Letter to Nikolai Bukharin, January 9, 1926

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Dear Nikolai Ivanovich:

I am thankful for your note, since it gives us an opportunity — after a long interval — to exchange views on the most urgent questions of party life. And since, by the will of fate and the party congress, you and I are serving on the same Politburo, an honest attempt at such a comradely clarification of the issues can, at any rate, do no harm.

Kamenev reproached you at a meeting [right after the Fourteenth Congress] with the fact that previously you had objected to measures of extreme administrative pressure in relation to the “Opposition” (apparently referring to 1923-24) but now you support the most drastic steps in relation to Leningrad. My thought, expressed out loud, was essentially this: “He has acquired the taste.” Taking up this remark of mine, you write: “You think that I have ‘acquired the taste,’ but this ‘taste’ makes me tremble from head to foot.” By no means did I intend, by this accidentally voiced observation, to suggest that you take pleasure in extreme repressive measures by the apparatus. My thought was rather that you have accommodated yourself to such measures, grown used to them, and are not inclined to notice their impact and effect outside the circles of the dominant elements of the apparatus.

In your note you charge that “out of formal considerations about democracy,” I don’t want to see the real state of affairs. But what do you yourself see as the “real state of affairs”? You write: “(1) The Leningrad apparatus is hardened to the core; the upper echelons are welded into one; they have been in power without any changes for eight years — they are welded together in their daily lives. (2) The secondary leadership is hand-picked; it is impossible to change all their minds (the top brass) — that is utopian. (3) What they seek to play upon, their main theme, is that the economic privileges of the industrial workers will be taken away (credits, factories, etc.); this is unconscionable demagogy.” From this you conclude that “it is necessary to win people over from below, while crushing resistance from above.”

It is by no means my purpose to polemicize with you or to recall the past. That is pointless. But in order to get at the essence of the problem, I must nevertheless say that you have produced a formulation which counterposes the party apparatus to the rank and file in the sharpest, harshest, and most glaring way. Your “construction” is as follows: There is a tightly knit, or as you put it, thoroughly “hardened” group at the top, and a secondary leadership hand-picked from above; then there is the party rank and file, deceived and corrupted by the demagogy of this apparatus; and beyond that, the mass of non-party workers. Of course, in a private note you may express yourself in stronger terms than in an article. But even making allowance for that, the result is an absolutely devastating picture. Every thinking member of the party will wonder: If a conflict hadn’t arisen between Zinoviev and the CC majority, would the top brass in Leningrad have continued to maintain for a ninth and a tenth year the kind of regime it established during the past eight years?

The “real state of affairs” is not at all as you see it. Actually it is this — the impermissible character of the Leningrad regime was revealed only because a conflict arose between it and the top brass in Moscow, certainly not because the Leningrad ranks made a protest, expressed dissatisfaction, etc. Can it be that this doesn’t hit you right in the eye? If Leningrad, i.e., the most cultured proletarian center, is ruled by a “hardened” clique, “welded together in their daily lives,” and a hand-picked secondary leadership, how is it that the party organization has failed to notice this? Are there really no vital, honest, and energetic party members in the Leningrad organization to raise the voice of protest and win over the majority of the organization to their side — even if their protest meets with no response from the CC? After all, we aren’t talking about Chita or Kherson (although there too of course we can and should expect that a Bolshevik party organization would not, over a period of years, tolerate barbarities by the upper echelons). We are talking about Leningrad, where unquestionably the most proletarian and the most highly skilled vanguard of our party is concentrated. Do you really not see that it is precisely in this and in nothing else that the “real state of affairs” consists? And now, when you give some thought, as you should, to this state of affairs, you must conclude: Leningrad is by no means a world unto itself. In Leningrad one finds only a sharper and more deformed expression of the negative characteristics which are typical of the party as a whole. Is this really not clear?

To you it seems that “because of formal considerations about democracy” I fail to see the realities in Leningrad. You are mistaken. I have never proclaimed democracy to be “sacred,” as one of my former Mends once did [that is, Bukharin].

You will perhaps recall that two years ago, during a session of the Politburo at my home, I said that the ranks of the Leningrad party were muzzled more than was the case elsewhere. This expression (I confess, a very strong one) was used by me in an intimate circle, just as you used in your personal note the words “unconscionable demagogy.”

To be sure, this did not prevent my remark concerning the muzzling of the party ranks by the Leningrad party apparatus from being broadcast through meetings and through the press. (That is another matter, however, and — I hope — not a precedent.) But doesn’t this mean I did see the real state of affairs? Moreover, unlike some comrades, I saw it a year and a half and two and three years ago. At that time, during the same session, I remarked that everything in Leningrad goes splendidly (100 percent) five minutes before things get very bad. This is possible only under a super-apparatus regime. Why then do you say that I did not see the real state of affairs? True, I did not consider Leningrad to be separated from the rest of the country by an impenetrable barrier. The theory of a “sick Leningrad” and a “healthy country,” which was held in high respect under Kerensky, was never my theory. I said and I repeat now that the traits of apparatus bureaucratism, characteristic of the whole party, have been brought to their extreme expression in the regime of the Leningrad party. I must, however, add that in these two and a half years (i.e., since the autumn of 1923) the apparatus-bureaucratic tendencies have grown in the extreme not only in Leningrad but throughout the entire party.

Consider for a moment this fact: Moscow and Leningrad, the two main proletarian centers, adopt simultaneously and furthermore unanimously (think of it: unanimously!) at their district party conferences two resolutions aimed against each other. And consider also this, that official party opinion, represented by the press, does not even dwell on this truly shocking fact.

How could this have happened? What social trends are concealed beneath this? Is it conceivable that in the party of Lenin, when there is such an exceptionally serious clash of tendencies, no attempt has been made to define their social, i.e., class, character? I am not talking about the “moods” of Sokolnikov or Kamenev or Zinoviev but about the fact that the two main proletarian centers, without which there would be no Soviet Union, turned out to be “unanimously” opposed to one another. How? Why? In what way? What are the special (?) social (?!) conditions in Leningrad and Moscow which permit such drastic and “unanimous” polar opposites? No one looks for them, no one wonders about them. What then is the explanation? Simply this, that everyone says inwardly, in silence — the hundred percent counter-position of Leningrad and Moscow is the work of the apparatus. That, Nikolai Ivanovich, is the real state of affairs. And I consider it in the highest degree alarming. Please try to grasp that!!

You allude to the way the Leningrad top echelons are welded together “in their daily lives” and you think that in my “formalism” I don’t see that. But just by chance several days ago a comrade reminded me of a conversation he and I had had more than two years ago. At that time I proposed approximately the following line of thought: Given the extremely apparatus-heavy character of the Leningrad regime, given the apparatus arrogance of the ruling clique, the development of a special “mutual protection” system in the upper ranks of the organization is inevitable, and that in turn will inevitably lead to very negative consequences in the outlook of the less stable elements in the party and state apparatuses. Thus, for example, I regarded as extremely dangerous the special kind of “insurance” through the party apparatus for the positions of military, economic, and other officials. Through their "loyalty” to the secretary of the province committee they won the right, within the sphere of official work, to violate orders or decrees in force on a statewide basis. In the sphere of “daily life” they lived with the confidence that they would not be held accountable for any of their “shortcomings” in that sphere as long as they remained loyal to the secretary of the province committee. Moreover, they had no doubt that anyone who tried to bring objections of a moral or work-related kind against them would find themselves categorized as Oppositionists, with all the ensuing consequences. Thus you are greatly mistaken to think that “because of formal considerations about democracy” I have failed to note the reality, in particular the reality of “daily life.” Only I did not have to wait until the conflict between Zinoviev and the CC majority to see this unattractive reality and the dangerous tendencies inherent in its further development

But even in regard to “daily life” Leningrad does not stand alone. In the past year we had on the one hand the Chita business, and on the other that in Kherson. Naturally you and I understand that the Chita and Kherson abominations are exceptions precisely because of their excesses. But these exceptions are symptomatic. Could the things that happened in Chita have occurred had there not been among the upper echelons in Chita a special, closed-in, mutual-protection system, with independence from the rank and file as its basis? Did you read the report of Shlichter’s investigating committee on the Kherson business? The document is instructive to the highest degree — not only because it characterizes some of the Kherson personnel, but also because it characterizes certain aspects of the party regime as a whole. To the question, “Why did all the local Communists, who had known of the crimes of the responsible workers, keep quiet, apparently for a period of two or three years?” Shlichter received the answer; “Just try to speak up — you’ll lose your job, you’ll get sent to the countryside, etc., etc.” I quote, of course, from memory, but this is the gist of it. And Shlichter exclaims apropos of this: “What! Up to now only Oppositionists have told us that for this or that opinion they have allegedly (?!) been removed from posts, sent to the countryside, etc., etc. But now we hear from party members that they do not protest against criminal actions of leading comrades for fear of being fired, sent to the countryside, expelled from the party, etc.” I cite again from memory.

I must in all honesty say that Shlichter’s pathetic exclamation (not at a public meeting but in a report at the Central Committee!) surprised me no less than the facts he investigated in Kherson. It goes without saying that the system of apparatus terror cannot stop with so-called ideological deviations, real or invented, but must inevitably extend to the life and activity of the organization as a whole. If the rank-and-file Communists are afraid to express any opinion that diverges or threatens to diverge from the opinion of the secretary of the bureau, province committee, district committee, county committee, etc., the same rank-and-file Communists will be still more afraid to raise their voices against impermissible and even criminal actions by officials in the central leadership. The one follows inseparably from the other. Especially because a morally tarnished official, in defending his post or his power or his influence, inevitably attributes any reference to his “tarnish” to the latest deviation, whatever it is. In such phenomena bureaucratism finds its most flagrant expression.

Today you condemn the Leningrad regime, exaggerating its apparatus ‘character in the process, i.e., portraying the situation as though there were no ideological bond of any kind between the upper echelons and the rank and, file. Here you fall into exactly the opposite error of the one you fell into when, politically and organizationally, you followed in Leningrad’s wake — and that was not so very long ago. Proceeding from this error, you wish to drive one wedge out with another, so that in the struggle against the Leningrad apparatchiks you want — to tighten all the screws of the apparatus tighter than ever. In the resolution of December 5, 1923, you and I jointly wrote that the bureaucratic tendencies in the party apparatus inevitably give rise, by way of a reaction, to factional groupings [see Challenge of The Left Opposition (1923-25), pp. 404-13]. And since that time we have had enough instances of this to see that the apparatus struggle against factional groupings [only] deepens the bureaucratic tendencies in the apparatus.

The purely administrative struggle against earlier “Oppositions” — a struggle which did not shrink from the use of any organizational or ideological means whatever — resulted in all decisions being adopted by party organizations in no other way than by unanimous vote. You yourself have praised this unanimous voting more than once in Pravda and, following Zinoviev’s lead, have described it as the product of ideological unity of mind. But then it turned out that Leningrad “unanimously” opposed itself to Moscow, and you pronounce this the result of the criminal demagogy of the hardened Leningrad apparatus. No, the problem lies deeper. You have before you the ultimate dialectics of the apparatus principle: unanimity is suddenly transformed into its opposite. Now you have opened up exactly the same kind of struggle, using the same old stereotypes, against the new Opposition. The ideological range of the dominant echelons of the party is constricted still more. Their ideological authority is inevitably reduced. The need for an intensification of apparatus regimentation follows from this. This need has dragged you into the process 'as well. A year or two ago, in Kamenev’s words, you “objected.” But now you take the initiative, although in your own words it makes you “tremble from head to foot.” I venture to say that in this instance you personally represent a fairly accurate and sensitive barometer of the degree of bureaucratization in the party regime over the last two or three years.

I know that certain comrades, possibly you among them, have until recent times been carrying out a plan somewhat as follows: give the workers in the cells the opportunity to criticize things on the workshop, factory, or district level, and at the same time, crack down resolutely on every “opposition” emanating from the upper ranks of the party. In this way, the apparatus regime as a whole was to be preserved by providing it with a broader base. But this experiment was not at all successful. The methods and habits of the apparatus regime inevitably trickle down from the top. If every criticism of the Central Committee and even criticism inside the Central Committee is equated, under all conditions, with a factional struggle for power, with all the ensuing consequences, then the Leningrad Committee will carry out the very same policy in relation to those who criticize it in the sphere of its absolute powers. And under the Leningrad Committee there are districts and sub-districts After that come the working groups and collectives. The size of the organization doesn’t change the basic trend. Criticizing a “red director” — if he enjoys the support of the cell secretary — means the same for the members of a factory workforce as criticizing the CC would mean for a CC member, a secretary of a province committee, or a delegate to a congress. Any criticism, if it is concerned with vital questions, is bound to infringe on someone, and the critic will invariably be accused of a “deviation,” “squabbling,” or simply personal insult. That is why it is necessary to begin all resolutions on party and trade union democracy over and over again with the words: “In spite of all the resolutions, decrees, and educational instructions, in the local areas, such and such goes on,” etc. But in fact what goes on in the local areas is only what goes on at the top. By using apparatus methods to suppress the apparatus regime in Leningrad you will only arrive at an even worse Leningrad regime.

This cannot be doubted for a moment. It is no accident that the pressure has been put on in Leningrad more strongly than anywhere else. In the rural provinces with their scattered party cells, largely lacking in culture, the role of the party-secretary apparatus will loom quite large simply because of the objective conditions. And this must be accounted as an inevitable and — within limits that are nevertheless not excessive — a progressive fact. But in Leningrad, with the high political and cultural level of its industrial workers, matters are different. Here an apparatus regime can maintain itself only by greater tightening of the screws, on the one hand, and by demagogy, on the other. By smashing one apparatus with another, before the ranks of the Leningrad party — or the party as a whole — have understood anything whatsoever, you are forced to supplement this work with counter-demagogy which is very similar to the demagogy [you complain of].

I have taken up only the question you raised in your note. But major social questions show through the question of the party regime. I cannot dwell on them in detail in this already overly long letter, and anyway there is no time for that. But I would like to hope that you will grasp my meaning from the following few words.

When in 1923 the Opposition arose in Moscow (without the aid of the local apparatus, and against its resistance) the central and local apparatus brought the bludgeon down on Moscow’s skull under the slogan: “Shut up! You do not recognize the peasantry.” In the same apparatus-way you are now bludgeoning the Leningrad organization and crying: “Shut up! You do not recognize the middle peasant.” You are thus terrorizing the thinking habits of the best proletarian elements in the two main centers of the proletarian dictatorship, teaching them not to give voice to their own views, whether correct or erroneous, not even to their anxieties concerning the general questions of the revolution and of socialism. And meanwhile in the rural areas, elements of [bourgeois] democracy are unquestionably being strengthened and entrenched. Can’t you see all the dangers that flow from this?

I say once again that I have touched on only one aspect of the colossal question of the future destiny of our party and revolution. I am personally grateful to you that your note gave me occasion to express these thoughts to you. Why have I written? To what end? Well, you see, I think it is possible, as well as necessary and indispensable, to make a transition from the present party regime to a more healthy one — without convulsions, without new debates, without a struggle for power, without “triumvirates,” “quadrumvirates” or “novumvirates” — through normal and full-bodied work by all the party organizations, beginning at the very top, the Politburo. That, Nikolai Ivanovich, is why I wrote this long letter. I am totally willing to continue our clarification of the issues and would like to hope that it will not hamper but at least in part will help smooth the road toward truly collective work in the Politburo and the Central Committee, without which there will not be collective work in any of the lower bodies of the party. It goes without saying that this letter is not in any way and not in the slightest degree an official party document. It is my private and personal letter to you in reply to your note. It was typed only because it was dictated to a stenographer, a comrade whose absolute party loyalty and discretion are beyond all question.

Regards!

Yours,

L. Trotsky