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Special pages :
Letter to W, December 8, 1935
Author(s) | Leon Trotsky |
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Written | 8 December 1935 |
Remarks in Passing
Dear Friend W:
I was very happy to receive some sign of life from you after such a long silence. That you remain unbowed and ready to fight despite all the shocks and difficult tests you have had to undergo came as no surprise to me, but it greatly cheered me nonetheless in these times when so many lose heart, adapt to reformism, or stand on the sidelines under cover of a whole spectrum of ultra-radical critiques.
Comrades from the CP or the Zinoviev faction who are inclined toward us, not a few of them politically talented individuals, do not, unfortunately, find the right path and the right words so easily. This theme is taken up at least in part in the article âThose Who Have Not Gotten Hold of Themselvesâ in the most recent issue of Unser Wort. The leadership of the European Communists (including the Zinovievists) were thrust all at once into the âmassesâ â thanks to the war and the October Revolution. They then settled down to indolence and accustomed themselves to âcommandingâ the masses with short, pithy phrases. They thought that their power resided in themselves and in their phrases. In actuality, their power resided in the confidence of the awakening masses in the October Revolution and the Comintern â despite their false formulas. Hence many elements from this layer are like the young wastrel who has squandered his inheritance and is looking for some magic formula that will fill his pockets again. The determined preparatory and educational work of the revolutionary pioneer doesnât appeal to them. Instead they are always looking not just for our errors (of which there are, naturally, many) but for the error which prevents the masses from rallying to them again en masse. They know from the history books that Bolshevism experienced not only periods of flood, but periods of ebb too (1906-12, 1914-17), but they have never understood this politically. This is the reason for their constant vacillating, their tendency to give equal weight to what is secondary and what is essential in our program and their propensity to listen to the SAPâs philistine gossip â and in fact not just to its gossip, but to its real opportunistic critique as well.
A fresh example: Erde, who was supposed to assume responsibility for international aid to the internationalist parties, had a falling out with the IS over secondary â although in practice important â considerations. I got the impression that the IS did not really handle everything as it should have been handled. Nevertheless (or rather, all the more), I viewed Erdeâs break with the IS as absolutely wrong. I wrote him a letter to this effect. The answer arrived a short time ago. Erde sets forth a whole number of criticisms of the Bolshevik-Leninists, among which the important ones are mixed in with the unimportant and no general perspective emerges. The whole document is, however, characterized by a hostile tone, directed not against me personally, but against our international organization and various individual comrades. There are two passages in this letter that I find revealing: one has to do with the question of sanctions, the other with the SAP.
Erde writes: âSince the working class is doing nothing, can do nothing, and for the most part desires to do nothing, the measures taken by the bourgeoisie must serve as the basis for a campaign. Any kind of negative position serves fascism.â
On this basis, Erde rejects the position on sanctions taken by our Italian comrades. What position does Comrade Erde himself take toward the Stalinists and reformists? Since the proletariat is weak at present, it must⌠look to the bourgeoisie for support. The weakness of the proletariat is in fact a result of allowing the bourgeoisie to do as it likes. And, if this passivity toward oneâs own imperialist government is raised to the level of a principle, this serves not to strengthen the proletariat but only to undermine the future of its vanguard.
Erde writes further: âHow is it possible to make such a foolish decision as the Dutch sectionâs resolve to have nothing more to do with the emigres who are members of the SAP? These SAP comrades are our closest friends.â
I donât think the Dutch sectionâs decision is foolish; I think it is beneficial. The American party also decided a short time ago to break off all friendly relations with the SAP and the IAG. The SAP is at present nothing more than the organized agency for all the shortcomings and ambiguities of the leaderships and ex-leaderships of the old organizations â for an underhanded, slanderous, philistine attack on the Fourth International.
If Erde takes the above-mentioned positions on these two questions â which are, moreover, closely related (sanctions and the SAP, i.e., right opportunism) â what sense is there in wasting time discussing the practical errors of the IS or the real or imagined errors committed by Unser Wort? We are standing on different sides of the barricades.
I donât know where Comrade Harte stands on sanctions and âour closest friends,â although at first he marched in step with Erde. It is unlikely that he agrees with Erde. But, as I can tell from his letters, he too is among the impatient ones, who just yesterday âcommandedâ the masses and have not yet rid themselves of this habit, which they can find no application for in our ranks. Not just because we have no great masses to command, but because the âsmall massâ that we are gathering around us with increasing success does not want to be âcommandedâ after the Zinoviev-Stalin experience. That our young comrades can use good advice is not to be disputed. That is why I always placed special emphasis on attracting the best elements of the older generation. But now some of them want to replace long-term educational work with the crack of the overseerâs whip. This will not do. For even the youngest among us have a feeling of independence, acquired at great cost. And this feeling is what makes it possible for them to resist the old organizations, with their united front, their Peopleâs Front and all their other grand gestures that impress the philistines so much.
You write that one comrade thinks I myself have already reached the conclusion that the counterrevolution has completely triumphed in the Soviet Union, but that I do not consider it opportune to say so publicly. Even if it was unintentional, this comrade could not do me any greater insult. Saying what is has always been our highest principle. Implying that I have two opinions, one for myself (or for myself and my closest friends) and the other for the outside world â that is really too much.
On the question of the historical analogy with Thermidor, I recently undertook to correct myself publicly. There it was a question of nothing more than an analogy, which is always one-sided, never complete. I really canât add anything to what Iâve said before as far as the essence of the matter is concerned. Regarding the Soviet Union and the war, Comrade Braun will give you a short formulation of my position, reduced to the barest essentials. Can we work with comrades who are of another opinion on this decisive question? This question cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. The Treint group in France declares that they agree with us on all questions except that of the social character of the Soviet Union, but for this reason they will not sign the Open Letter. If however, some individual or group joins the Fourth International despite differences on the Soviet Union â that means that either they feel quite sure of themselves or else they underestimate the importance of this question. In both cases it would be wrong to reject such comrades. We should accept them in order to discuss further with them, on the basis of events. I donât think a more precise answer to this question can be given.
As for the question of the united front, I think that there is a tendency to create great terminological confusion over this, which makes it difficult to pose the question clearly. The concept âunited frontâ is closely linked with the well-known maxim: march separately, but strike together. In order to strike together, it is necessary to form a united front. It is thus not a question of a permanent institution, but of a temporary battle formation. In âquietâ times, the application of a united front would prove the exception. In a revolutionary period, the united front can have an extended character and even take on an organizational form (e.g., the form of revolutionary soviets). In any case, under all circumstances, it is a question of closing ranks in order to strike â something that presupposes mass organizations.
Letâs take, for example, the late âunited frontâ between the ILP and the British CP. This was a permanent alliance between propaganda groups. That is not a united front but an open admission that one of the two groups (or perhaps both) has no claim to an independent political existence. They march together even before they have succeeded in gathering the forces to strike. One should march alone if one really has something to say to the working class.
I am not sure whether these remarks made in passing apply to the discussion you mentioned or whether they are thus useful for clarifying the question. But you will be able to judge that better than I. In any case, we must be patient with all those groupings that approach us even if they approach with airs of superiority which are not totally justified. We should yield nothing in the realm of principle, but we should not play prestige politics. We should not allow ourselves to be influenced by unpleasant memories and we should not lose our heads. This, I believe, should be our rule. Even with the SAP people we exercised the greatest patience for several years. That in this instance reserving judgment proved to be no more than a reprieve is their own fault. We must show goodwill toward every other group and every individual, since we are the stronger. We have a tradition behind us and no doubts whatever about our future.
Stay well, dear friend, and donât let lifeâs misfortunes get you down.
L. Trotsky