Letter to the International Secretariat, December 15, 1934

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Once More on Our Turn

To the International Secretariat

For all Sections

Dear Comrades:

As of this writing I still do not know the decision of the Belgian national conference. But I must state with the greatest regret that there is a faction in the Belgian section that does not wish to learn from events because it is satisfied with abstract formulas that demand little and allow nothing. Isn’t the experience of the French section clear enough?

The Belgian “intransigents” supported the Naville group in France as the most intransigent tendency. The experiment has been tried and only the deliberately blind can avoid drawing the necessary lessons. Naville represented conservatism, a wait-and-hope attitude, and a closed-circle discussion-group mentality — Souvarinism. He systematically refrains from criticizing the politics of the SFIO in order to be able to “act” under its protection. We have denounced this antirevolutionary attitude many times. But to no avail. At the moment of the turn, Naville tried to cover his conservatism with intransigent formulations. He called the entry “capitulation” because basically he was frightened by the prospect of a ferocious battle against a powerful apparatus. It is much easier to defend “intransigent” principles in a sealed jar… . Our analysis of Naville was made in a very factional period. But since then, I repeat, the experiment has been tried. Since then Naville has entered the Socialist Party. But he abandoned the banner of the organization, the program. He does not wish to be more than the left wing of the SP. He has already presented motions in common with the left wing, confused opportunist motions, full of the verbiage of so-called left centrism. The Belgian “intransigents” have been well punished. “Tell me who your friends and international allies are, and I’ll tell you who you are.”

The most intransigent opponent of the entry, even more so than Naville, was Bauer. Comrade Give’s most important arguments seem to be drawn from Bauer’s arsenal. What is Bauer’s attitude, then, toward entry? He demands that our German section join the SAP, and while awaiting this development he has become a contributor to the SAP paper — against us. Is a more clear and complete bankruptcy imaginable? The SFIO is a mass organization, not a homogeneous propaganda group. The state of this organization is such that the possibility is open to us to enter it as a homogeneous propaganda group. They say to us: “That will never be possible.” Well, the experiment has been tried. On the plane of principle our French section has remained what it was. But on the political plane, it has graduated from a preparatory course to a more advanced course.

The SAP is not a mass organization. It is itself a propaganda group. This being the case, fusion is impermissible in the absence of a common program and method. Our attempt a year ago to find this common ground failed: the leaders of the SAP did not want to accept our principles. In a series of documents Bauer dealt with them as incorrigible centrists, or more simply, people without principles. It is possible that the leaders of the SAP have evolved in a favorable direction. If this is the case, we should renew our attempt to come to an understanding with them on a programmatic basis. But to condemn the entry of our French section into a mass organization and at the same time demand the dissolution of our German section into a small propaganda group, which Bauer himself characterized as centrist just a short time ago — -isn’t this an abominable mockery of the ABCs of Marxism?

Once again I ask Comrade Give and those who support him

how they explain the fact that the “intransigents” in France have turned out to be opportunists and adventurers while the “capitulators” continue to support our principles with redoubled energy, principles which for the first time now directly or indirectly influence the internal life of the Socialist Party, as well as that of the Communist Party, and even of the trade unions (see, for instance, the documents of the departmental union of Isère). Comrade Give will tell us that these two instances of Naville and Bauer are questions of personality, etc. But we do not allow anyone to hide behind this individualist, idealist, and anti-Marxist explanation. We have all the more right to make a point of this since we predicted the evolution of the Navilles and Bauers after deciphering the real meaning of their “intransigence.” And we say: “Comrade Give bears full responsibility for his allies in France whom he supported as the truly revolutionary tendency.”

We’ve tried the experiment, Comrade Give. We have had enough generalities. Explain to us your bad luck in France if you please. In the eyes of the International you bear part of the responsibility for Naville-Bauer.

The “disastrous” picture Comrade Give paints of the International (see the Belgian national committee minutes for November 25) is completely tendentious or else it reveals a total lack of comprehension about what is really going on. “In Poland a three-way split,” “a split in Greece,” etc. Comrade Give is only echoing Naville and Bauer, who, of course, for their part, see only the reverse side of the turn. Give doesn’t mention that the French comrades have won the 6,000-member Federation of the Seine to our program of action and that our youth are in the leadership of the Seine Alliance with its 1,450 members. We do not wish to exaggerate the revolutionary weight of this success. There is more to do than we have succeeded in doing in the three-and-a-half months that have passed since our entry. But really one would have to be deaf and blind to fail to grasp the radical change in the activity of our French section and the enormous possibilities that have opened before it. There are comrades who hold up the incident with Leon Blum as proof of our French comrades’ dependence. Arguments of this sort are proof of their own total political bankruptcy. If we want to win over the Socialist workers, we must present our ideas in language they can understand. They can understand our arguments against Blum, but they cannot accept ridicule, especially now, at a time when the Stalinists are fraternizing with Blum and Company. The psychological transgression against the mood of the Socialist workers that was committed by the editors of La Vérité was far more serious than the juridical transgression against the statutes of the SFIO. But precisely because La Vérité now breathes the same air as the workers, it has forthrightly corrected its error and as a result it has been able to increase its prestige in the eyes of the best elements of the Socialist Party. To seize upon this incident of a purely technical nature in order to accredit the tattered remnants of the arguments raised by the “intransigents” before our entry — what further certification of bankruptcy is necessary?

Other comrades of the same Bordigist and Hennautist tendency will object: “You told us that Doumergue would yield to the fascists, and look, it’s Flandin who has replaced him. The whole perspective of the entrists has proven false. We do have time to grow independently . . It is fatal to let an incorrect position deform your whole perspective and all your criteria. Never did we say that Doumergue would personally hand over power to the fascists; we spoke of French Bonapartism, of which Doumergue was the first (but not the last) representative.

In Germany, Brüning, the first representative of semi-parliamentary Bonapartism, yielded to von Papen, the direct extra-parliamentary agent of Hindenburg, but von Papen had to yield to Schleicher, who was more “social” and more parliamentary than he was. One can never predict personal combinations and concrete developments. It is enough to predict the general tendency. For us, Flandin represents a feebler version of the Doumergue regime. If French Bonapartism had only a few weeks to live, this change in the regime would be of no avail. It is precisely because the Bonapartist regime in France still has a certain lease on life that the change can yield important and even decisive results.

There is much talk of diminishing of the economic crisis. If this actually comes about (let us accept the hypothesis), then the showdown will be postponed for one, two, or even three years. If that were the case, would we establish ourselves on the basis of the new conjuncture in order to take advantage of the workers’ economic struggles and to prepare their mobilization as a revolutionary force? But even an important conjunctural change (and we are still a long way from that) would not change our general line of development or our orientation. After a very short time, a new crisis far more terrible than the present one would break out and the whole political process would assume a much quicker tempo than at present. Thanks to the turn executed while there is still time, we still have the chance to enter the decisive battle — that is, the armed conflict between the proletariat and fascism — not as a small sect that looks on and criticizes, but as the prime mover of the revolutionary vanguard.

Instead of rejoicing over the fact that our French section was able to draw the lessons of the German events, etc., in time, Comrades Bauer and the others wax indignant: “We’ve been deceived: we entered the SFIO and fascism hasn’t arrived yet.” It is true that thanks to the efforts of Comrade Give and others, Naville and Bauer were able to weaken the French section for a certain time. By entering, our youth lost more than a few comrades, even workers. But thanks to the effectiveness of the turn, we are now winning back the elements who left us for a certain time, while the intransigents, the instigators of the split, have lost everything: program, prestige, principles.

It is absurd to say that the international situation is disastrous. In what way? In Holland, the OSP, after expelling de Kadt from its ranks, has evolved in a Marxist direction and thanks to the turn in France has decided to fuse with our section, the RSP. In America the AWP (Muste’s party), long courted by the Lovestoneites and the Stalinists, decided to fuse with our section. Those are two remarkable successes. The unified party in America will have great opportunities on the socialist left. We can predict that the unified party in Holland will create new breaches in the Social Democratic Party and among the Stalinists. The Polish section is one of the newest sections. It is going through its period of infantile disorders. The split in the Greek section has nothing to do with the French turn. The faction hostile to our international organization is led by Witte, whom Vereecken tore to pieces fifteen months ago for having a total lack of principles and conducting intrigues dictated by vulgar motives. Now it turns out that the Witte faction is “intransigent” and severely condemns entry into the SFIO. Comrade Give should be more prudent and not invoke the Greek events. Allies like Witte are really too compromising.

Much more disturbing is the passivity of our Spanish section (with a few honorable exceptions) during the [recent] great revolutionary events. We have always criticized the leaders of the Spanish section for being imbued with a purely propagandistic spirit and a wait-and-see attitude. Every comrade can and should reread the international discussions with the Spanish leadership.

And here is the significant point: the Spanish comrades have openly declared their hostility to the French turn. This is another confirmation that “intransigence” on this question is nothing but a mask for purely propagandistic and journalistic passivity. As far as we are concerned, we will continue to repeat: the greatest error that has been committed by any of our sections is the error of the Spanish section in not joining the Socialist Party when the preparation for armed struggle was beginning.

Where did the majority of the Belgian section go wrong on the question of entry into the SFIO? We pointed it out at the time: instead of analyzing the real condition of the workers’ movement in each country, Vereecken manipulated absolute abstract notions — reformism, Second International, etc., … “reformism cannot tolerate this …” “reformism cannot accept that… .” Recent events in Spain have greatly contributed to discrediting this Bordigist, anti-Marxist, metaphysical method. The leadership of the POB wanted to expel the Action Socialiste group. The trade union leaders called for the same thing. But changes in the situation forced the bureaucracy to tolerate Action Socialiste and pushed de Man into flirting with the JGS, whose revolutionary character, given inevitable ups and downs, is constantly on the increase. We can see that history makes use of more colors than just red and yellow. It possesses transitional shades, and the art of politics consists in discerning them in order to influence their change by the appropriate means. To lose even one more day because of Bordigist scruples is a crime. Entry into the Young Socialist Guards in order to defend Leninist ideas with patience, energy, and tact — this is the only road for the construction of a revolutionary party.

Every great turn occasioned by a change in the objective situation has a profound impact on the organization, whose mood reflects the previous period. In such cases, individual defections or even partial splits of sections are inevitable. But a turn executed in time is a hundred times more important than the loss of a few comrades who wish at all costs to mark time. The best of these splitters will repent the errors they have committed and return to our organization so that we will eventually be able to reinforce it by linking it to the mass movements.

My best revolutionary and anti-sectarian greetings,

X [Leon Trotsky]