On the Fundamentals of Communist Policy in China

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1. The sources of the Chinese revolution consist in the mismatch between the  developing productive forces of China (a commodity economy in the countryside  and its social differentiation, the development of capitalism in the cities)  and the political fragmentation of China and its dependence on foreign  imperialism, as well as a mismatch between the political awakening of the  masses and the absolutism of the provincial little tsars supported by international  imperialism. The revolutionary forces growing on the basis of this  contradiction are the working class, the many million-strong mass of artisans  and generally the urban poor, and the peasantry. The upper bourgeoisie  in the shape of the comprador one is linked to world imperialism and plays a  counter-revolutionary role. The independent commodity bourgeoisie and the  industrial and banking bourgeoisie have an interest in the struggle with foreign  capital, so long as it controls the customs and is in competition with it. But it  fears the unfolding class struggle of the proletariat. While exploiting the vacillations  of the bourgeoisie, the Chinese proletariat after all should remember  that the victory of the Chinese national revolution depends on its [proletariat’s]  link with the mass of artisans, peasants, and the urban poor. The intelligentsia  and student body are simply representatives of these classes. The struggle of  the artisans is directed against capitalist competition, which is ruining them,  but it is directed in the first place against the strongest capitalist competition,  which is foreign. The mass of the artisans will still continue to play a revolutionary  role for a considerable period to come. The revolutionary role of the  peasantry is deeper, owing to the relative overpopulation of the countryside,  which cannot find accommodation for its surplus in the city, whose development  is held up by foreign capital. The massive social dislocation penetrating  the countryside makes it a powder keg. The sufferings of the countryside, propartisan for the reunification of China to a greater extent than was the case in Western Europe.

2. Whether the Chinese revolution concludes with the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship which would unite China for the struggle with imperialism, but which would also inaugurate a period of capitalist development, or whether it leads directly to the socialist revolution evading the bourgeoisdemocratic phase, depends to a considerable degree on the course of events in Europe. If the proletariat is victorious in a series of industrial countries in the immediate future, then it is not excluded that the Chinese revolution, like the Russian one, will reduce to a minimum the period of time taken by the transformation of the bourgeois-democratic into the proletarian revolution. Irrespective of either prognosis, the link between the working class and theurban and rural petty bourgeois strata is an obligatory precondition of victory. In the first case, the democratic-revolutionary phase will end temporarily with the crossing over of the petty bourgeoisie to the side of the upper bourgeoisie, by the liquidation of the democratic-revolutionary dictatorship and the foundationof a bourgeois government. In the new situation, the proletariat will then have to seek a coalition with plebeian elements, at whose expense the bourgeoisie will try to organise its regime. In present circumstances the elementsfor the resolution of the revolutionary tasks of China along Russian lines are not yet apparent. The Communist Party should attempt to determine these questions, by means of an 1848,3 so as to bring about an acceleration of the transformation of the national-bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution, to the extent that the sharpening of international and Chinese circumstances will in future permit. The immediate objective of this will be a democraticrevolutionary dictatorship of workers, peasants and artisans.

3. The necessity of a link between the working class and the petty bourgeois strata does not in any way pre-determine the form of this link. Even in the Russian revolution these forms changed in shape very much. We took power with the well-known neutrality of the Left-SRs, and subsequently found ourselves in a coalition government with them which ended with their uprising against us. And now we maintain a link with the peasantry directly, relating to the poor and middling masses without the intermediary of a peasant party.

4. In the Chinese revolution the question of the form of the connection between the working class and petty bourgeois elements already has a history of its own. When the Chinese Communist Party was founded as the party of the progressive Chinese intelligentsia, the petty bourgeoisie had its own vanguardin the shape of the Guomindang. Neither this organisation nor the Communist Party yet had serious contacts with the popular masses. The advantage of the Communists in relation to the Guomindang consisted not just in a fully developed ideology received from the European proletariat but in the fact that the USSR stood behind the Communists. Sun Yat-sen began moving towards an alliance with the Communists from considerations of international policy in the first place. Having lost faith in liberalism and American assistance, he set course for a link between the Chinese revolution and the world revolution and moved towards a coalition with the Chinese Communists. The young Chinese Communist Party, being more disciplined than the Guomindang, which represented the ideological current of supporters of Sun Yat-sen but not an organised party, was able to conquer a series of commanding roles for themselves in this bloc. Relations between the Communist Party and the Guomindang worked out so that the CCP entered the Guomindang, influenced its policies, and took part in its leading institutions, all the time preserving its organisational independence. To understand this peculiar situation, one must take into account that unlike in Western Europe, there is no excretion of workers’ democracy out of petty bourgeois democracy in China, but to a considerable extent there is a conquest of the administration of a petty bourgeois party by the Communist Party.

5. This situation, which gave the Communists significant advantages, was only possible for so long time until the Communist Party and the Guomindang began to attract the masses. Now it threatens to change from an element for the development of the revolution into an element weakening it. It threatens the link of the working class with the petty bourgeois elements or the independence of the workers’ movement. Having grown up into a mass party, the Guomindang found control by the Communists irksome. It feels the abnormality of the situation, which consists in the fact that the Communists are members of Guomindang organisations and take part in their leadership. The Guomindang is not a member of Communist organisations and has no control over it [must be them]. In this area endless wrangles occur, which threatens a rift. The Communists on their part, having a formally contractual influence over the Guomindang, do not make any effort to win over the confidence of the Guomindang masses, and try to decide questions by means of giving orders or behind the scenes intrigues. On the basis of this situation frictions appear which threaten the existence of the Canton government and provide a basis for the right wing of the Guomindang, which aims for a break-up of the bloc with the working class. From that situation there are two possible outcomes. Either a renunciation by the Communists of their own independent policy, a complete subordination to the Guomindang – the left Guomindang member Su-Chen in a letter to me6 demands that the Communists accept the three pillars of Sun Yat-sen as their platform – or it is necessary to move from the present form to a bloc with the Guomindang as an alliance of independent parties.

6. This transition is demanded by the entire political situation. The present form of contact with the Guomindang necessarily involves the fostering of illusions among the popular masses concerning the Guomindang. A condition of a bloc of a workers’ party with a petty bourgeois party, a condition which we cannot renounce, consists in the freedom to criticise the ally. The social composition of the Guomindang is variegated, containing within itself the likelihood that some of the members of the Guomindang will go over to the positions of the upper bourgeoisie, but even the leftist members of the Guomindang will strive [to go over to the position of the upper bourgeoisie], even when it is a matter of civil war in the name of the interests of petty bourgeois strata, for example the peasants. The most left-wing members of the Guomindang demonstrate a failure to understand the inevitability of a civil war for the liberation of the peasants from exploitation by the leaseholders and the gentry. Only the pressure from the Communists, and pressure not behind closed doors but before the face of the masses, will push the Guomindang to the left. In the present situation we are not only whitewashing the essential character of the Guomindang, but we are pushing it towards a politics of pretence. Under our influence the Guomindang are taking on Communist phraseology and are even competing with us among the masses of the workers. Already the question has arisen as to whether or not to allow the Guomindang to enter the trade unions. In addition, instead of pushing the Guomindang to organise the peasant masses and the artisans on the basis of their real interests, we are wasting our time with getting the Guomindang to adopt revolutionary declarations, which are not inspired by any revolutionary policy, not even of a covert nature. Changing all this is possible only with an open discussion of the question of a bloc between us and the Guomindang, as of a bloc of a workers’ party with petty

bourgeois [elements].

7. Before an enlarged plenum of the Executive Committee I raised theseviews in conversations with the comrades guiding our policy in China. To my great surprise, these comrades then rejected them. They spoke up in defence of these views at the very moment when the right-wing Guomindang were demanding a breach with the Communists. In defending my views in the Politburo, I then spoke out against the implementation of their views at a moment of a right-wing attack, considering that one should not overload the horses when the river threatens to sweep the cart away.12 But the attack of the rightists was repelled, and now the moment has arrived, when we must table the question of altering the form of the relations between the Guomindang and the CCP. In putting forward this question, we must propose as the central idea the necessity of a link between the working class and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie of the cities and countryside. For this link the creation of an independent, mass petty bourgeois party is vital. The form of the bloc with it must take into account the desire for independence that has been unleashed within it. The Guomindang and the Communist Party must have independent local and central organisations. The connection between them must be realised through coalition committees in the centre and in the localities. It is understood that it is impossible to foresee all the transitional forms from the present situation to such a bloc. These forms must be worked out in practice while allowing continuously fortwo objectives: the foundation of an independent mass Communist Party and its ties with the party representing the petty bourgeoisie.

8. The working out of a concrete programme of the Communist Party with reference to the peasantry and the artisans will play a major role in the effective strengthening of this bloc.The elaboration of this programme and the agitation for it among the masses will force the Guomindang to address these questions and move from an intelligentsia policy to one of mass democracy.