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Preface by H.N. Brailsford (1921 British edition)[edit source]

It has been said of the Bolsheviks that they are more interestng than Bolshevism. To those who hold to the economic interpretation of history that may seem a heresy. None the less, I believe that the personality not merely of the leaders but also of their party goes far to explain the making and survival of the Russian Revolution. To us in the West they seem a wholly foreign type. With Socialist leaders and organizations we and our fathers have been familiar for three-quarters of a century. There has been no lack of talent and even of genius among them. The movement has produced its great theorist in Marx, its orator in Jaurès, its powerful tacticians like Bebel, and it has influenced literature in Morris, Anatole France and Shaw. It bred, however, no considerable man of action, and it was left for the Russians to do what generations of Western Socialists had spent their lives in discussing. There was in this Russian achievement an almost barbaric simplicity and directness. Here were men who really believed the formulÌ of our theorists and the resolutions of our Congresses. What had become for us a sterilized and almost respectable orthodoxy rang to their ears as a trumpet call to action. The older generation has found it difficult to pardon their sincerity. The rest of us want to understand the miracle.

The real audacity of the Bolsheviks lay in this, that they made a proletarian revolution precisely in that country which, of all portions of the civilized world, seemed the least prepared for it by its economic development. For an agrarian revolt, for the subdivision of the soil, even for the overthrow of the old governing class, Russia was certainly ready. But any spontaneous revolution, with its foundations laid in the masses of the peasantry, would have been individualistic and not communistic. The daring of the Bolsheviks lay in their belief that the minute minority of the urban working class could, by its concentration, its greater intelligence and its relative capacity for organization, dominate the inert peasant mass, and give to their outbreak of land-hunger the character and form of a constructive proletarian revolution. The bitter struggle among Russian parties which lasted from March, 1917, down to the defeat of Wrangel in November, 1920, was really an internecine competition among them for the leadership of the peasants. Which of these several groups could enlist their confidence, to the extent of inducing them not merely to fight, but to accept the discipline, military and civilian, necessary for victory? At the start the Bolsheviks had everything against them. They are nearly all townsmen. They talked in terms of a foreign and very German doctrine. Few of them, save Lenin, grasped the problems of rural life at all. The landed class should at least have known the peasant better. Their chief rivals were the Social Revolutionaries; a party which from its first beginnings had made a cult of the Russian peasant, studied him, idealized him and courted him, which even seemed in 1917 to have won him. Many circumstances explain the success of the Bolsheviks, who proved once again in history the capacity of the town, even when its population is relatively minute, for swift and concentrated action. They also had the luck to deal with opponents who committed the supreme mistake of invoking foreign aid. But none of these advantages would have availed without an immense superiority of character. The Slav temperament, dreamy, emotional, undisciplined, showed itself at its worst in the incorrigible self-indulgence of the more aristocratic “Whites,” while the “intellectuals” of the moderate Socialist and Liberal groups have been ruined for action by their exclusively literary and æsthetic education. The Bolsheviks may be a less cultivated group, but, in their underground life of conspiracy, they had learned sobriety, discipline, obedience, and mutual confidence. Their rigid dogmatic Marxist faith gives to them the power of action which belongs only to those who believe without criticism or question. Their ability to lead depends much less than most Englishmen suppose, on their ruthlessness and their readiness to practise the arts of intimidation and suppression. Their chief asset is their self-confidence. In every emergency they are always sure that they have the only workable plan. They stand before the rest of Russia as one man. They never doubt or despair, and even when they compromise, they do it with an air of truculence. Their survival amid invasion, famine, blockade, and economic collapse has been from first to last a triumph of the unflinching will and the fanatical faith. They have spurred a lazy and demoralized people to notable feats of arms and to still more astonishing feats of endurance. To hypnotize a nation in this fashion is, perhaps, the most remarkable feat of the human will in modern times.

This book is, so far, by far the most typical expression of the Bolshevik temperament which the revolution has produced. Characteristically it is a polemic, and not a constructive essay. Its self-confidence, its dash, even its insolence, are a true expression of the movement. Its author bears a world famous name. Everyone can visualize the powerful head, the singularly handsome features, the athletic figure of the man. He makes in private talk an impression of decision and definiteness. He is not rapid or expansive in speech, for everything that he says is calculated and clear cut. One has the sense that one is in the presence of abounding yet disciplined vitality. The background is an office which by its military order and punctuality rebukes the habitual slovenliness of Russia. On the platform his manner was much quieter than I expected. He spoke rather slowly, in a pleasant tenor voice, walking to and fro across the stage and choosing his words, obviously anxious to express his thoughts forcibly but also exactly. A flash of wit and a striking phrase came frequently, but the manner was emphatically not that of a demagogue. The man, indeed, is a natural aristocrat, and his tendency, which Lenin, the aristocrat by birth, corrects, is towards military discipline and authoritative regimentation.

There is nothing surprising to-day in the note of authority which one hears in Trotsky’s voice and detects in his writing, for he is the chief of a considerable army, which owes everything to his talent for organization. It was at Brest-Litovsk that he displayed the audacity which is genius. Up to that moment there was little in his career to distinguish him from his comrades of the revolutionary underworld – a university course cut short by prison, an apprenticeship to agitation in Russia, some years of exile spent in Vienna, Paris, and New York, the distinction which he shares with Tchitcherin of “sitting” in a British prison, a ready wit, a gift of trenchant speech, but as yet neither the solid achievement nor the legend which gives confidence. Yet this obscure agitator, handicapped in such a task by his Jewish birth, faced the diplomatist and soldiers of the Central Empires, flushed as they were with victory and the insolence of their kind, forced them into public debate, staggered them by talking of first principles as though the defeat and impotence of Russia counted for nothing, and actually used the negotiations to shout across their heads his summons to their own subjects to revolt. He showed in this astonishing performance the grace and audacity of a “matador.” This unique bit of drama revealed the persistent belief of the Bolsheviks in the power of the defiant challenge, the magnetic effect of sheer will. Since this episode his services to the revolution have been more solid but not less brilliant. He had no military knowledge or experience, yet he took in hand the almost desperate task of creating an army. He has often been compared to Carnot. But, save that both had lost officers, there was little in common between the French and the Russian armies in the early stages of the two revolutions. The French army had not been demoralized by defeat, or wearied by long inaction, or sapped by destructive propaganda. Trotsky had to create his Red Army from the foundations. He imposed firm discipline, and yet contrived to preserve the plan of the revolutionary spirit. Hampered by the inconceivable difficulties that arose from ruined railways and decayed industries, he none the less contrived to make a military machine which overthrew the armies of Kolchak , Denikin and Wrangel, with the flower of the old professional officers at their head. As a feat of organization under inordinate difficulties, his work ranks as the most remarkable performance of the revolution.

It is not the business of a preface to anticipate the argument of a book, still less to obtrude personal opinions. Kautsky’s labored essay, to which this book is the brilliant reply, has been translated into English, and is widely known. The case against the possibility of political democracy in a capitalist society could hardly be better put than in these pages, and the polemic against purely evolutionary methods is formidable. The English reader of to-day is aware, however, that the Russian revolution has not stood still since Trotsky wrote. We have to realize that, even in the view of the Bolsheviks themselves, the evolution towards Communism is in Russia only in its early stages. The recent compromises imply, at the best, a very long period of transition, through controlled capitalist production, to Socialism. Experience has proved that catastrophic revolution and the seizure of political power do not in themselves avail to make a Socialist society. The economic development in that direction has actually been retarded, and Russia, under the stress of civil war, has retrogaded into a primitive village system of production and exchange. To every reader’s mind the question will be present whether the peculiar temperament of the Bolsheviks has led them to overestimate the importance of political power, to underestimate the inert resistance of the majority, and to risk too much for the illusion of dictating. To that question history has not yet given the decisive answer. The dæmonic will that made the revolution and defended it by achieving the impossible may yet vindicate itself against the dull trend of impersonal forces.

Foreword by Max Bedacht (1922 American edition)[edit source]

In a land where “democracy” is so deeply entrenched as in our United States of America it may seem futile to try to make friends for a dictatorship, by a close comparison of the principles of the two – Dictatorship versus Democracy. But then, confiding in the inviting gesture of the Goddess of Liberty many of our friends and fellow citizens have tested that sacred principle of democracy, freedom of speech, a little too freely – and landed in the penitentiary for it. Others again, relying on the not less sacred principle of democracy, freedom of assembly, have come in unpleasant Contact with a substantial stick of hardwood, wielded by an unwieldly guardian of the law, and awoke from the immediate effects of this collision in some jail. Again others, leaning a little too heavily against the democratic principle of freedom of press broke down that pasteboard pillar of democracy, and incidentally into prison.

Looking at this side of the bright shining medal of our beloved democracy it seems that there is not the slightest bit of difference between the democracy of capitalist America and the dictatorship of Soviet Russia. But there is a great difference. The dictatorship in Russia is bold and upright class rule, which has as its ultimate object the abolition of all class rule and all dictatorships. Our democracy, on the other hand, is a Pecksniffian Dictatorship, is hypocrisy incarnate, promising all liberty in phrases, but in reality even penalizing free thinking, consistently working only for one object: to perpetuate the rule of the capitalist class, the capitalist dictatorship.

“Dictatorship versus Democracy” is, therefore, enough of an open question even in our own country to deserve some consideration. To give food for thought on this subject is the object of the publication of Trotsky’s book.

This book is an answer to a book by Karl Kautsky, Terrorism and Communism. It is polemical in character. Polemical writings are, as a rule, only thoroughly understood if one reads both sides of the question. But even if we could not take for granted that the proletarian reader is fully familiar with the question at issue we could not conscientiously advise a worker to get Kautsky’s book. It is really asking our readers to undertake the superhuman task of reading a book which in the guise of a scientific treatise is foully hitting him below the belt, and then expect him to pay two dollars for it in the bargain.

Anyhow, to read Kautsky’s book is an ordeal for any revolutionist. Kautsky, in his book, tries to prove that the humanitarian instincts of the masses must defeat any attempt to overpower and suppress the bourgeoisie by terrorist means. But to read his book must kill in the proletarian reader the last remnants of those instincts on which Kautsky’s hope for the safety of the bourgeoisie is based. There would even not be enough of those instincts left to save Kautsky from the utter contempt of the proletarian masses, a fate he so richly deserves.

Mr. Kautsky was once the foremost exponent of Marxism. Many of those fighting to-day in the front ranks of the proletarian army revered Kautsky as their teacher. But even in his most glorious days as a Marxist his was the musty pedantry of the German professor, which was hardly ever penetrated by a live spark of revolutionary spirit. Still, the Russian revolution of 1905 found a friend in him. That revolution did not commit the unpardonable sin of being successful. But when the tornado of the first victorious proletarian revolution swept over Russia and destroyed in its fury some of the tormentors and exploiters of the working class – then Kautsky’s “humanitarianism” killed the last remnant of revolutionary spirit and instinct in him and left only a pitiful wreck of an apologist for capitalism, that was once Kautsky, the Marxist.

July, 1914. The echoes of the shots fired in Sarajewo [Sarajevo, now part of Bosnia – Transcriber] threaten to set the world in flames. Will it come, the seeming inevitable? No ! – A thousand times no! Had not the forces of a future order, had not the International of Labor – the Second International – solemnly declared in 1907 in Stuttgart, in 1911 in Copenhagen and in 1912 in Basel: “We will fight war by all means at our disposal. Let the exploiters start a war. It will begin as a war of capitalist governments against each other; it will end – it must end – as a war of the working class of the world against world capitalism; it must end in the proletarian revolution.” We, the socialists of the world, comrades from England and Russia, from America and Germany, from France and Austria; we comrades from all over the world, had solemnly promised ourselves: “War against war” We had promised ourselves and our cause to answer the call of capitalism for a world war with a call on the proletariat for a world revolution.

Days passed. July disappeared in the ocean of time. The first days of August brought the booming of the cannon to our ears, messengers of the grim reality of war. And then the news of the collapse of the Second International; reports of betrayal by the socialists; betrayal in London and Vienna; betrayal in Berlin and Brussels; betrayal in Paris; betrayal everywhere. What would Kautsky say to this rank betrayal, Kautsky, the foremost disciple of Marx, Kautsky the foremost theoretician of the Second International? Will he at least speak up? He did not speak up. Commenting on the betrayal he wrote in Die Neue Zeit: “Die Kritik der Waffen hat eingesetzt; jetzt hat die Waffe der Kritik zu schweigen.” [The arbitrament of arms is on; now the weapon of criticism must rest.] With this one sentence Kautsky replaced Marxism as the basis of his science with rank and undisguised hypocrisy. From then on although trying to retain the toga of a Marxist scholar on his shoulders, with thousands of “if’s” and “when’s”’ and “but’s” he became the apologist for the betrayal of the German Social Democracy, and the betrayal of the Second International.

It is true that his “if’s” and “when’s” and “but’s” did not satisfy the Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party. They hoped for a victory of the imperial army and wanted to secure a full and unmitigated share of the glory of “His Majesty’s” victory. That is why they did not appreciate Kautsky’s excellent service. So they helped the renegade to a cheap martyrdom by removing him from the editorship of Die Neue Zeit. After 1918 it may have dawned upon Scheidemann and Ebert how much better Kautsky served the capitalist cause by couching his betrayal in words that did not lose him outright all the confidence of the proletariat. And Kautsky himself is now exhausting every effort to prove to Noske and Scheidemann how cruelly he was mistreated and how well he deserves to be taken back to their bosom.

Kautsky’s book Terrorism and Communism is dictated by hatred of the Russian revolution. It is influenced by fear of a like revolution in Germany. It is written with tears for the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and its pseudo-”socialist” henchmen who have been sacrificed on the altar of revolution by the proletarian dictatorship in Russia. Kautsky prefers to sacrifice the revolution and the revolutionists on the altar of “humanitarianism.” The author of Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History knows – must know – that humanitarianism under capitalism is capitalist humanitarianism. This humanitarianism mints gold out of the bones, the blood, the health and the suffering of the whole working class while it sheds tears about an individual case of cruelty to one human being. This humanitarianism punishes murder with death and beats to death the pacifist who protests against war as an act of mass murder. Under the cloak of “humanitarian instincts”’ Kautsky only hides the enemy of the proletarian revolution. The question at issue is not terrorism. It is the dictatorship; it is revolution itself. If the Russian proletariat was justified in taking over power it was in duty bound to use all means necessary to keep it. If it is a crime for them to use terrorist means then it was a crime to take a power which they could maintain only by terrorist means. And that is really Kautsky’s point. The crime of the Bolsheviki is that they took power. If Kautsky were a mere sentimentalist and yet a revolutionist he could shed tears over the unwillingness of the bourgeoisie to give up power without a struggle. But not being a revolutionist he condemns the proletariat for having taken and maintained power by the only means possible, by force. Kautsky would much prefer to shed crocodile tears over tens of thousands of proletarian revolutionists slaughtered by a successful counter-revolution. He scorns the Russian Communists because they robbed him of the opportunity to parade his petit bourgeois and consequently pro-capitalist “humanitarian’” sentiments in a pro-revolutionary cloak. But he must parade them at any cost. So he parades them without disguise as a mourner for the suppressed bourgeoisie in Russia.

Trotsky’s answer to Kautsky is not only one side of a controversy. It is one of the literary fruits of the revolution itself. It breathes the breath of revolution. It conquers the gray scholastic theory of the renegade with the irresistible weapon of the revolutionary experience of the Russian proletariat. It refuses to shed tears over the victims of Gallifet and shows what alone saved the Russian revolution from the Russian Gallifets, the Kolchaks, Wrangels, etc.

Trotsky’s book is not only an answer to Karl Kautsky; it is an answer to the thousands of Kautskys in the socialist movement the world over who want the proletariat to drown the memory of seas of proletarian blood shed by their treachery in an ocean of tears shed for the suppressed bourgeoisie of Russia.

Trotsky’s book is one of the most effective weapons in the literary arsenal of the revolutionary proletariat in its fight against the social traitors for leadership of the proletarian masses.

Preface by Trotsky (1935, Second English Edition)[edit source]

This book was written in 1920 in the car of a military train and amid the flames of civil war. This circumstance the reader must keep before his eyes if he wishes rightly to understand not only the basic material of the book, but also its harsh allusions, and particularly the tone in which it is written.

The book was written as an attack on Karl Kautsky. To the younger generation this name does not mean much, although indeed Kautsky is still alive among us: not long ago he kept his eightieth birthday. Kautsky at one time wielded a very great authority in the ranks of the Second International as the theorist of Marxism. The war soon showed that his Marxism was only a method for a passive interpretation of the process of history, but not a method of revolutionary action. So long as the class struggle flowed between the peaceful shores of parliamentarism, Kautsky, like thousands of others, indulged himself in the luxury of revolutionary criticism and bold perspectives: in practice these did not bind him to anything. But when the war and the after-war period brought the problems of revolution onto the field, Kautsky took up his position definitively on the other side of the barricade. Without breaking away from Marxist phraseology he made himself, instead of the champion of the proletarian revolution, the advocate of passivity. of a crawling capitulation before Imperialism.

In the period before the war Karl Kautsky and the leaders of the British Labour Party seemed to be standing at opposite poles of the Second International. Our generation, which then was young, in the fight against the opportunism of MacDonald, Henderson, and their brethren, not seldom made use of weapons taken from Kautsky’s arsenal. But in truth even in those days we went a great deal further than that wavering and ambiguous teacher was willing to go. Even before the war, Rosa Luxemburg, who had a closer knowledge of Kautsky than others, had ruthlessly exposed the pinchbeck in his radicalism. These last years, anyhow, have thrown a full light on the facts: politically Kautsky belongs to the same camp as Henderson. If the former still goes on quoting from Marx, while the latter chooses rather the psalms of King David, this difference in habits does no harm whatever to their solidarity. All that is essentially uttered in this book against Kautsky can likewise almost unreservedly be applied to the leaders of the British trade union movement and of the Labour Party.

One of the chapters in the book is given to the so-called Austrian school of Marxism (Otto Bauer, Karl Renner, and others). Essentially this school fulfilled the same function: with the help of sterilised formulae from Marxism it gave shelter to a policy of cowering opportunism and, coward-like, it refused to make those bold decisions which were inevitably called for by the course of the class struggle. Events put both Kautskianism and Austrian Marxism to a ruthless test. The once powerful social-democratic parties of Germany and Austria, raised (against their own will) by the revolutionary movement in 1918 to the heights of power, freely yielded up bit by bit their positions to the bourgeoisie, until they were seen to have been ruthlessly crushed by it. The history of these two parties will be found to be a priceless illustration in the question of the part played by revolutionary and counter-revolutionary violence in history.

For the sake of continuity I have kept the title for the book under which the first English edition came out: ‘‘The Defence of Terrorism.’’ But it must at once be said here that this title, which is that of the original publishers and not the author’s, is too wide and may even give grounds for misunderstanding. What we are concerned with is not at all the defence of ‘‘terrorism’’ as such. Methods of compulsion and terrorisation down to the physical extirpation of its opponents have up to now advantaged, and continue to advantage in an infinitely higher degree the cause of reaction, as represented by the outworn exploiting classes, than they do the cause of historical progress, as represented by the proletariat. The jury of moralists who condemn ‘‘terrorism’’ of whatever kind have their gaze fixed really on the revolutionary deeds of the persecuted who are seeking to set themselves free. The best example of this is Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. In the name of the eternal principles of morality and religion he was unwearied in condemning violence. But when the collapse of the capitalist system and the sharpening of the class struggle made the revolutionary fight of the proletariat for power an actual and living question for England also, MacDonald left the Labour camp for that of the Conservative bourgeoisie with just as little bother as when a passenger changes from a smoking compartment to a non-smoking. To-day the pious enemy of terrorism is keeping up by the help of organised violence a ‘‘peaceful’’ system of unemployment, colonial oppression, armed forces and preparation for fresh wars.

The present work, therefore, is far away from any thought of defending terrorism in general. It champions the historical justification of the proletarian revolution. The root idea of the book is this: that history down to now has not thought out any other way of carrying mankind forward than that of setting up always the revolutionary violence of the progressive class against the conservative violence of the outworn classes.

The incurable Fabians, it is true, keep on saying that, if the arguments of this book are true for backward Russia, they are utterly without application to advanced lands, especially to old democracies like Great Britain. This consoling illusion may have worn a cloak of persuasiveness up to fifteen or ten years ago. But since then a wave of Fascist or militarised police dictatorships has overwhelmed a great part of the European states. The day after I was exiled from the Soviet Union, on February 25, 1929, I wrote—not for the first time, indeed—with reference to the situation in Europe: ‘‘Democratic institutions have shown that they cannot withstand the pressure of present-day antagonisms, both international and national—more often, both together. . . . On the analogy with electrical science democracy may be defined as a system of safety switches and fuses to guard against too strong currents of national or social hostility. There has never been one period in the history of mankind even within the slightest degree so filled with antagonisms as our own. The overloading of the current shows itself more and more at various points in the European system. Under the too high tension of class and international oppositions the safety switches of democracy fuse or burst. This is the essence of the short-circuit of dictatorship. The first to give way, of course, are the weakest switches. Internal and world oppositions, however, are not losing strength, but growing. It is hardly a ground for consolation that the process has taken hold only of the edge of the capitalistic world; gout begins with the big toe, but, once it has begun, it reaches the heart.’’

In the six years that have gone by since these lines were written the ‘‘short-circuits’’ of dictatorship have arisen in Germany, Austria, and Spain—in this last after a short-lived revolutionary flowering of democracy. All those democratic illusionary dreamers who tried to explain Italian Fascism as a passing phenomenon that had arisen in a relatively backward land as the result of an after-war psychosis, met with the sternest refutation from the facts themselves. Among the great European countries the parliamentary régime is now left only in France and in England. But after what has happened in Europe anyone would have to be extraordinarily blind if he believes France and England to be safe from civil war and dictatorship. On February 6, 1934, French parliamentarianism was given its first warning.

Extraordinarily superficial is the idea that the comparatively strong resisting power of the British political system arises out of the great age of its parliamentary traditions, and that as the years go on it automatically draws fresh strength from these for resistance. It has nowhere been found that old things, other circumstances being the same, are set firmer than new things. The fact is that British parliamentarianism holds together better than the others amid the crisis of the capitalist system only because their former world dominion allowed the ruling classes of Great Britain to heap up an immense wealth, which now goes on lighting up the gloom of their days. In other words: the British parliamentary democracy holds together not through a mystic power of tradition, but from the plump savings which have been handed down from thriving times.

The future lot of British democracy depends not on its inner characteristics, but on the lot of British and world capitalism. If the jugglers and wonder-workers in power were really to find out the secret of giving youth to capitalism, there is no doubt that along with it bourgeois democracy would find its own youth again. But we see no grounds for believing in the jugglers and wonder-workers. The last imperialistic war, indeed, came as an expression, and at the same time a proof, of the historical truth that world capitalism has drunk its progressive mission to the last drop. The development of the productive powers comes to rest against two reactionary barriers: private ownership of the means of production and the frontiers of the national state. Unless these two barriers are swept away, that is to Say, unless the means of production are concentrated in the hands of the community, and unless there is an organised planned economy, which can gradually enfold the whole world, the economic and cultural collapse of mankind is foredoomed. Further short-circuitings by reactionary dictatorships would in such a case inevitably spread to Great Britain also: the successes won by Fascism are seen to be no more than the political expression of the decay of the capitalist system. In other words: even in England a political state of things is not impossible wherein some coxcomb such as Mosley, will be able to play an historical part like that played by his teachers Mussolini and Hitler.

From the Fabians we may hear it objected that the English proletariat have it quite in their own hands to come to power by way of Parliament, to carry through peacefully, within the law and step by step, all the changes called for in the capitalist system, and by so doing not only to make revolutionary terrorism needless, but also to dig the ground away under the feet of counter-revolutionary adventurers. An outlook such as this has at first sight a particular persuasiveness in the light of the Labour Party’s very important successes in the elections—but only at first sight, and that a very superficial one. The Fabian hope must, I fear, be held from the very beginning to be out of the question. I say “TI fear,’ since a peaceful, parliamentary change over to a new social structure would undoubtedly offer highly important advantages from the standpoint of the interests of culture, and therefore those of socialism. But in politics nothing is more dangerous than to mistake what we wish for what is possible. On the one hand, a victory for the Labour Party at the elections would by no means bring with it the immediate concentration of real power in its hands. On the other hand, the Labour Party does not, indeed, aim at full power, for, as represented by its leaders, it has no wish to expropriate the bourgeoisie. Henderson, Lansbury, and the others have nothing about them of the great social reformers; they are nothing else than small bourgeois conservatives. We have seen social democracy in power in Austria and Germany. In England we have twice beheld a so-called Labour Government. To-day there are social democratic Governments at the head of Denmark and of Sweden. In all these cases not one hair has fallen from the head of capitalism. A HendersonLansbury Government would not differ in the slightest from a Hermann Miller Government in Germany. It would not dare to lay a finger on the property of the bourgeoisie, and would be doomed to try paltry reforms, which, while disappointing the workers, would irritate the bourgeoisie. Farreaching social reforms cannot be carried out amid the conditions of crumbling capitalism. The workers would be more and more insistent in demanding more determined measures from the Government. In the parliamentary section of the Labour Party the revolutionary wing would split off; the right wing would be drawn more and more openly to a capitulation on the MacDonald pattern. As a counterweight to the Labour Government and a safeguard against revolutionary action by the masses, big capital would set about energetically supporting (this it has already begun to do) the Fascist movement. The Crown, the House of Lords, the bourgeois minority in the House of Commons, the bureaucracy, the military and naval commands, the banks, the trusts, the main body of the Press, ever ready to bring up the bands of Mosley or of some other more efficient adventurer to help the regular armed forces. In other words the ‘‘parliamentary outlook’’ would inevitably and fatally lead along the road to civil war, a civil war which, the less the leaders of the Labour Party were ready for it, would threaten the more to take on a long-drawn, embittered, and for the proletariat, unfavourable character.

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the British proletariat must not reckon on any historic privileges. It will have to struggle for power by the road of revolution and keep it in its hands by crushing the fierce resistance of the exploiters. There is no other way leading to Socialism. The problems of revolutionary violence, or ‘‘terrorism,”’ therefore have their practical interest for England also. That is why I agreed to a new English edition of this book.

At the Geneva conference (1922) the French representative Cobrat stated: ‘‘Soviet Russia, which has brought the land to the brink of an economic crash, has no right to teach the other countries Socialism.’’ But to-day he would find it hard to repeat these words. The Soviet Union since then has succeeded in showing in practice how great are the economic possibilities that lie in the nationalisation of the means of production. This proof is the more striking since we have to do with a backward land, and one without any reserves of trained workers and technicians.

At the time of the civil war, when this book was written, the Soviets were still under the flag of ‘“‘military Communism.” This system was not an “‘illusion’’—as the Philistines often maintained afterwards—but an iron necessity. The question was how the wretched resources were to be applied, mainly for the needs of the war, and how production, on however small a scale, was to be kept alive for these same ends and without any possibility of the work being paid for. Military Communism fulfilled its mission in so far as it made victory a possibility in the civil war. ‘‘Illusions,’’ so far as this word has any application at all here, are rather what we may call those economic hopes which were bound up with the development of the world revolution. The common and inseparable conviction of the whole party at that time was that the speedy victory of the proletariat in the West, beginning with Germany, would reveal vast technical and cultural possibilities, and thereby leave the ground free for a direct passage from militant Communism to a Socialistic system of production. The idea of five-year plans was not only formulated in that period, but in some economic departments it was also technically worked out.

The slow development of the revolution in the West brought about a far-reaching change in the economic methods of the Soviets. The period of the New Economic Policy started. It Jed on the one hand to a general quickening of the economic life, and on the other to a new birth of the small bourgeoisie, especially of the kulaks. The Soviet bureaucracy for the first time felt itself less dependent on the proletariat. It was now standing ‘‘between the classes,’’ regulating their relations to one another. At the same time as this it was losing piece by piece its trust and interest in the Western proletariat. It is from the autumn of 1924 that Stalin, in utter contradiction with the party traditions and with what he wrote himself as late as the spring of the same year, puts forward for the first time the theory of ‘Socialism in one country.’’ Bukharin supplements it by a theory of the “gradual growth of the kulak into Socialism.’’ Stalin and Bukharin go along arm in arm.

The difficulties of the revolution, the deprivations, the sacrifices, the death of the best workers during the civil war, the slow coming of economic successes led in those days to an inevitable reaction among the masses of the population. The loss of hope in the European workers made greater the dependence of the Russian workers on their own bureaucracy. On the other hand the reaction arising out of weariness among the masses favoured a further growth of independence in the machinery of government. Taking its stand on the conservative forces among the small bourgeoisie, and making every use of the defeat of the world proletariat and of the fallen spirit among the Soviet masses, Stalin’s section, that staff of the bureaucracy, comes down with a heavy hand on the so-called left opposition (“‘the Trotskyites’’). The October revolution enters on the stage of bureaucratic degeneration.

But the kulak is not at all allured by the vision of a ‘‘peaceful growth into Socialism.’? What he wishes is the restoration of freedom to trade. He accumulates in his hands the wheat supplies and refuses them to the Government. He demands payment against the notes he was given by the bureaucracy during the struggle with the opposition of the left. From an ally he becomes a foe.

The bureaucracy is driven to defend itself. It starts a campaign against the kulak, whose existence it had yesterday denied, and against the right wing of the party, its ally in the struggle with the opposition of the left. The new political course which was set in 1928 threw a strong light on the dependence of the Soviet bureaucracy upon the economic foundations laid by the October revolution. Unwillingly and always struggling, it was forced to take the road of industrialisation and collectivisation. Here for the first time it brings to light those unbounded productive possibilities that are the necessary results of the concentration of the means of production in the hands of the State.

The wonderful, though very uneven, successes of the fiveyear plan naturally raised the self-confidence of the bureaucracy. The collectivisation of millions of small peasant holdings gave it at the same time a new social basis. The defeats suffered by the world proletariat, the growth of Fascist and Bonapartist dictatorships in Europe all helped towards the success of the doctrine of ‘‘Socialism in one country.” The bureaucracy succeeded, indeed, in breaking up the Bolshevist Party and the Soviets, too, which were left only in name. The power passed from the masses, from the party, to a centralised bureaucracy; from this to a close supreme authority; and in the end to one man as the embodiment of an unchecked bureaucracy.

Many onlookers are astounded and repelled by the worship of the “‘leader’’ which so humiliatingly brings the Soviet system of to-day not far away from Hitler’s system. The “party” in Russia and Germany alike has one, and only one, right: the right to agree with the leader. The party meetings become nothing else than demonstrations of a unanimity that is assured beforehand. In what way is the Soviet order of things better than the Fascist? is the question put by the democrats, the pacifists, the idealists, who are none of them capable of looking below the political superstructure. Without in the slightest wishing to defend the bureaucratic caricature of the Soviet system, we will answer this one-sided criticism of it by pointing to its social basis. Hitler’s system is seen to be the last and truly desperate form of self-defence taken by a capitalism rotting to destruction. Stalin’s system is seen to be the misshapen bureaucratic form of self-defence taken by a Socialism that is rising. These two are not the same.

In so far as the Soviet bureaucracy is forced in its own interest to preserve the frontiers and the institutions of the Russian Soviet republic against foes without and within, and to give heed to the development of the nationalised productive forces, this bureaucracy is still fulfilling a progressive historical task, and has so far a right to the support of the workers of the world. But the root of the matter is this: that the farther ahead the tasks of economic and cultural construction lie, the less capable are they of being carried through by bureaucratic methods. The distribution of productive forces and materials is now carried out by the authorities under orders from above, without any share by the workers in deciding those questions on which their labour and their life depend. Cases where there is a lack of proportion or ill-adjustment in management grow more and more. The raising of the standard of life among the masses goes on exceedingly slowly and unevenly, and lags far behind technical achievements and the output of energy by the workers. Thus, economic successes, while for a time they strengthen the bureaucratic autocracy, in their further development turn more and more against it.

The Socialistic economy must be directed to ensuring the satisfaction of every possible human need. Such a problem it is impossible to solve by way of commands only. The greater the scale of the productive forces, the more involved the technique; the more complex the needs, then the more indispensable is a wide and free creative initiative of the organised producers and consumers. The Socialist culture implies the utmost development of the human personality. Progress along this path is made possible not through a standardised cringing before irresponsible ‘“‘leaders,’’ but only through a fully conscious and critical participation by all in a Socialistic creative activity. The youthful generations stand in need of independence, which is wholly consistent with a firm leadership but rules out any police regimentation. Thus the bureaucratic system in crushing the Soviets and the party is coming ever more clearly into opposition with the basic needs of economic and cultural development.

The workers’ state has come into existence for the first time in history. Neither its forms and methods, nor the stages it must go through could be, and they cannot now be, laid down beforehand. Bourgeois society developed itself in the course of centuries and came into power by stepping into the place of scores of political systems. There are good grounds for believing that the Socialist society will reach its full development by an incomparably shorter and more economical road. But it would, anyhow, be a poor kind of illusion to imagine that an ‘“‘enlightened bureaucracy’’ is capable of leading mankind by the bridle in a straight line to Socialism. The workers’ state will more than once again reform its methods before it becomes dissolved in a Communist society. The great historical reform whose turn has now come demands that the Soviet state be set free from bureaucratic absolutism; in other words: the restoration of the creative character of the Soviets on new and deeper economic and cultural foundations. This task cannot be carried through unless the working masses take up the fight against the usurping bureaucracy.

The historical part played by government violence naturally changes along with changes in the character of the workers’ state. So far as bureaucratic violence, however grim it may sometimes be, is defending the social foundations of the new system, it is historically justified. But to defend the Soviet state and to defend the positions of bureaucracy within the Soviet state is not one and the same thing. As time goes on the bureaucracy has recourse more and more cynically to terror against the party and the working class, so as to defend its economic and political privileges. Its object, of course, is to make its caste defence look like the defence of the highest interests of Socialism. Hence comes the evergrowing falseness of the official ideology, the repulsive worship of the leaders and the downright deception of the working masses through political and legal forgeries.

It is the policy of the Soviet bureaucracy in relation to the international proletariat that has a peculiarly criminal character. Having in reality long ago given up any hopes for a world revolution, the bureaucracy is keeping sections of the Communist International in a purely military subordination, and turning them into auxiliary instruments for its diplomacy. The revolutionary defence of the Soviet Union has long been exchanged for the lawyers’ defence of all the actions of the ruling Soviet heads. The leaders of the Komintern more and more show themselves to the workers as officials independent of the masses.

The German Communist party, which had seemed so imposing, was found, when it was brought against real danger, to be a political cipher. Blind obedience is not a thing to be proud of in a revolutionary. The Komintern has been robbed of life, personality, and soul. If in England, in spite of the highly favourable conditions, the Communist party is still an organisation without importance, without influence, without authority, and without a future, then the responsibility for this lies above all with the Soviet bureaucracy.

Everything in England is heading for a_ revolutionary explosion. A happy issue from the economic crisis—and this is quite a possibility in itself and even inevitable—could never have more than a transitory character, and would quickly yield once more to a fresh and devastating crisis. There is no way to salvation through capitalism. The coming into power of the Labour party will have only this meaning for progress, that once more it will show—and infinitely clearer even than before—the bankruptcy of the methods and illusions of parliamentarianism amidst the crumbling ruins of the capitalist system. And so the absolute need for a new, a truly revolutionary party will stand forth clear-cut before our eyes. The British proletariat will enter upon a period of political crisis and theoretical criticism. The problems of revolutionary violence will stand in their full height before it. The teachings of Marx and Lenin for the first time will find the masses as their audience. Such being the case, it may be also that the present book will turn out to be not without its use.

L. TROTSKY

January 10, 1935