From the Opposition’s Circular-Letters, December 20 and 28, 1929

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December 20, 1929

It comes out most strikingly that the deadly dangers — I repeat: the deadly dangers — which the party regime is running with regard to the economy are not understood. They described our position as super-industrializationist. But in this matter we were only struggling against economic Menshevism, pointing out that the real possibilities of industrialization were immeasurably greater than they seemed to the rightists and the centrists; but we never considered these possibilities unlimited. In my 1925 pamphlet Toward Capitalism or Socialism? I expressed confidence that we had the possibility, after the period of reconstruction had been completed, of reaching an annual increase in industrial production of 15 to 20 percent. Molotov and the other philistines scoffed at our “optimism.” But this is not the point. The approximate calculation of the coefficient of development was based on the (very approximate, of course) economic estimates of available and possible resources. That means we always had in view real industrialization and not superindustrialization.

Let us recall that in 1925 our industry went through a stormy flowering. When I returned from the Caucasus in May, I found a picture typical of stock-jobbing All the trusts were chasing after investment capital; dealings of the Industrial Bank were rising madly. In June I wrote to Dzerzhinsky and Pyatakov, warning that this hurry-scurry was leading in a fatal way to a financial and industrial crisis. Neither Dzerzhinsky nor Pyatakov understood, and they even accused me (Pyatakov, particularly) of speaking up “against” industrialization. I pointed out to them that the overall material base of industrialization, given a correct policy, could be considerably increased; but on the given material base, industrialization should not be pushed ahead with the help of unreal credits. Probably everyone remembers that in September 1925 a deep crisis did break out, accompanied with the layoff of workers, etc.

I have given this example in order to show that our industrialization program was never an abstract “general line” of bureaucrats but flowed from an appraisal of the living and active equilibrium between economic factors and class relations, including the international ones.

Are these conditions required for industry being observed today? By what I can judge from here, not in the slightest. Instead of economic leadership and management, we are presented with industrialization races.

All theoretical considerations and specific economic symptoms show that the economy is faced with a repetition of the well- known miscalculation of 1925, only this time on a gigantic scale. At that time industry overcame the barrier of material resources which the right-centrist policy had allowed it. It was possible to correct that conjunctural “miscalculation” at the time, in either of two ways: by quickly and sharply restricting industry, or by increasing its general share of the national economy. To begin with, the leadership tried the first way, then it tried the second, and that is how it got out of its difficulties.

Now the frantic stock-jobbing of 1925 has become the general line. One asks: In general, are there objective material limits to the rate of industrialization? One wonders if there are. Is account taken of these limits in the present “races”? To speak more precisely: Are they taken into account in systematic fashion? I don’t see it. It is possible that I don’t know the whole story; but in my opinion we are heading for a disturbance of the total economic equilibrium and consequently of the social equilibrium.

At this point we come to the connection between the economy and the regime. We said, following our teachers, that the real victory of the socialist economy would be linked not with the liquidation of discussion and struggles but, on the contrary, with their immense flowering on a new basis; that factions would be created of “electrifiers,” of “petroleumists,” of “peat-fuelists,” of “tractorists,” of “collectivists,” etc., and the struggle in this industrial democracy would be one of the most important factors for regulating industrial development, to some extent as in the Middle Ages when the struggle of the guilds controlled contemporary production.

What do we see instead? A regime which completely excludes any kind of ideological grouping, any kind of struggle over economic proposals, and any kind of control of the economic process on the basis of the living experience of all its participants. The relation between agriculture and industry, the relation between the different branches of industry, the relation between quantity and quality in production, the relation between consumption and accumulation — all these elements of industrialization cannot be predetermined a priori by a “general line” nor prescribed by races. This is a more dangerous method than the capitalist for, so to speak, it socializes stock-jobbing, and not only does it not remove all difficulties from its path but it also multiplies them through the compulsion and encouragement of the state.

Thanks to the gigantic advantages of a centralized state economy, partial periodic conjunctural crises can be anticipated or overcome for a long period of time. At the same time, these conditions, in the absence of internal, living, and vital control of the economic processes — given the monstrously bureaucratic character of the all-powerful leadership — may lead to such an accumulation of crises and contradictions that any capitalist crisis would be child’s play in comparison with them.

Theoretically all this is absolutely clear and incontestable. It is possible in fact to establish the depths of the danger, the degree of its proximity, etc., only with a radical change in the regime of the Soviet and the party.

Does that mean the danger now lies in “superindustrialization”? Does that mean that the Right Opposition is correct? The “Right” is as correct in the industrialization question as, let us say, the French social democratic Right is correct when, despite Molotov, they think there is no revolutionary situation in France today. The “Right” adopts the standpoint of economic minimalism. Had the general line led to an irreparable crisis, the Russian Right would naturally have been able to rejoice, just as the international Right rejoiced at the failure of the August 1 demonstrations. Naturally, we have nothing in common with the Right on this question, the more so since, as conclusion to their misadventures, these defenders of the snail’s pace have decided to capitulate to the racetrack tempos just at the very time when its dangers are becoming still more evident.

The regime of the party has now become the nub of all the economic questions, a regime which after the latest capitulations has become not better but worse and which tends to grow worse as a result of the economic contradictions revived and accumulated by the “general line.”

These thoughts need to be elaborated profoundly and thoroughly, and we should get down to it now with all the necessary energy. It is perfectly clear, however, that the direction of this elaboration leads directly contrary not only to capitulation but also to vulgar conciliationism and timeserving.

Yours,

L.T.

December 28, 1929

Dear Friend,

I don’t see clearly from your letters what changes of attitude you say I propose, nor what change in tactics you reject. Isn’t there some misunderstanding?

The last declaration of the Opposition had as its aim to inform the party and the country that the Opposition is not closing its eyes to the change produced in the official line, and it is fully prepared to base itself on this change for the purpose of carrying out work in common with the majority of the party and for a peaceful, “non-factional” struggle — to the extent that, in general, that can be realized — for its point of view inside the party. In this declaration there was not a shadow of diplomacy, if one considers its content and not this or that formulation. But as you know, there was a reply to this declaration. Do you think it is possible to ignore this reply? Naturally not. Otherwise that would simply mean that you don’t take your own declaration seriously. The reply did not come from the party, but from the summit of the apparatus. Do you think that it is your duty to inform the party what you are going to do next? One can’t evade this question with a diplomatic answer. The reply must be calm and explanatory in tone; but you must tell the party whether you intend to continue the struggle for your ideas. If these ideas aren’t worth the struggle, then you have to behave in the manner of Radek and Smirnov. Your relation to the problem cannot be like that. Therefore we are obliged to point out before the party and the International that the reply to our declaration from the summit of the apparatus obliges us to defend our ideas which we are not prepared to renounce (the left tum of the Central Committee is confirmation of their correctness) in the only possible ways left to us, i.e., factional ways, like those of our previous struggle which had its repercussion in the change of the party’s official line. In the same way, we hope that our struggle in the future, inspired with genuine party spirit, will help the party to get out of its contradictions and to liquidate its mistakes, with the least possible disturbance.

It is possible to make a declaration of this kind in a dry and formal way, in the style written about above. It is possible to transform it into a political declaration which, under the present conditions, would be more difficult. In any case, a political declaration is inevitable, even though it might be some time after the formal declaration.

You write that, under the present conditions, there can be a shift from the left-centrist regime only to the right, not to the left. We can accept that conditionally, i.e., if we abstract the international factor. But are we preparing ourselves to overthrow the centrist apparatus? How could we do it, being a small minority? Are there adventurist ideas of this kind among us? I hear about them for the first time. We fought and we continue to fight to influence the vanguard of the workers. One of the results of our merciless struggle was the left turn of the centrists. Naturally, “objective” conditions were decisive here. But the force of our platform lies in a correct analysis of the objective conditions.

The task of the Opposition is not to overthrow the centrist apparatus by the adventurist act of a minority, but to change the relation of forces to the advantage of the Left. In this struggle against the Right dangers the Left will naturally be in the front line.