The Situation in Germany

Add a subpage to this text

Read the help page for usage.

 

Comrade Otto [Schüssler] reports on the German leadership’s political resolution, “On the Situation in Germany.” The resolution is very turgid and very weak. It does not give enough consideration to the special position of the Left Opposition as contrasted to the position of the other groups and parties.

The first section, on the economic situation, contains general observations, but offers no perspective. War is discussed only in very general terms.

The political section devotes far too much space to the Center Party and the Brüning regime and is more a pure historical presentation. Questionable formulations are also used, as, for instance, “The blows of the Center Reich government and the SPD-Center coalition were directed solely against the KPD.” That is not correct since the major attack during the Brüning period was directed against social policy and wages and as such affected the entire working class. Indirectly the resolution itself formulates this in the following sentences where mention is made of the “resistance of their own mass membership base” which made it impossible for the SPD to continue to support Brüning's government by decree.

“Lesser evil” politics is mentioned only in passing and not characterized. This then leads to the formulation: “Looking backward, it can now be said that the big bourgeoisie, knowing that it would have the support of the SPD in this period of preparation for its dictatorship, set the tasks and the SPD carried them out voluntarily and without hesitation.” It cannot be said that the SPD went along with everything “voluntarily.” The decline of reformism and its own position as a whole forced it to go along. It was, so to speak, a case of “forced voluntarism.” The resolution never takes up the situation of reformism and its consequences. Also the question of the Iron Front and the SAP is hardly mentioned.

On the question of the [1932] presidential elections, the resolution forgets to mention the position of the Left Opposition. At that time there was wavering and uncertainty, and the lessons must be drawn in the resolution and at the conference. In this connection the resolution speaks only in general terms about the party’s false slogan “the SPD is the chief enemy” and fails to give a resolute characterization of the role and the character of the SPD.

A crucial weakness of this political resolution is its extremely unclear and indecisive treatment of Bonapartism, which is hardly more than mentioned by name. It is this very question of Bonapartism that sharply sets us apart from all other organizations. This question was debated within the German Left Opposition itself. It is necessary that the question of Bonapartism be clarified in the resolution since it will undoubtedly still play a role in coming discussions.

The formulation on Bonapartism in the section “Seizure of power” is ambiguous: “Bonapartism lacks the power of a mass base for carrying out extraordinary economic measures.” It is quite possible that Bonapartism’s striving for a mass base can be successful. The lack of a mass base is to be sure a correct observation as far as Papen-Schleicher Bonapartism is concerned. But we should not generalize from this case.

In point 3 of the same section on “Seizure of power” it says that the differences that might possibly arise in the government camp are “not decisive.” It seems to me that this formulation is aimed at playing down the importance of differences within the ruling class at the very time when we should be examining these differences and preparing for them. They can become extremely important and can lead to a lull in the development of the methods of repression, which can be of decisive importance for the working class.

There is also too little that is correct about the section on the “political program of the party.” It contents itself with an enumeration of the party’s various errors and slogans and gives no clear evaluation. It is necessary to offer a clear formulation on the question of “social fascism” and on the “national program” too. These are the very questions that will play an important role in our debates with Stalinism. This is also true of the question of “people’s revolution.”

The term “ultraleft, bureaucratic zigzag,” which Comrade Trotsky polemicized against in his letter to the editorial board of SAZ (published in Permanente Revolution), is a rather conspicuously questionable formulation.

Can one say that the “red referendum” was “an ultraright as well as a criminal adventure”?

Trotsky: The handling of this “referendum” involved a mixture of extreme opportunistic tendencies along with ultraleft tendencies. The bloc with the Nazis was of course an instance of outrageous right adventurism. It is sufficient to say that the handling of the referendum was adventurism.

This resolution totally lacks a perspective; judging by its size and its form, it is more like an article. After making the necessary changes as indicated, it should be used as a commentary, and a resolution about two pages long should be written. If we have to work illegally, how can we make any sense of things on the basis of such a lengthy resolution? The comprehensive commentary can be published in a bulletin, but a two-or three-page summary has to be prepared for use by our agitators. In this summary, the characterization of the crisis and the Center Party, like everything that is general knowledge, should be left out.

The object of the resolution as a resolution is to clearly emphasize those things which separate us from and counterpose us to other organizations, and to show why we exist as an independent organization. General matters can then be taken up in the commentary.

The question of the SAP is rather important. We can make large gains there now. It would be Worthwhile to write a letter to the members of the SAP, principled but friendly in tone. We can approach the workers better with a letter than a resolution.

I think our comrades are too formalistic in placing so much emphasis on counterposing ourselves to the SAP on the question of “faction versus party.” For us this question is very important and retains its importance today, although tomorrow that may change. Through our role as a faction we say to the ranks of the party: we belong to you and we want to march together with you.

With the SAP, however, we have a very different situation. It already has a history of its own, it has proclaimed itself as a party and counterposed itself to the KPD. It has developed or can develop in a communist direction. But they are not yet communists and we cannot expect them to understand the question of the “faction.” The jumping off point is a communist program. We must say to them: “You are a party. Good. But you have a bad program.” But on the question of “faction versus party” we should not be formalistic.

What does it mean when the SAP members say “We are a party”? In their minds it means: We do not wish to work together with the Social Democracy any longer. For them that is a step forward. To demand of them that they consider themselves a faction of the KPD (which has just lately been calling them left social fascists) is absurd. This sort of attitude toward the “faction versus party” question is wrong. We have to raise other questions with the SAP — questions of German and international politics, great world events, the Russian question, the question of bureaucratic centrism, etc.

Of greatest importance are the eleven points of the preconference theses. They have to be put before the SAP and we have to get them to express their opinions on these questions. If they demand that we enter the SAP, we can’t motivate our refusal by saying, no, you’re not a faction. This way of formulating the question is impossible.

Rather we have to put the question somewhat like this: “The measure of a party is its program. We can only unite when we are in agreement on the principled questions, only then can we enter the SAP. Do you agree with our eleven points?” We have to take each of these points as a point of departure for a critique.

Otto: It would be well to thoroughly discuss once again within the German Left Opposition itself the position and the role of the Opposition as a faction. The past weakness of the German Left Opposition with regard to the party is explained in part by the past history of the German Left Opposition. In the debates with Urbahns’s Leninbund we placed the question of the “faction” in the foreground, counterposing it to Urbahns’s efforts to build a new party.

Trotsky: I think that in the immediate future we will maintain our position as a faction in Germany. Perhaps now is the very time when we will harvest the positive fruits of our position. If a process of great ferment begins in the party, the different opinions will not immediately lead to the formation of individual factions. Many will struggle for a change in the party. And we will be able to approach them on this basis.

I am sure that if Hitler remains at the helm and the KPD goes under, then we will have to build a new party. But the most important part of the new party will be recruited out of the old party. This question will then be more important for us than the approach to the SAP. Hence at this point we cannot simply concentrate on influencing, say, the SAP. Even if we have this orientation toward the KPD, we need not demand the same thing of the SAP. In this area we have to proceed in a political-pedagogical fashion and approach the educational work from the right direction. If we force them to accept our point of view and the content of our platform, then the organizational consequences will follow naturally, with our help, of course. Perhaps we will build the new party together with them and sections of the KPD.

In relation to the SAP, it is extremely important to emphasize those of our eleven points which separate the SAP people from the Brandlerites, since the greatest danger for these people is that they will return to Brandlerism, because politically they are only a semi-finished product.

Frank: The preconference theses have nothing on the question of 1923. This question is crucial for Germany.

Trotsky: The year 1923 is very important, but for reasons of expedience (which are admissible) I would not insist on this point with the SAP, since this question sharply provokes their leadership, which considers it “a matter of honor” not to recognize the 1923 question. This is only a matter of the sequence of discussion, of how we should begin the discussion with the SAP. And I would not begin with 1923.

The political resolution of the German leadership offers no perspective. But that is just what needs to be worked out.

In any case it is important to note that, despite the energetic tempo in the destruction of the workers’ organizations, this destruction should not be accepted as an accomplished fact. The counterrevolution (like the revolution) takes leaps forward, but cannot always hold the positions it has captured. Hitler may yet have his July days, although he is already in power. He has already been obliged to retreat on the question of tactics toward the Center Party. He may have the same experience in his struggle against the Social Democracy. The SPD is so closely allied with the bourgeois parties and with the entrepreneurs that Hitler’s fight against it will cut deep into the ranks of the bourgeoisie. In this regard he may be forced to retreat His allies can force him to let up for a time, and it is not out of the question that the working class can catch its breath again during this lull. Of course this should not be interpreted to mean that we should perhaps neglect the building of an underground organization; quite the contrary. But we should keep a careful eye on the enemy, watching what is going on in his camp so that we can come out in the open. The question of a united front toward the Social Democracy has lost none of its importance; in particular, the trade union question has increased in importance. Whether Hitler dares to dissolve the trade unions will be of the greatest importance. He will hardly try to do this all at once. Under such conditions the trade unions are the natural organizational form for the communists. The RGO must enter the trade unions again, whatever the cost.

From Germany people are writing about putsch tendencies within the party. What do they mean by “putsch tendencies”? Not that the workers are learning to defend themselves, not that they are preparing caches of weapons, not that they are standing their ground in battles with the fascists — none of these things are putsch tendencies. A putsch is when a minority counterposed to the majority of the working class as an adversary goes into struggle.

We are for active self-defense — including armed self-defense. This active self-defense can be successful when it is supported and covered by the understanding and sympathy of the great mass of the workers, and the Social Democratic workers first of all. The task of the hour is to crush the theory of “social fascism” underfoot. In the course of the defensive struggle the Communists will naturally form shock brigades; these must be protected by the sympathy of the Social Democratic workers and must fight shoulder to shoulder with the young Social Democratic workers. Otherwise defense can degenerate into putschism, which would mean nothing less than the extermination of the youngest and most active revolutionary forces in the proletariat.

The Social Democratic slogan “stay at home” must be combated But military defense must proceed on the political basis of a united front. Then it will not run the danger of degenerating into isolated putsch actions.

Every opportunity must be thoroughly utilized. It is as if you were climbing a steep mountain, which looks like a sheer wall when you stand in front of it so that it seems impossible to climb. But if you take advantage of every crack, every natural step, every hole, to find a handhold or a foot support, the highest mountain can be climbed under the most difficult conditions. You must have the necessary courage, but also foresight and the broad view.

Providing that is the most important thing for the German resolution.

The question of the offensive and the defensive must be clearly worked out. We have absolutely no interest in appearing as the aggressor, as the KPD did until just recently. We declare ourselves before the public opinion of the working class to be the victims of aggression, which is in fact the case. Our present task is to place the defensive in a politically favorable position, to prepare it organizationally and technically, and to strengthen it. This must be said in the resolution. From the point of view of a goal-oriented strategy the defensive will, along with the course of the class struggle, he transformed into an offensive at a certain point. What is most important now, however, is not the strategic position of the offensive (which is also very important) but the tactical position of the defensive.

Naturally we cannot wait and hope for developments in the fascist camp. This is the tactic adopted by the Social Democracy. But if the working class remains quiet in the face of all attacks, these differences will not develop and come to a head. There would be no reason for them to. But if the working class actively defends itself, if the actions of the government and the fascists run into opposition, then the differences can break through and develop, differences over long-term perspectives on how to suppress the proletariat, over methods, tempo, etc.

All Catholic communists must now enter the Catholic trade unions, since these organizations may also develop in a leftward direction under pressure from the fascists, and this would provide us with important cover. Even if the Free Trade Unionscontinue to exist, some of the communists must enter the Christian trade unions; this is an even more natural step if the Free Unions are dissolved, which is improbable, but not impossible. Not a single inch of legal ground should be yielded through caution, let alone neglect. At the same time, of course, an underground organization must be established.

The Left Opposition must also take some practical organizational steps. It is important to establish a paper outside of the country, which can be somewhat more theoretical if necessary.

In summary:

1. From the existing resolution material, work up two pages for the political resolution.

2. An outline of perspectives, also two to three pages.

3. The rest of the German leadership’s resolution with the necessary changes indicated should be used as motivation and commentary.

4. On the SAP question — it is better to compose a letter to the SAP membership rather than a resolution. This letter should be based on the decisions of the preconference.

It is necessary to apply the preconference theses in the daily work of the organization, otherwise how can they be tested and improved? Without such field-testing we will never come up with an international program. It is too bad that these theses were never published in Germany. If possible, we should publish these theses as a two-page insert in a special number of Permanente Revolution. Publishing them in an internal bulletin is not sufficient. It is very important for us to hold an international conference now on the eve of great events.

Swabeck: In the German resolution it says that the prosperity in America is over and that the further expansion of American imperialism is very much dependent on the situation in other countries. That is correct, but it is necessary to motivate why this is so. America has to forge ahead in a declining economic situation and in addition it must help defend other countries against revolution.

It also seems now that the American conjuncture is worsening; take, for instance, the recent bank failures. Is this a sign of a further decline, or just a device for bringing about a change in the conjuncture?

Trotsky: To set a timetable for the phases of the conjuncture was something that even a Marx could not do. It is even less possible to make exact time predictions for the future. I haven’t followed the American bank failures. The American financial structure is two-tiered. There are powerful modern banking institutions with ties to the most modern economy and industry and, on the other hand, there are countless completely local banks. These form the first tier and above them loom the powerful modern banks. I think it is inherent in the logic of the situation that it will be the small local banks that suffer most from the crisis, that even an improvement in the conjuncture will not save them, and that the big, powerful central banks are consciously carrying out such a policy. If they are of a mind to bring a Ford to his knees, they certainly will make short shrift of the small banks. It is possible that a process of natural selection will take place. Many will fold at the beginning of the prosperity and this will be combined with the conscious policy of Wall Street to make life difficult for the provincial banks in order to eventually finish them off. Hence these bank crises in and of themselves do not at all speak against an improvement in the conjuncture. What has been said here is, of course, hypothetical. Theoretically it is unassailable, but the question is whether it applies in this case.

Swabeck: Is it not necessary now for the German Left Opposition to raise the demand for credits to the Soviet Union?

Trotsky: With the Hitler government in power now, and the rapprochement of the USSR to France, and the suppression of the only party in Germany that could fight for this demand, this slogan is less important.

The comrades in Mährisch-Ostrau published a pamphlet on the Russian question and included in it my [1932] article in which I propagandized for a mobilization of the Red Army if Hitler should take power. I would now be opposed to publishing this article, since the situation in the Soviet Union is becoming continually worse. From the standpoint of the international policy of a revolutionary state and given a correct line for the party in Germany, it would, of course, be correct to have the Red Army play a role as an international revolutionary factor. But the situation in the Soviet Union is so very bad as a result of very bad policies that it would be impossible for the Soviet Union to undertake a military initiative at the present time. The living standard of the masses is indescribably low, and if we call for a mobilization now, people in Russia will not understand it, and the masses will regard it as a provocation. Because of these considerations I would not now repeat what I said then in the perspective.

Swabeck: At the preconference the major emphasis on the German question was placed on having the German Left Opposition differentiate itself more sharply from the party. It seems to me that this is not clearly enough expressed in the resolution either.

Trotsky: In considering what tone we take toward the party now, we must take into account that the KPD is at present a persecuted party.