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Special pages :
Letter to Ephraim Sklyansky, May 2, 1919
Source: Lenin Collected Works, Progress Publishers, 1975, Moscow, Volume 44, page 222c.
This was written on a telegram from K. A. Mekhonoshin, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army, who asked that part of the 33rd Division, which was to be transferred to the Eastern Front, should be left in the Astrakhan area. Mekhonoshin reported that the transfer of the whole 33rd Division and the impossibility of a rapid formation of the 34th Division, owing to the delay in sending promised reinforcements, would compel them to stop the offensive against Kizlyar and give up the idea of capturing Guriev and Rakusha, where there was oil, and would put the fleet, which was threatened with loss of its base, in a hopeless position. âThe absence of precise orders from Field Headquarters,â wrote Mekhonoshin, âputs the army in an absolutely impossible position and gives grounds for accusing us of inactivity.â Lenin made a number of underlinings and markings on Mekhonoshinâs telegram (Lenin Miscellany XXXIV, pp. 127â 28).
Sklyansky: this is very important; it is necessary to leave them part of the 33rd Division and immediately get Vatsetis to send an absolutely precise telegram to this effect to Astrakhan.
Lenin
2/V.