Discussions with US trotskyists

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Agenda:

1. Report on Conference of Fourth International

2. War and Perspectives

3. Aftermath of Internal Fight

4. Party Organization, Methods, etc.

5. Stalinists

6. Youth Question

7. Racial Minorities

Minutes:

(Secretary not present at first session. Excused)

June 12, 1940

Trotsky: It is extremely difficult to make prognoses on account of the unprecedented character of the war. The moral factor in the French army is the big unknown. The intervention of Italy complicates and at the same time simplifies the situation. If Great Britain and France do not capitulate, they must seek a redoubt in the Mediterranean. This would signify an aggressive policy toward Italy. That Italy is now destroying the bridges on her border with France shows that Italy does not intend to invade France but fears invasion. The Alps give France the advantage. It is downhill fighting for them. Italy follows a purely defensive policy in the Alps, an offensive policy in relation to the Suez Canal, North Africa, etc. As for the invasion of the British Isles by Hitler, that would mean only a question of national existence; the Mediterranean is the question of the empire's existence.

It is not excluded that Italy will prove to be Germany's weak link. Great Britain can use North Africa for a new base of operations. It would mean blockading Europe. In regard to the invasion of Great Britain, Churchill speaks of retreating to Canada, but he didn't mention the Mediterranean area. Are they ready to abandon this area? It is more natural that they would fight retreating to the Mediterranean. Then America would be the third phase. If it were not necessary for Great Britain to defend the isles any longer, she would have the preponderance in the Mediterranean. She would make Italy the objective of an intensive fight and blockade Germany, that is, Europe.

It is also excluded that Russia will enter the war on the side of Hitler and Mussolini. If the United States enters the war, and I believe it will, this will have a tremendous influence on Moscow. Let us consider the alternative: not to enter. The very speed of Germany's advance fortifies the isolationists who would wait for Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Latin America to drop in their lap. Then a war against Japan before meeting Hitler. But not only the isolationists, but the march of war in Europe determines the course that will be followed.

I must confess that I have read little about the war during the past few weeks beyond what appears in the newspapers. You will understand that this other matter [the assassination attempt] preoccupied my attention.

The so-called isolationists are inclined to accept the defeat of the British Empire. They are afraid of Hitler. They say that they can’t postpone the war against him. He can prevent us from obtaining the British heritage. Hence we read in the papers that the Senate unanimously votes an unprecedented power to Roosevelt. This indicates that he has made an agreement with both the Republicans and the Democrats about the necessity of entering the war.

Cardenas's telegram of sympathy for France over the Italian entrance into the war is the Mexican response to the American voices that Mexico Is Nazi and hence intervention is required. It signifies agreement between Cardenas and Washington. Of course those are my impressions rather than sure conclusions. As I mentioned, I have not been following the events the past few weeks as closely as necessary for sure conclusions. Latest events have brought the United States closer to the war. What form will the war have? If the Allies should succeed against Italy, then they would have good air bases against Germany. Success against Italy gives mastery over Spain. Support from the United States in the form of war materials can then become very effective. United States entry might possibly begin with airplanes, battleships, possibly marines — but not the army, at least at the beginning. The sea fleets must be organized in conjunction with Britain and France; a blockade must be organized of Europe in order to stifle" Hitler economically despite his victories. This can be done especially if they win Moscow which is very probable. Such successes in Italy would swing Moscow to the Allies, at least as much as toward Germany at the present — like a satellite swung by a new force.

Our working hypothesis for propaganda must be six months legality — no more. We have often discussed illegality and how to work under such conditions. Illegality can be maintained only if we are hidden in mass organizations.

Militarization now goes on on a tremendous scale. We cannot oppose it with pacifist phrases. This militarization has wide support among the workers. They bear a sentimental hatred against Hitler mixed with confused class sentiments. They have a hatred against the victorious brigands. The bureaucracy utilizes this to say help the defeated gangster. Our conclusions are completely different. But this sentiment is the inevitable base for the last period of preparation. We must find a new realistic base for this preparation. We must oppose sending untrained boys into battle. The trade unions not only must protect the workers in peaceful times and protect their industrial skill, but they must now demand the possibility of learning the military art from the state.

For instance in the trade union we can argue like this: I am a socialist and you are a patriot. Good. We will discuss this difference between us. But we should agree that the workers be trained at government expense to become military experts. Schools should be set up in connection with the trade unions — at government expense but under the control of the trade unions. This kind of approach would give us access to the workers, who are 95 to 98 percent patriotic even at the present time.

Only with this perspective, not abstract opposition to militarism, can we have success in the trade unions and the military organizations. We can find in this way new routes and sympathies for illegal situations. Of course the technical side of underground activity is important but it is only a small part of illegal activity.

As for the Stalinists. They flatly oppose the entrance of the United States until Moscow switches. But meantime there is an important distinction between them and us. Abstract slogans have a similarity. They with their larger organization shout louder than us. We must seek to create a very clear distinction in the matter of militarism. Naturally we are against all these things in general but we have particular differences over the matter of militarization. It makes the most important difference in the matter of preparing for illegality.

Everything indicates that Moscow is preparing a switch.

In Mexico, where these shifts are often indicated first, the CP has the right to place Hitler on the same level as Churchill. On the day that Moscow makes a half turn toward the democracies as a half friend, there will be a new explosion in the ranks of the CP. We must be ready to gain from it I consider the possibilities in the CP very good despite the transitory radicalness of the CP, which cannot be for long. Likewise, in general, despite the CP radicalness, possibilities are very good. It is possible that the U. S. will enter during the next six months. It will enter as a military machine. We must learn how to handle arms. All things will now be decided on the military front.

The state is now organizing tremendous military machines with millions of men. No longer do we have just the small possibilities of defense guards but the wide possibilities given by the bourgeois state itself.

Cannon: Can this take the form of resolutions in the trade unions? Do we demand military equipment, training, etc.? What about the possibility of confusing us with the patriots?

Trotsky: Partial confusion is inevitable, especially at the beginning. But we place our whole agitation on a class basis. We are against the bourgeois officers who treat you like cattle, who use you for cannon-fodder. We are concerned about the deaths of the workers, unlike the bourgeois officers. We want workers’ officers.

We can say to the workers: We are ready for revolution. But you aren't ready. But both of us want our own workers' officers in this situation. We want special workers' schools which will train us to be officers.

At first the bourgeois press will hesitate. It may even support the idea. But with the class lines sharply drawn they will be disquieted and then launch an attack.

Cannon: The New York Times just printed an editorial advocating universal military training. Do we agree with that?

Trotsky: Yes. That is correct — but under control of our own organizations. We reject the control of the Sixty Families. We want an improvement of conditions for the worker-soldier. We want to safeguard his life. Not waste it. Yes, Mr. Bourgeois, you must depend on the workers. You train them for your own aims. We want them trained for their own aims. We don't want them trained for the command of stupid indifferent bourgeois officers who will use them for cannon-fodder.

Dobbs: On the technical side there is an abundance of material for such agitation. Men were drafted in May and within two or three months were dead in France. They were not properly trained to take care of themselves. We can compile factual material in relation to past experience. In advocating that workers be trained as officers we can compile material on how officers have wasted material. Also it is a good point in arguing against the patriots by showing how the workers lost their lives because they weren't trained. It is a very impressive argument with workers.

Cannon: Doesn't this line make a very sharp break with the pacifists such as Norman Thomas and the Keep America Out of War outfit? For a long time our agitation has been abstract It was against war in general. Only revolution can stop war. Hence we favor universal training. The difficulty is to make clear that we are really against war. We need very clear and precise formulations.

Dobbs: We can attack the pacifists. Wouldn't that solve it? It is Inevitable that we have to fight. You must train yourselves. Whether In the red or the bourgeois army you must train yourselves.

Cannon: It signifies too a re-education of our own movement. The youth has been impregnated with an anti-militarist and escapist attitude toward war. Already many have asked about going to Mexico in order to hide out. Our propaganda is not sufficiently separated from that of the pacifists. We say there must be no war! At the same time we say we can't avoid war! There is a link missing somewhere. All questions will be solved with war. Mere opposition can't signify anything. But the problem which requires clearest formulation is making ourselves distinct from the patriots.

Konikow: What about our slogans such as "not a cent for war"?

Trotsky: Suppose we had a senator. He would introduce a bill in favor of training camps for workers. He might ask 500 millions for it. At the same time he would vote against the military budget because it is controlled by class enemies. We can't expropriate the bourgeoisie at present, so we allow them to exploit the workers. But we try to protect the workers with trade unions. The courts are bourgeois but we don't boycott them as do the anarchists. We try to use them and fight within them. Likewise with parliaments. We are enemies of the bourgeoisie and its institutions, but we utilize them. War is a bourgeois institution a thousand times more powerful than all the other bourgeois institutions. We accept it as a fact like the bourgeois schools and try to utilize it. Pacifists accept everything bourgeois but militarism. They accept the schools, the parliament, the courts, without question. Everything is good in peacetime. But militarism, which is just as much bourgeois as the rest? No, they draw back and say we don't want any of that. The Marxists try to utilize war like any other bourgeois institution. It is clear now that in the next period our opposition to militarism will constitute the base for our propaganda: our agitation will be for the training of the masses.

Our military transitional program is an agitational program. Our socialist revolutionary program is propaganda.

We must be terribly categoric in the next period. We must brand Thomas as the most perfidious enemy. We must say the war is inevitable. Bureaucrats! this war signifies the death of your trade unions. We must make the most categoric predictions in the darkest colors. We must come out categorically for the dictatorship of the proletariat. We must make a complete break with the pacifists. A short time ago everyone was against the war. Any confusion with the pacifists is a hundred times more dangerous than temporary confusion with the bourgeois militarists. We prepare the new arena to overthrow the militarists. The pacifists help to lull the workers to support the militarists. Thomas, we must predict, will support the war — war is inevitable. We must learn the art of handling arms. As for the escapists — including those in our own party — we must speak about them with full contempt. They are deserters. Likewise with the conscientious objectors who accepted everything in peacetime but don’t want to accept war. Escapists are deserters from their class and their revolution.

Konikow: Yes, we must not run away from the masses.

Gordon: I believe that the rapid militarization among the broad masses will aid in putting over this program and make it easier than among the radicals, where anti-militarism has along tradition. Men such as Debs are their heroes. This tradition still exists in the labor movement. Just how to get around it is not yet clear in my mind.

Trotsky: Not even Debs had the perspective of taking power and launching the socialist society. He proclaimed his aversion to war and went to prison. He was brave and honest but he did not have the perspective of revolution.

Cannon: It was a protest and not a revolutionary approach. Our movement is infected with it, contaminated, especially the youth who had the socialist tradition of protest but not the tradition of entering the armed forces and conquering them.

Trotsky: It is no longer the slogan "Jobs not Guns." In a military situation we need new slogans. It would be good to have a party discussion, possibly a small conference to elaborate a good start for this agitation. We could try out a small experience in Minneapolis or St. Paul and see. We should have articles in the magazine on military questions. Likewise in the Socialist Appeal. In four or five weeks we can make a reorientation. Even those in the majority with an old trade union background can be re-educated at an extremely rapid tempo. Thomas and his ilk will become ridiculous in a short time and lose their audience. In order to fight the real enemy, we must enter his land, which is now militarism.

Cannon: Can we be called militarists?

Trotsky: Yes — in a certain sense — we are proletarian socialist revolutionary militarists. Possibly we should not use it at first. Wait until we are called militarists by Thomas or someone like that, and then make a polemical reply. Thomas has called us militarists. Yes, we can be called militarists in a certain sense. Then we can use it with this explanation.

Konikow: We started to discuss this in our branch but were afraid to bring it out on account of spies. We don't want to bring about the conditions where they will put our young men in concentration camps instead of the army. We were almost afraid our members would be excluded from the army. How can we agitate so as not to be stamped in advance as traitors?

Trotsky: We will have victims. It is inevitable. There will be carelessness and so on. But the general line will protect us. In the union I can say I am for the Fourth International. I am against war. But I am with you. I will not sabotage the war. I will be the best soldier just as I was the best and most skilled worker in the factory. At the same time I will try to convince you that we should change our society. In court my fellow-worker would say, "He said that he would be a disciplined soldier, that he wouldn't provoke rebellions. All he asked for was the right to give his opinion." We can make a similar defense in court for our prediction regarding the doom of bourgeois society. If the bourgeoisie could preserve democracy, good, but within a year they will impose a dictatorship. We are against dictatorship. We will fight arms in hand against such a dictatorship. Naturally in principle we would overthrow so-called bourgeois democracy given the opportunity, but the bourgeois won't give us time.

Dobbs: Just as in the factory one must be a very good worker in order to influence the other workers, so in war he must be a good soldier.

Konikow: We must use caution in our agitation.

Cannon: To what extent can we use the analogy of the army and the factory? Can we use it as categorically as you have expressed it here?

Trotsky: Yes, I think so. In the factories now more than half of their produce is war goods.

Dobbs: Whether we enlist or wait for conscription or avoid entering is a practical question, isn't it? Whether we join voluntarily, await conscription or evade conscription — that’s a practical day-to-day question.

Trotsky: We must be for compulsory military training for the workers and under the control of the workers. It is an approach to the workers' militia. As to entry into the army that is an individual question. Obviously we don't agitate for entry!

Dobbs: In Texas a congressman proposes appropriations for the creation of military combat units against the Fifth Column. These workers are to be trained by officers to be selected by the employer. That appears to be an ideal case, one we should pick up and show how it should be turned around and used.

Trotsky: There will be dozens of such examples.

One more point: We must polemicize against the stupid argument that the U. S. cannot be attacked. Of course the U. S. is attacked. Any modern empire is attacked by changes in the military powers of other countries. Germany threatens the empire of the United States. Capitalism is international.

June 13, 1940

Cannon: … We consider that the return of 10 percent would be the maximum that it would be healthy for our party to take back. Five percent is about what we actually expect. Looking over their entire ranks we cannot envisage more than 10 percent that are worth taking back. We contemplate no unity movements. Absolute hostility is our attitude. We expect their complete disintegration. Burnham's resignation deals them a terrible moral blow. Many thought that they would suppress their own internal differences for six months or so just for the sake of appearances and pride. Burnham utilized Shachtman and Abern for a dignified political retreat rather than open desertion. The minority have no links with the mass movement. In maritime where we are strong, they have one to three who sympathize with their program. In automobile there are no minorityites. Likewise with the truck drivers There is no need to contemplate organizational relations with the minority. Open hammer blows rather than a policy of maneuver. As their position becomes more clearly hopeless they may start a unity movement. But we must be very careful. They are not assimilable in the great majority. We did not provoke the fight or the split, but despite the overhead cost it is hard to see how we could have built the kind of party we want for this epoch without a split.

The problem is the Stalinists, not the centrists. We are more effective than all the centrist groups. Centrists upon leaving Marxism don't stop halfway. They go clear to Roosevelt. This is shown particularly by the New York intellectuals who have played a most miserable role. This is one of the features that will have most deadly effect on the minority. Shachtman and Abern are only a stepping stone on the way to Roosevelt. They have no recruiting power except here and there incidentally.

The problem of converting an ideological grouping into a workers' party is the most difficult of all. The worker militant is not interested in ideological struggles until they touch his daily life. We have an example of this in the party. While the top engaged in a polemical struggle, the trade unionists were recruiting right along.

The general perspective is quite optimistic. The Stalinists are the problem. By their change in line they dealt a heavy blow. We were forging ahead when they made the switch, paralyzing our work. The workers are unable to distinguish the real difference between us, especially with the faction fight compelling us to give undue emphasis to our defense of the Soviet Union. We need a line of agitation to distinguish ourselves from them. The Stalinist party still has a powerful cadre of militants. It has a strong trade union machine which draws the workers. The [Stalin-Hitler] pact seemed to disintegrate them, but it was losing just the democrats. The old militants are more devoted than ever. They believe that the party now has the "real revolutionary" line. We need a more effective counterattack against the Stalinists.

Trotsky: We don't participate in the presidential elections?

Cannon: There are very rigorous election laws which prevent small parties from getting on the ballot.

Trotsky: And the CP?

Cannon: The CP buys its way onto the ballot. For example, in upper New York where it is extremely reactionary, the CP simply buys signatures from those who make a business of dealing in signatures. For us there is no way to get on the b allot.

Trotsky: Your attitude toward the other parties?

Cannon: We are running local campaigns in some places for minor offices.

Trotsky: What do we tell the workers when they ask which president they should vote for?

Cannon: They shouldn't ask such embarrassing questions. We tried write-in campaigns in previous elections, but it is not serious. Nor can we support either the Stalinists or Thomas.

Trotsky: I see there is no campaign in the Socialist Appeal for a workers' candidate. Why haven't you proposed a congress of trade unions, a convention to nominate a candidate for the presidency? If he were independent we would support him. We cannot remain completely indifferent. We can very well insist In unions where we have influence that Roosevelt is not our candidate and the workers must have their own candidate. We should demand a nationwide congress connected with the independent labor party.

Dobbs: For a while some people thought Lewis would run. But Lewis never seriously intended to run. He attempted to bargain with the Roosevelt administration. Now it appears certain that Roosevelt will run.

Trotsky: With the centrists the situation is clear. For a long time in the United States, the socialist movement was not necessary. Now with changed times when it is necessary, it can't have a reformist nature. That possibility is exhausted. At one time the United States was rich in reformist tendencies, but the New Deal was the last flareup. Now with the war it is clear that the New Deal exhausted all the reformist and democratic possibilities and created incomparably more favorable possibilities for revolution.

I talked with E. a few weeks ago. For Roosevelt, but absolutely helpless about further possibilities of democracy. When I questioned him he was absolutely incapable of answering, and I thought he was going to break down in tears like a little boy.

The entrance into the war is the end of the last remnants of the New Deal and Good Neighbor policy. The Roosevelt of the third term will be completely different from the Roosevelt of the first two term a

Dobbs: In the CIO and the AFL the leaders have been affected by Roosevelt's war drive, becoming more and more outspoken for unity. Tobin has become more expressive, more deeply involved. Behind the scenes he moves in coordination with the war moves. Dubinsky, one of the original CIO leaders, voted to reaffiliate with the AFL, thus weakening Lewis. Hillman, a CIO leader, negotiated a jurisdiction agreement with Dubinsky and is cool toward Lewis. There is grave danger of capitulation on the part of the top bureaucrats, weakening the industrial workers. Lewis may have to reach unity at the expense of industrial unionism. All these leaders are jumping as Roosevelt cracks the whip.

Trotsky: The Stalinists are clearly the most important for us. E. says they lost 15 percent but that the workers remain true to the party. It is a question of attitude. Their dependence on the Kremlin was of great value to the national leaders.

Their line was changed from patriotism to antiwar. In the next period their dependence on the Kremlin will create great difficulties for them.

They are antiwar and anti-imperialist, but so are we in general, Do we have a nucleus among them?

Cannon: We have a small nucleus in New York and in one or two other places.

Trotsky: Sent in?

Dobbs: No. They came to us and we advised them to stay and work within.

Cannon: We got some with our campaign against the fascists.

Trotsky: Theoretically it is possible to support the Stalinist candidate. It is a way of approaching the Stalinist workers. We can say, yes, we know this candidate. But we will give critical support. We can repeat on a small scale what we would do if Lewis were nominated.

Theoretically it is not impossible. It would be very difficult, it is true — but then it is only an analysis. They of course would say, we don't need your support. We would answer, we don't support you but the workers who support you. We warn them but go through the experience with them. These leaders will betray you. It is necessary to find an approach to the Stalinist party. Theoretically it is not impossible to support their candidate with very sharp warnings. It would seize them. What? How?

Konikow: But in Boston the Stalinists wouldn't even permit us to enter their hall. They even threw our comrade outside.

Trotsky: I know. They have even shot at us. But some tens of thousands of workers are with them. I don't know exactly how many. It is very difficult to determine. Of course we would suffer the indignation of Burnham. Shachtman would say, "See, I predicted it — capitulation to Stalinism.” There would even be considerable aversion in our ranks. But the question is the Stalinist workers. The working class is decisive. With guarantees, warnings, why not consider it? Is Browder a worse rascal than Lewis? I doubt it. Both are rascals.

Cannon: The Stalinist movement is peculiar. In France we could approach the Socialists and join them. The Stalinists are large compared to us but small compared with the CIO. The Stalinists are hated by the militants. It is not the psychological attitude of our members but the broad anti-Stalinist movement. If we started to play this kind of politics we would run into this indignation of these militants. For example, the food workers in New York. Our comrades succeeded in creating a strong progressive faction. They may possibly be elected to posts. We built our strength on opposition to Stalinist control of the union. Such a line would disrupt our work. The same is true in the maritime unions and in the auto union. The Stalinists are the main obstacle. A policy of maneuver would be disastrous. What we gained from the Stalinists we would lose otherwise.

Trotsky: Before entrance into the Socialist Party we tried to analyze the situation in the same way. Before entrance into the Socialist Party we had the perspective of exhausting all the possibilities. We were not closer to Thomas than we are to Browder. Those advocating entry predicted that we would finish with the SP and then turn to the CP. Imagine the CP without holding a specific hatred toward it. Could we enter it as we did the SP? I see no reason why not — theoretically. Physically it would be impossible but not in principle. After entrance into the SP there is nothing that would prevent our entrance into the CP. But that is excluded. We can't enter. They won' t let us.

Can we make this maneuver from the outside? The progressive elements oppose the Stalinists but we don't win many progressive elements. Everywhere we meet Stalinists. How to break the Stalinist party? The support of the progressives is not stable. It is found at the top of the union rather than as a rank and file current. Now with the war we will have these progressives against us. We need a stronger base in the ranks. There are small Tobins on whom we depend. They depend on big Tobins. They on Roosevelt. This phase is inevitable. It opened the door for us in the trade unions. But it can become dangerous. We can't depend on those elements or their sentiments. We will lose them and isolate ourselves from the Stalinist workers. Now we have no attitude toward them. Burnham and Shachtman opposed an active attitude toward the Stalinists. They are not an accident but a crystallization of American workers abused by Moscow. They represent a whole period from 1917 up to date. We can't move without them. The coincidence between their slogans and ours is transitory, but it can give us a bridge to these workers. The question must be examined. If persecutions should begin tomorrow, it would begin first against them, second against us. The honest, hard members will remain true. The progressives are a type in the leadership. The rank and file are disquieted, unconsciously revolutionary.

Dobbs: It is not quite correct to say that the "progressives" include only the tops of the unions. The progressives include the rank and file, especially is this true in the big unions.

Cannon: They are not cohesive, but in revolt against the Stalinists. Where the Stalinists control the union that is where a real anti-Stalinist movement is strongest. The Stalinists control th6 maritime unions by and large and we have a powerful experience in development of a progressive revolt against them.

Robins: The trade union movement grew by the millions. A new bureaucracy was formed, there was a new stream of union-conscious members. In this there were two currents, the Stalinists and the anti-Stalinists. Both streams included both rank and filers and bureaucrats.

Trotsky: But why the difference?

Robins: The difference began in 1934 when the Stalinists emerged from the red unions and were taken as a revolutionary movement. Many were corrupted. Many thought the New Deal swing a maneuver. The Stalinists made a deal with the CIO tops. They led many unions. They had a reputation of militancy. No one policy, it is true, but they recruited as revolutionists. Now they are not considered revolutionists. Many of the best have dropped out. Those remaining are bureaucrats or confused.

Cannon: The problem is to get the CP out of the road. There is not a large percentage of revolutionary material in its ranks. They have discontented workers who saw no other force. They attract through the sheer inertia of a big apparatus and a big party. They use corruption where they do not already control the machinery. They use economic terrorism. They do everything the old-time bureaucrats did but on a conveyor system. Unquestionably there are good workers among them, but only a small percentage. It is a terrible danger to risk the condemnation of non-Stalinist workers for the sake of a maneuver that would win little.

The progressive movement is composed of anti-Stalinists and legitimate rank and file forces organized by us. The Stalinists even buy old-time fakers. They provoke a legitimate movement of protest which is our main source of recruitment and which comes during the struggle against the CP. In the Los Angeles auto movement, for example, some ex-CPers organized a counter-movement from which we recruited. The Stalinists have built up a terrible hatred against themselves. Seventy-five percent is genuine workers' grievances and consists of many former Stalinists animated by a terrible bitterness. A complicated maneuver giving the possibility of identifying us with the Stalinists would be wrong. Our main line must be toward the non-Stalinist workers. We must handle the Stalinist question within this framework.

Gordon: I am against the maneuver. Perhaps I am not entirely rational about this. Perhaps it is mostly from inertia. Cannon wrote about the Stalinists that they are an alien movement in the workers' movement, irresponsible. Our influence in the progressive groups is a top movement, not a rank and file movement, especially in New York. Our position is very precarious. Not something that we can look forward to as a big recruiting ground. The Stalinist influence in the unions is quite solid. They make deals with the old-time fakers, but also have a rank and file following. In the painters union they made a deal with the gangsters but also were supported by the anti-gangster following. We built up a movement, kicked out the Stalinists but couldn't consolidate or recruit. Stalinists operate with corruption, but different degrees of corruption. A worker in the TWU [Transport Workers Union] who quit the CP in 1938 told us that they are disillusioned with the CP but not enough to join us. They use corruption by degrees — the best jobs are given to the Stalinists, lesser jobs to the group surrounding them, lesser jobs to sympathizers. The militants don't regard themselves as corrupt — just members of the CP. "If we don't get the jobs, the reactionaries will." That seems to be their attitude.

But we don't have contact with the Stalinist rank and file. Before we could make such a maneuver we need to organize a nucleus in the Stalinists.

Trotsky: If the results of our conversation were nothing more than more precise investigation in relation to the Stalinists it would be very fruitful.

Our party is not bound to the Stalinist maneuver any more than it was to the SP maneuver. Nevertheless we undertook such a maneuver. We must add up the pluses and minuses. The Stalinists gained their influence during the past ten years. There was the Depression and then the tremendous trade union movement culminating in the CIO. Only the craft unionists could remain indifferent.

The Stalinists tried to exploit this movement, to build up their own bureaucracy. The progressives are afraid of this. The politics of these so-called progressives is determined by their need to meet the needs of the workers in this movement, on the other hand it comes from fear of the Stalinists. They can't have the same policy as Green because otherwise the Stalinists would occupy their posts. Their existence is a reflex of this new movement, but it is not a direct reflection of the rank and file. It is an adaptation of the conservative bureaucrats to this situation. There are two competitors, the progressive bureaucrats and the Stalinists, We are a third competitor trying to capture this sentiment These progressive bureaucrats can lean on us for advisers in the fight against the Stalinists. But the role of an advisor to a progressive bureaucrat doesn't promise much in the long run. Our real role is that of third competitor.

Then the question of our attitude toward these bureaucrats — do we have an absolutely clear position toward these competitors? These bureaucrats are Rooseveltians, militarists. We tried to penetrate the trade unions with their help. This was a correct maneuver, I believe. We can say that the question of the Stalinists would be resolved in passing insofar as we succeed in our main maneuver. But before the presidential campaign and the war question we have time for a small maneuver. We can say, your leaders betray you, but we support you without any confidence in your leaders in order to show that we can go with you and to show that your leaders will betray you.

It is a short maneuver, not hinging on the main question of the war. But it is necessary to know incomparably better the Stalinists and their place in the trade unions, their reaction to our party. It would be fatal to pay too much attention to the impression that we can make on the pacifists and on our "progressive” bureaucrat friends. In this case we become the squeezed lemon of the bureaucrats. They use us against the Stalinists but as the war nears call us unpatriotic and expel us. These Stalinist workers can become revolutionary, especially if Moscow changes its line and becomes patriotic. At the time of Finland, Moscow made a difficult turn; a new turn is still more painful.

But we must have contact and information. I don't insist on this plan, understand, but we must have a plan. What plan do you propose? The progressive bureaucrats and dishonest centrists of the trade union movement reflect important changes in the base, but the question is how to approach the base? We encounter between us and the base, the Stalinists.

Konikow: To support the Stalinists in the presidential campaign would kill us. They shift their line —

Trotsky: Nothing can kill us, Comrade Konikow.

Konikow: Our sympathizers would be driven away. The Stalinists cannot even talk with us. They are expelled for talking with us.

Trotsky: That is a blow against the party. They say that we are agents of this and that power. We say, if your leaders are serious against war then we are with you, but your leaders will betray you. It is the politics of critical support. Tobin, for example, is a faker combined with a reactionary stupid petty-bourgeois, but would we vote for him if he were running on an independent ticket for president? Yes.

Konikow: But Tobin or Lewis wouldn't kill us.

Trotsky: I am not so sure Lewis would kill us very efficiently if he were elected and war came. It is not a sentimental question. It is how to break this hypnosis. They say the Trotskyites are agents — but we say if you are seriously against the war we are with you. Even the problem of making them listen to us — we meet that by explaining. It is a very daring undertaking. But the cohesion of our party is such that we could succeed. But if we reject this plan, then we must find another policy. I repeat then we must find another policy. What is it?

Cornell: We must keep aware of the main task, to present ourselves to the American workers. I think that we would be swallowed up in this maneuver because of the size of the party. Now we are becoming able to separate ourselves from them — but this maneuver would swallow us up. We must be careful to make an independent stand, not as an opposition movement to the Stalinists.

Trotsky: It is not a question of entry. And such a maneuver would be very short and very critical. The maneuver itself presupposes that we are an independent party. The maneuver is a measure of our independence. The workers of the Stalinist party are in a closed milieu, hypnotized by lies for a long time. Now the persecution from the war begins. Our criticisms seem part of the persecution and suddenly we appear to support them — because of the bourgeois persecutions. I don't say even that we will actually vote for them — by November the situation can change. The leaders can carry out their betrayal.

Hansen: The maneuver seems to me to bear some resemblance to our united front proposal to the CP at the time of the antifascist demonstration. At the first demonstration, we made no such proposals. Many of the rank and file of our party criticized us. At the second demonstration we made such a proposal. It brought immediate response from the Stalinists. The rank and file were favorably impressed and questioned their leaders. The leaders were forced to launch a new campaign against us. We gained some members as a result.

Trotsky: The analogy holds except that then we had the initiative. Now they have the initiative. Good, we support this initiative. An investigation is needed, a small conference. I don't wish to exaggerate this maneuver. It is not our strategic line, but a tactical question. It is one possibility.

Dobbs: It seems to me you are considering two aspects of the question: One, you are weighing the question as to whether more is to be gained in numbers and quality than would be lost among the anti-Stalinists. Two, the maneuver is possible only while they have an antiwar attitude

Trotsky: Yes. The Stalinist machine makes different turns and maneuvers in obedience to Moscow. Now they make a turn corresponding to the most intimate feelings of the rank and file. Now we can approach them or remain indifferent. We can give support to them against their leaders or remain aside.

There is a presidential campaign besides this. If you are an independent party you must have politics, a line in relation to this campaign. I have tried to combine the two in a not decisive but important period. It combines the honest feelings of the Stalinist rank and file and also touches the masses at election time. If you had an independent candidate I would be for him, but where is he? It is either complete abstention from the campaign because of technical reasons, or you must choose between Browder and Norman Thomas. We can accept abstention. The bourgeois state deprived us the possibility of running our candidate. We can proclaim that everyone is a faker. That is one thing, but events confirming our proclamation is another. Shall we follow negative or dynamic politics? I must say that during the conversation I have become still more convinced that we must follow the dynamic course. However, I propose only a serious investigation, a discussion, and then a conference. We must have our own politics. Imagine the effect on the Stalinist rank and file. It would be very good. They expect from such a terrible enemy as us that we will throw very cold water on them. We will surprise them with some terribly hot water.

June 14, 1940

Trotsky: Toledano's speech, reported today in the press, is important for our policy in America. The Mexican people, says Toledano, 'love" the United States and will fight the Nazis arms in hand. Toledano indicates complete fraternization with the democracies. This is the first announcement of a new turn by Moscow. I have a concrete suggestion, that we publish a letter to the Stalinist workers: during five years your leaders were protagonists of the democracies, then they changed and were against all the imperialisms. If you make a firm decision not to permit a change in line then we are ready to convoke a convention to support your presidential candidate. You must give a pledge. It would be a letter of propaganda and agitation to the Stalinist workers. We will see. It is probable that the line will change in some weeks. This letter would give you free possibilities without having to vote for their candidate.

Cannon: They will probably make a change before we return.

Trotsky: Yes, it is quite likely.

Cannon: We must exercise great caution in dealing with the Stalinists in order not to compromise ourselves. Yesterday's discussion took a one-sided channel regarding our relations in the unions, that we act only as attorneys for the progressive labor fakers. This is very false. Our objective is to create our own forces. The problem is how to begin. All sectarians are independent forces — in their own imagination. Your impression that the anti-Stalinists are rival labor fakers is not quite correct. It has that aspect, but it has other aspects too. Without opposition to the Stalinists we have no reason for existing in the unions. We start as oppositionists and become irreconcilable. Where small groups break their necks is that they scorn maneuvers and combinations and never consolidate anything. At the opposite extreme is the Lovestone group.

In the SUP [Sailors Union of the Pacific] we began without any members, the way we usually begin. Up to the time of the war .it was hard to find a more fruitful ground than the anti-Stalinist elements. We began with this idea, that it is impossible to play a role in the unions unless you have people in the unions. With a small party, the possibility to enter is the first essential. In the SUP we made a combination with syndicalist elements. It was an exceptional situation, a small weak bureaucracy, most of whose policies were correct and which was against the Stalinists. It was incomprehensible that we could play any role except as an opposition to the Stalinists who were the most treacherous elements in the situation.

We formed a tacit bloc with the one possibility to enter the union freely. We were weak numerically, strong politically. The progressives grew, defeated the Stalinists. We grew too. We have fifty members and may possess soon fifty more. We followed a very careful policy — not to have sharp clashes which were not necessary anyway so far, so as not to bring about a premature split — not to let the main fight against the Stalinists be obscured.

The maritime unions are an important section in the field. Our first enemy there is the Stalinists. They are the big problem. In new unions such as the maritime, which in reality surged forward in 1934, shattering the old bureaucracy, the Stalinists came to the fore. The old-fashioned craft unionists cannot prevail against the Stalinists. The struggle for control is between us and the Stalinists. We have to be careful not to compromise this fight. We must be the classical intransigent force.

The Stalinists gained powerful positions in these unions, especially in the auto union. The Lovestoneites followed the policy outlined by Trotsky yesterday — attorneys for the labor fakers, especially in auto. They disappeared from the scene.

We followed a more careful policy. We tried to exploit the differences between the Martin gang and the Stalinists. For a while we were the left wing of the Martin outfit, but we extricated ourselves in the proper time. Auto is ostensibly CIO but in reality the Stalinists are in control. Now we are coming forward as the leading and inspiring circle in the rank and file that has no top leaders, that is anti-Stalinist, anti-patriotic, anti-Lewis. We have every chance for success. We must not overlook the possibility that these chances developed from experiments in the past period to exploit differences between the union tops. If we had taken a sectarian attitude we would still be there.

In the food unions there was an inchoate opposition to the Stalinists. There were office-seekers, progressives, former CPers. We have only a few people. We must link ourselves with one or the other to come forward. Later we will be able to come forward. Two things can compromise us: One, confusion with the Stalinists. Two, a purist attitude. If we imagine ourselves a power, ignoring the differences between the reactionary wings, we will remain sterile.

Dobbs: The general situation leads me to believe that we would lose more than we would gain from giving the impression that we are locking arms with the Stalinists. We have made connections with reactionary people but at the same time we have gained some very good trade union elements, bringing them closer to true Bolshevism. We have gained additional footholds. In steel we have twenty-two comrades in the rank and file movement. Some playing a very important role. At the last convention one comrade especially got the biggest ovation at the convention when he made his speech. Prior to the convention we had only a small nucleus. Since then we have grown among the rank and file.

Trotsky: Can we get them to go against Roosevelt?

Dobbs: Yes.

Trotsky: For whom will they vote?

Dobbs: I don't know. Maybe Roosevelt. For us to turn to the Stalinists will sow real confusion in their minds. It should not be rushed in any case.

Trotsky: I believe we have the critical point very clear. We are in a bloc with so-called progressives — not only fakers but honest rank and file. Yes, they are honest and progressive but from time to time they vote for Roosevelt — once in four years. This is decisive. You propose a trade union policy, not a Bolshevik policy. Bolshevik policies begin outside the trade unions. The worker is an honest trade unionist but far from Bolshevik politics. The honest militant can develop but it is not identical with being a Bolshevik. You are afraid to become compromised in the eyes of the Rooseveltian trade unionists. They on the other hand are not worried in the slightest about being compromised by voting for Roosevelt against you. We are afraid of being compromised. If you are afraid, you lose your independence and become half-Rooseveltian. In peacetimes this is not catastrophic. In war-times it will compromise us. They can smash us. Our policy is too much for pro-Rooseveltian trade unionists. I notice that in the Northwest Organizer this is true. We discussed it before, but not a word was changed; not a single word. The danger — a terrible danger — is adaptation to the pro-Rooseveltian trade unionists. You don’t give any answer to the elections, not even the beginning of an answer. But we must have a policy.

It is not necessary now to vote for Browder. We are against Roosevelt. As for Norman Thomas, he is just a political misunderstanding. Browder however is a tremendous handicap because he has a "revolutionary" attitude toward the imperialist war, etc. And our attitude? We turn our backs and give no answer. I understand that the situation is difficult.

What I propose is a manifesto to the Stalinist workers, to say that for five years you were for Roosevelt, then you changed. This turn is in the right direction. Will you develop and continue this policy or not? Will you let the leaders change it or not? Will you continue and develop it or not? If you are firm we will support you. In this manifesto we can say that if you fix a sharp program for your candidate, then we will vote for him. I see no reason why we can't say this with these ifs. Does this signify that we have changed our trade union policy? Not at all. We continue to oppose them as before. We say, if you seriously consider your attitude to Roosevelt you would have such and such a policy in the trade unions. But you don't have such a policy there. We can't go along with you in the trade unions.

I would be very glad to hear even one single word from you on policy in regard to the presidential election.

Cannon: It is not entirely correct to pose the problem in that way. We are not with the pro-Roosevelt militants. We developed when the Stalinists were pro-Rooseveltian. Their present attitude is conjunctural. It is not correct that we lean toward Roosevelt. Comrade Trotsky's polemic is a polemic for an independent candidate. If we were opposed to that then his account would be correct. For technical reasons we can't have an independent candidate. The real answer is independent politics.

It Is a false issue: Roosevelt vs. the Stalinists. It is not a bona fide class opposition to Roosevelt. Possibly we could support Browder against Roosevelt, but Browder would not only repudiate our votes, but would withdraw in favor of Roosevelt.

Trotsky: That would be the very best occurrence for us. After laying down our conditions for support, this capitulation would win us a section of the Stalinists. It is not a strategic policy but a policy for the presidential campaign only.

The fact is that they have developed this antiwar propaganda. We must consider this important fact in the life of the American workers. We begin with nothing being done about the Stalinists.

The "progressive" rank and file are a kind of semi-fabrication They have class struggle tendencies but they vote for Roosevelt. They are not formed politically. The rank and file Stalinists are not worse. They are caught in a machine. They are disciplined, political. Our aim is to oppose the Stalinist worker to the machine. How accomplish this? By leaving them alone? We will never do it. By postponing? That is not a policy.

We are for an independent labor ticket. But we don't even have this expressed in our press. Why? Because our party is embarrassed. It has no line on the elections.

Last January we discussed a campaign in the unions to have our own trade union presidential candidate. We were to start in Minneapolis. We were to address Tobin. We were to propose to him that we would vote for him if he were nominated. Even Lewis. We were to begin the campaign for a labor president. But not a thing was done. Nothing appeared. Nothing in the Northwest Organizer.

Dobbs: Perhaps it was my fault —

Trotsky: No. That is the bad Hitler theory of history —

I can't explain it by negligence. Nor just because it Is a trade union paper with just a trade union policy. The members of the party could write letters to the editor. What do their trade union leaders believe? Why can't our comrades write to the Northwest Organizer*! We discussed in detail the technical details. But nothing was done. Why? It signifies an immediate clash with the Rooseveltians — not the rank and file — but a clash with our allies, the machine, the conscious Rooseveltians, who would immediately attack, a clash with our own class enemies such as Tobin.

Cannon: It is necessary to counterpose trade union candidates in the field. That would retain our following. But what I can't accept is Browder as a symbol of the class struggle.

Trotsky: That is a bit of false polemics. In January I didn't propose Browder. But you are reduced to Browder or Roosevelt. Why this lack of initiative? Why were these six months not utilized? Why? It is not reduced to an individual fight, it has general reasons. I discussed with O'Shea two years ago on this same problem and this same necessity. With Dunne too. But the Northwest Organizer remains unchanged. It is a photograph of our adaptation to the Rooseveltians.

Understand, I don't believe that it would be advisable for important comrades to start such a campaign. But even totally unknown comrades could write such letters. He could write the executive board of the union, asking them what will be the fate of the workers. What kind of a president do we need? At least five months were not utilized. Completely lost. So we should lose two or three months more?

And Browder suddenly becomes an ideal political figure for me! A little false polemics!

How reach a compromise? I ask two or three hundred Stalinist workers. That is the minimum requirement. We can get them by holding their leaders to a class struggle policy. Are you ready to impose this class struggle line on your leader, we ask. Then we will find common grounds.

It is not just to write a manifesto, but to turn our political face to the Stalinist workers. What is bad about that? We begin an action against the Stalinists; what is wrong with that?

I propose a compromise. I will evaluate Browder 50 percent lower than I estimate him now in return for 50 percent more interest from you in the Stalinist party.

Cannon: It has many complications.

Gordon: On the question of adaptation to Roosevelt's program by our trade union comrades. Is it true? If so, it was necessary for our trade union work. The trade unionists are for Roosevelt. If we want to make headway we have to adapt — by not unfolding our full program — in order to get a foothold for the next stage. We are still at the beginning despite all the work done. That is one thing, but to make it a permanent policy is another thing. We are against that. What is the right time to make the break? Have we exhausted the period of adaptation?

Cannon: The failure of the campaign to develop an independent ticket is due to inertia at the center, the faction fight, the tendency to wait in place of energetic application of policies, a feeling of smallness of the party — psychological faults rather than conscious or unconscious adaptation to the Rooseveltians. The bide in the trade unions is not a political bloc but a bloc over trade union policy. It is possible to have an active policy in opposition. In 1936 we supported the Socialist Party, not Roosevelt, despite the trade unionists giving open support to Roosevelt. The ideal situation would be for Comrade Trotsky to use his influence with the government to change the laws.

Trotsky: That is the job of the SWP.

Cannon: We should have started a campaign six months ago. During the faction fight there was a congressional campaign. Browder was running. Our policy was that it would be best to have our own candidate. We proposed this, but it was sabotaged by Abern.

But to go out and campaign for Browder, just at the time of war, when we are trying to explain our policy —

Trotsky: It is precisely one of the elements of explaining that theirs is a false policy.

Cannon: Support for a labor candidate can be justified, but the CP is entirely different. The CP is not a genuine workers' party.

Dobbs: We are caught short. The criticisms are very pertinent They will be productive of better results, you may be certain. But we feel that this policy would be completely disastrous. We would prefer to sacrifice the maneuver for Jimmy Higgins work and put our own candidate on the ballot. It is not a question of Roosevelt. We will do anything short of supporting the Stalinists in order to go against Roosevelt.

Trotsky: Good. But why not write a manifesto, addressing them? Give them arguments understandable to them?

But we don’t have a candidate. It is now too late to have a candidate. What Is your policy?

Good — we will abandon voting for Browder. We will abandon a manifesto. We will make a leaflet. You would agree with a leaflet on the above lines? We can state our differences with the CP: your party accepts the class struggle only on accidental grounds. …

And if the Stalinist worker comes up to you and asks, will you vote for our candidate? We are a serious political party, where do you stand? We must give him a serious answer. We must say, yes, we will vote for him.

No party is homogeneous, not even the Stalinist party. We cannot change the party but only introduce a wedge to start some of them moving toward us.

Cannon: In 1920, in the first year of the CP in this country, we had a situation similar to this. We were in illegality. A few months before the election and impossible to run our own candidate. We openly boycotted the elections. It was completely ineffective.

Lenin wrote us a letter. He held that we should have voted for Debs. But at that time there was a strong psychological separation from the SP. Lenin's statement produced quite a shock. And Debs was in prison — not a Browder.

Trotsky: Yes. Although Browder is condemned to prison.

Cannon: There has not been a direct attack or approach to the Stalinists for some years. Could it be possible?

★ ★ ★

Cannon: The faction fight brought the youth question to the fore. You have seen the correspondence: Held's, a letter of mine. We have about one-third of the youth left. They are now discussing the question of an independent organization. The majority I think are in favor of no independent organization. The central committee has not yet discussed the question. Personally I am inclined that in the next period we don't have an independent organization.

Theoretically the youth should be a broad movement from which the party recruits. For twenty years, however, the youth has been a small shadow of the party, always attracting predominantly students. In a serious faction fight it always becomes a colony to be exploited. The real youth don't join. They don't want to be considered YPSLs. They join the unions. If they are serious politicians, they join the party. There is just a certain special type which clings to the youth. There is something artificial about it. We had a good experiment with the youth movement in the SP. Abnormal conditions were associated with it. They had a high age limit — twenty-five years and then thirty years. It was a kind of rival party. When we won it, we won a thousand or more people over twenty-one. They had a tradition of struggle against the party. A tradition of "vanguardism."

Gould, the leader of the youth, first defended the party, then adopted the prejudices against the party.

Shall we attempt to recreate this movement or consider it past? Shall we have a formally independent organization for the youth, take them into the party, or form student clubs? It would probably be more honest to call them student clubs. Shall we organize our comrades in school into Marxist clubs, do away with the fiction of organizational equality to the party? Personally I am of this viewpoint, not to recreate the youth as a separate organization.

I would like to hear the pre-war experience of the Bolsheviks in this respect.

Trotsky: It is difficult to make an analogy. Then it was the time of the ascension of capital. Industry lacked workers. There was an Influx from the villages. There was a brusque change in the situation. The youth from the village was disoriented. The party got him almost immediately. He broke sharply from his family, his church, the village. He became almost immediately a party man. The underground movement was a political movement. It was not possible to create dancing clubs. Europe likewise has no analogy. The pre-war period was one of party conservatism. Karl Liebknecht directed the youth movement against the party. It was not very strong. It acted as a substitute for a left wing to the party.

The situation is now fundamentally different economically. The youth are doomed. There are no jobs. Why do we have only students and not workers? The students are theoretically disoriented. In place of eternal prosperity they see only bankruptcy. The youth are seeking formulas to get out of this situation. The working class youth is atomized. It is not accustomed to generalizations, hence it is difficult to win them to the trade unions or the political fields. This is the difficulty. As to relations between the youth and the party, I abstain from any predictions. This is a time of abrupt changes. Predictions in this field are difficult. Possibly at this stage it is not reasonable to have a separate youth organization. At first I was absolutely opposed to Held, but now I have reconsidered. This concrete period and stage doesn't open up serious possibilities for a separate organization.

The question is how penetrate the youth organized by the capitalist state? It is a new question. I would not be surprised if tomorrow you found yourselves compelled to create a special organization for this, that is, a special organization for the youth and those organized into the military forces. We should create a special commission to study this. It will develop at a feverish rate. Such an organization can become as important as the trade unions. You will have organizations with millions of members. Many will begin their education in the army. Many were never in the trade unions. Here they will receive their education in collective action.

We can’t invent forms, but we can investigate. This can be transformed by and by into a separate organization. It would be a terrible crime to lose time in this. We must initiate this immediately. We must see all the possibilities. If we have initiative we can have a tremendous success. Not a special youth organization but the beginning of a special organization in the military field.

Dobbs: We must go through an experimental stage. We have no blueprint. The militarization of the youth is an entirely new problem. The youth are agreed that they shouldn't have a separate organization at the present. We have used them in the past as a recruiting ground for the party; those not in industry were placed in contact wherever possible with broader layers of youth. But in Minneapolis only a party decision could make them take membership in the YPSL.

Hansen: I think that Weiss is not in agreement with the other comrades leading the youth. If I understand it correctly, his position is that while in the immediate period it may not be feasible to have a separate youth organization, we must prepare for one in the future; that the possibilities of a separate youth organization are by no means exhausted.

Dobbs: With the militarization of the youth proceeding along with the militarization of the trade unions, big possibilities will open up for us. In the CCC [Civilian Conservation Corps] camps organization was extremely difficult. The CCC is looked upon by the youth as a makeshift. But with the youth in real military organizations, the possibilities are tremendous.

June 15, 1940

Hansen: Yesterday Comrade Trotsky made some remarks about our adaptation to the so-called progressives in the trade unions, he mentioned the line of the Northwest Organizer and also our attitude in connection with the elections and the Stalinists. I wish to point out that this is not something completely new on Comrade Trotsky's part. More than two years ago during the discussions over the transitional program, he discussed exactly these same points and had exactly the same position, with due regard for the difference in time and that then it was not the elections but the farmer-labor party that was to the fore.

Comrade Trotsky has also written some letters regarding the Stalinists and the need for a more positive line toward them. In the past faction fight too, Comrade Trotsky mentioned in his polemic "From a Scratch to the Danger of Gangrene" the following point, which he underlined: "More than once the party will have to remind its own trade unionists that a pedagogical adaptation to the more backward layers of the proletariat must not become transformed into a political adaptation to the conservative bureaucracy of the trade unions.’’ I am wondering if Comrade Trotsky considers that our party is displaying a conservative tendency in the sense that we are adapting ourselves politically to the trade union bureaucracy.

Trotsky: To a certain degree I believe it is so. I cannot observe closely enough to be completely certain. This phase is not reflected in the Socialist Appeal well enough. There is no internal bulletin for the trade unionists. It would be very good to have such a bulletin and to publish controversial articles on our trade union work. In observing the Northwest Organizer I have observed not the slightest change during a whole period. It remains apolitical. This is a dangerous symptom. The complete neglect of work in relation to the Stalinist party is another dangerous symptom.

Turning to the Stalinists does not mean that we should turn away from the progressives. It means only that we should tell the truth to the Stalinists, that we should catch the Stalinists beforehand in their new turn.

It seems to me that a kind of passive adaptation to our trade union work can be recognized. There is not an immediate danger, but a serious warning indicating a change in direction is necessary. Many comrades are more interested in trade union work than in party work. More party cohesion is needed, more sharp maneuvering, a more serious systematic theoretical training; otherwise the trade unions can absorb our comrades.

It is a historic law that the trade union functionaries form the right wing of the party. There is no exception to this. It was true of the Social Democracy; it was true of the Bolsheviks too. Tomsky was with the right wing, you know. This is absolutely natural. They deal with the class, the backward elements; they are the party vanguard in the working class. The necessary field of adaptation is among the trade unions. The people who have this adaptation as their job are those in the trade unions. That is why the pressure of the backward elements is always reflected through the trade union comrades. It is a healthy pressure; but it can also break them from the historic class interests — they can become opportunists.

The party has made serious gains. These gains were possible only through a certain degree of adaptation; but on the other hand we must take measures to circumvent dangers that are inevitable. I have noticed only some serious symptoms which indicate the need for more cohesion, more emphasis on the party. Our comrades must be in the first line party members, and only in the second line trade union members. This is especially true for trade union functionaries and editors. …

Before we go on — I have just received the latest number of Labor Action. Shachtman is calling for a new slogan: "Let’s have a program for peace not war." But it is war not peace. This is a pacifist tendency. It is no program for war which is inevitable.

Cannon: Can the Stalinists be regarded in any important sense as different from any other labor party or grouping? Are tactics applicable to the socialists, etc., also applicable to them? There is a strong tendency to regard the Stalinists as different. Not as a labor tendency. The crassest expression of this tendency is exhibited in the American Labor Party in New York. They regard the Stalinists not as a working class party but as an agency of a foreign power. This was the position of Lovestone and Hook on the Browder passport case. It was Burnham's position in the central committee

We held for critical defense. If Oneal for example were arrested we would defend him similarly. There is no fundamental difference between Oneal of the Second International and Browder as representative of the Stalinist bureaucracy.

Both are treacherous in the labor movement. Burnham held that the Stalinists are not a labor movement at all. That they are like the German Nazis. We should defend neither. This point is important in elaborating our general political tactics. So long as the Social Democrats represent a force we must have not only direct opposition but a policy of maneuver. Can any fundamental distinction be made between them and Lewis, Green, etc.? In my opinion we at least subjectively have made a distinction. We have not had a policy of maneuver since 1934, neither nationally nor internationally. In general should we not reexamine this again? Your proposal raises this drastically.

Trotsky: Of course the Stalinists are a legitimate part of the workers’ movement. That it is abused by its leaders for specific GPU ends is one thing, for Kremlin ends another. It is not at all different from other opposition labor bureaucracies. The powerful interests of Moscow influence the Third International, but it is not different in principle Of course we consider the terror of the GPU control differently; we fight with all means, even bourgeois police. But the political current of Stalinism is a current in the workers' movement. If it differs, it differs advantageously.

In France the Stalinists show courage against the government. They are still inspired by October. They are a selection of revolutionary elements, abused by Moscow, but honest. If they are persecuted in the United States and remain anti-patriotic because Moscow delays its new turn, this would give them considerable political authority. Our revulsion from the Kremlin will not destroy this political authority. We must consider them objectively. We must consider them from the objective Marxist viewpoint They are a very contradictory phenomenon. They began with October as the base, they have become deformed, but they have great courage.

We can't let the antipathies of our moral feelings sway us. Even the assailants on Trotsky's house had great courage. I think that we can hope to win these workers who began as a crystallization of October. We see them negatively; how to break through this obstacle. We must set the base against the top. The Moscow gang we consider gangsters but the rank and file don't feel themselves to be gangsters, but revolutionists. They have been terribly poisoned. If we show that we understand, that we have a common language, we can turn them against their leaders. If we win five percent, the party will be doomed. They can then lead only a conservative existence. Disintegration will set in, because this five percent connects them with new sources from the masses.

★ ★ ★

Dobbs: I was discussing the question of racial minorities in the United States, and particularly the Negro question with Dunne. The problem was to find a proper basis of approach. Dunne suggested that a column in the Appeal headed "Negro Question" raises in the mind of the colored person our considering him as a special problem. We have other racial minorities, the Mexicans, Filipinos, Chinese, Japanese. He suggested that we change the name to Racial Minorities Department and change the column in the Appeal likewise. That we make a more conscious effort to involve him as a worker with common problems — with special problems too, it is true; that we advise the Fourth International to take up a series of articles on the various racial minority problems on a broader basis, with special emphasis on the Negro problem because of its size.

Trotsky: Have we had any success with the Negroes?

Dobbs: Some success, especially since Birchman took over. We have been trying to link up the Negro Department with the Trade Union Department. In the musicians' union we got a clear cut report of a situation where they have separate Negro locals, continuing to discriminate against the Negro. Such things give us a tangible connection also for following up. We have had considerable reaction from Negroes that we are doing this for philanthropy and not out of class solidarity. We have set up a committee with one PC member and two Negroes.

Konikow: In Boston we tried to reach the Negroes through helping them in agitation on the lynch law. The Stalinists demanded that our comrade be thrown out, but the organization refused.

Gordon: It is not possible to put the Negroes in one category as a special problem. They are unique. They have their own problems, which are much bigger than the general problems of the racial minorities. We have been making headway but haven't yet begun to scratch the surface. In all Harlem we don't have one comrade. But in order to do this work we need Negroes. It seems to me that we have to devise some drastic measures to get into this work. Harlem is the biggest proletarian center in New York.

We have a problem too with the Jewish minority. We attempted once to put out a Yiddish organ but had to give it up. As a party we do nothing about this problem. The Jewish movement is going through a hectic development. It is now social patriotic out of utter despair. It would be a good thing to place on our agenda for lengthy discussion and definition. To determine a perspective. A program of activity regarding both the Jews and the Negroes.

Konikow: The name of the column should be changed. "Negroes" is not very attractive. Perhaps the name should be "Negro Workers."

Trotsky: How is the racial minority question resolved by the different unions? Aren't they international unions?

Cannon: They exist in Canada. This makes them international.

Trotsky: Some unions have special groupings? Educational groupings?

Dobbs: Some unions discriminate less. But there is no real progress.

Trotsky: Do they have publications in different languages?

Dobbs: In the needle trades they do and they have locals organized according to language.

Trotsky: What ones?

Dobbs: Italians, Greeks, Jews. But they are different in this respect from most unions.

Trotsky: Do the teamsters have any influence among other nationalities?

Dobbs: Only English. In the last few years there has been a rather sharp turn toward the Negroes. Formerly they were discriminated against. Now in a number of unions they can join in the South. In Dallas sixty whites and twenty Negroes went on strike. The Negroes always sat separated. They never spoke until the whites were through and when they were asked. That was at the beginning. On the picket line they showed great courage, even better than the whites. There were company owned houses in which they lived. The company demanded that they pay up their back rent or get out. They were evicted from two houses. The next day the two houses were in ashes. At the end of the strike the Negroes felt more that they had the right to speak.

Trotsky: Why wasn't this reported in the Appeal? It is very important. It would make the best kind of column on the Negroes.

The racial minorities question is not equitable. The most important and most common mean is a publication in the language of the minority in question. The education of the workers is hindered by differences in language. Even the most centralized party must find the means of communicating to different nationalities. The party is never a total of nation organizations. It is not a federation of national groupings and every worker is a member of a common organization. Channels must be created for the expression of these workers. This is true of the Mexican workers, Chinese, Jews, Polish, etc., but the Negroes have nothing to do with language. It is a social question determined by their skin. But it is not necessary to create a new paper; that is why it is not on the same level. That is why it is a different kind of means is not needed.

Dobbs: But these same social discriminations affect the Chinese, etc.

Trotsky: Through what is common, but it is not necessary to create special language papers for them. I believe that it should be explained in articles how we approach these minorities, And to have special approaches for the Mexicans, etc., but most important of course are the Negroes. Should we change the name to one more general? I am not ready to say. Is it the content that is philanthropic? We should exaggerate in favor of the Negroes. The white slaveholders accustom the Negroes not to speak first. But on the picket line they show more courage. That is true of all oppressed nationalities. We must approach them everywhere by advocating that for every lynching they should lynch ten or twenty lynchers.

We should pay more attention to the Latin American workers in relation to American imperialism. We should turn in the direction of Latin America. American imperialism is already turning in that direction.

★ ★ ★

Cannon: The fundamental question of party organization was dealt with in the faction fight. The discussion posed the question: the nature of our epoch is military; the only serious party is one which aims at power. We have had a double hangover in our party from the past. One, the socialists never dreamed of changing society. They wanted to make protests, but actually a party to change society over was never in their bones. Their concept was a flabby one, Christian socialism. People from the Social Democracy who came to our party had these concepts. Two, our party the world over suffered from over-correction of Stalinist bureaucratism, all the more so due to the petty bourgeois. They were afraid more than anything else of being disciplined. They don’t want a regime with firmness or discipline. This was a tendency of Burnham and Shachtman. For eleven years we had a see-saw, half the time for Lenin's conceptions, half the time for the other extreme. When it became serious all we got was a forty-fifty percent compromise. In this fight we had a strong impulse from the rank and file for more discipline, a more serious party. We must devote more time to the concept of the party that flows from the military age. A mish-mash party is good for nothing. To have this idea assimilated into the very bones of the members.

I think that the party in the eyes of the leading militants should be considered as a military organization. The party forms should be much more considerably formalized in a deliberate form of hierarchical organization. A strict record of grades of authority in the party. All these things must be deliberately inculcated to build a party able to struggle for power in this epoch. If this is correct we have an opportunity to build it now. One, because there is a real impulse for it from the rank and file. They feel that there is not enough discipline, not enough firmness.

In the leadership now there is no serious conflict on this conception, a far more serious advance for joint collaboration. No opportunity for weak and faltering elements to capitalize on differences. Formerly this was bad, especially in New York. That was the damnable role of Abern and Shachtman, to pacify the weaklings. Now . there is no possibility for that, not in the next period.

In my polemics against Burnham I amplified the idea of a professional leadership — no part-time dilettantism and trying to play with the party. I believe of course that in this question of being a full time party worker it depends on funds. But the idea that a party militant should be ready to work for the party — this idea should be universal. Do away with the toleration for amateur leadership.

Trotsky: Before I forget — the party should elaborate a kind of platform for the Jewish question, a balance on the whole experience of Zionism with the simple conclusion that the Jewish people cannot save themselves except by socialist revolution. I believe that we could have an important influence in New York among the garment workers.

Gordon: What tactical approach would you suggest?

Trotsky: That is another thing. I am not informed very well about that phase. The first thing is to give them a perspective, criticize all the past, the democratic tendency, etc. To pose for them that the socialist revolution is the only realistic solution of the Jewish question. If the Jewish workers and peasants asked for an independent state, good — but they didn't get it under Great Britain. But if they want it, the proletariat will give it. We are not in favor, but only the victorious working class can give it to them.

I believe that it is of tremendous importance what Cannon wrote one time, to create a patriotism toward the party, that if mature revolutionists disagree, but also understand the historic value of the party, then they can have a very sharp discussion but can be sure the base is common, that the minority will submit to the majority. Such a feeling cannot be produced artificially, but of course a propaganda expressing the importance of the party in this epoch can make the members proud of their membership. What is miserable about the petty bourgeois is their light-minded attitude toward the party. They don't understand what a party is.

At the same time it is necessary to create an elastic relationship between democracy and centralism. We have enough hundreds of members who have passed through enough experiences who now require more centralized organization. These people in another ten years will be the old guard. These cadres in a new phase can give the possibility of some hundreds of thousands of members of different origin. These people can introduce new tendencies of criticism. To assimilate them it can't be done by centralism. It is necessary to enlarge the democracy, to let them find that the old guard is more experienced. So after a period of very centralized existence, you can have a new period of wide discussion, then a more normalized centralized period.

Our growth will be a convulsive growth. It can introduce into its ranks some half-raw human material. It is a tremendous advantage to have the support of the cadres. They will explain to the new comrades. At the same time it is dangerous to impose centralism too soon on new members who don't have this tradition of esteem for the leadership which is based by and large on experiences of the past. This also maintains the party's equilibrium.

This also was one of the finest qualities of Lenin's leadership: from iron discipline to apparent complete freedom of the ranks. Actually he never lost control, but the average member felt perfectly free. In this way he laid the basis for a new centralism. This gave him the possibility to pass through a severe war. During a severe war the party relations indicated a severe and military organization. In spite of all the party equilibrium was preserved. Even at the front we had closed party meetings, where all party members discussed with complete freedom, criticized orders, etc. But when we left the room, the orders became a strict discipline, for the breaking of which a commander could shoot. We were able to carry out very complicated maneuvers. At the beginning when the army was almost all communists from the pre-revolutionary period, especially with relationships already stabilized, it was easy. But when more than five million Joined, the majority were fresh elements without tradition and in the army they learned the discipline in its more severe form. There were protests of dissatisfaction which were utilized then by Stalin against Trotsky. It was necessary for some time to give these elements free rein and then by convincing them to create a new basis for more severe military regime. Tsaritsyn played a role in this, Stalin, Voroshilov, Timoshenko. They based themselves on these elements. They were guerrilla fighters, like Shachtman in his politics. In the Finnish war it was the proof of the old Tsaritsyn group [that] Stalin didn't appear at the front — absolutely incomprehensible. Of course he had his GPU to take care of in the Kremlin, Voroshilov is dismissed, the last of the Tsaritsyn opposition.

Dobbs: We worked out something like that in Minneapolis on the picket line. Full discussion, then work under severe discipline.

Trotsky: Yes, it is a psychological thing, to devote enough time to convince them that the heads carry out these things in the interests of the party and not for their personal interests. Then it is the most important moral capital of the party.

Konikow: Wouldn't it be helped by an internal bulletin?

Cannon: Yes, yes.

Gordon: How do you conceive the party life for the coming period? Can we afford conventions, plenums, etc.?

Trotsky: It depends on objective conditions of the war. It is possible they will begin to persecute you in the next period. Then centralism becomes absolute. The central committee must have the right to co-opt new members without a convention. In case of police arrests. To support by these means the cohesion of the party. Confidence is possible only by good policy and courage. It would be very important proof and very serious selection. The real centralism which will form a precious capital of ultimate party life. When a convention is not possible, we have the possibility of informing the best cadres, the best elements, who then defend the policy in the local organizations so as not to take the party by surprise. It depends often on twenty-four hours time to explain. Then we can begin the action. Otherwise they can be dissatisfied, the party can be disrupted in a short time.