Letter on the German “Lefts”, April 2, 1927

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Dear Comrade:

I have now read for the first time one of the issues of the information bulletin of the Left Opposition in the German Communist Party [KPD], no. 5-6, March 1, 1927. This issue provides a fairly clear picture of the general features characterizing the group of Maslow, Fischer, Urbahns, et al.

1. One cannot fail to stress that the claim that this group is conducting a renegade struggle against the Soviet Union, declaring it to be a bourgeois state, is untrue. The opposite is the case. The group very sharply poses the question of the struggle against imperialist intervention, which threatens the Soviet Union. Its statement to the Eleventh Congress of the KPD says: “ We on the other hand will surely stand with Soviet Russia with all our strength — quite unlike the ‘friends’ from the reformist camp.”

In their open letter to the party congress they say: “In exactly the same way we reject the false, non-Communist views put forward on the Russian question by such figures as Katz, Korsch, or Schwartz.

“We see Soviet Russia as the first proletarian state in the world and reject as liquidationist any and all talk of the ‘bourgeois’ character of the Russian revolution (Korsch) or of preparations for a ‘real proletarian revolution’ in Russia (Schwartz). As always, we consider support for proletarian Russia against any imperialist attack and against the slander campaign of the Mensheviks to be the self-evident duty of every Communist.”

The text gives a reference to the appropriate speeches by representatives of the left in the Reichstag, etc., sharply delineating themselves from the ultra-lefts … They advance a number of proposals which have the purpose of placing the struggle against the dangers threatening the USSR on a more concrete basis. This fact seems to me the central one from the point of view of whether or not it is possible, now or later, to restore this group to its place in the Comintern.

2. Among the measures proposed by the lefts for the struggle against intervention (calling a conference of transport workers, sailors, workers in war industry, etc.) there is also this proposal:

“Immediate convening of the Anglo-Russian Committee, whose reformist members — it goes without saying — will undertake nothing against their ‘own’ imperialist bourgeoisie, which they support. In response, we should use this as a basis for exposing these traitors and thus retrieve what was lost during the British General Strike and open the eyes of the British proletariat to ‘left’ as well as right-wing reformism,”

This proposal is completely correct and politically expedient. The entire Communist press, following the initiative of our press, has said quite a bit in the recent period about the danger of intervention. The Anglo-Russian Committee, which they tell us “is not a corpse,” has been silent the whole time. There has been a sharp exchange of diplomatic notes between the British and Soviet governments. On England’s part this is an open threat to peace. The Anglo-Russian Committee remains silent. British artillery has been bombarding Nanjing The Anglo-Russian Committee remains silent. If it exists, why does it hold its peace? And if it does not exist, why is its demise kept quiet? We see here a worse repetition of the policy which the Russian Opposition denounced after the derailment of the British General Strike and which it continued to denounce as long as the coalminers’ strike went on, a strike that was being betrayed anew every day by the British members of the Anglo-Russian Committee. Whether we mean to or not, we are now providing cover for the British Mensheviks, who — as Lenin said — are far, far worse than their Russian counterparts.

3. In the article dealing with the Essen Congress of the KPD, which was then about to convene, the situation is characterized as follows: “The relative stabilization of capitalism in Germany is reflected in the consolidation of the reformists’ influence on the proletariat. This is revealed not only in the parliamentary elections of the recent past but — far more important — in all the trade union elections.”

Farther on in the same article we find a statement of exceptional importance, which sheds light on the special character of the “stabilization” in Germany.

“In reality the biggest mistake of the lefts at the party congress was that they were not hard and unrelenting enough in telling the party how severe the defeat in 1923 was. They did not draw the necessary conclusions, did not explain to the party soberly and straightforwardly the tendencies toward the relative stabilization of capitalism, and did not present a corresponding program of struggle and slogans for the period immediately to come, although that would have been entirely possible, along with their completely correct and absolutely necessary sharp emphasis on programmatic issues” (emphasis mine — L.T.).

I think that this acknowledgment, correct in essence, is exceptionally valuable as an indication that the lefts have learned a great deal on this question. That the crucial phase of the revolutionary situation had been missed; that the ebb-tide had already begun; that the tide would ebb with greater force from month to month — all this was clear enough even by November-December 1923. Brandler, one of those chiefly responsible for the policies leading to this extremely heavy defeat for the proletariat, did not wish to acknowledge the downturn. He said that the revolutionary situation was “developing.” Klara Zetkin said the same. But the lefts, too, failed to assess the full depth of the defeat at that time and therefore failed to foresee the inevitability of an abrupt and deep-going turn in the whole political situation. Moreover, in the heat of the moment they were ready to write off as “liquidators” those who pointed even then to the inevitability of this turn, who warned against policies that would have been absolutely correct and necessary in 1923, but which could become extremely dangerous and even disastrous in 1924, unquestionably the year of stabilization. The article I have quoted refers quite correctly to the fact that as a result of the defeat, on the one hand, and of an incorrect assessment of its meaning and consequences, on the other, there was found in the left camp — and in our opinion there predominated — “an absolutely false conception of what ‘leftism’ meant under the conditions of that time.” Thus many lefts, as the article puts it — we would say, the left current as a whole — considered it then to be “impermissible in principle to speak of a slowing of the pace of the revolution.”

This is very aptly put. Leftism consisted in a superficial impatience and lack of desire to “resign oneself’ to the fact that at that time a revolutionary situation of exceptional importance had been let slip. On this issue the views of the left coincided oddly with those of Brandler, although of course each proceeded from different assumptions and inclinations. Brandler sought to conceal the dimensions of the defeat, accusing us of “overestimating” the revolutionary situation of 1923, and portrayed himself as an optimist looking to the future. The lefts continued to push an immediate revolutionary perspective and thus were forced to minimize the significance of the 1923 defeat and to view the political situation of 1924 not as the result of an abrupt turn but as the direct continuation of what had gone before. At the Fifth Comintern Congress Brandler sharply condemned the assessment of the situation made by Trotsky. Not one of the lefts corrected him. On the contrary, on that point, agreement reigned. At the time of the Fifth Congress, i.e., a year and a half after the stabilization and the ebbing of the revolution had begun, Stalin spoke of the masses turning to the left (!). Precisely from this assessment flowed the incorrect general orientation, which led the left leaders in Germany into a number of mistakes and facilitated their rapid elimination. …

It is not true that the lefts (Maslow, R. Fischer, Urbahns, et al.) deny the so-called stabilization. On the contrary, as we see from the quoted passages, they explicitly recognize it — and in quite a correct way — not as some automatic economic process but as a change in the balance of class forces. They see absolutely correctly that the main political symptom of the stabilization is the strengthening of reformist influences on the proletariat. They quite correctly see the cause of this to be the defeat of the revolution in the fall of 1923, when the party did not know how to take advantage of the unquestionably revolutionary situation and lead the unquestionably revolutionary masses to the conquest of power. This colossal defeat, after colossal sufferings and hopes, could have no result but a decline in the revolutionary activism of the proletariat and consequently a shift in the relationship of political forces in favor of the bourgeoisie. The political strengthening of the bourgeoisie gave it the opportunity to pursue policies aimed at strengthening its economic positions. Hence the very possibility of a whole series of government measures paving the way to economic “stabilization.”

The charge of denying the economic stabilization, aimed at the Russian Opposition, makes no sense. The economic chaos of 1923 (in Germany) could not have lasted long: the political strengthening of the bourgeoisie was bound to lead to a restoration of order in the economic sphere, and this, in turn, to a further strengthening of the positions of the capitalists. But in a period of such highly concentrated changes it is more necessary than ever to understand economic and political phenomena clearly in their dialectical interdependence. We have nothing in common with the vulgar fatalism which says that the onset of stabilization (how? from what? why?) interrupted the development of the revolution in Germany. The revolution was interrupted not by economic but by political factors — the incapacity of the Communist Party to cope with the situation. That test, and the party’s failure to meet it, took place before the eyes of the entire proletariat, the eyes of all the people. Hence the search for ways out of the hopeless crisis along other paths, with the leading role passing over to the bourgeoisie. Whoever has not understood that has understood nothing.

The lefts, as we see, have understood the abrupt change in the situation at the end of 1923. This by itself is a sign of growing political maturity. Our epoch, unlike the prewar period, is an epoch of abrupt political turns. One must know how to recognize and assess them in time. To say, a year and a half after the ebb-tide has begun, that the masses are “moving to the left” means to head straight toward the most disastrous kinds of errors. The lefts have now understood this. The qualifications they place upon this assessment are of secondary importance and flow from their past. They have understood the most important thing — namely, that the methods and techniques that were correct in 1923 could have become ruinous in 1924-25. They have understood that it was not “impermissible in principle” (!) to speak of a slowdown in the pace of revolutionary developments. On the contrary, it is impermissible in principle to fail to take the facts into account, if you do not wish to break your neck.

Things are quite different when it comes to the German “ultra-lefts” (see their publication Communist Policy for March 1, 1927). They totally reject any acknowledgment of the relative stabilization. They regard as mere hypocrisy the statement that a new revolutionary situation will develop out of this stabilization as it unfolds. In what way, they ask, can a revolutionary situation grow out of stabilization, i.e., the consolidation of capitalism? They treat stabilization just as fatalistically as the opportunists do — but from the opposite direction. To them stabilization is a self-contained process of capitalist consolidation. To us it is first of all a process in the class struggle, with shifts and changes in the balance of forces in one direction or the other. Every new stage in the stabilization reproduces the contradictions between the classes and between the capitalist states in a new and higher form, with a permanent tendency toward the aggravation of those contradictions. Lodged within this very dialectic is the inevitability of both revolutionary and military convulsions. Only pathetic philistines could suppose that the Communist Party is only needed during an immediately revolutionary situation. It can be said with certainty that the present imperialist epoch will see to it that there is no shortage of revolutionary situations. The German Communist Party need only utilize the present stabilization period to make the appropriate preparations. Here Brandler has not had any success; the success of the lefts is undeniable. …

Of an entirely different nature is the question of possible agreement by a workers’ state with capitalist states for the purpose of defending its existence. It is absolutely clear that the Soviet Union cannot put itself in a position of permanent or prolonged defensive or offensive ^alliance with any capitalist state, for their aims and policies are so opposed that a temporary coincidence of interests may arise only by way of exception, not as a rule. But exceptions are possible: for example, an agreement with bordering states to refuse permission for foreign troops to pass through for purposes of intervention. If such an agreement were possible, even if very costly, it would be entirely permissible, and under certain circumstances quite expedient and useful. A Communist Party in such a border state should speak in favor of such an agreement without tying its own hands in any way, of course, in regard to criticism of its own bourgeoisie. Here it would be a question not of supporting “one’s own” oppressed bourgeoisie, but of a national war by an imperialist state, even though a weak one, and of utilizing the special circumstances in which the imperialist state finds itself, be it small or large, in order to facilitate the defense of the workers’ state against attack by other imperialist powers.

The recent campaign over artillery shells, based on lies and slander, has been and is being waged as a preparation for intervention. But we are fully justified in posing the question on the level of principle: Is it permissible for a workers’ state to conclude an agreement of a military and technical kind — for joint manufacture of ammunition, let us say — with an imperialist state which because of circumstances has an interest in doing this? If the workers’ state in question were a backward one, if it did not have sufficient technical resources of its own, if it could, through such an agreement, strengthen its defense capacity, it would have the right and the duty to conclude such an agreement. Lenin long ago dealt with this question in a polemic with Bukharin. The occasion was that we did not refuse military and technical aid from French imperialism against the Hohenzollern offensive. Can’t an honest person get a pistol from a bandit? Lenin asked, to point up the error of Bukharin’s position in a popular way. Nothing is changed if the bandit is willing to supply the honest person with the pistol on the condition that he, the bandit, be allowed the chance to make a pistol for himself at the same time. It would be absurd, pathetic, shameful to deny a workers’ state surrounded by powerful enemies the right to make episodic arrangements with even the worst of the imperialists, in order to strengthen the workers' state in military or economic respects. Every revolutionist in Germany — or simply every honest worker — will understand that without such agreements the workers’ state would long ago have perished. Only pathetic and contemptible blowhards such as Korsch, Schwartz, and Company could see treason in something that is, on the contrary, the duty of the government of the proletarian dictatorship.

With that I conclude my comments on the issue of the information bulletin of the lefts that I received. My general conclusion has already been stated above: Brandler has learned nothing over these past few years; the lefts have learned a great deal. This is why I think they will win back their place in the International.