Letter to Friedrich Engels, April 22, 1859

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MARX TO ENGELS

IN MANCHESTER

[London,] 22 April 1859

Dear Frederick,

I have MODIFIED your ARTICLE to accord with the latest NEWS. You didn't, I suppose, waste your time (as I was obliged to do) wading through last Monday's parliamentary debates. Their CIST was as follows:

1. England has been duped throughout the negotiations. 2. England is decidedly pro-Austrian. ad 1. The English ministers had announced once before that everything was SETTLED. This was when the news of the evacuation of Rome was appearing in all the papers. From statements made in the House of Lords it follows: that the Pope really had requested that his territory be evacuated. France had repeatedly complained to the English about the falsity of her position in Rome. She had wished to withdraw but was prevented, on the one hand, by the Pope's apprehensions and, on the other, by the Austrians' refusal similarly to withdraw. This was actually the official PRETEXT Boustrapa gave England to justify the scene with the Austrian ambassador on 1 January. WELL, the Pope scotched that PRETEXT. Austria ACTUALLY withdrew 2 battalions from Bologna and had given ORDERS for the remaining troops to leave. Then Bonaparte discovered a pretext for not evacuating, and thus the whole business fell through. This put Mr Derby into a very BAD TEMPER and, TO SOOTH HIM, Bonaparte unbosomed himself about the 'ITALIAN QUESTION' to Lord Cowley, who telegraphed London saying he found his demands 'SATISFACTORY'. Thereupon Cowley was sent to Vienna bearing Bonaparte's demands which England had ac- cepted. (This man Cowley is the selfsame swine who, in Vienna in 1848/49, intrigued against the German revolution.) This was at the end of February. Austria, being exceedingly reluctant to engage in a war and having at the time not progressed nearly so far in the matter of armaments as by the middle of March, accepted everything. When Cowley arrived in London on his way back to Paris, both 'he' and the 'Ministry', as Derby himself says, were fully convinced that everything was SETTLED, and again discredited themselves by making a fresh statement to that effect before Parliament. So Cowley departs in sanguine mood for Paris. Here he learns that they've been playing blind man's buff with him and that, at Russia's suggestion, Boustrapa has agreed to A GENERAL CONGRESS at which, again at Russia's suggestion, only the 5 great powers were to be represented, i.e. Sardinia was to be excluded. Derby declared outright that Russia's intervention (although agreed with France; but Bonaparte, of course, could not reject CONDITIONS put to Austria by England in his name) was alone to blame for the fact that peace had not been achieved. On the same day Palmerston said in the House OF COMMONS that he didn't (OF COURSE) blame Russia; had England's mediation been successful Russia would not have played the role she would certainly play at a congress and which was her due where European questions were concerned. Although with very bad grace, Derby accepted the Russian proposal under certain conditions, of which THE PRINCIPAL was that the TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENTS of the Treaty of Vienna of 1815 should not be infringed. Austria, who had already assumed that everything was settled, now clearly perceived that war had been decided upon and that an attempt was being made to lead her by the nose. Hence her reply to the new English proposal was the outrageous demand that, by way of a preliminary to the congress, Sardinia must disarm. Whereupon Derby proposed to Bonaparte that Sardinia should be induced to consent to this outrage on condition that both France and England simultaneous- ly undertook to guarantee her against a breach of the peace by Austria during the congress. That ass Bonaparte rejected this. Had he accepted he could have got his agents to stage some sort of fracas on the Austro-Piedmontese border, when England would have been BOUND DOWN TO AN OFFENSIVE TREATY WITH FRANCE AND SARDINIA AGAINST AUSTRIA, and Palmerston would have certainly compelled the Tories TO BE AS GOOD AS THEIR WORD. The Austrians, for their part, were alarmed by the ease with which, under certain circumstances, England was prepared to enter into an offensive alliance against them. They therefore promptly declared themselves in favour of the English proposal, and made Sardinia's disarmament a general disarmament. Then came the row as to whether disarmament should take place before the MEETING of the CONGRESS, as maintained by Austria, or after it, as maintained by Bonaparte, and then as to whether or not Sardinia should be admitted, etc. In short, all the

new difficulties stemmed from Bonaparte, 1) the QUIBBLES about disarmament; 2) after all, he and Russia had proposed the exclusion of Sardinia from the congress. So enraged was Derby last Monday that he is said to have literally shouted when he declared that England would now make one more, ULTIMATE proposal; but he was weary of TRIFLING and if that one failed he would no longer act as mediator, etc.

ad 2. Bonaparte could accept these latter proposals since they were detrimental solely to Austria in so far as she was in the lead with her armaments. He had to accept them if Derby was not to be given a pretext for taking an outright stand against him. Austria had to reject them if she was not to deprive herself of every advantage, etc. Bonaparte, who had counted on Derby's fall and Palmerston's accession, was IN A PLIGHT THE WORSE since in their speeches Derby and Disraeli had plainly indicated that they were tired of being duped by Bonaparte and Russia and had, moreover, definitely sided with Austria. Malmesbury said he failed to understand upon what pretext Bonaparte had intervened in the Italian imbroglio. Derby said that England would at first observe ARMED NEUTRALITY, but turn against any power which 'for no good reason' instigated a war. Derby said that England's interests in the Adriatic did not permit him to look on with folded arms; and that he would regard an attack on Trieste almost as a casus belli. Disraeli said that Austria had behaved with DIGNIFIED MODERATION' and that Sardinia was AMBIGUOUS, VEXING AND EVEN AMBITIOUS-. Finally they all said that the treaties of 1815 must be MAINTAINED, and repeatedly emphasised, with immediate reference to the TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT

IN ITALY, that those treaties INTENDED PUTTING A CHECK UPON THE

ENCROACHING AMBITION OF FRANCE'.

This much is certain: T h e ruse whereby Derby, instead of resigning, consigned Parliament to the devil, thus temporarily banishing Palmerston into private life, has placed the Russo- French game in a serious dilemma.

T h e r e are only two alternatives. Either Austria allows herself to be intimidated by minatory TELEGRAMS from London and Berlin, and WITHDRAWS Gyulay's ultimatum to Piedmont, in which case not even God will be able to help Bonaparte. For then he will, IN FACT, be compelled to disarm and be treated by the army as a Soulouque. As it is, the workers in Paris have been infuriated by the turpitude of Blanqui's deportation to Cayenne. O r else Austria wearies of diplomatic trifling and marches on Turin. In which case Mr Bonaparte has won a diplomatic victory in as much as Austria will

have been the first to declare war; but that diplomatic victory will have been bought at the expense of AN UGLY MILITARY DEFEAT. In which case I don't give 4 MONTHS PURCHASE FOR HIS CROWN AND DYNASTY.

I'll send you the Tribunes tomorrow. Apropos. T h e great imperial Vogt has written Freiligrath an epistle in which he informs him that this imperial gang is bringing out a new newspaper in Zurich (or Berne, I forget which). He invited Freiligrath to write for the feuilleton and to enlist the profound Bûcher as political correspondent.

T h e platform upon which imperial Vogt proposes to build a new 'party' and which has, as he himself puts it, been most warmly welcomed by A. Herzen, is this: Germany surrenders her extrater- ritorial possessions. Does not support Austria. French despotism is transitory, Austrian permanent. Both despots to be allowed to bleed to death. (Even some predilection for Bonaparte in evidence.) Armed neutrality for Germany. A revolutionary move- ment in Germany, as Vogt 'knows on the best authority', is not to be thought of DURING OUR LIFETIME. CONSEQUENTLY, as soon as Austria has been ruined by Bonaparte, the fatherland will experience the spontaneous beginnings of a moderate, liberal-national develop- ment à la imperial Regency, and Vogt may yet become Prussian court jester. From Vogt's letter it is evident that he believes Freiligrath to be no longer connected with us in any way. T h e ignorance of this imperial Vogt about the people he is dealing with! Bûcher, as an Urquhartite, is an Austrian. T h e great Blind, ON THE OTHER HAND, finding himself in the dilemma of being anti-Bonaparte as a German and anti-Austria asVRotteck, is AT THE PRESENT MOMENT convening a 'German Parliament', as the telegraph will soon announce in Manchester.

Salut.

Your

K. M.