Draft of a Speech at the Trial of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung

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The extant part of the draft of a speech at the trial of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung held on February 7, 1849 (see Note 284), refers to that part of Marx’s speech in which, on the basis of a legal analysis of the relevant articles of the French Code pénal he refutes the accusation levelled :At the newspaper’s editors of insulting Chief Public Prosecutor Zweiffel and calumniating the police officers. To what extent Marx used this draft in the speech itself tan be seen by comparing it with the published text (see this volume, pp. 304-17). The manuscript of the draft has come down to us in an incomplete and rough form, indecipherable in some places.

Ad Article 222.

“Lorsqu’un ou plusieurs magistrats de l’ordre administratif ou judiciaire auront reçu dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions ou à l’occasion de cet exercice quelque outrage par paroles tendant: inculper leur honneur ou leur délicatesse, celui qui les aura ainsi outragés, sera puni d’un emprisonnement d’un mois à deux ans.—Si l’outrage a eu lieu à l’audience d’une cour ou d’un tribunal, l’emprisonnement sera de deux à cinq ans.

What is honneur? What is délicatesse?

The distinction between “insult” and “calumny” is contained in Article 375, which reads as follows:

“Quant aux injures ou aux expressions outrageantes qui ne renfermeraient l’imputation d’aucun fait précis, mais celle d’un vice déterminé, si elles ont été proférées dans des lieux ou réunions publics ou insérées dans des écrits imprimés ou non, qui auraient été répandus et distribués, la peine sera une amende de seize francs à cinq cents francs.” § 376. “Toutes autres injures ou expressions outrageantes qui n’auront pas eu ce double caractère de gravité et de publicité, ne donneront lieu qu’à des peines de simple police.”

Calumny, therefore, is present only where I impute to someone a fait précis, a definite act, which he himself is supposed to have committed. If I call someone a thief, then only Article 375 is applicable. The term “thief” is not a “fait précis”, it is not at all the imputation of an “act”, but only an “expression outrageante”, the imputation of a “definite vice”. Yesterday at such and such a place you stole a couple of silver spoons, is on the other hand calumny. Instead of the fine under §375 it incurs the much heavier punishment of imprisonment and loss of civil rights. The reason is: in the latter case the thing is more probable, greater damage to honour, and so on. Just as Article 375 concerns a private person, Article 222 concerns an official when the délit is committed against him in the performance of his duties. In accordance with the hierarchical spirit of the Code, an insult to a functioning official is punished more severely than an insult to an ordinary person. In content and concept, Article 222 is entirely identical with Article 375. Article 222 is simply an intensification of the punishment, as of the crime. Article 375 is applied in respect of officials engaged in performing their function.

Article 222 does not take the place of Article 367, where the crime of calumny against functioning officials is committed, but of Article 375. Otherwise crimes against private persons would be more severely punished than crimes against functioning officials, which is contrary to the spirit of the Code.

Therefore 1) Article 222 is identical with Article 375.

2) Article 222 differs from Article 367, just as 367 does from 375.

As regards Zweiffel, the only incriminating statement can be: “Furthermore, Herr Chief Public Prosecutor Zweiffel is said to have stated that within eight days etc. he would put an end to it.” Hence Article 222 (375) is not applicable, for which it would have to be said: “Zweiffel is said to have made base and dishonourable statements”... and the particular statement is a “fait précis”, a definite and precisely adduced utterance.

But Article 222 is not applicable for other reasons, too:

2) Zweiffel was not functioning at all.

The words in Article 222 “dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions ou à l’occasion de cet exercice” and the words “outrage par paroles” express the same thought, and demonstrate in an equally convincing way that in this article the legislator had in view only insults which occur immediately on the occasion of an official function, hence must be made orally, and that Article 222 does not cover insults which are made in written form long after the completion of the official function.

If the insult must have taken place “par paroles”, orally, then that already implies that it is made during the performance of the official function. If we prove that in Article 222 the legislator had in view only insults uttered in the presence in person of the official, it is thereby shown that no insult comes under Article 222 which is made long afterwards and in the absence of the official in written form. (A written insult in itself presupposes the absence of the person insulted, the presence of the person insulted presupposes an oral insult.)

In the motives given for Article 222 (exposé par M. le conseiller d’état Berlier, séance du 6 février 1810), it is stated:

“Il ne sera donc ici question que des seuls outrages qui compromettent la paix publique e.àd. de ceux dirigés contre les fonctionnaires ou agents publics dans l’exercice ou à l’occasion de l’exercice de leurs fonctions; dans ce cas ce n’est plus seulement un particulier, c’est l’ordre public qui est blessé... La hiérarchie politique sera dans ce cas prise en considération: celui qui se permet des outrages ou violences envers un officier ministériel est coupable, sans doute, mais il commet un moindre scandale que lorsqu’il outrage un magistrat.”

It follows from this:

The legislator regards the insult against which he invokes Article

222 as the lowest degree of resistance to a functioning official, as a revolt and résistance against the functioning official which is confined to grumbling without going as far as acts of violence. How otherwise could such an “outrage” violate “la paix publique”? La paix publique is violated only when a revolt for overthrowing the laws is undertaken in one way or another, or when any official performing the duties of his office testifies to resistance to the law, whether by deed or only by insulting utterances. If today I insult the Chief Public Prosecutor in a newspaper, I do not thereby disturb la paix publique, and it is expressly stated in the motives quoted above:

“II ne sera donc ici question que des seuls outrages qui compromettent la paix publique.”

In the same passage it is stated:

“Ainsi qui se permet des outrages ou violences envers un officier.”

Outrage and violence are here regarded as identical in concept and are treated as crimes differing only in the degree of their gravity. But just as violence can only be committed in the presence in person of the functioning official, so outrage, the lowest degree of the same offence, requires the personal presence of the official. Otherwise the insult does not cause any disturbance to the performance of an official function, and therefore also no disturbance of la paix publique.

If, however, this presence in person of the official (the insulted person) is necessary, the insult can only be committed orally, par parole, and cannot be extended to include insults in writing, or at any rate only in those cases where written insults are possible during the performance of an official Junction. (For example, the examining magistrate.) Hence, too, there is no provision for lèse-majesté in the Code. If the Code understands insults to officials only in such a way that the official is insulted during the performance of his office and in fact in his own presence in person, crimes of lèse-majesté in this sense would be impossible, because the King does not perform any function personally, but only causes it to be performed by others, and consequently can never be insulted in the sense of Article 222, during appearance in person and immediate functioning.

By the addition of “à l’occasion de cet exercice”, it seems that the matter assumes a different character and that the requirement of presence in person ceases to exist. This interpretation is best refuted by §228, which states:

“Tout individu qui, même sans armes, et sans qu’il en soit résulté de blessures, aura frappé un magistrat dans l’exercice de ses fonctions, ou à l’occasion de cet exercice, sera puni d’un emprisonnement de deux à cinq ans/—Si cette voie de fait a eu lieu à l’audience d’une cour ou d’un tribunal, le coupable sera puni du carcan.”

Presence in person, therefore, continues to be essential through the words “à l’occasion”, for I cannot strike anyone in his absence. Moreover, “à l’occasion” does not mean “in relation to “, but “on the occasion of”. I cannot deal any “relative” blows.

The legislator has added here the words “à l’occasion” only so that the case envisaged by Articles 222 and 228 is not restricted merely to the duration of the official action, so that the insult can take place also immediately before or immediately afterwards, but always immediately linked with the official function, and must take place in the presence in person of the official.

As I can strike an official only in his presence, so, too, the case envisaged by Article 222, since it contains the’same phrase “à l’occasion de cet exercice” as is required also by Article 228 concerning coups and blessures can take place only in the presence of the official and therefore by means of words.

There is no calumny in respect of the police:

a) Proof of the truth.

b) Because they are not named. The word “policeman” does not denote a particular individual, but is a collective concept.

There is no calumny in respect of Zweiffel:

a) Zweiffel not accused of any “faits, qui s’ils existaient” etc., but merely of “mots”. This distinction justified. An “utterance” not only does not make one punishable by law, but equally does not make “the citizen hated and despised”.

b) Zweiffel “is said”. An assertion which is to be believed must not cast doubt on itself...

Article 367 concludes with the words:

“La présente disposition n’est point applicable aux faits dont la loi autorise la publicité, ni à ceux que l’auteur de l’imputation était, par la nature de ses fonctions ou de ses devoirs, obligé de révéler ou de réprimer. “

There is, in addition:

§ 372. “Lorsque les faits imputés seront punissables suivant la loi, et que l’auteur de l’imputation les aura dénoncés, il sera, durant l’instruction sur ces faits, sursis à la poursuite et au jugement du délit de calomnie.”

§ 309