,551 shots were fired, of which 5,626 were hits (at these enormous distances!); 3,495 of these hit the outer wall area, 2,130 the inner. After the walls had been subjected to fire for a while many shells went right through both of them.

Gillmore also had a rifled 300-pounder but it burst on the seventh shot. The first six shells, however, are said to have gone through both walls and caused collapses of brickwork up to 20 feet high in places.

Understandably, the fort returned the fire on a small scale only. The batteries could not have provided any visible targets at a distance of half a German mile, even if there had been guns with such a range. As it was situated under the close fire of many Confederate batteries, no attempt was made to occupy it immediately, but now that Fort Wagner and Cunnings.Point have fallen, this will probably already have happened.

From the same batteries Gillmore launched 15 incendiary bombs on to the town of Charleston—over one German mile away—and only discontinued the bombardment because, after such a long journey, his percussion shells, not landing on their noses, failed to explode.

What should we in Germany make of all this shooting? What should we think of our uncovered stone-wall fortifications? What about the detached forts, 800-1,200 paces before the main rampart, which are supposed to protect the place against bombardment? What of the redoubts of the Cologne forts, the flanking gates of Coblenz, and what about Ehrenbreitstein? Our enemies, who are naval powers, will soon have enough rifled artillery of the very heaviest calibre, and railways to carry it are everywhere. On the other hand, as far as we know, the biggest rifled calibre yet introduced is that of the 24-pounder, roughly 4 1/2”—a veritable dwarf gun compared with what our enemies will pitch against us; and, if we had the same artillery in our casemates, it would not be possible to hit batteries 5,000 paces anyway. Our Rhine fortresses, however inadequately fortified the river line might be, have hitherto been our main strength against the first French attack; but what are they worth after experiences such as those described above?

This is no time for reflection. We must act, and straight away. Any delay may cost us a campaign. Videant consules, ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat

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