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Special pages :
The League Faced with a Turn
Author(s) | Leon Trotsky |
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Written | 1 July 1934 |
1. It is not enough for a revolutionist to have correct ideas. Let us not forget that correct ideas have already been set down in Capital and in The Communist Manifesto. But that has not prevented false ideas from being broadcast. It is the task of the revolutionary party to weld together the correct ideas with the mass labor movement Only in this manner can an idea become a driving force.
2. A revolutionary organization does not mean a paper and its readers. One can write and read revolutionary articles day in and day out and still remain in reality outside of the revolutionary movement One can give the labor organizations good advice — from the sidelines. That is something. But that still does not make a revolutionary organization.
3. Although the living conditions inside the Comintern are hardly normal, the Left Opposition as a faction would have developed in constant contact with the mass movement. But the Stalinist apparatus isolated the Opposition mechanically from the very first steps of its existence. Two aims were achieved by this: (1) the internal life of the Comintern was choked off and (2) the Opposition was deprived of the necessary sphere of political action.
4. The League (like other sections) was forced to develop as an isolated propaganda group. This determined both its positive sides (an honest and serious attachment to the principles) and its negative sides (observing the labor movement from the outside). In the course of the elaboration of the principles and methods of the Left Opposition, the positive sides of the League carried the day. At present, when it becomes necessary to circulate the accumulated capital, the negative sides are threatening to get the upper hand.
5. The leadership of the League has entrusted the circulation end [of the paper] to a capitalist concern. For a group of literati the circulation end is an unpleasant burden. For a revolutionary organization it is an important lever. How can one entrust such an important lever to the enemy when one is seriously preparing for the struggle? The revolutionary movement is composed of dozens and hundreds of different sorts of just such "uninteresting," "technical" labors. Without detailed and assiduous preparatory work it is impossible to begin with a militia or a strike, and even less so with the general strike or the insurrection. A revolutionary organization that is incapable (or more clearly, unwilling) of taking care of the circulation end thereby forgoes in advance leadership in the execution of more complicated labors.
6. In relation to the Socialist Party, the League has shown not only insufficient initiative but also a hidebound sectarianism. Instead of taking for its task the creation of a faction inside the SFIO just as soon as the crisis in the latter became obvious, the League demanded that every Socialist become convinced of the correctness of our ideas and leave his mass organization to join the group of La Vérité readers. In order to create an internal faction, it was necessary to pursue the mass movement, to adapt oneself to the environment, to carry on menial daily work. Precisely in this very decisive field the League has not been able to make any progress up to the present — with very few exceptions. A great deal of valuable time was allowed to be lost. After a delay of a whole year, the Political Bureau now poses the task: "to create an internal faction." No — that is no longer sufficient The situation requires more decisive measures.
7. The criticism, the ideas, the slogans of the League are in general correct, but in this present period particularly inadequate. The revolutionary ideas must be transformed into life itself every day through the experience of the masses themselves. But how can the League explain this to them when it is itself cut off from the experience of the masses? It is necessary to add: several comrades do not even see the need of this experience. It seems to them to be sufficient to form an opinion on the basis of newspaper accounts they read and then to give it expression in an article or in a talk. Yet if the most correct ideas do not reflect directly the ideas and actions of the mass, they will escape the attention of the masses altogether.
8. In that case the League is bankrupt, is it not? — An absolutely false conclusion. The successes of the League are obviously much smaller than many of us had hoped — much smaller than they could have been if there were not the fetters of an abstract conservatism. But despite the immense obstacles, there have been undoubtedly some successes. The League has exercised certain influence on the ideas and slogans of the labor movement in its entirety (united front, the workers' militia, trade-union unity). But it is exactly these successes, when taken into consideration together with the whole situation and particularly with the changed tactics of the bureaucratic apparatuses, that demand on the part of the League a new and decisive turn. Whither? To the masses.
9. The general situation in France puts the entire conscious labor movement before a task of short perspective: either the proletariat will in the course of six months, a year or perhaps the coming two years, destroy fascism and take a tremendous step forward all the way to the struggle for power, or it will itself be destroyed and all of Europe will become the arena for fascist tyranny and war. The pressure of this terrible alternative has forced both of the labor parties to strike out on the road of the united front. But in an exact sense this great victory poses the question before the League in all its amplitude: to be or not to be.
10. The joint meeting of July 2 gives a remarkably clear picture of the situation created. Just as the League has so often predicted, the very first step of the united front has aroused an extraordinary enthusiasm among the masses. The possibility of victory along this road is beyond all doubt. And yet neither the Stalinists nor the Socialists utilized the unification in order to advance aims of struggle but, on the contrary, directed their energy towards having the mass find satisfaction in the fact of unification itself. Yesterday the greatest danger was the sabotage of the united front Today the greatest danger lies in the illusions of the united front, very closely related to the parliamentary illusions: the diplomatic notes, the pathetic speeches, the handshaking, the bloc without revolutionary content — and the betrayal of the masses. At this symbolic gathering, the League did not get the floor. And this is no accident: we face the program of action of both these bureaucracies for the whole coming period.
11. This program can be realized practically only because the League remains isolated from the masses. The attempt to skim over this isolation through an exchange of diplomatic notes with the Central Committee or through attendance at the sessions of the Socialist National Council is nothing but diplomatic horseplay that aims to conceal the unfavorable relationship of forces. That is not at all worthy of us. The relationship of forces has to be changed, not concealed. It is necessary to go to the masses. It is necessary to find a place for oneself within the framework of the united front, Le., within the framework of one of the two parties of which it is composed. In actual practice, that means within the framework of the SFIO.
12. Is that not a capitulation before the Second International? Such a complaint can be lodged with much more justice against the Stalinists. It was they who renounced, inside of twenty-four hours and on command from Litvinov, the theory of social fascism when they realized that democracy is to be preferred. And they even gave up all criticism of their new friends. But we 'have nothing to renounce. We merely admit honestly that our organization is too weak to establish for itself a practical independent role in the struggles that are looming ahead of us. At the same time, as good revolutionists, we do not want to stand on the sidelines. In 1848 Marx and his weak Communist organization entered the democratic party. In order not to stand on the sidelines, Plekhanov attempted to join his group "Emancipation of Labor" to that of the "People's Will" (Narodnaya Volya), with which he had broken on principled grounds only five years before For different reasons and in a different situation, Lenin advised the Communist Party of England to join the Labour Party.We, on our part, have been ready to form a new International together with the SAP and OSP. We urgently advised our British comrades to enter the ILP and some of them took our advice. Was that capitulation? Not at all. We are now concerned with applying and developing the same policy in France.
13. Nevertheless — have we not proclaimed the necessity of creating a new party and a new International? This program remains in force in its entirety. But we have never promised to stop and ruminate until such a time as the Fourth International gathers about us. We have always declared that the means for its creation are complex and not of the same character in the different countries, just as was the case with the Third International. Comrade Trotsky reminded us a year ago particularly of the French example. There, in spite of the break of the Bolsheviks with the Second International, the whole section was won over to the Third International. We know of no law that says that a repetition of the Tours Congress is impossible. On the contrary, many of the prevailing conditions speak for such a possibility.
14. But in that case the SFIO will not accept us! — It is quite possible that the big shots will refuse. But the local organizations, on the other hand, will for the most part go with us. Inside of the party, the struggle of the tendencies continues to pursue its course. The left wing will be for us. Our ties with the left wing will be strengthened. And the developments themselves appear to work for the left wing.
15. And we are to agree to maintain discipline? To be sure, we shall work in the membership and maintain discipline. We shall develop into a faction. In return for that, we shall be in constant contact with tens of thousandsof workers, and we shall receive the right to participate in the struggle and in the discussion — and we shall have the opportunity, particularly indispensable for us, of controlling our ideas and slogans daily in the actions of the masses.
16. But does not entry into the SFIO imply the danger of opportunist adaptation or of degeneration? Undoubtedly. Yet it would be naive to think that one can escape this danger through self-isolation. The League is at present independent. But unfortunately its position on the SFIO policy contains elements of an impermissible adaptation. It is not necessary to use strong words against the leaders, but it is absolutely necessary to expose the danger of such a purely decorative attitude toward the "struggle against fascism" as has been expressed in the columns of Le Populaire (or l'Humanité).The proletariat is facing a deadly enemy who is prepared for all events and who will be armed to the teeth if necessary. The proletarian vanguard should develop in its own ranks and among the broad masses an unshakable preparedness for struggle, an iron will, a revolutionary spirit of discipline, a military pugnacity. Parades at given times, demonstrations with permission of the police and other such symbolic actions tend only to lull the watchfulness and the willpower of the workers. A fighting organization is necessary; steel battalions are necessary; instructors and officers are necessary. It is necessary to disarm the enemy, to sweep him off the streets, to terrorize him. The task of the League — whether it remains independent or joins one of the parties of the united front — demands imperiously an explanation to the workers as frank, as clear, as honest as the seriousness of the situation and the tasks flowing from it require.
17. In that case, what will be our position as regards the Communist Party? We shall come more closely in contact with it than before — through the united front. We must clearly bear in mind that the CP is capable only of such a dissolution of the SFIO as will be of no advantage whatever to the revolution. It is notoriously true that this has been the result of the coalition between the CP of England and the ILP. But if we can intervene effectively, we will have a new and invaluable opportunity to influence the proletarian core of the CP. In such a manner, a powerful section of the Fourth International may evolve.
18. But the proletarian party must be independent. Quite so. But the League is not yet a party. It is an embryo, and an embryo needs covering and nourishment in order to develop.
19. But if … and then … and if? To foresee everything and to provide for everything in advance is impossible. It is necessary to understand the situation clearly, to determine the tasks and to proceed with their fulfillment In six months we can lose forever that opportunity that we are offered now. We must look at things from the short perspective.
20. To conclude: the Koran says that the mountain came to the prophet Marxism counsels the prophet to go to the mountain.