Alma

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"Alma" did not figure in the provisional list of articles for The New American Cyclopaedia contained in Engels' letter to Marx of May 28, 1857. But on July 11, 1857 Engels wrote to Marx that in a few days he was going to send him an item on this subject, together with other articles under A. Marx apparently sent it to New York with the first batch of articles on July 24, 1857. Charles Dana acknowledged receipt in a letter of September 2, 1857.

Alma, a small river in the Crimea, running from the high ground in the neighborhood of Bakhtchisarai in a westerly direction, and emptying its waters into Kalamita bay, between Eupatoria and Sebastopol. The southern bank of this river, which rises very steep toward its mouth, and everywhere commands the opposite shore, was selected during the late Russo-Turkish war by Prince Mentchikoff as a defensive position in which to receive the onset of the allied armies just landed in the Crimea.

The forces under his command comprised 42 battalions, 16 squadrons, 1,100 Cossacks, and 96 guns, in all 35,000 men. The allies landed on Sept. 14, 1854, a little north of the Alma, 28,000 French (4 divisions), 28,000 English (five infantry andj one cavalry division), and 6,000 Turks. Their artillery was exactly 4s numerous as that of the Russians, viz.: 72 French and 24 English guns. The Russian position was of considerable apparent strength, but in reality offered many weak points. Its front extended nearly 5 miles, far too great a distance for the small number of troops at Mentchikoff’s disposal. The right wing was completely unsupported, while the left (on account of the allied fleets, the fire from which commanded the coast) could not occupy the position as far as the sea, and therefore labored under the same defect. The plan of the allies was founded on these facts. The front of the Russians was to be occupied by false attacks, while the French, under the cover of the 5 fleets, were to turn the Russian left, and the English, under the cover of their cavalry, to turn their right.

On the 20th the attack took place. It was to be made at daybreak, but owing to the slow movements of the English, the French could not venture to advance across the river before that time. On the French extreme right, Bosquet’s division passed the river, which was almost everywhere fordable, and climbed the steep banks of the southern shore without finding any resistance. Means were also found, by vigorous effort, to bring 12 guns up to the plateau. To the left of Bosquet, Canrobert brought his division across the river, and began to deploy on the high ground, while Prince Napoleon’s division was engaged in clearing the gardens, vineyards, and houses of the village of Alma from the Russian skirmishers. To all these attacks, made with 29 battalions, Mentchikoff opposed in his first and second lines only 9 battalions, in support of which 7 more soon arrived. These 16 battalions, supported by 40 guns and 4 squadrons of hussars, had to bear the brunt of the immensely superior attack of the French, who were soon supported by the remaining 9 battalions of Forey’s division. Thus all St. Arnaud’s troops were engaged, with the exception of the Turks, who remained in reserve. The result could not long be doubtful. The Russians slowly gave way, and retired in as good order as could be expected. In the mean time the English had commenced their attack. About 4 o’clock the fire of Bosquet’s guns from the height of the plateau at the left of the Russian position had shown the battle to be seriously engaged; in about an hour the English skirmishing line engaged that of the Russians. The English had given up the plan of turning the Russian right, since the Russian cavalry, twice as strong, without Cossacks, as that of the British, covered that wing so as even to menace the English left. Accordingly, Lord Raglan determined to attack the Russians straight before him. He fell upon their centre, having in his first line Brown’s light division and Evans’ division; the two divisions of the duke of Cambridge and Gen. England formed the second line, while the reserve (Cathcart’s division), supported by the cavalry, followed behind the left wing. The first line deployed and charged two villages before its front, and after dislodging the Russians, passed the Alma. Here the reports vary. The English distinctly maintain that their light division reached the breastwork behind which the Russians had placed their heavy artillery, but were then repulsed. The Russians declare that the light division never got well across the river, much less up the steep on which this breastwork was placed. At all events, the second line marched close behind, deployed, had to fall into column again to pass the Alma and to climb up the heights; deployed again, and after several volleys, charged. It was the duke of Cambridge’s division (guards and Highlanders) especially, which came to the rescue of the light division. Evans, though slow in his advance, was not repelled, so that England’s division in his rear could scarcely give him any support. The breastwork was taken by the guards and Highlanders, and the position was, after a short but violent struggle, abandoned by the Russians. Eighteen Russian battalions were here engaged against the same number of English battalions; and if the English battalions were stronger than the Russian by some 50 men each, the Russians amply made up for this by their superiority in artillery and the strength of the position. The English infantry fire, however, which is generally reputed as very murderous, was especially so on this occasion. Most of the troops engaged were armed with the Minié rifle, and the impact of their bullets, killing whole files at once, was most destructive to the deep Russian columns. The Russians, having all their infantry, except 6 battalions, engaged, and no hope to stem the advancing tide, broke off the battle, the cavalry and light artillery, together with the small infantry reserve, covering the retreat, which was not molested. The English fought decidedly better than any other troops in this battle, but in their habitual clumsy way of manoeuvring, deploying, forming columns, and deploying again, unnecessarily, under the enemy’s fire, by which both time and lives were lost. The consequence of this battle was to the allies the undisputed possession of the open country of the Crimea as long as the Russians remained without reinforcements, and the opening of the road to Sebastopol. By the first advantage they did not profit, but of the second they availed themselves without delay.