From the Memoires de R. Levasseur (De La Sarthe). Paris, 1829

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The summary of the first volume of the Jacobin Levasseur’s Memoirs was compiled by Marx in connection with his plans to write a work on the history of the French Revolution. Marx began to be interested in the revolutionary events in France at the end of the eighteenth century as early as the summer of 1843, as can be seen from his excerpts from special works on this subject by the German historians Wachsmuth and Ludwig contained in the Kreuznach Notebooks. As evidenced by A. Ruge (Ruge’s letters to Feuerbach of May 15, 1844, to Fleischer of May 20 and July 9, 1844 — see A. Ruges Briefwechsel und Tagebuchblätter, Bd. 1, Berlin, 1886), after he had moved to Paris in the autumn of 1843, Marx planned to write a work on the history of the French Convention. He worked on it during several months of 1844, reading a lot of material, including the press of the time, memoirs of contemporaries, etc. In 1845 the radical Trier’sche Zeitung also wrote about these plans of Marx, which were never realised, in connection with Marx’s banishment from France. Excerpts from Levasseur’s Memoirs were published in the newspaper Vorwärts! in 1844, evidently on Marx’s advice.

The time when this conspectus was compiled apparently coincided with the beginning of Marx’s economic research: it is contained in the third notebook of the series with excerpts from the works of economists which Marx made since his arrival in Paris to August 1844. Besides the summary of Levasseur’s Memoirs, the notebook contains the end of the excerpts from the French translation of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations begun in the second notebook.

The pages of the notebook are divided into two columns by a vertical line. On the left-hand side Marx wrote direct quotations from the book in French (only one quotation is in German) or gave brief rendering in German of separate passages. Marx’s own text consists of laconic comments and references which are typed in long primer in this edition. On the right-hand side there is more coherent rendering of the book’s contents to which Marx gave the title: “The Struggle Between the Montagnards and the Girondists”. The whole text is in German with the exception of some French terms and expressions which are given in the original in this edition. In some cases, especially when assessing events and public figures, Marx also quotes from Levasseur’s text word for word or almost word for word in German. These passages are typed in small type (the quotation marks being the editors').

In this edition we publish first the text of the left columns under the subheading “Excerpts”, and then the text of the summary proper, written in the right columns. The italics are Marx’s.

Volume 1

[Excerpts]

“So what we today assume to have been the frenzy of a few excited maniacs, was the general feeling of a whole people and in a way its manner of life.” P. 2 1 .

“Later one saw different opinions dividing the nation; but it was not like this in 1788: all those in France who were not making a living out of abuses were united in a unanimous wish to destroy a rule of the sword; all those who were not devourers of the national wealth wished to see its management entrusted to the representatives of the people; all those who were not members of the privileged castes wished to see the law applied equally to all and to make all citizens liable to the same burdens.” P. 27.

“The Constitution was revised” (after the King’s flight) “in a less popular way than it had been originally drawn u p ; the changes made were not very important but they sufficed to make the Assembly lose all its popularity and the Constitution its most desirable sanction, that of the nation.” P. 32.

“The session of the Legislative Assembly was nothing but a barely concealed war of the popular power against the royal authority. A war in which each of the two contenders used the Constitution in turn either as a sword or as a shield. An implacable war in which the Constitution, ceaselessly invoked by both sides, was for both sides only an empty word in which nobody believed. For the rest, this impotent Assembly, wrapped by the Constitution in swaddling-clothes, was unable to do anything useful... consequently the numerous events which happened during its lifetime did not original« from this body. Constitutionally speaking, or according to the limits of their legal powers, the court and the Assembly could do nothing, and they did nothing. These two great colossi regarded one another in silence and demanded of secret conspiracies what they could not expect from the law.” Pp. 37, 38.

“Neither the one nor the other” (party) “was honest.... Hence the crisis in which France had been left by the Constituent Assembly could only be solved in one of two ways: the toppling of the throne or the return to the old regime. Thus for each of the two parties it was a question of their very existence.” P. 38.

“This great epoch of 1791 to 1792 which decided France’s destiny was not marked by outstanding parliamentary struggles. It was between the people and the rulers that the battle continued to be waged. June 20, Pétion’s triumph on July 14, and the movements which marked the entry of the volunteers from Marseilles into Paris, these events led to important results without the Assembly playing the least part in them. The deputies acted as conspirators and not as deputies. Even the declaration of war, the major event of this period, was decided by the Jacobins.” P. 39.

La Fayette. P. 40.

August 10. P. 41.

“The insurrection, which had replaced all existing authorities on August 10, continued ... it was an active force and it crushed the enemies of liberty. P. 43.

“The only force which existed in France during the interregnum which began on August 10 was the popular élan, insurrection, anarchy.... The only means of salvation still remaining was, therefore, to make use of the resources offered by anarchy and to direct against our enemies the brutal force which it aroused.” Pp. 43, 44.

“The decrees which it” (the Legislative Assembly) “issued had not the slightest authority. The Ministry, product of an impotent Assembly, was not itself a real power.... The government therefore passed into the hands of those who knew how to separate themselves from it, that is, to the popular societies and the municipalities. But these improvised centres of government, products of anarchy itself and having no basis in law or in the Constitution, were simply the leaders of the people, powerful as long as they restricted themselves to directing the line of march of the people and giving effect to its wishes; they would not have been able to enforce obedience had they come into conflict with the people and wished to impose on it the rule of law.” Pp. 44, 45.

“It is the Gironde which has separated itself from us. It is Buzot who left the place he had occupied in the Constituent Assembly; it is Vergniaud who abandoned the seat he had recently occupied in the Legislative Assembly” (i.e., on the left). P. 49. “We were far from seeking divisions.... Pétion was nominated President [of the Convention] almost unanimously; the other members of the committee were chosen from amongst the most influential deputies of the previous Assembly P. 49.

The new deputies (belonging to the Mountain) knew nothing of the internal split. P. 50.

“Thus when we met, the new deputies ... who formed the great majority in the Mountain, did not even know that there were two camps and that the Republicans were not all inspired by the same sentiments and the same aspirations.” P. 51.

“The Centre was made up of all those who have the constant habit of declaring themselves in favour of the winning side and who, before they show their colours, look for ways of not compromising themselves and without incurring any risk await further developments. This kind of deputy, who first concealed himself in the Centre, later became an ardent Montagnard and then an even more ardent reactionary. There were also ... men of talent: Barere ... Sieyès, Dulaure ... Boissy d’Anglas.” P. 52.

“The only party which came to the Convention with a complete system and a previously worked-out plan took their place on the seats on the right.” (The Girondists.) P. 52. “By swarming on to the seats opposite ours, they declared war on us, before they even knew us.” P. 53.

The main speakers for the Girondists [were] lawyers from the Bordeaux Bar; the Girondists [were] all-powerful in the Legislative Assembly where they [had] controlled the majority; they also dominated the Jacobin Club, that is, public opinion; at the time of the insurrection of August 10 [they] believed they had France in their hands; when the National Convention was convoked they concluded therefore that no majority independent of them could come about. But the forty-two-day interregnum changed the position. The energy which the Legislative Assembly, that is, the Girondists, had displayed in the struggle with the Crown vanished after August 10. “Feeble and irresolute as soon as the helm of the state was indisputably in their hands” ... [In their] speeches, declamations, they divorced themselves from public opinion without being able to prevent disorder, “merely depriving themselves of the means available to them for controlling the torrent. The Jacobin Club then became the thermometer of public opinion. It very rarely happened that the majority of Frenchmen opposed its decisions” .Bor a long time the word of the Girondists had been law in the Jacobin Club; even before the end of the Constituent Assembly they expelled the Lameths and drove the Constitutionals “into the unpopular precincts of the Feuillants”. After August 10 they were superseded and went into opposition to the Jacobins. The Provisional Council of Ministers, entrusted with executive power by the Gironde on August 10, was powerless “since the party on which it depended had made itself unpopular”, “executive power was in fact exercised by the Communes, especially by the Commune of Paris, composed of men of vigour and beloved of the people. The elections in the capital took place under the influence of the Commune whose leading members were elected”. Pp. 53, 54. Hence the hostile attitude of the Girondists. “On their arrival in Paris all the deputies who were known to have energy and patriotism were admitted to the Jacobin Club in which the Commune had great influence. These deputies sat on the left-hand side, which was sufficient to make the men of the Gironde take their seats on the right. The Jacobins, having spurned their authority, had become their enemies”, and also those deputies who sat on the side of the Commune and the deputies of Paris. P. 55.

“Thus at the beginning of the session, the Convention was not divided into parties.... But there arose in its midst an ambitious clique which wished to impose its opinions on the assembly and prepared to fight to avenge the wounds which its self-conceit had suffered and to satisfy its particular resentments.” P. 55

Danton, pp. 56, 57. Robespierre, Marat, pp. 57, 58.

“The majority of the party of the Gironde were by no means traitors but some were concealed in its ranks. No, it did not desire the ruin of the Republic, but its theories led in that direction.” P. 59. The Girondists were the aggressors, the Montagnards were at first on the defensive, ibid.

On September 21. 1792, the session of the Convention begins. The President is Pétion.

Danton, pp. 60, 61, 62

The first two decrees passed by the assembly had been proposed by Danton: 1) “No Constitution without the approval of the people.” 2) “Safety of persons and property to be protected by the nation.” Unanimous adoption of Grégoire’s motion: 3) Abolition of the monarchy.

The Girondists begin the struggle. P. 63.

“On September 24, Kersaint, speaking of the dangers facing the Convention in the capital, proposes to surround it [the Convention] with a force drawn from the Departments. P. 63. The Girondists are against the Commune, which has been a effacing them since August 10, as well as against Danton, who dominated the Executive Council. [P. 64.] Before the convocation of the Convention the [members of the] deputation of Paris had nearly all been part of the Commune of August 10. P. 63.

Hence the wrath of the Girondists “against that redoubtable Commune and particularly against the deputation of Paris”. Pp. 63, 64.

Thus one sees: the Girondists wanted to avenge themselves for their defeat and insignificance during the interregnum beginning on August 10.

Joseph Egalité [Duke of] Orléans and Jean Paul Marat. Pp. 64, 65.

“Such a man” (Marat) “would never have exercised the least influence if the Girondists had not increased his importance by attacking in his person the very principle of energy and provided him with the opportunity at least to display the calmness, the consistency, sang-froid and contempt for insults characteristic of real conviction and devotion.” P. 65.

September 24. Concealed attack on the Commune and on a number of Pans deputies “for seeking to organise a dictatorship”.

September 25. Barbaroux and Rebecqui accuse Robespierre. Danton pleads for harmony. Pp. 66, 67. The Girondists continue with their denunciations. Vergniaud against Marat. P. 67.

Marat, pp. 68, 69.

The dissensions continue every day: “the differences between the Ministers Roland and Danton, the offences ascribed to the Commune of Paris, Marat’s posters, were the pretexts for these useless struggles”. P. 69. Victory seemed almost always to go to the Girondists. P. 70. The majority are as yet not firmly organised and vacillate undecidedly. “Thus for a long time a large number of firm Republicans voted with the Right—they included Philippeaux, Cambon, Cambacérès, etc.” P. 70.

September 29. Roland, elected deputy of the Somme Department, announces to the Convention his intention of resigning his position as Minister of the Interior. Buzot demands “that the Minister be invited to remain at his post; all the Girondists support him”. Philippeaux proposes “to ask Danton to support this invitation”. Danton is against this: “the only possible way in which Roland can be retained in his post is to pronounce his election invalid”.

Struggle, Roland’s letter, etc. Pp. 70, 71

Decree dissolving the Commune of Paris. Pp. 73, 74, 75.

“The mutual accusations were repeated each day with renewed fury. The Right always began the attack, basing itself on facts that occurred prior to the meeting of the Convention, constantly exploiting the kind of repugnance which Marat aroused in the assembly as a whole in order to incriminate the entire Mountain.” P. 78, cf. p. 79. “... inter-party strife in the course of which the elected representatives of the people wasted precious time and consumed energies which they ought to have directed entirely against the enemies of France.” P. 79.

October 29. Roland’s, Louvet’s accusation against Robespierre. P. 80 sqq.

“... he” (Louvet) “and Barbaroux were, quite undoubtedly, the only men of action in their party”. P. 81.

“The long-winded and garrulous eloquence of the latter” (Robespierre). P. 82. “The committees of the Convention and the Convention itself dealt with all the branches of administration and performed through decrees numerous and frequent acts of executive authority. On the other hand, the municipalities had also taken over a large section of the administration. Civil power, military power, even judicial power, nothing was properly organised.... As soon as, for any reason whatsoever, a gathering of citizens was called upon to deal with a matter of public concern, it would at the same time interfere in matters quite unconnected with the task it had been given.... If there existed an infinity of powers in practice, a single collective entity, the Convention, legally united in itself all the authority of the social body, and it frequently used it: it acted as the legislative authority through its decrees, as the administration through its committees, and besides it exercised judicial power through the manner in which it extended the right of indictment.” P. 85.

“As a transitional state between the monarchy which had been destroyed and the Republic which was being organised, as a weapon of war against the aristocracy, the emigration and foreign invaders, this concentration of all powers was a happy symptom and, I would say, even indispensable.” P. 86.

“It is they” (the Girondists) “who demanded bills of indictment against their colleagues; it is they who in handing over Marat to the Revolutionary Tribunal violated the immunity of the elected representatives of the people.” P. 87

December 16. Buzofs motion for the expulsion of [the Duke of] Orleans and his sons; Buzot was supported by Louvet and Lanjuinais.

Roland’s intrigues. Pp. 88, 89.

“In spite of their prejudices against us, Louvet, Roland, Guadet, Pétion, Gensonné were true and sincere Republicans.” P. 90.

About the Girondists, pp. 90, 91.

“The dissensions which hampered the deliberations of the National Convention soon manifested themselves in the Executive Council. When Servan was compelled to relinquish the Ministry of War on account of ill health, the Convention, on Roland’s suggestion, unhesitatingly appointed citizen Pache, then working in the Ministry of the Interior, to take his place. The new Minister did not share the aversions and the views of his patron.” P. 91.

“During these interminable quarrels, the committees of the Convention were not as inactive as the Convention itself. The Committee of National Defence, under the influence of Camot, assisted our armies and paved the way for our victories; the Committee of Accounts, for which Cambon was the regular reporter, created resources with the aid of the paper money, which under the name of assignats was so greatly and so frequently devalued, and by the sale of national property.” Pp. 92, 93.

“By the end of January 1793 ... the Montagnards had abandoned the defensive which they had maintained perhaps too long and gone over in their turn to the attack on the Gironde.” P. 100.

After the death of Michel de Le Peletier Saint-Fargeau ... “the Girondists ceased to have an assured majority”. P. 101.

Danton, p. 143 sqq.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE MONTAGNARDS

AND THE GIRONDISTS

An interregnum begins on August 10, 1792. Impotence of the Legislative Assembly, impotence of the Ministry to which it had given rise. Government passes over to the public meetings and municipalities; improvised centres of government, products of anarchy, they were bound to be the expression of the popular movement, for their power was only the power of popular opinion (pp. 44, 45). From now on division amongst those with influence.

One party wishes to re-establish the order disrupted by August 10 and to ensure the implementation of the existing laws. The principal members of the Ministry and of the Legislative Assembly are the leaders of this party.

The other party sees in anarchy the only mobile d’actionb, in the enthusiasm which it produces the substitute for a ready-made organisation, the only power of resistance externally and internally. These men are the masters of the Commune of Paris and of nearly all other municipalities in France, they possess one voice (Danton) in the Ministry (pp. 45, 46).

The Girondists (the first party) do not oppose any effective means to the popular movement. Their theories are limited in practice to speeches and declamations, which make their unpopularity almost universal without having the slightest effect on developments.

“During this period, the Commune of Paris drives the citizens towards the frontiers; the alarm guns, thundering away hour after hour, proclaim the public danger; all citizens enrol in the sections in order to march against the enemy.”

During this period occur the September days.

Had they been quelled, all public life would have been extinguished (pp. 46, 47).

The provinces detest the September murders but they are grateful to the men who are maintaining the insurrectionary fever in order to fill the army camps with citizen soldiers.

The Girondists are despised; lacking the courage to drive the citizens against the foreign troops, they do not even know how to organise an energetic resistance to the crimes which they denounce and which they use as a means of recrimination against their vigorous enemy.

The elections took place during this stormy period.

When the Convention opened, Paris was still in the grip of the insurrectionary movement and the Commune was all-powerful.

The Girondists were the first to separate themselves from the Montagnards. The almost unanimous election of Pétion as President of the Convention shows how little the newly-arrived men of the Mountain were looking for divisions; the other members of the committee were likewise elected from amongst the most influential members of the previous Assembly. Almost all the newly-arrived deputies knew nothing of the inner dissensions. Robespierre and Pétion, Danton and Guadet equally enjoyed their respect.

The only party which came to the assembly with a complete system and a previously worked-out plan (the Girondists), took their place on the right-hand side. By leaving their former seats (on the left) and rushing en masse to the right-hand side, they declared war on the newly-arrived Republicans who surged on to the left as the traditional side of patriotism.

The Girondists had controlled the majority in the assemblée legislative as well as in the Jacobin Club. They thought they had France in their hands at the time of August 10. In summoning the National Convention they never suspected for a moment that a majority independent of them could arise. But the forty-two-day interregnum altered the state of affairs and the character of the elections.

“The Legislative Assembly, that is, the Girondists, had displayed some energy in the struggle against the Court. They showed themselves to be weak and irresolute as soon as they obtained undisputed control of the state. They did not know how to restrain the current unleashed by August 10; they were inept enough to oppose it with declamations. They isolated themselves from public opinion without being able to prevent any disorder whatsoever. They only deprived themselves of the means they had to direct events. The Jacobin Club was the thermometer of public opinion at that time. [...] The word of the Gironde had been law there for a long time. Even before the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly they had dethroned the Lameths and driven the Constitutionals into the unpopular precincts of the Feuillants. After August 10, they allowed themselves in their turn to be superseded: they lost their popularity, nearly all of them left a society whose merits they had loudly proclaimed as long as it applauded their views but which they regarded as nothing more than a den of rebels as soon as it thought differently than they did.

“The Gironde had, moreover, on August 10 vested executive power in a Provisional Council of Ministers. Without any support in the nation, this Council was powerless as soon as the party to which it belonged became unpopular. The executive power was in fact exercised by the Communes, and especially by the Commune of Paris, composed of vigorous men of the people. The elections in the capital took place under the influence of the Commune. Its leading members were elected [to the Convention].”

Hence the hostile attitude of the Girondists from the very first moments of the Convention.

“All new deputies who were known to have energy or patriotism, were admitted on their arrival to the Jacobin Club, in which the Commune had great influence. These deputies took their seats on the left side. This sufficed to drive the Girondists to the right. The Jacobins [...] had become their enemies [...]; they called their new opponents Jacobins. [...] Originally only enemies of the Commune and of the deputation of Paris, they extended their hatred to include all who sat on the side used by the Jacobins and who were ardent Republicans. Thus at the beginning of the session, the Convention was not divided; a solid mass of Republicans united by a common feeling, in other respects however differing on many points. But an ambitious clique arose in its midst, which wished to impose its opinions on the assembly and prepared to fight to avenge the wounds which its self-conceit had suffered and to satisfy its private resentments.”

The majority of the Girondists were not traitors, but there were traitors in their ranks; the ruin of the Republic was not their aim but the consequence of their theories; the few Royalists in the Convention therefore joined forces with them. They were the attackers; the Mountain was on the defensive for a long time; the Girondists were unable to sacrifice their egotism for the public cause (pp. 47-59).

On September 21, 1792, opening of the Convention. Pétion President. Danton resigns his post as Minister of Justice. A conciliatory speech. No Constitution could exist unless it was accepted by a majority of the primary meetings. A declaration regarding security of property ought to be decreed. Both Danton’s proposals became decrees (the first decrees promulgated by the Convention). In his speech Danton declared that the popular agitation was temporarily necessary; now, however, the constituted power of the Convention should replace it, excesses should be abandoned.

Unanimous abolition of the monarchy on Grégoire’s motion. The first session of the Convention shows the desire of the Mountain for general reconciliation in the interests of order and of freedom. The Girondists immediately demonstrate their urge to take revenge. On September 24, Kersaint, speaking of the dangers in the capital, proposes to surround it [the Convention] with force recruited from the Departments. This is the first declaration of war by the Girondists who are full of anger against the deputation of Paris because the Girondists who had been members of the Legislative Assembly were annihilated as a result of the activities of the Commune and because of Danton’s domination in the Executive Council.

Jean Paul Marat and Joseph Egalité in particular gave the Girondists the opportunity of making spiteful charges against the Mountain, charges of blood-thirstiness and anarchy on the one side and of ambition and Royalism on the other.

September 24. Indirect accusations that the Commune of Paris is striving for a dictatorship.

September 25: Rebecqui and Barbaroux name Robespierre as the candidate of the dictatorship. Danton again preaches concord and defends the Commune: an extra-legal power had been necessary under the weak leadership of the assemblée legislative, now there should be a return to order. Girondists do not pay attention to Danton’s admonitions; they keep returning to the past in order to seek continual grounds for recrimination.

Vergniaud and Boileau attack Marat. Marat’s courageous reply. The assembly turns to the business of the day. But the hostilities already initiated are continued.

“While [the Assembly] waited for a decisive act and a split between Roland and Danton, the alleged outrages by the Commune of Paris and Marat’s posters served as pretexts for these useless conflicts. Victory seemed almost always to favour the side of the Girondists. The majority was not yet organised during these first conflicts, swaying uncertainly this way and that. For a considerable time many firm Republicans, e. g., Philippeaux, Cambon, Cambacérès, voted with the Right. .

September 29: Roland, elected deputy of the. Somme Department, informs the Assembly that he would relinquish his position as Minister of the Interior. Those on the right express their regrets Buzot proposes to request Roland to remain at his post, Philippeaux would like Danton to support this request; Danton opposes; an invitation is below the dignity of the Convention; the only way to keep Roland at his post is to declare his election null and void. The Girondists insist on an invitation. Valazé declares that Roland’s name is holy to him. Louvet, Barbaroux overwhelm him with praise. This time the men of the Centre, Barère, Lacroix, Tureau, who often provided the Right with a majority without actually belonging to them, are against Buzot’s proposal.

September 30: Roland writes a letter to the Convention in which he states that he wants to remain Minister, he praises himself a great deal in this letter, lectures his opponents, accuses Danton indirectly; all these reproaches against Danton and the Commune refer to facts which occurred prior to the meeting of the Convention; evidence of the hatred of a vanquished party for the victors.

Each day the Right persecutes the Commune, which is defended by the deputies of Paris. Finally this revolutionary authority is ordered to dissolve; it is requested to give an account of itself. New source of strife emerges. The comité de surveillance of the Commune gives notice to the Convention of the seizure of important papers which will throw light on the treacheries of the Court, in which several deputies will find themselves compromised. It asks that it should nojt be compelled to part with these documents and to be allowed to continue to function until a favourable moment for their use. [...] The Girondists regard this as an open wish on the part of the Commune to perpetuate its functions; the Montagnards see in their opponents people interested in stifling the truth. The discussion confirms each party in its prejudices. [...] The documents are finally handed over to a commission of 25 representatives, which comprises no members either of the Commune and the deputation of Paris, or of the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies.

Nothing emerges either against the Commune or against the Gironde. Even the report of Joseph Delaunay (a Girondist deputy) comes out, in the main, in favour of the Commune.

“The mutual accusations are repeated daily with renewed fury, the Right always initiating the attack, basing themselves on facts which occurred before the convocation of the Convention. [...] Freedom of opinion is always misconstrued when a representative of the Left wishes to speak; Robespierre was driven from the rostrum by uproar and insults.”

Marat was only able to make his reply by dint of perseverance.

Up to now the Right has always had a majority; the Mountain votes with it whenever questions of principle, establishment of order, implementation of laws, etc., are involved.

In his reports to the Convention, Roland constantly repeats that the crimes of the interregnum still have to be punished, and introduces indirect accusations against Robespierre and Danton, and also against the deputation of Paris.

Roland is furious because Danton’s supremacy in the Council has crushed him.

On October 29 Roland makes a report to the Convention in which Robespierre is again accused. While on the rostrum seeking to defend himself, Robespierre is interrupted by the clamour of the Girondists and by constant interjections by President Guadet.

Louvets attack on Robespierre.

November 5. Robespierre’s reply.

“Return to the order of the day demanded on all sides, even Vergniaud, Guadet and Pétion support this. Only Salles, Barbaroux, Lanjuinais, Lariviére stand by Louvet [...]. The return to the agenda is adopted almost unanimously. Barbaroux still demands the floor in order to support the accusations [...] and then goes down to the bar and wants to speak as plaintiff and even as the accused. This unseemly scene is prolonged and, as usual, ends without the assembly having made any decisions whatsoever” (pp. 60-83).

December 16. Thuriot brings about the proclamation of the unity and indivisibility of the Republic. Buzot proposes a motion for the expulsion of the Duke of Orléans and his sons and is supported by Louvet and Lanjuinais. In this way the Girondists make the first attempt to decimate the National Assembly. Incidentally, the a Girondists are on friendly terms with Orléan’s creatures — Dumouriez, Sillery, Biron, Valence.

The Ministers showed open bias in favour of the Girondists.

“When Louvet accused Robespierre, the Convention ordered the printing of both the indictment and the defence. Roland had Louvet’s speech distributed in large quantities with the words: Imprimé par ordre de la Convention, and restricted the distribution of Robespierre’s speech to members of the Convention. Thus the impression was to be produced among the public that a kind of censure had been pronounced on Robespierre. A similar knavish trick was repeated over the decree concerning the banishment of the Bourbons. Before the reading of the minutes, which signified its adoption, i.e., before the final wording had been approved by majority decision as was the rule, its printing was speeded up and its dispatch to the 84 Departments carefully arranged by Roland, while the postponement of any decision regarding the fate of Philippe Egalité was not given the same publicity. Thus one could believe that the supporters of Orléans, brought about the repeal of a decree which concerned him by a surprise move on the next morning [...].”

The dissensions which interfered with the deliberations of the National Convention soon crept into the Executive Council itself. Servan retiring on account of ill health, the Convention on Roland’s recommendation appointed Fache, then working in the Ministry of the Interior. Pache wanted to be independent, in addition he associated with the Jacobins. Pache was a good patriot but a bad Minister of War. By accusing him of treason, the Girondists caused a redoubling of the recriminations which for a long time had been levelled against Roland.

Assignats, law concerning the practice of worship (cf. p. 93), decree concerning food, compare Levasseur’s speech, p. 94 sqq.

Shortly after the decree on means of subsistence, discussions in connection with the trial of Louis XVI. This occasioned further acrimony.

End of January 1793. Baseless animosities, just as at the beginning of the Convention. But a big change has taken place in the temper of the assembly. The Mountain has now gone over from the defensive to the offensive. The war of the parties is at fever heat.

“There is a feeling that from now on it is impossible to advance towards any organisation of the Republic without the complete destruction of one of the two parties.

“The assassination of Michel de Le Peletier Saint-Fargeau led to an argument and an open breach between the two extremes.”

The Marsh, tired of the capricious intrigues and the conceit of the Girondists, frequently allies itself with the Mountain against them. Roland’s resignation accepted.

January 28: Buzot denounces the comité de sûreté générale (in which apart from the Girondists there are several Montagnards—Tallien, Chabot, Bazire) on account of the arrest of a journalist and demands its dissolution.

“The Girondists were in the habit of sacrificing any institution rather than allow it to flourish in the hands of their opponents” (pp. 84-103).

March 8. Great agitation because of the military set-backs in Belgium under Dumouriez. Commissioners are sent to all the sections [of] Paris to call the citizens to arms, and also to the Departments.

March 9. The Commissioners present their reports. Guarantees are demanded against internal conspiracies. Decree for the establishment of an extraordinary criminal court, from whose findings there is no appeal, for the hearing of all cases involving traitors, conspirators and counter-revolutionaries. Great excitement in the capital. The printing-presses belonging to Gorsas are smashed up; he is forced to flee. The people were so worked up that it required a decree of the Convention to get the bakers to return to the bakeries and the Post-Office clerks to the telegraph office.

March 10. Debates about the organisation of the Revolutionary Tribunal.

Great excitement in Paris. Evening session of the Convention at 9 o’clock. The seats on the right almost empty. After midnight the combined crowds in the Champs Elysées assume a rebellious character. They go to the Jacobin and Cordelier Clubs, they preach insurrection against the Convention. These proposals are rejected by the Montagnards.

March 11. Decree relating to the Revolutionary Tribunal.

March 12. Marat speaks against the assaults made on the 10th.

March 13. Complaints and attacks by the Girondists in connection with March 10.

“The rebellious movements of March 10 in Paris were nurtured by all the parties, because all of them took part in the agitation — an agitation stirred up in order to drive the people to the frontiers; the scenes on March 10 were a necessary consequence of this impassioned state. The Mountain, sitting alone in the Chamber, had quietened the threatening disorders in a few hours. Pache and Santerre [...] were praised for their ardour; Marat and Dubois-Crancé pacified both the Jacobin and the Cordelier Clubs and persuaded them to abandon their sinister plans. Marat first of all denounced the March 10 disorders, he initiated a decree of indictment against Fournier l’Américain, one of their instigators; La Source, an impassioned Girondist, addressed eulogies to him during the March 12 session. Finally, [...] a member of the Right who had insulted Marat during the same sitting [...] was censured and it was unanimously decided to enter this in the official record despite the revolting partisanship against the ami du peuple which people were in the habit of displaying” [pp. 122-23].

When it was first established, the comité de sûreté générale was composed overwhelmingly of Girondists.

A few days after March 10, the Girondists wanted to shift responsibility for it on to the Mountain.

“Stormy sessions became the customary state of affairs in the Convention. Tumultuous scenes. [...] The galleries often participated in these scandalous interruptions. Then the Girondists screamed that they were no longer safe in Paris, they called the Departmental forces to their aid. The Mountain, from their side, accused their opponents of preaching civil war. Sometimes whole days and nights passed in these wretched debates” [p. 127].

Nevertheless the immunity of deputies was still respected on all sides until now. The Right was the first to depart from this rule. On Guadet’s motion, Marat was committed for trial. The Legislation Committee prepared a bill of indictment in which his condemnation was anticipated. Marat was unanimously acquitted by the Revolutionary Tribunal, and led back to the Convention by the people in triumph [pp. 127-29].

This event had important results. Party conflicts of the deputies assumed the form of legal proceedings. The persecution of Marat was the immediate prelude to May 31.

March 18. Defeat of Dumouriez near Neerwinden; his letters to the Executive Council contain insults against the Convention (Danton’s opinion regarding Dumouriez, p. 133). The Girondists applaud his insolent letters.

March 29. A letter from Dumouriez evokes the greatest indignation. Decree ordering Dumouriez to appear before the bar of the House, etc. The treason of Dumouriez.

April 3. La Source dares to denounce Danton as an accomplice of Dumouriez. (Cf. p. 137.) Danton declares war on the Girondists. Danton’s speech makes great impression. Danton had tried to bring about a reconciliation between the two sides of the assembly.

“Although he was sitting on the summit of the Mountain, he was, to some extent, the leader of the Marsh. He had often criticised the passion of the Montagnards, fought against Robespierre’s suspicions, maintained that instead of fighting the Girondists one should compel them to support the Mountain in order jointly to save the common cause. Even a few days before La Source’s attack, Danton had had a conference with the chief leaders of the Right at which agreement was reached to work together in harmony and to concentrate on the struggle against the foreigners and the aristocrats. The whole of the Mountain loved Danton but the majority thought that he misjudged the situation if he hoped to establish an alliance between the Mountain and the Gironde.” [p. 143].

“The discussions assumed a much more serious character toward the end of

April and the beginning of May. No more parliamentary bickering but a life and death struggle. Each side began to seek help from outside in order to win. But [...] the Mountain, in spite of this internal discord, paid serious attention to matters concerning France while the Gironde only thought about the destruction of its opponents and abandoned completely the direction of the state. During these two months the question of the maximum was dealt with. [...] The Right fought [...] this measure by means of slanders. It made accusations about violation of the right to own property and threats to the life of property owners. These declamations were aimed at turning the middle classes against the Mountain. The maximum was adopted” [p. 147, 150].

The Girondists always had the majority when party wrangling was involved, as, for example, when such questions as the impeachment of Marat, the March disorders, the petitions of the sections, the Commission of the Twelve, were being discussed. The Mountain had the majority when big questions of general interest were involved, such as the maximum, means for revolutionary recruitment, the extraordinary tribunal, forced loans, etc.

An incident occurred during the discussion of the maximum. Ducos was on the rostrum criticising the proposed measure, counterposing the sansculottes to the middle classes, when a violent uproar broke out in one of the public galleries. Guadet demands the transfer of the Convention to Versailles. Acclamation on the right. Levasseur demands that the rules should be observed and the galleries cleared. Resistance by the Right. Philippeaux,, Danton, Lacroix vainly call on the assembly to remember its dignity and its urgent obligations. In vain they demand that matters of the greatest importance should not be interrupted on account of an insignificant incident. The Girondists had to give vent to their rage. Animated discussion, attacks on the Paris authorities, threats that the provinces would take vengeance.

Thus the tocsin of civil war was sounded at the very moment when it was a question of interests which had roused the people. The intention was to incite the two classes of the people against one another. The Mountain went with the party of the popular masses, where the sinewy arms and strong devotion are to be found [pp. 152-53].

Disorders in the Vendée had developed into a real civil war. New enrolments and renewed expenditure of funds became necessary. Danton, Desmoulins, Philippeaux, Couthon tried to find means to make this possible. The only possible means of meeting the urgent expenditure was the mobilisation of the national wealth, an emprunt force* (cf. p. 161 sqq.), which was derived from superfluous wealth in the hands of citizens.

The Girondists, who denounced the measures of the Mountain, did not even propose an alternative plan. They did nothing at all.