Letter to Max Shachtman, November 25, 1930

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Personal Elements in the French Struggle

Dear Comrade Shachtman:

The latent crisis in the French League has suddenly become acute again and now everyone must take a position. You know that Naville and Molinier visited us for some time and that we discussed all disputed questions more than thoroughly and then unanimously agreed on the necessary measures. Naville was sure that he would have problems with a number of comrades — particularly with Comrade Rosmer — but he was quite ready to surmount these obstacles together with the others. His parting words consisted of a completely spontaneous promise to conduct an open, non-diplomatic correspondence. Since his departure he hasn’t written me a single line. The second issue of the International Bulletin that the three of us put together here, and which should have appeared in Paris a few days later, has still not been published. The Provisional Secretariat which we assembled together is not functioning because Naville is boycotting it. Despite all of Comrade Molinier’s attempts to put collaborative work on a firm footing, this has not come about because of Naville’s continual resistance.

Now this situation is not purely, or if you will, it is not in the final analysis a result of Naville’s ill will; rather it has come about because of new complications that outweigh everything else. You know from experience the way organizational matters are handled in Paris. You, my dear friend, have also contributed somewhat to this sloppy organization — while reproaching me for not publishing my circular letter through the International Bulletin and the Secretariat after the April conference at a time when, despite all efforts, no international life could be summoned up in Paris. But that is just an aside. In French matters the work was just as sloppily organized, particularly in the most important area — trade union work. The entire task of propagating communist ideas in the trade unions has been left up to Comrade Gourget, on his own responsibility — no directives, no controls, no regular reports. In letters to Rosmer, Naville, and Gourget himself I have repeatedly expressed my amazement at this way of carrying out work and propagandized urgently but unsuccessfully for collective work in this most important of areas. The basis for my concern was Comrade Gourget’s approach to things and people. He prefers a personal-diplomatic approach to a principled-propagandistic one, and if necessary polemical education. I am not against the art of individual diplomacy, but it cannot replace programmatic work. For this reason I considered Comrade Gourget invaluable as a member of a trade union commission, which naturally would be completely under the control of the leadership of the League. But since Naville, Rosmer and the others were protecting Gourget because of the (seemingly vacuous) internal struggle, they did not find an opportunity to put things back on the track. When Naville visited me I underscored this critical point and predicted that Gourget’s personal character in a situation of complete independence from the League in this most important area of work could engender harmful consequences — which has proved to be the case much sooner than I had imagined.

On November 20 there was supposed to be a conference of the Unitary Opposition. Gourget undertook to work out theses on his own in collaboration with a semi-communist who was outside the League. What he produced was a political trade union platform composed of bits and pieces culled from syndicalism, communism and reformism. One can clearly see where the good Gourget in diplomatic deference to his partner threw one communist principle after the other overboard, on the one hand, and on the other incorporated one prejudice after another into the document. I will ask Comrade Frankel to write out at least the most important parts (the document is huge) and enclose them with this letter. I have written a short critique, unfortunately in Russian. I am enclosing it anyway. Perhaps you have someone now who can translate it into English. Had the document been written by non-communist trade unionists half-way friendly to the League a friendly principled critique of this jumble would be in order. But that a communist, a member of the League, sets his name to the document, that communist trade unionists vote for it, let alone that we as the International Opposition take responsibility for it — this is absolutely out of the question.

As mentioned, these theses were drafted completely behind the back of the leadership. It was only at Comrade Molinier’s demand that Gourget presented his document for examination and then reluctantly. Naville, Gerard [Rosenthal] not to mention Molinier, [Pierre] Frank and others, had to immediately concede that the platform was unacceptable. This promptly caused Comrade Gourget to hand in his resignation with a written explanation to the effect that the League was attempting to subordinate the trade union opposition [Unitary Opposition] to itself, i.e., he raised the same charge the syndicalists habitually raise against the communists with, in any case, one difference — that here it was not a case of “subordinating” the trade union opposition, at least for the present, but rather it was a case of the League controlling one of its members to whom the trade union work was entrusted.

Since then Naville’s position has been so wavering and equivocal that he has not, as I mentioned, trusted himself to write me a few lines although throughout I maintained a cordial correspondence with his wife — in constant expectation of his letter. Instead of condemning Comrade Gourget’s absolutely impermissible, unrevolutionary methods, he initiated guerrilla warfare against Molinier and Mill, and sabotaged the work of the International Secretariat. No one knows what conclusions Naville will draw from the situation, since unfortunately he is used to allowing himself to be motivated by personal and sentimental considerations rather than political and organizational ones.

It goes without saying that Comrade Rosmer’s attitude plays the most important role in all this. It is difficult for me to touch upon this sensitive point, but the matter is above personal considerations, even if an old friend is involved. Except for a short period, Comrade Rosmer never belonged to a large political organization. Like Monatte, he was active within the confines of a small, intimate anarcho-syndicalist group which never adopted strict organizational norms but always remained a federation of individualities. More than once I was amazed at the meeting of this organization at Quai Jemmapes 96 (where Vie Ouvrière used to be located): no agenda, no minutes, unstructured give-and-take of discussion, no decisions, the meeting breaks up and everyone does just what he feels like doing or even nothing at all. And so it went week after week for years on end. The way the April conference was organized (to be sure, with your help, my dear friend) represents a carryover of the same methods and norms into the Left Opposition. This explains too why Rosmer found it quite natural for Gourget to carry the entire burden of the trade union work — no more, no less — and on his own responsibility, without being accountable to anyone. As you also know, for years after his expulsion from the party, Rosmer was completely outside the movement. One must also take into consideration that he is a sick man, who can only maintain his physical equilibrium by leading a very quiet life. He is happy working in a group of good friends, but is completely incapable of bearing internal conflicts and reacts by leaving the field to the combatants in such cases.

The International Secretariat under Rosmer’s leadership was unable to begin its work because Overstraeten had objections and Naville some doubts, and Rosmer absolutely no desire to take on these false objections and equally false doubts. The same thing was repeated later with the Bordigists to whom I had written an open letter that Rosmer refused to publish in La Vérité because he knew it would not cause friction with me and would avoid new conflicts with the Bordigists. I hope you will understand that I am not complaining to you about Rosmer. I am just trying to acquaint you with those particular traits of his character which explain his attitude in the present crisis.

If I were free to travel I would come to Paris immediately to have a word with an old friend. Unfortunately this is denied to me. For this reason I urgently implored Rosmer to come to Prinkipo again so that we could try to clarify the situation together. Whatever develops from this personal factor, the general situation in the League, that is, the character of the crisis, is completely clear. The League is on the way to transforming itself from a small propaganda group, which was like a family, to a public organization where relations are less warm, ties and duties more formal, and conflicts at times brutal. Politically speaking, this is a great step forward, which can also clearly be seen in the development of La Vérité. But the ineluctable negative aspects of this step forward Rosmer finds unbearable — and this is the personal explanation for the Rosmer case.

As for Naville, it should not be forgotten that he, with all his positive and promising qualities, belonged to Revolution Surrealiste as early as 1927, then later worked on Clarté and until the fall of 1929 still stood between the right and left wings in close alliance with Souvarine. These are not reproaches. Naville is quite young, comes from a bourgeois milieu and is making his way without distractions or inhibitions. But a theoretical Marxist education is no substitute for revolutionary training in a proletarian milieu. And this is precisely what Naville lacks, as does the Lutte des classes group. He accepts the correct standpoint in principle, but then in dealing with a practical problem other factors, individualistic and even national ones, come to the fore, making it difficult for him to decide and sometimes even forcing him onto the wrong track. These unsurmounted non-proletarian characteristics of his are so well defined that it is almost always possible to predict what kind of error he will make in one question or another. I repeat once again that with him errors are increasingly unavoidable the less they are theoretical (and that means purely theoretical) and the more they encompass practical and personal questions. This is the case now too, where Gourget’s improper conduct has caused him to vacillate and where he is trying to put pressure not on Gourget but on the others who are completely in the right. Naturally this only enlarges the scope of the crisis since one can overcome other people’s waverings only if one does not waver oneself.

I wrote a letter to Naville today, a copy of which is enclosed. At the same time I wrote to Comrade Mill, who is also the representative of the Russian Opposition in Paris, saying that in my opinion the work of the Secretariat should not be interrupted for a day. I asked him to look up Comrade Souzo and go together with him to Comrade Naville and implore him not to neglect his responsibilities to the International Opposition despite the crisis in the French League.

But all these things are simply unpleasant side effects. It would be better if they did not exist. But it would be highly frivolous to fall into despair or even to become pessimistic because of them. For in the course of the last year we’ve come a long way and these crises no longer arise from the old, unhealthy stagnation of the foreign Opposition groups, but rather out of their development, metamorphosis, and growth.

This letter is intended for you personally, not that I have anything to conceal, but rather because those comrades who are not acquainted with the personal aspects of the situation might not interpret this letter in the spirit in which it was written.

If you want my opinion on your position, I’ll give you the following advice: do not support or even indulge Comrade Naville’s waverings, but demonstrate to him most forcefully that starting with the key question of the trade unions he must guide himself in accordance with principled and not personal motives. Once this side has been shored up, together we will do everything possible to avoid losing our dear Gourget. He is a good comrade, very sharp, and many of the qualities which show up as weaknesses because of insufficient organization could do excellent service for the International Opposition if correctly applied.

With best greetings,

Yours,

L. Trotsky

P.S. In my letter to Naville you will find a reference to Comrade Landau’s preparations for the German conference. I am not sure whether you are informed about this. The conference was supposed to take place five days after the [September 14, 1930] elections, that is, at a time when nothing had yet been resolved. The conference was announced suddenly so that I had to content myself personally with a short letter which was published in Kommunist. At the last moment the conference was postponed a few weeks, supposedly to give the delegates time to take a position on the elections. That gave me time to write the small pamphlet that you did such an excellent job in publishing. I also wrote letters to Landau and Well with the request to send the draft resolutions to the international comrades, myself included. I insisted that my pamphlet be sent to the local organizations in manuscript form to serve as a basis for discussion. None of this was done. No resolutions were prepared for the conference. My pamphlet appeared almost simultaneously with the American edition. The conference concerned itself exclusively with personal dirt, that is, it was a replay on a broader scale of the conference you yourself attended. The selection of delegates and the entire management of the conference had a single goal: to establish and affirm that not Neuman and Grylewicz but Landau was right without regard for which large and important questions this right and wrong applied to. Before the conference I asked Comrade Landau about the preparations and received the firmest assurances from him that he would collaborate with Roman Well and try to make the conference count as a real political-revolutionary assembly. The delegates, lacking any political ideas, could do nothing but declare the leadership was right and, as Comrade Seipold admits, go home extremely depressed, without having adopted the most meager political resolutions. Comrade Landau regards this as his victory and I am afraid he has led Naville into the temptation of trying for a similar victory in France. Landau’s weaknesses (and of course he has his strong points too) are analogous to Comrade Naville’s weaknesses and hence their comradeship in arms is not founded on an entirely healthy basis. So, now you know all that I have to tell you, since for the moment there is nothing more to add.

L.T.