The League Faced with a Decisive Turn

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For several years the most active fighting slogan of the League was "The United Front" Without a doubt this slogan was, in spite of its "abstract" character for two or three years, the key to the situation in Germany, then in France. The defeat of the German proletariat, the Austrian catastrophe, the growth of fascism in France and other countries were necessary before the Comintern bureaucracy took a radical turn in the question of the united front. The examples of earlier turns have only proven to us all too well that without a critical overhauling of the old position and without a theoretical foundation for the new one a turn even formally progressive offers no guarantee for a correct policy. On the contrary, it unavoidably bears within it a chain of new vacillations and mistakes. Eloquent signs of the new dangers are already there: the ultimatists become opportunists. For this reason our whole struggle transfers itself to a new, higher plane.

Social Democracy on its part has trod the path of the united front with the definite purpose of breaking off its revolutionary head. In the field of the united front, the fight against the reformist bureaucracy must be carried oh less noisily in form but in a more systematic and concentrated way than ever.

Both bureaucracies are united by their common interest against the growing opposition that brings to expression or tries to express the tasks of the hour. On the other hand, both bureaucracies inimically oppose each other in a competition sharper than ever. For this reason, one can differentiate in the policy of both bureaucracies: the conspiracy against all who aim to encroach on their rule and the fear of each of them becoming a victim of the ally. The result is the readiness to break the united front at any time.

Only a short time ago the lessons of the events, Marxist analysis, the criticism of the Bolshevik-Leninists spoke for the policy of the united front Now in France a mighty factor has added itself, the active pressure of the masses themselves. Now this factor is decisive. It expresses itself directly in the militant demonstrations on the street and indirectly in the political turn of both apparatuses. That is a tremendous step forward. But just because the step is tremendous, it changes the political situation from top to bottom.

Only yesterday the slogan of the united front was the sole monopoly of the Bolshevik-Leninists. Today this monopoly has been taken from us. The slogan has become common property. It expresses the deep, passionate, but politically very nebulous longing of the masses to oppose the forward march of reaction with the united forces of all the oppressed. The presence of this longing creates the most important condition, if not for a directly revolutionary situation, at least for a prerevolutionary one. But, unfortunately, the existing organizations see very poorly the real changes in the mood of the working masses. To have an ear for the average worker in the factory, on the street, in the streetcar, in the cafe, in the family in order to know how he sees the situation, what hopes he cherishes, what he believes in — to listen attentively to such a worker — that is the first duty of a revolutionary organization, above all in a critical period such as the present when the consciousness of the masses literally changes every day. At the moment one can judge the depth and the acuteness of the turn in the consciousness of the masses, above all, by their sympathetic expression, especially by the events that are taking place within both parties (crystallization of a left wing within the Social Democracy, the split of Saint-Denis, the turn of both bureaucracies to the united front, etc.). The character of such symptomatic expressions has certainly remained backward and is distorted; nevertheless they allow the following conclusion: (1) the workers see not only the danger but also the possibility of resistance; (2) they see their salvation in the united front; (3) with a halfway correct policy that reinforces the confidence of the workers in themselves, the active defense can in a short time go over to a general attack.

The task of the Bolshevik-Leninists does not now consist in the repetition of abstract formulas on the united front (workers' alliances, etc.) but in the formulation of definite slogans, concrete activity and the perspective of the struggle on the basis of the policy of a mass united front. It is the task of the defense to set up soviets and to hasten their transformation into organs of the struggle for power. The task of the League according to the present situation does not diminish but, on the contrary, grows, shifts to another plane and takes on another character. Not to understand that, to occupy oneself with the reflection of what has already been learned, would mean to lose the game.

Of decisive significance for the fate of the League will be from now on its relation to the united front, not as an abstract slogan, but as the living reality of a mass struggle. The new situation expresses itself most clearly in the example of Saint-Denis. Only yesterday Doriot was the leader in the fight for the united front, which he, in his own way, made a reality in Saint-Denis. Tomorrow, in case of an agreement between the two bureaucracies, the masses will see in Doriot an obstacle, a splitter, a saboteur of the united front. The Stalinist bureaucracy will either press Saint-Denis to return to the ranks of its old party (with or without Doriot?) or will smash Saint-Denis.

The policy of the League is naturally not exhausted with the abstract idea of the united front, for this reason — historically seen, the course of the Bolshevik-Leninists cannot be liquidated by the agreement of both bureaucracies. Should the League remain passive, however, unable to adjust itself courageously and rapidly to the new situation, the League can be for a long period cast back into the void.

One can object: the united front demands the participation of all proletarian groupings and organizations, consequently the participation of Saint-Denis as well as that of the League. But this objection is only of formal significance. Decisive is the relation of forces. If the League had been able at the proper time to take deeper roots in the masses, if Saint-Denis had joined the League, if … etc., then there would have been a third force alongside of both bureaucracies whose participation in the united front would have been necessitated by the situation itself. In the field of the united front, this third force would have become decisive. But that is not the situation. The League is organizationally weak; Saint-Denis and other groups are politically exceptionally weak. For this reason they are all, including the League, threatened with the danger of actually having to remain outside of the united front, in spite of the fact that it is the tremendous merit of the League to have set it in motion.

If the League remains on the outside and concentrates its efforts upon criticism from without, it risks the danger of creating anger among the workers instead of attention. Let us once more recapitulate: in the unity of the ranks, the masses now see their only means of salvation. Everyone who remains outside the common ranks, everyone who criticizes from the sidelines, the masses look upon as an obstacle. Not to take this mighty and, at bottom, healthy mood of the masses into consideration, to work against it, that would be death. With the rise of a movement, the task of the Marxists consists in, supported by the wave, bringing in the necessary clarity of thought and method.

The League must take an organic place in the ranks of the united front It is too weak to claim an independent place. That is as much to say that it must immediately take a place in one of the two parties that have negotiated the agreement For us there is no principled difference between the two parties, or almost none. Practically, however, only the entry into the Social Democratic party is possible

What? At once we hear a hail of objections, the League should go into Leon Blum's party? It should capitulate before reformism? But we are for a new party? We are for the Fourth International? How can we join the Second? What will the Stalinists say? What will the workers say? etc., etc. All of these arguments look very mighty, but in reality they are superficial, for they make a leap over reality. They are based on that which would be desirable, not on that which is.

Of course, we are against reformism — in the present situation more adamantly than ever. But one must know how to come nearer the goal in the given, concrete situation. To renounce the principles or to "provisionally" relinquish the struggle for them would be open treason. But to bring the methods of struggle in congruence with the situation and our own forces is an elementary demand of realism. Bolshevism, represented by the Leninist leadership, did not betray and renounce itself, but in 1905-06 the Bolsheviks were forced by the pressure of the masses that longed for unity to coalesce themselves with the Mensheviks. This coalition led progressively to a new split. But in 1910 Lenin, under the pressure of the sentiment in his own ranks, was himself forced to undertake an attempt at unity that was in two years to lead to a final split. Irreconcilableness of principle has nothing in common with sectarian ossification, which heedlessly passes over the changes in the situation and the mood of the masses. From the thesis that the proletarian party must be independent at all costs, our English comrades concluded that it would be impermissible to go into the ILP. Alas! They only forgot that they were far from being a party, but were only a propaganda circle, that a party does not fall from heaven, that the propaganda circle must pass through a period of embryonic existence before it can become a party. Our English comrades (the majority) doubtlessly paid dearly for their mistake in perspective, and we with them. Let us here recall the following: at the time we did not reproach Watcher and Co. for entering the SAP, but, in doing so, for sheathing the banner of Marxism. We will not do this.

Naturally the League cannot enter the Socialist Party other than as a Bolshevik-Leninist faction. It will maintain La Vérité, which will transform itself into a factional organ with the same rights as Action Socialiste, etc. Openly posing the question of admission, the League will say: "Our views have completely vindicated themselves. The united front is getting under way on the rails of the masses. We want to participate actively. The sole possibility for our organization to participate in the mass united front under the given circumstances is by entering the Socialist Party. Now as before we consider it to be more necessary than ever to fight for the principles of Bolshevism, for the creation of a truly revolutionary party of the proletarian vanguard and for the Fourth International. We hope to convince the majority of the Socialist as well as the Communist workers of this. We will bind ourselves to pursue this task within the framework of the party, to subject ourselves to its discipline and to preserve the unity of action."

Naturally the Stalinists will fly up in a furious howl or attempt to fly up. But, in the first place, they themselves have undertaken a sharp turn by their entry into a bloc with the "social fascists." Secondly, in their campaign against us, they will encounter the indignation of the Socialist workers. Thirdly, and that is at bottom the only important consideration, it is not a question of what the Stalinists will say but of how the League can become a serious force in the labor movement. If it succeeds, by its entry into the Socialist Party, in the course of a year or even in six months (all processes evolve very quickly today) in rallying to its banner several thousand workers, it will never occur to anyone to remember the campaign of the Stalinists.

Several comrades, I among them, accused the leadership of the League and La Vérité of insufficiency in the struggle against the Social Democratic leadership. At first glance it might seem as though there lay an irreconcilable contradiction between this criticism, which I still maintain today in its full extent, and the proposal to enter the Social Democratic party. In reality, that is not the case. To exist as an independent organization and thereby not to demarcate oneself sharply from the Social Democrats means to risk becoming an appendage of Social Democracy. To enter openly (under the given concrete conditions) the Social Democratic party in order to develop an inexorable struggle against the reformist leadership means to perform a revolutionary act The critical examination of the policy of Blum and Co. must be the same in both cases.

One can make still another objection: Why begin with the Socialist Party? Would it not be more correct to address oneself first to the Communist Party? At any rate the question cannot become the object of serious differences of opinion; it is clear that the appeal to the Stalinists can only have the character of a demonstration. Is it necessary? It is possible that it would be useful as regards a definite section of Communist workers. The declaration of the League could then have the following content: "We have fought against the theory of social fascism, for the united front, etc. The latest steps of the party are evidence of a certain turn in this direction. For this reason we are ready to make a loyal attempt to work within the party, naturally under the condition that it be possible for us to fight for our ideas on the basis of party democracy." After the inevitable refused, the League would have to address itself to the Socialist Party. If the leadership of the Socialist Party refuses to admit the League (and that is very well possible), then a broad field would be opened for the fight against the leadership in the lower bodies. The sympathies of the Socialist workers would in this case undoubtedly be on the side of the League.

The League is faced with the most serious turn in its whole history. The success of this turn will only be ensured by boldness, quickness and unanimity. Loss of time, endless discussions and internal strife would mean destruction.

First the Central Committee, beginning with the Politburo, must establish its position, naturally hand in hand with the International Secretariat. Then the members of the Politburo must, on the spot, prepare the opinion of the members. Because of the extraordinary significance of the question, it would be necessary to summon a conference in order to pass a final resolution. In the face of this rapid course of events, the conference should convene not later than the middle of July, for example on the fourteenth of July. Only by observing this tempo in deeds and by the character of the turn itself can one firmly count not only on the League not running along behind the events but also on it making a great stride forward on the road to the creation of a really revolutionary party of the proletariat and the building of the Fourth International.