The Struggle in the CLA

Add a subpage to this text

Read the help page for usage.

 

Swabeck: It is now quite certain that we can expect a much more rapid intensification of the contradictions within American imperialism and its role as a world power as well as an intensification of the class struggle — and this in the near future. This opens up a broad perspective for us. We assume that the role of the workers’ organizations in America will increase considerably in the future. In the process the major problems of the trade union movement will be broached along with the theoretical questions of the trade unions and the class struggle in general. Of course, this does not exclude a certain reformist development. Up till now, the reformist parties have made more gains than the Communist Party. The most immediately possible perspective seems to be that developments will be intensified so quickly that perhaps social reformism will not be able to keep pace. That offers great possibilities for the CP. The Social Democracy, the Communist Party, and the unions are still small at the present time. The CP is just as bad or even worse than other CPs and has at most 8,000 members. Of course, the Left Opposition also faces big problems, especially with such a small CP in such a large country. I think we have already taken a number of steps to prepare the Left Opposition for the coming developments.

In the first period of its existence our organization grew very rapidly. Then growth was halted until about the end of 1930. At the beginning of 1931 we built up our center and our apparatus and numbered about 100 members. At the time of our second conference [September 1931] the organization had grown to about 150 members and now we have around 210-212. In general this shows that we have made a certain amount of progress. It was to our advantage that the core cadres were a unified group sharing the same points of view and were expelled from the party for this reason. There were no differences about platform, theses, and the class struggle in general. Naturally there were small differences of opinion. At the beginning of 1931 we decided on an expansion program, which was primarily a propaganda program, and included among other things the reappearance of The Militant as a weekly paper. During this period we attracted elements that perhaps otherwise would not have been attracted to us — they came to us mainly for literary reasons, but of course this does not apply to all of them. With this program we began to undertake organizational steps, chiefly in the direction of expanding and steeling the membership. Our influence is in general greater than our organizational growth.

At the present time we don’t have the right kind of contact with the party, which is chiefly due to the fact that the party is carrying out an extremely sharp struggle against the Left Opposition. For instance, they expel members merely for attending our public meetings. Nevertheless, we have been able to determine on a number of occasions that we do have influence on party members, for example, on the question of our campaign about the situation in Germany, also on the attempt of the party bureaucrats to characterize us as murderers, and on the antiwar question. Our insufficient ties with the party are a weakness. Our opinion is that thus far we have gone through a propaganda period and must now participate in the class struggle more directly. That doesn’t mean a turn but rather one step further along our charted course.

On questions of principle we are in agreement. The differences are manifested only in the working out of these problems. One of the most important problems is creating cadres who can make judgments on all questions.

The entire organization must be oriented in the international questions and able to take a position on them. For a long time we have had disagreements with Comrade Shachtman’s methods in particular. He viewed everything as a personal question. Often he would show us only a small portion of a letter and defend his action by saying that it was a “personal” letter. So up till now the League has always been very slow on the international questions and our international contacts have been too weak. Comrade Glotzer behaves like Comrade Shachtman, too. He returned to America, submitted a statement in which he sharply separated his views from those of Comrade Shachtman. Now he has made an alliance with Comrade Shachtman in order to fight the majority and he says that it was only Shachtman’s views on the international questions that he disagreed with.

The internal situation has become increasingly strained. Comrade Carter published a number of articles on Engels’s views.

We saw these articles as incorrect and dangerous since they were a defense of Social Democratic points of view. This difference gave rise to a further intensification of internal tensions although it was, of course, not the real reason. The Carter group is an independent grouping, but has ties with Comrade Shachtman.

At the last plenum we unanimously approved the resolutions, including the resolution on the international question which the minority at first opposed as totally incorrect. The resolution on the Carter question, which was a resolution condemning the views and the methods of the Carter group, was also unanimously adopted. After the plenum, however, the struggle was resumed and intensified.

The National Committee is composed of nine members: five for the majority, three for the minority, and one (Spector) who more or less supports the minority. The New York branch executive committee has five members. There, however, the minority has a majority. At the plenum we suggested that the New York committee either be reorganized or that one or two representatives of the majority be coopted onto it. The minority agreed with this and a resolution to this effect was adopted. A later statement by the minority reopened this question. Now an attempt is being made to renounce the false position that Shachtman had on the European question. The minority was opposed to sending an official representative to the preconference, just as they were opposed to the preconference in general.

The minority has initiated unprincipled campaigns in various branches. In New York, Chicago, Boston, they have gotten resolutions adopted against the majority.

The differences are not over principled questions, but rather fundamentally over the question of what conception one has of a communist organization. What methods should be employed? The Left Opposition cannot remain a literary circle forever. I’m not implying that that is what the minority wants, but in practice that is what it amounts to. More participation in the class struggle or more literary work? We demand greater responsibility and greater capacity for self-sacrifice from every member. We are against personal combinations.

At the plenum a resolution against Carter was unanimously adopted and his tendency was condemned as scholastic.

Trotsky: This group is not represented on the central committee?

Swabeck: No, only in the youth organization. There it has the majority. It [the Spartacus Youth leadership] was not elected but instead was appointed by the [CLA] National Committee.

After the plenum the entire Carter group abstained on the international resolution. They asked for more information. We think that this position will bring the minority closer to us. In New York we have proposed the election of a new executive committee because Carter is the dominant force there. We offered the minority a united front on this point, but it refused and entered into a combination against us.

Despite the fact that the minority agreed with us at the plenum on the question of cooptation in New York and said they would not oppose it, they went with the Carter group against us on this question. Cooptation was a matter of life and death. In New York we felt the necessity to change the social base of this group, which is not proletarian enough. In a factional situation this state of affairs complicates and exacerbates matters. We proposed accepting only workers into membership for a period of six months, regarding others as sympathizers until the social base of the group had changed. Further, every member would be obliged to play an active role in a mass organization and to report on his activity. This resolution was strenuously opposed by the Shachtman-Carter combination — especially the first point — and was finally voted down by the New York branch. We hold to our view for the rest of the organization as well.

On the occasion of the trip to Copenhagen and the hue and cry raised by the Stalinists, the minority suggested calling a meeting on this subject. Shachtman and Eastman were to speak. We had nothing against this meeting, but thought that having Eastman as a speaker was out of the question. We had a heated argument over this question in three meetings and finally had to raise the question of discipline. The meeting did not take place.

Trotsky: Was the fight over the meeting or over Eastman?

Swabeck: Over Eastman.

In Boston we have a group of seven. Four came over to us from the CP in 1928. These comrades have never been in agreement with us on the trade union question, from the beginning right up to the present. They hold a sort of tail-endist position vis-à-vis the Stalinist third period. In the National Committee we have general agreement on the trade union question. We have always argued with the Boston comrades, written them long letters, etc. In some instances they even refuse to carry out decisions. On the questions of the cooptation, the international questions, and the international representative there was an alliance between the Boston group and the minority.

In about April or May 1932 the minority began to work as an organized faction, with their own center, their own finances, etc. We, on the other hand, took no steps at that time. But this sort of factionalizing means the first step towards a split. We called a meeting of the comrades who agree with us for the first time just a few months ago, no earlier than that. We have no particular objections to a faction with a political program. But there are no differences of opinion on any political question and the minority has not put forward its own platform dealing with any question. They themselves admit that. In this respect the question of the faction has no principled basis and is very dangerous for the League. On this basis there can be no discipline and the leadership can have no authority.

The strength of the League in its first period was based on the existence of a unified leadership. Since April 1932 this has changed and it is now seriously reducing the authority of the leadership. There are already enough examples of this.

When Weisbord returned to America, he did not get in touch with us and he didn’t write to us either. He only informed us that he was holding a public meeting where he would speak on the subject of his visit to Trotsky. We were invited and if we wished, a representative of ours could speak. We didn’t agree with that at all and turned him down completely. In the New York organization there was a tendency that was conciliatory toward Weisbord. We decided not to take part in the meeting and that our comrades should not attend either, with the exception of one or two observers. A few comrades in the conciliatory tendency said they didn’t care what the decision was. There were four or five of them — finally only two went [to Weisbord’s meeting]: one who didn’t know about the decision and another who openly declared that he didn’t care in the least what had been decided. Even in this case we didn’t propose any [disciplinary] measures. But when the matter was brought up and criticized, the minority and the Carter group entered into a combination against the National Committee and even passed a resolution against the National Committee.

Trotsky: The minority voted against the National Committee in the local organization?

Swabeck: They didn’t vote for the resolution, but they spoke in favor of it — Shachtman in particular, but also Abern and Glotzer. But in the elections which followed, the comrade who had attended the Weisbord meeting was nevertheless elected to the branch executive committee on the minority slate. He has only been in the League for six months. Out of the eleven members of the local leadership in New York, two supported the majority and the [branch] leadership was elected on the basis of a statement by Comrade Shachtman. He wants to have a local leadership that is opposed to the National Committee. This is another example of the unprincipled combination. Once again we had proposed a united front against the Carter group to the minority.

When I left, I proposed that Comrade Cannon be appointed to take my place as national secretary. The minority was strongly opposed to this.

Trotsky: What did the minority suggest?

Swabeck: 1. They counterposed the financial question to this proposal. 2. They said that Comrade Cannon had in the past not fulfilled all of his assignments. (He hadn’t worked full time for the organization for two and a half years. He was in such a bad economic position that he had taken a regular job.) 3. They proposed a secretariat composed of two comrades (Cannon and Abern) who would work as volunteers without pay.

The question of salary was never a serious question. But we think two secretaries are impossible, especially from two different factions, like Cannon and Abern.

The two factions differ in their approach to concepts and methods; especially now when measures have to be taken for strengthening our direct participation in the class struggle. The personal combinations formed by the minority are very dangerous. Unless something changes, there is bound to be a split. There is no other way.

We asked the minority if it wanted to be represented in Europe and at the preconference. They demanded that we call the third [national] conference right away. We have nothing against this. However, we want to have enough time to discuss all questions in detail: how we can carry out our new tasks better; what is the American situation; the world situation; how can we orient ourselves correctly?

Trotsky: What is the composition of the [Militant] editorial board?

Swabeck: It’s made up of five comrades: Cannon, Shachtman, Abern, Spector, Swabeck.

Trotsky: Who has the power of decision — the editor or the committee?

Swabeck: The committee, but collective work with Shachtman is almost impossible. He keeps the comrades waiting, and edits the paper in a far too individualistic fashion.

The date of the third conference has already been set for the end of June or the beginning of July.

It is possible that we have enough time till then, but we need new theses, the old ones are no longer sufficient. The three years of crisis and the intensified class struggle must be treated in a fundamental way. Basically what we need is enough time so that the international can contribute to the discussion extensively. We want the help of the international sections and their advice, especially in our present situation. If the minority does not change its methods, a split is unavoidable. Playing games with principled questions cannot be tolerated, especially in an organization as young as the League.

Trotsky: It is not clear what is at issue here. I have only been able to determine that the majority of the central committee consists of comrades who are, so to speak, more American, who were involved in revolutionary organizations even before the advent of the Communist Party, in the IWW, while the leaders of the minority are younger comrades who haven’t worked in the unions and the revolutionary organizations. The other point is that according to Comrade Swabeck’s reports the workers in the local organizations, especially those with trade union experience, tend to go with the majority, while the intellectuals, etc., who have come to the organization more or less on an ideological basis, go with the minority. This division is not absolutely accurate, but is more or less correct. It is important insofar as it corresponds to the facts for there are certain socially based points of support. Since the organization was oriented more toward propaganda work, this can account for the fact that these differences or divergences, which are based in the social composition of the organization, have not yet broken through to the surface. Up till now, for both groups, it has been a question of finding the correct propaganda formulations, and since the different compositions of the two groups and the different traditions (or in one case — the absence of traditions) have not yet found political expression, they are channeled, so to speak, into side roads — into organizational and personal questions, etc. That is what is most dangerous. The very fact that the two factions have different social compositions and different traditions is not sufficient to make a split necessary, for every party is formed from different groups, elements, etc., and is not socially homogeneous. And every party is a melting pot, but there has to be activity. The present situation in the League corresponds with the beginning of more energetic activity directed outward. The essential question is whether the League will become a melting pot. To a certain extent this is dependent on opportunities and successes. If you score successes, this will weld together the best elements. In case of failures and inch-by-inch development, the discontent can find its expression in a split.

Why were so few members involved in the vote on the plenum resolution on the cooptation question?

Swabeck: At the plenum all resolutions were adopted unanimously so the question arose: “You have decided everything by unanimous vote, why then the cooptation?” We proposed it because we knew how serious the situation still is despite the unanimity. We had to keep an eye on the minority and that’s why we demanded guarantees.

Trotsky: Where does Comrade Spector stand?

Swabeck: The question of Comrade Spector is of secondary importance. We had a group in Toronto which began with twenty-seven or twenty-eight members but fell to about ten. It was principally Comrade Spector who was blamed for this. He is to blame to a certain extent because he didn’t do everything he had to do. It came to a split there because the majority of the group demanded that he carry out a definite amount of work. Spector demanded that his group be recognized. In the majority of the Toronto group there are elements similar to the Carter group. We passed a resolution in which we support Spector’s political tendency but also call for the unification of the two groups. Since the plenum the Spector group has had eighteen members with six more sympathizers around it. This plays no role, however, in our dispute.

Are our differences of opinion personal or political questions? Personal questions always play a role in such discussions, especially at the beginning, when the political differences do not stand out clearly. In our opinion the differences are political although they are not clear or sharply defined.

Trotsky: A split would destroy the League and compromise the movement seriously. One cannot explain a split to the workers by unclear social stratifications on the one hand and the expression that these find in organizational and political forms on the other. When an organization is politically mature and its members have experience in factional struggle, the frictions can be held in check until the major political differences are evident. However, the debates often appear to be purely personal and organizational. The special nature of the situation consists in the fact that the intensity of the struggle does not correspond to the stage of development in the formation of factions. Both factions find themselves, so to speak, in a state of infancy, they have no clearly developed form. On the other hand, they are already organized as factions and confront the League more or less with a split. And that can destroy it. When a split takes place after intense political struggles, it can be understandable and natural. But the way things stand in the League, I believe there is also an element of personal fault involved. The fact that the conflict has flared up so prematurely and with such intensity, and that no one knows how to cool it down — that seems to me to be a negative symptom for the leadership.

Let’s take the question of cooptation, for instance: Comrade Swabeck himself recognizes that this measure did not benefit the popularity of the leadership. I wonder if the results really justify this measure. The figures are very interesting: the members of the local organizations see that all resolutions have been adopted unanimously and a proposal is made for cooptations in order to reinforce the “majority.” The members ask themselves: “What majority? You have been able to clarify your standpoint so that the minority has been forced to follow suit.” The cooptation proposal has caused dissatisfaction among the membership. On the one hand, they see it as undemocratic, on the other, as factional, as dangerous for the unity of the organization. So there were very good reasons motivating the no vote. The membership does not want a leadership artificially imposed upon it and, secondly, it has good enough reasons to be concerned about the organization. The result was the vote against the majority and the shaking of the majority’s position despite the fact that it wished to strengthen its position. It was an inappropriate measure and revealed perhaps too much organizational intolerance. Given the present situation, it would perhaps be better in the long run not to carry out cooptations.

I am also not quite clear on the question of the secretariat. Of course it was quite natural to propose Cannon as secretary, but perhaps in Cannon’s position I would say: “I would like a representative of the minority to work with me as assistant secretary.” That would be an attempt to cooperatively regulate the disputed questions and perhaps the frictions would indeed be lessened in the course of day-to-day collaboration. The personal-organizational disputes are out of proportion to the stage of maturation of the principled differences. It seems to me that in fact an element of organizational “ultimatism” on the part of the majority played a role. It must be kept in mind that a split in the near future would be a fatal blow for the organization.

The third conference in June-July: In the present situation what can it accomplish? Perhaps it can adopt good resolutions, but as far as the disputes between the different groupings are concerned we can say: 110 here and 100 there or the other way around. Everything will be as before. The majority stands only to lose, since it cannot hope to win eight seats as against one for the minority. In such a situation personal relations play a very great role. Naturally, if one says the split is unavoidable, I have my 51 percent, I am going to set a course for throwing the others out — this can be carried through to the end. But there must be political reasons for it. The international organization has as its task to put the brake on this development. We have to warn the American comrades, we can under no circumstances allow ourselves the luxury of a split in America. If the Left Opposition had more money, we would have to send some comrades from the IS to America.

We must express this perspective very clearly: what do the comrades hope to gain from a new conference and what can they hope to gain — 110 to 100? If you chart a course toward establishing a majority of a few percent on one side and then changing everything, then you will just lose members, because immediately an element will appear which heads for the sidelines.

The appearance of The Militant three times a week shows that the League is capable of initiative. And there were no differences of opinion on this question. Here the whole League marches in the same step.

What differences of opinion were there about the Weisbord question?

Swabeck: I have read Comrade Shachtman’s letter on the Weisbord question in which he says there were opinions on the National Committee which expressed themselves in terms of leaving the League if Weisbord were forced upon them. This is a totally irresponsible way of picturing it.

We do not say there must be a split, rather we ask how we can avoid a split. But the comrades of the minority are forcing a split. We are agreed that we must use all means at our disposal to hold the comrades back, but we also think it is necessary to characterize the situation as it really is.

On cooptation: there is no doubt that it was an unfortunate tactic, but we were in an unfortunate situation. There was a local organization in which the minority held the majority. We had to do something and the proposal for cooptation was unanimously adopted at the plenum, the minority declared that they would not oppose it. We had to assume that this would not become an issue for dispute, otherwise we would not have made this proposal.

Trotsky: In order to justify the cooptation you would have had to propose a resolution that forced the minority to vote against it. That would have made the emergency measures clear to the organization. But perhaps such a course of action was impossible since there were no such deep going differences of opinion, and that very fact made the cooptation an arbitrary measure.