Protest to the Central Control Commission

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Politburo, Presidium of the Central Control Commission:

1. The Politburo decided on May 12 not to publish my articles. It seems this concerns two articles, one, “The Chinese Revolution and the Theses of Comrade Stalin,” which I sent to Bolshevik, and the other, “The Sure Road,” which I sent to Pravda. I was not summoned to be present for the Politburo discussion of this question, although such would be required for even a pretense of fairness.

2. The reason given for not carrying the articles was that they criticize the Central Committee and are in the nature of a discussion. In other words, a rule is being established whereby all party members and the entire party press can only echo the Central Committee, whatever it says, whatever it does, no matter what the circumstances.

3. I consider the line of the Central Committee on the Chinese question to be fundamentally wrong. It was precisely this erroneous line that ensured the success of the April coup of the Chinese counterrevolution. Confuting the widely circulated lies and slander that the Opposition “is trying to profit from the difficulties,” Zinoviev et al. offered to discuss the question of the future line for China and all of the most important questions of our policy in a closed plenum. This in itself indicated our intention to study and decide these questions on their merits, in a formal manner, without stenographic records — consequently without seeking to “exploit” anything. The Politburo, together with the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, refuses to convene such a plenum. Thus the attempt to correct a line that is false to the core and disastrous in its effects, by means of a serious discussion in the Central Committee, has failed through the fault of the Politburo, automatically backed up as always by the Presidium of the Central Control Commission.

4. Then, Comrade Stalin’s theses suddenly appear, representing a reinforcement and deepening of the most erroneous aspects of a thoroughly erroneous policy. And finally, to top it all off, the Politburo, having refused to discuss the Chinese question with us at a closed plenum (of course, it was discussed — without us — at "private” meetings) sanctioned Stalin’s theses, and afterward refuses to allow anybody to pose in the press the question of why Jiǎng Jièshí triumphed so easily, why the Chinese proletariat proved to be so unprepared, why our party has gotten so horribly entangled in the web of Martynovism, why Stalin’s theses are pushing the Chinese Communist Party and the entire International into the swamp of opportunism, and why the Sotsialistichesky Vestnik so emphatically approved Martynov’s article earlier, and Stalin’s theses now (May 9, 1927).

5. Are the Chinese revolution and the Comintern’s entire political line really such small items that they can be swept under the rug? Can this really further the process of education in the Chinese Communist Party? Is this really the way for foreign sections of the Comintern to be developed? Can our party really survive following this course? Is such a bureaucratic utopia really conceivable?

6. The resolution of the Politburo states that we want to force the party into a discussion. If by discussion what is meant is the roar of the apparatus, the shouts and whistling of the claques that have been organized in advance, the packing of cells with goons trained to use violence against the Opposition, the overwhelming of workers’ cells with threats and cries about a split — then, of course, we do not want such “discussion.” But it is this very type of discussion our party life is brimming with. We want the party to discuss the question of the Chinese revolution, beginning as a minimum with the party’s theoretical and central organs.

7. Yes, we want a discussion on the question of the fate of the Chinese revolution and consequently of our own fate. Why was such a discussion considered normal under Lenin throughout our party’s entire history? Can anyone really believe that the theses Stalin, Molotov, and Bukharin pronounce at any given moment are the last word in historical development for the party? Yes, we want a discussion of these questions in order to demonstrate and make clear to the party that these theses are false to the core, and that carrying them out threatens to break the neck of the Chinese revolution.

8. The Central Committee does not want a discussion. Yet what this discussion would entail is criticism of the Central Committee itself. It can be said as a general rule that the more erroneous any Central Committee line proves to be, and the more strikingly and harshly it is refuted by events, the less taste there will be for a discussion. I don’t think there were ever any mistakes in the history of our party that compare with those made by Stalin and Bukharin on the Chinese question or on the question of the Anglo-Russian Committee. But the point is not what happened yesterday. Every one of us has been ready, and is ready now, to give it all up as a bad job. But these mistakes, promulgated by decree, are being extended into the future with their magnitude increased tenfold. This is what I am talking about. It is understandable that the Politburo “does not want” a discussion. But does the Politburo really have the right to forbid a discussion of the issue, when involved are fundamental errors of the Politburo itself on questions of world-historic importance?

9. The Politburo does not want a discussion. Why? Ostensibly so as “not to upset” the party. However, the Politburo opened up an artificial discussion, contrived by the leadership, about the allegedly anti-party statement of Comrade Zinoviev at an alleged non-party meeting. The party was not told anything about what Comrade Zinoviev said (as for me, I subscribe to every word he said). Comrade Zinoviev’s speech has not been published. The affair is presented as though it was a non-party meeting, whereas in fact the entire meeting had the character of a party meeting, even though a certain number of people who are not in the party may have been present. The “discussion” against Comrade Zinoviev proceeds at full tilt. The Central Control Commission is quiet. It is not stepping in. But when the “discussion” has made its way along the line, the Central Control Commission will also pronounce a “verdict”

10. Now, during the discussion of the Chinese question, open meetings of the party cells have been specially set up all over the country so as not to allow anyone to speak out on the mistakes of the revolutionary leadership and in order to have a chance to hold anyone who makes criticisms accountable for speaking against the party at a non-party meeting. This is the system. It is a system organized by the leadership, a system organized for the purpose of stifling thought within the party. Actually, one could get the idea that there is no real need for members of the Bolshevik party to exchange opinions on the question of the Chinese revolution, especially now that it has become clear that the Politburo, instead of learning from its errors, is imposing these errors on the party by decree. Compelled to make a choice in a situation like this, every honest party member should say: “It will be immeasurably more dangerous if I conceal my criticism of the party than if, against my will, a few people who aren’t in the party hear my criticism.”

11. We want a party discussion of the conditions and causes of the Chinese catastrophe. lit order to hinder this, the Central Committee converts Comrade Zinoviev’s supremely calm and supremely moderate statement into a party “catastrophe.” Despite the critical situation, the difficulties, the dangers, etc., the leadership whips up the party, shakes it up, terrorizes it, and deliberately shouts in the party’s ear the lie that Comrade Zinoviev is mobilizing non-party elements against it. By means of a one-sided, fierce, envenomed discussion on grounds that have been artificially blown up, they want to prevent the party from calmly discussing the basic issues of the Chinese revolution. Amidst the noise, fuss, and clamor of a one-sided apparatus discussion, our articles are forbidden publication. Why are they forbidden? Because Stalin cannot answer them. Because the pathetic, empty, hurriedly stuck-together sentences of his theses that so satisfied Dan fly to pieces at a puff of criticism.

12. Discussion of the most basic issues is forbidden by referring to the difficulties of the situation, the dangers from without, and the approaching threat of war. As for these undeniable dangers, the Opposition stands out if only because it foresaw them earlier and assessed them in greater depth. The dangers are present, and moreover gigantic. But the fact is that every one of these dangers will become a hundred times more dangerous as a result of the mistakes of the leadership. The main source of the dangers lies in the defeat of the Chinese revolution, so swiftly brought about through the absence of the necessary class base. We prevented this base from being created at the proper time by our false policy. At the present stage this is a blow to the revolution and our international position. If we go further along the path of Stalin’s theses, the position of the Chinese revolution — and that means ours as well — will further deteriorate (see Chén Dúxiù’s speech). Then they can point to a position that has deteriorated doubly and they can doubly forbid all criticism. The more in error the leadership is, the less possible will it be — given the present course — to criticize it.

13. They will turn the whole question inside out. In favorable conditions it is still possible to make headway even with an incorrect line. But a serious situation demands a correct line, all the more imperatively the more serious it is. If the line is incorrect and if a leadership’s persistence in following the incorrect line threatens the workers’ state and the international revolution with new defeats and jolts, only a pathetic bureaucrat who has lost any feeling of personal responsibility or a base careerist — of whom, by the way, there are more than a few around — can keep silent about the mistakes, once having seen them and recognized them. Stifling a principled political discussion of the disputed issues with the noise, clamor, and hooting of the artificially contrived “discussion” directed against Comrade Zinoviev means terrorizing the rank-and-file party members, depriving them of any feeling of personal responsibility, raising the apparatchik even higher above them, and allowing the careerist to thrive like a fish in water.

14. I am calling things by their proper names because innuendo can help nothing in a situation like this. It is possible to mechanistically suppress anything for a short period of time: doubts, questions, and outraged protests. But Lenin called such methods rude and disloyal. They are rude and disloyal, not because they have an unpleasant form, but because they are inherently incompatible with the nature of the party. The Chinese revolution cannot be stuck in a bottle and sealed up. Nobody will succeed in doing this. The move to crush the Opposition that is being secretly prepared can be successful only superficially and mechanistically. The line we defend has been tested in the fire of the greatest events in world history, confirmed by the entire experience of Bolshevism, and reaffirmed, even though negatively, by the tragic experience of the Chinese revolution and the Anglo-Russian Committee. This line cannot be suppressed. However, it is entirely possible to do irreparable image to the party and the Comintern.

This is what I want to state clearly and unequivocally to the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission.