The State of the League and Its Tasks

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A Contribution to the Discussion

1. The year 1934 has been marked by a daily aggravation of the world economic crisis. Instead of forming a horizontal line, the graph for the first six months shows a decline (not very pronounced but nevertheless a decline) toward the lowest point of the crisis. The sharpness of inter-imperialist contradictions forecasts the imminence of a world conflagration.

As for France, all the statistics show that the French economy is becoming increasingly affected. Through its policy of “collective security” and its speedup in arms production, French imperialism is openly making its preparations for the coming war. The increasingly acute character of the economic crisis in France and the corresponding struggle of the social layers to find a way out of this situation — each at the expense of the other — determine the tempo and ferocity of the struggle and the principal features of the present deep political crisis in France. This crisis no longer shares any of the aspects of the previous crises since 1920. The period of solutions through parliamentary debate is finished. The February days — the violent offensive of the reactionary vanguard and the furious and oft-repeated response of the proletarian vanguard — have opened up the arena of decisive revolutionary struggles in this crisis.

There can be no question of prolonged stability for the present transitory Bonapartist government, which is only the first form of Bonapartism to follow the February events. A return to the “coalition” type of government could come about only as the result of an intensification of mass pressure, which would either pass beyond this form of government or recede as the result of a reactionary victory won, as always, on the extra-parliamentary field. Passage to another form of Bonapartist government will have to be based on violent repression of the proletariat.

The reactionary forces, even though they advanced their position through their February offensive, have not yet succeeded in making themselves masters of the decisive layers of the nation. Their rise seems in fact to have been checked among the poor peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and the working masses — social layers for which the “government of national reconciliation” has done nothing but impose heavy taxes. The vast propaganda offensive of the reactionary vanguard is notable more for its extent than for its results. The furious replies of the organized working masses found an echo among the intermediary social strata, providing a point of support for the “left” in its convulsive attempts at resistance under the fierce attack of the right during the period of reconciliation (Cudenet, the measures taken by Doumergue, the threats of Daladier).

The working masses, hard hit by the government of reconciliation, have not been able to resist effectively on the economic field because of the state of their organizations. But on the political plane their ferment is clear. The battle tends to extend its scope at a rapid pace. We have entered a period of intense prerevolutionary struggle in which regroupments decisive for a whole period will take place among the masses.

The reaction of the organized masses and those layers of society influenced by them reflects a deep-seated mood among the working masses. A determination to unify their efforts has become manifest in the character of their street demonstrations as well as in the debates in their trade unions. The latest CGT conventions, involving categories of workers considered to be conservative — postal employees, government employees, railroad workers — have expressed a growth in the desire for united action. The bureaucratic leaderships have been forced to take this into account: the 180-degree turn of the SFIO in 1934 as compared to its positions of 1933; the speeches of Jouhaux; the radical turn of the Communist Party following grave threats of split and disintegration (Saint-Denis, the withdrawal of the boatmen and naval dock workers from the CGTU). The lesson of Germany has hit home, although belatedly. The bureaucracies are seeking a foothold among the masses, the masses are seeking a solution in action. This convergence of the maneuvers made by the apparatuses will have the effect of pushing forward the masses who are already seething. The political consciousness of important sections of militants will rapidly become transformed in the course of action, the conservative resistance of the bureaucracies will be weakened by action, and so will their defensive arsenal. History is opening up its book; little attention will be paid to the catechisms of the bureaucracies.

All this creates an entirely new situation for our vanguard, one which demands a serious examination of our tasks.

2. Our situation. The very fact of our existence on an international scale, our political homogeneity, the training of our cadres, such as they are, constitutes a factor which may become decisive for the revolutionary movement. Politically our ideas are victorious at the present moment. But the disproportion between the potential strength of our politics and our influence as an organization reappears with even greater force. This disproportion is in large part a product of the situation which created us. Our struggle was and remains “against the stream,” but this is a stream that exploits all possibilities of claiming credit for the October conquests. While holding our ground, we have progressed little by little in the midst of a terrible upheaval.

Our League has made important progress in extending its political influence; however in the field of organizational consolidation — when measured by the favorable possibilities created for it by our new orientation and by the development of the political situation — the League has been marking time for more than a year. The League has rooted our ideas in every part of France and its colonies. There are no workers’ districts where we do not have a “receptive audience.” But a receptive audience — that does not mean “groups” working systematically, according to a plan and with a coherent centralized direction, growing little by little through systematic recruitment. Outside the Parisian district even an attempt at this has hardly been made. The leading cadres of our organization are weak, new people have not yet come to us, a new process of selection is now taking place. But our ability to improve the old cadres remains limited because of the lack of a mass base favorable to their development.

The League has not become a revolutionary pole of attraction, a force to be reckoned with. The desire to gain a place in the present struggle in France has been the driving force behind all our activity during the whole past period. This was a step forward, but our organic weakness arose as an obstacle at each stage, as did our social composition. The united front with the SFIO (alliance committee, Père Lachaise) appeared on these occasions and others as another caricature of the united front, making us an appendage of Amsterdam, a united front in which the SFIO pulled us out of their sleeves whenever it suited their interests. The attempt to win over the Saint-Denis militants resembled a patient and luckless courtship more than a political struggle. La Vérité remains too caught up in the wake of other formations to tend to its own affairs. (I limit myself to assertions here, but I am ready in each case to amplify, if necessary.)

In the revolutionary struggles that are beginning, our frail cruiser will throw itself into battle — but in the wake of large political formations, which are starting to put their ranks in battle order through the united front. The maneuver itself absorbs the entire attention of the crew, whose eyes are fixed anxiously on the horizon, and the tougher the struggle becomes the more the respective general staffs will be able to isolate our frail ship, even to sink it. That is the real danger in the present situation: we seem to be coming to these struggles from the outside; we have no corresponding organized forces in the mass organizations, particularly in the trade unions; our permanent ties with the working class are almost nil.

Nowhere in the CGTU is there a solid fraction; only twelve members at the most hold responsible posts in it.

There is no fraction in the CGT.

There is no nationally coordinated fraction in the SFIO although we have members active in it.

In general, there are no fractions at all in the mass organizations; along with this goes an underestimation of this work and the necessary attention to be given to isolated militants active in the mass organizations and to their observations. (All this on a national scale, in the case of the adult organization.)

Our direct agitation among the masses is in its initial probing stage; each militant feeling his way in this work realizes that we have not yet hit on the proper “tone.” Often our agitation remains superficial because our social composition cuts us off from the workers of the locality after a meeting is finished. How many courageous efforts have been made! Aren’t the participants astonished at the feeble response to these efforts? In the sum total causes of this disproportion, the mistakes, even the most serious ones, can be considered only a small factor. It is possible to coordinate our efforts better, to establish serious rules in our organizational relationships, to modify the character of the paper, to change this or that aspect, but all this would continue within the limits of our original handicap. To be sure, certain mistakes can be avoided, efforts can be made, improvements can be achieved — but at what pace and in what proportion to this sea that rises up and engulfs us?

What sort of reception will our little organization get when all eyes are fixed on the struggle, on the upheavals and the blocs of the old established organizations? What chance will it have now that the lever of the united front has been wrested from its hands? The broad layers of the population will not judge us by the back issues of our ever-so-valiant Vérité Who can dare assert that in this new situation we can become the decisive pole of attraction for these struggles without a radical change of tactics? Hurled from outside the battle, the slogan of a new party resembles a medication more than a decisive weapon. It runs the risk of attracting more intellectuals than fighters. The [German] Spartacus League was crushed because it had insufficient ties with the masses. What are we compared to Spartacus?

3. The problem of the new party is more urgently posed than ever before. In this whole period of struggles of a revolutionary character, in which all the problems of revolutionary strategy and of the conquest of power (organs of power, etc.) have to be solved, the vanguard party is the indispensable weapon for the victory of the proletariat. The bureaucratic zigzags of the Stalinist party have nothing in common with the tactics of such a vanguard party. Release the brake of “socialism in one country” today and who can tell what will happen tomorrow? The totally independent character of the proletarian party has nothing in common with the Stalinist formation, which is held in chains by the conservative interests of the Soviet bureaucracy.

The method by which cadres decide on a proposed course of action, through Marxist analysis, has nothing in common with the CP’s forced acceptance of the latest turn. Revolutionary workers tied down to a miserable centrist bureaucracy by their attachment to the Russian Revolution — this is not the party of the revolution. That party has yet to be created. Not one whit of our ten years of criticism, of our explanation of the defeats that have been suffered, or of their meaning and the conclusions that they imply needs to be softened or rejected. Turns and zigzags of the centrist apparatus may contain elements that are progressive or regressive, depending on the case at hand; but the Comintern is no longer the guide of the proletariat. Today, just as yesterday, in the face of the rising tide of revolution and the threat of world war, the first point in our program remains: build the revolutionary party, construct the Fourth International!

Nor is there anything to retract in our analysis of the Second International and of the SFIO’s role in the relationship of classes. What is of interest to us in the differences between this reformist party and the centrist Stalinist party is:

a. The fact that the bankruptcy of the Comintern, instead of putting an end to the Social Democracy, has permitted it to grow and regroup among sections of workers who — under the impact of events in Germany, Austria, and France — are becoming oriented toward revolution and will not hesitate to enter into battle against their own bureaucracy.

b. The fact that the [SFIO’s] internal regime, in spite of the bureaucracy’s power, has not yet straitjacketed the rank and file and permits a certain freedom of movement among sections of the workers.

In the Stalinist party the rank and file is dependent on the bureaucracy; but in the SFIO, up to now, the ranks have been relatively independent of the bureaucracy. This form of internal regime was the original form of the democratic party in the democratic state and will suffer the consequences of the state crisis; the present form is favorable for the rank and file in this period of regroupment, so the bureaucracy may be in for a fight.

As revolutionary parties, the SFIO and the CP are equally bankrupt. But in this period of upheavals and readjustments it is our task to adjust our tactics according to both our knowledge of the environment and our opportunities for creating the new revolutionary party. We must therefore observe that the internal political life of the Stalinist party is nil and that the possibility of developing a tendency in its midst must be excluded (the apparatus has just undertaken a 180-degree turn in the orientation of the work of the party members and Monmousseau is surprised that no one is surprised). The Socialist Party, on the other hand, has preserved throughout this whole period a relatively intense life, all proportions considered. In this respect, the present period is comparable to that which preceded the [1920] Tours congress.

All these elements are important facts to be considered in connection with the problem of the “new party.”

4. What is the solution? Shall we continue along the path we have followed — though improving our methods? My answer to that is already given in section 2. No matter what path we choose, it will be necessary to rearm our organization in all of its internal life, in all of its organizational procedures. That is an urgent task. It means tempering our arms anew, but it does not mean making the same use of them as before. It is apparent that with the present state of our forces and maintaining our present positions we would not be able to grow with sufficient rapidity to become a decisive pole of attraction. On the contrary, we would be kept out of the center of the struggles, to the detriment of their outcome. To reserve the greater part of our forces for fractional work within a mass organization would be to acknowledge the scanty returns we have received from our independent work. But given our numerical weakness, it would also mean not putting adequate forces in any one area. For example, the militants of our League, scattered here and there in the SFIO, would see their effectiveness decreased by the clandestine character of the entry. This fractional work in the SFIO, which has been neglected for more than a year, cannot suffice now even if it is improved.

It is necessary to take a decisive step, to bring ourselves closer to a group of workers that is evolving toward revolutionary ideas, to become its catalyst, thereby increasing our opportunities.

Without renouncing any of our positions and without dissolving ourselves, it is necessary to carry the fight into the very midst of a group that is in the process of evolving. We have outlined our special difficulties and weaknesses above, but we must not underestimate the value of our propagandist nuclei and their abilities. It is enough to put them in the right place in order to transform their slow advances into decisive leaps forward.

Where? Access to the Communist Party is cut off to us because of its internal regime. And a capitulation is totally out of the question.

There remains the SFIO. Its internal situation permits the possibility of our entering it under our own banner. The environment suits the aims we have set for ourselves. What is necessary now is to act in such a manner that our declaration will not in any way strengthen the leading bourgeois wing, but rather will support the progressive proletarian wing; that its text and its distribution will allow us to hold our heads high in case of acceptance as well as in case of dilatory maneuvers or rejection.

There is no question of dissolving ourselves. We enter as the Bolshevik-Leninist faction, our organizational ties remain the same, our press continues to exist just as do Bataille Socialiste and others.

There are two things necessary for the success of this step, that can, within a short period of time, completely transform the whole political constellation in the labor movement: organizational cohesion (through the steadfastness of each member) and promptness of implementation. To drag out such decisions means to lose the opportune moment for their implementation, that is, to put ourselves at a disadvantage.

Further on we shall examine some suggestions concerning the means of implementation. The organization must take an inventory of its forces and understand that in the present situation the means of increasing them tenfold lie not in sticking to routine but in making a courageous effort to win to revolutionary ideas the thousands of workers whom the degeneration of the Comintern prevented from taking the path of Bolshevism.

Before proposing implementation I must emphasize that this whole orientation is directly dependent upon the political characterization of the present crisis and of the relationship of forces in the proletarian movement.

It would be useful to draw the membership’s attention to the necessity that our debates on this question maintain the character of a serious discussion carried on before the whole labor movement. Any empty polemicizing could seriously hamper our ability to achieve the aims we have set for ourselves.

How are we to begin the orientation?

a. Put this orientation on the agenda of the leading bodies — (1) Political Bureau, (2) Central Committee, (3) regional committees — and draft a resolution on it.

b. Immediately publish an internal bulletin containing the resolution drafted probably by the Central Committee, send it out to the groups, assign a Central Committee reporter to each of them, and distribute the bulletin in time to have an adequate discussion.

c. Assign a comrade for “preparation” in the press (discussion article presenting the orientation) to convince our circle of sympathizers.

d. Assign a comrade to meet with Georget and Danno for the purpose of probing into the possibilities of one of the [SFIO] left-wing factions (Just’s or another) issuing an appeal on our behalf.

e. Prepare a draft declaration to the SFIO, to be presented by a delegation. Publicize the text and the reply.

f. Prepare a special number of La Vérité with the text of the declaration to the SFIO and of the program of action that is to serve as the basis of our propaganda.

g. Don’t neglect the “youth” aspect of the problem. On point a, it is necessary to convince our national youth committee at the same time as the Central Committee and to seriously consider with them the “youth” aspect of the problem — perhaps the appeal (d.) can be issued by the [Seine] Federation of Young Socialists. In any case, this attitude may denote a slowing down (for the immediate period) of the drive toward a split in the Young Socialists.

h. Call a Central Committee meeting for the purpose of submitting our declaration to the National Committee of the SFIO on July 15.