Letter to the Members of the Central Committee, February 21, 1927

Add a subpage to this text

Read the help page for usage.

 

For an Objective Assessment

To the Members of the Central Committee:

The question of evaluating the political condition of the proletariat, in connection with the entire situation, both domestic and international, was raised during the debates on the question of the Soviet elections and provoked disagreements that have not been clarified. I consider it necessary to explain my views on this, a question of the highest importance, because I think that a calm discussion of the question will at least clear away the false issues.

1. The proletariat, as a class, is not always identical with itself. Even under approximately the same economic conditions it changes politically, subject to the influence of numerous factors, both national and international in character.

2. Ten years ago our proletariat was at a much lower cultural level than now. But at that time, owing to a unique conjunction of domestic and international circumstances, it reached a pitch of revolutionary intensity that no other class in the world has reached. It would be absurd to think that this intense revolutionary pitch could be maintained for many long years, even decades. Downturns and upturns, sometimes very sharp and deep-going ones, are absolutely inevitable — depending on the entire set of circumstances, the course of world capitalist development as a whole, and the pace of socialist construction here.

3. The proletariat expected, just as we did, that the European revolution would follow immediately after 1917. In 1923 it looked forward to a revolution in Germany. In 1926, during the miners’ strike, it expected events in England to develop in a revolutionary direction. The years 1918-26 were years of very big defeats for the European proletariat. It would simply be stupid cowardice to dose one’s eyes to this fact (and equally stupid to draw so-called pessimistic conclusions from this). Our working class was deeply affected by the experience of these events. This took the form, first, of tense, highly concentrated expectation, and then of deep discouragement. Isn’t it really quite dear that this experience was bound to produce something new in our proletariat’s attitude toward the development of the world revolution in general, great caution and reserve; among tired-out elements, great skepticism; in immature circles, outright distrust?

4. The course of development within the country could not fail to affect the proletariat as a whole along the same lines: in our tenth year we have barely reached the prewar standard of living. Naturally the workers went into the revolution with much higher hopes, and the overwhelming majority of them, with big illusions. Following from this, especially given the retarded pace of development, it was inevitable that there should be a certain disillusionment with the revolution and its capacity for changing life and relationships profoundly in a short time. To say, in this regard, that the proletariat is disillusioned with revolution in general or is ready to turn its back on revolution would be idiocy, or renegacy. But not to see that the revolution does not, in the present period, hold the will and attention of the proletariat with the same intensity as before; that its will and attention have been diverted to a number of other problems; that everyday living problems, needs and wants on the job, in the local areas, etc., have not only devoured great amounts of attention but have also overshadowed in general revolutionary perspectives and general class perspectives — one would have to be blind not to see that.

5. In the early 1850s, Marx, taking into account the entire international situation, especially the economic situation, concluded that a temporary ebb in the revolution had begun. Marx did not fold up the revolutionary banner, but he did break with the subjectivists who did not want to take notice of the ebb. Marx was not afraid to call it by its name.

6. In 1907, Lenin concluded that there was a certain ebb in the revolution, and raised the demand for “bread,” for participation in the Third Duma, etc. He broke ruthlessly not only with tire Liquidators but also with the subjectivists who did not wish to see the change in the situation or the change in the moods of the working class itself (the otzovists, ultimatists, etc.).

7. We recognize that there has been a certain stabilization of European capitalism. We have acknowledged the fact that after the 1923 defeat in Germany the German Communist Party steadily lost influence among the masses, and we have noted that during the past year there has been a weakening of the French, Czechoslovak, Polish, Swedish, Norwegian, and other Communist parties. In this weakening of Communist Party influence political mistakes have played a big role. But at the root of this decline lies a more profound process, which has been going on among the proletarian masses since the 1918-23 period. Will this continue for a long time? Our epoch is one of abrupt turns. But this does not change our evaluation of the process going on at present. The miners’ strike in England ran its course while the European working class in fact remained apathetic. The defeat of that strike could only delay a new upsurge. Such are the facts that we must take into account, and certain ways of fighting for the proletarian revolution in Europe follow from these facts, at least for now.

8. Or is someone going to say that this is all more or less true of Europe but has no bearing on our situation? That would be national narrow-mindedness indeed — and in its most blatant form. We sometimes look at events in Germany, England, China, etc., over the heads of our working class. This bad habit is expressed in our press, which offers the working class only bits and pieces of world developments, primarily those of a celebratory nature. Our working class has felt the experience of the German, English, and Chinese events very deeply and the deposits that remain in the workers’ consciousness from those events cannot be overcome merely by empty sloganizing.

9. Comrade Molotov’s objection — “But what has happened to the ten-years’ work of the party?” — is bureaucratic through and through. The class, its experiences and conclusions, are not just the product of the work of party institutions. We all know what an important factor the party is in the life of the class But it is not the only factor. The party cannot neutralize the effect of the entire world situation, the victories and defeats of the working class, or the slowness of our economic growth. The party can and must soften the impact of the downturn. The party can and must look openly at all the processes under way in the working class, explain these to the vanguard, and prepare it for a new change in the situation. But the policy of closing one’s eyes to what is happening is not our policy.

10. Comrade Bukharin in his Leningrad report spoke of the fact that there are in our party certain Black Hundred elements. We will not exaggerate their numbers. But alongside them, there are also elements who take a tolerant attitude toward Black Hundredism. And next to them in turn is a layer of those who are not disposed toward an active struggle against Black Hundredism, and so on. Do you think that this is accidental? Isn’t there a correlation between these phenomena and the decline of class activism, vigilance, and alertness within the proletariat itself? Of course, as a party we bear a large part of the blame for this, because we have not helped the proletariat orient itself correctly. This is where we must begin. But how to begin depends on the extent to which the proletariat responds or fails to respond to warning voices, appeals, etc.

11. The classes and groups hostile or semi-hostile to the working class sense the weakening of its pressure, which is expressed not only through the state apparatus but also in the economy and in everyday life. Hence the rising tide of self-confidence among the politically active layers of the petty bourgeoisie.

This confidence keeps mounting regardless of one or another attempt to suppress or stop it. The proletariat undoubtedly has not yet realized the impending danger. This, to a considerable extent, is our fault.

12. The increased activism of the non-proletarian classes inevitably will bring the proletariat to its feet. It will arise to defend itself and, when conditions become at all favorable, will go over to the offensive. Such is the perspective for the morrow. For this we must prepare ourselves and others.

13. All this is simply not understood by the present-day subjectivists, who think that party bureaucratism is the only factor. On this question, as on many others, the subjectivists converge happily with the bureaucrats. The difference between them is not so great. The bureaucrat says, “All is well with the proletariat, and I am the expression of that.” The subjectivists say, “All is well with the proletariat, and I would be the expression of that if it weren’t for the bureaucrat.” Both are grossly mistaken.

14. Precisely because of the incorrectness of their whole orientation, the subjectivists draw absolutely worthless conclusions about the October developments of last year. Precisely for that reason we part ways with the subjectivists. At the root of our disagreement lies a different assessment of the relationship of political forces, a profound variance in our assessment of the proletariat’s general state of being at present.

15. It might be said, “All this is more or less true, but it isn't ‘tactful’ to talk about it.” Such an argument is absolutely false. Precisely in order to protect the party, especially its most farsighted elements, from demoralization, it is necessary to say what is. Of course we must do this in such a way as to be understood correctly, that is, we must offer a perspective for overcoming on the morrow the negative features of today. This perspective must include both objective and subjective aspects. But to close our eyes to the basic features of the present situation — that is not our kind of politics.