Tasks of the International Communist League

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1. The Bloc of Four fell apart because of the rightward development of its centrist participants, who pulled back from the independent propaganda of the Fourth International under pressure of the fascist attack and the pressure of the new centrist “mass currents” because they lacked a broad perspective and failed to understand the teachings of Marx and Lenin, creating the genial theory of unprincipled combinations and propaganda through silence.

The Bloc of Four as such was an indispensable step on the way to the Fourth International, a step that must and will be repeated on a higher level. Nevertheless, we should not close our eyes to the fact that following the demise of the Bloc of Four, the IGL is at the moment the only organization that openly and consistently raises the question of the new, communist, Fourth International. This fact imposes new and important tasks on our organization and imparts increased significance to it and to its development.

2. Aside from this fact, when considering our new tasks we should recognize and take into account in full measure the turn that the Comintern has completed in France and is initiating in other countries (Switzerland, Czechoslovakia). Our basic attitude toward the Comintern on the one hand and the new International on the other cannot be altered in the least by this. Our evaluation of Stalinism as bureaucratic centrism enabled us to predict just such a turn without being surprised by it. Even though the turn will hardly make the Comintern capable of helping the revolutionary cause to victory in any country — and even though its opportunistic character will have a disorienting effect in the long run — it is clear that this turn puts the objective development of the class struggle in various countries on a new plane and largely alters and to a certain extent improves the Comintern’s relationship to the masses. An insufficient or incorrect reaction to this turn could lead to a considerable weakening of our organization.

Not the least significant aspect of the Stalinists’ turn toward the united front, insofar as it takes mass pressure into account, is that it is a vindication and a confirmation of the political line of our organization, especially the line we have pursued for the last five years. This is a line that has not only allowed us to significantly strengthen and develop existing sections (such as the American, French, Belgian, and German sections) but that has also allowed us to win important new sections throughout the world (in Holland, Poland, Chile, etc.). Overlooking these successes would be just as fatal as would be holding the illusion that we could continue moving forward in the old manner, living off of accumulated capital.

3. It is apparent that the Stalinists’ opportunist turn can go far beyond the united front in certain countries, especially in France. In the most recent negotiations between the heads of the French CP and SP the question of a unified party was openly and positively considered by both sides! The reasons for this are clear; the turn of the Comintern is at least as much an expression of Russian foreign policy as it is a result of mass pressure. Litvinov’s foreign policy no longer has any revolutionary perspective. Its only goal is to prevent wars by forming alliances. In pursuit of this goal it is making an effort to keep regimes of the Doumergue type at the helm in France. The united front is supposed to create a left bloc to balance off the right bloc. In order to demonstrate to the French bourgeoisie (and more recently to the British bourgeoisie, which is approaching this bloc) how serious they are about this turn, the Soviet bureaucracy through Thorez, Cachin, etc., not only makes the united front conform to the wishes of the SFIO, but even steers toward the liquidation of the French CP, subordinating the revolutionary element in a unified party to the discipline of Leon Blum.

Regardless of whether the bureaucracy will carry this through to the end, or whether the continual regrouping of the powers will create a new situation, the importance of our independent role, our role in the revolution, is immensely increased. Of course, the broad masses will at first be caught up in the unity delirium; but on the other hand, the best communist elements in France and even more so in other countries will be drawn into our ranks, assuming that we know how to correctly respond to the situation. It appears as if the moment is drawing near when the theoretical liquidation of Marxism-Leninism by the Stalinists, which we have perceived and fought against since 1923, is going to break through visibly in practice, thereby opening up new opportunities for us.

4. The future destiny of our organization, like the development of the Fourth International, will depend above all on the existence of an international cadre that understands how to answer the questions of revolution and counterrevolution — especially in their fascist and Bonapartist guises — and that understands the question of the war threat and of how to implement our slogans and put them into practice. On an international plane, the answer to these questions can only flow from a politically and organizationally independent component. Even while making the most strenuous efforts to find allies, this component can never give up its independence, its efforts to select and educate its own cadre, and its thorough ideological work.

5. The first goal we proposed on the way to the revolution was the united front against fascism. The Stalinist turn is an important step in this direction. It is necessary to expose the indecisiveness of the bureaucracy and its inability to take further steps, drawing the connection between what has been achieved and what is still lacking, and making the sharpest attacks on the bureaucracy’s opportunist conceptions. What is necessary is to transform the united front in meetings into the united front in action and to demand the transformation of the united front of two parties into the united front of all workers’ organizations. It is necessary to prepare the transformation of the united front of organizations into a soviet movement.

6. Entering the united front ourselves is not in the least utopian. Good possibilities for this already exist in the ranks. And even where we are at present excluded, sympathy for us and for the demand for our inclusion will grow because we will be the only ones in a position to provide the united front with concrete content and concrete goals.

The question of practical proposals and practical slogans assumes the greatest importance in this context (demands for a militia, arming, concrete local and factory demands). Working out such measures will eliminate from our ranks the last remnants of a purely speculative and literary way of looking at things. This will at the same time be the best way to win the trust of the working masses and break the influence of the bureaucrats in the united front.

7. Insofar as the united front is actually realized and not sabotaged (which would lead to an important process of differentiation in the reformist parties) it cannot remain in the form the bureaucrats strive for — the united front in meetings, one that misleads the working class and lulls it to sleep. Either it will broaden out to include us and break through the bureaucratic framework (a process that will bring about the formation of left wings in both parties, which we must influence) or what is probably more likely in many countries — one of the two bureaucracies will be driven to break with the expanding united front for the sake of self-preservation, a development that will immediately place on the agenda the question of a split in the parties concerned. Systematic work on our part will make us a pole of attraction for the left wings of both parties and create the basis for a new communist party.

The possible formation of united parties confronts us with an entirely new situation. A momentary decline in mass response would be accompanied by our winning the best revolutionary elements. Clearly, further development would make our organization appear publicly as the only communist organization and would allow us to fill the role of the Communist parties at a disproportionately rapid pace, counterposing the demands and preparation for revolutionary action to hollow, opportunistic unity verbiage.

8. Any successful work we do must be based on a complete break with our past methods of work, the methods of the faction. The ideological work of the faction was for the most part critical in nature. The ideological work of the nucleus of the new party and the new International must center around positive, constructive, direction-giving work that does not in the least shy away from concretization. The previous activity was consciously limited to propaganda, since the faction consciously submitted itself to the discipline of the party in action. In its work the nucleus of the new party and the new International must on the contrary attempt to go beyond the bounds of propaganda at every opportunity and to prove the seriousness and value of our revolutionary determination through independent action or through participation in action. In this, we must take as our starting point the fact that the only way to convince broad masses of the correctness of our ideas is in action. This is the central point in our new orientation. There are no organizational measures that can get around this step and make it superfluous.

9. Alongside independent propaganda and active work all means must be employed — always in keeping with the concrete situation — to link up with the masses, push them forward, and consolidate new revolutionary cadres from their ranks.

Above all this includes:

a. Systematic fraction work in the trade unions under the slogan of trade union unity. The opportunity to reach and influence the worker masses is better here than in any party. In many countries trade union unity is almost of greater practical significance than the united front between the parties. The immediate economic effects of the reactionary development and the deep differentiation in the trade unions provide the best jumping-off point for our work.

b. Systematic fraction work in all workers’ parties and organizations, not just by forming fractions out of the sympathizers already present there, but also possibly by sending in really solid elements.

c. Very special attention to promoting work among the youth in existing youth organizations as well as by building and broadening new youth organizations.

d. Forming alliances and blocs with organizations striving for a new communist party and International. These must be based on a clear principled basis and concrete formulation of goals.

e. Fusion with such organizations on the basis of a clear communist program.

f. Under very exceptional circumstances, the entry of an entire section into a centrist organization can prove useful in increasing our influence and accelerating the construction of the Fourth International (the ILF in England). Calling these entry tactics a panacea [as some comrades have done] amounts to a declaration of bankruptcy for the political line followed up till now, means the liquidation of the independent organizations, is both a cause and effect of complete demoralization, and must be categorically rejected. [According to these comrades] even the proposed entry of the French League into the SFIO with the object of extending our influence must lead not only to de facto liquidation of our influence and de facto capitulation in France but also to the discrediting and disorientation of the entire ICL at the very moment when it is involved in expansion and has the greatest perspectives and tasks ahead of it. A thorough testing of this question, which is a life-and-death question for the entire ICL, and an immediate and vigorous rejection of this view are absolutely necessary so that the ICL does not lose a second in utilizing the immense new opportunities rather than falling to pieces.

A correct understanding of the newly created situation and a carrying out of the measures noted above, combined with the revitalization of the revolutionary forces in numerous countries, will make possible significant progress on the road to the Fourth International as well as effective preparation for the decisive confrontation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.