A Discussion with Herbert Solow (Summer 1932)

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Comrade Solow would like to say a few things about the American Communist Party’s policy on the war question.

The policy of the American CP is in general the same as that of the European parties. That goes also for the question of the antiwar congress. On Münzenberg’s orders a certain Urivich came to New York from Berlin with the responsibility of directing the organization of the antiwar campaign. He was furnished with recommendations to American pacifists and leaders of the CP. At a preparatory conference which was attended by twenty-thirty persons, including party members, Urivich declared that the antiwar movement would be based on the following slogan: True patriotism does not mean being in favor of war, but being against it.

Comrade Solow referred further to a question which has stood at the focal point of discussions in the American CP as well as among the American public as a whole in the recent period: that is, the tension between Russia and Japan on the one hand, between America and Japan on the other, and the resulting “community of interest” between America and Russia in the event of war. He cites a list of examples of which the following is the most characteristic of an alleged danger of social chauvinistic tendencies in the American CP: Trachtenberg, a leading party functionary, is occupying himself with collecting quotations from Marx designed to prove that an American war against Japan would be a progressive war.

Also, there is at present great interest in the question of American recognition of the Soviet Union. Senator Borahplays the role of energetic advocate of recognition. His main arguments are two: first, America needs to expand its business interests, and second, America must not stand alone in the Far East. In the Chinese-American conflict the interests of China are at issue as well as those of Russia and America. Solow believes that the movement for recognition will go forward — because it will be pointed out that Stalin drove the real revolutionaries out of the leadership long ago.

With respect to both problems, Solow believes that it is no longer possible to assume responsibility for the actions of the Third International. “If I had a group around me,” he says, “I would found a Fourth International today — but then I am not a very experienced politician.”

Trotsky: What you have said on the attitude of the American CP towards “alliances” between America and Russia against Japan, exaggeration aside, cannot by a long shot be regarded as social patriotism and social chauvinism. Social patriotism means going with the bourgeoisie through thick and thin while declaring the “common interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.”

In case of a conflict between America and Japan, should we place obstacles in the path of the American government? Yes or no?

The American CP and the American proletariat can in no way declare the interests of the American government to be their interests, can in no case give up opposition to the government. They must vote against war appropriations, and declare that they have no confidence that the American bourgeoisie will not use those weapons to stab the Soviet Union in the back, perhaps the very next day. We must do nothing to make us responsible [for the government] in the eyes of the masses. The means of struggle against the government are varied. Perhaps at a certain moment [in a war] we do not call for strikes. When we are strong enough to take power, however, then we must immediately bring down the government and lead the war against Japan ourselves. But if we are so weak that we cannot lead even small strikes, then this question does not arise. If we are not sufficiently strong to create major difficulties, then in that case I would suggest an oppositional policy by all means, but not an aggressive one. If the government does indeed make a turn, then we also make a turn.

Solow: Is that to say that the interests of the American revolution have to be sacrificed to the interests of the Soviet state?

Trotsky: No. I refer to Lenin’s example. He spoke of the eventuality of sacrificing the Soviet Union to the interests of the German revolution. In the very same manner the Soviet state must now declare that a Hitler regime in Germany means war with the Soviet Union.

There are different methods of fighting one’s own bourgeoisie:

1. In case of war by the American bourgeoisie against the Soviet Union.

2. In case of war by the American bourgeoisie against Japan.

Is there a difference between the two cases in the attitude of the

American proletariat toward the American bourgeoisie?

In the first case we have to stake everything on one card.

Are we duty-bound to do the same in the second case? No. In this case we can take a wait-and-see, although active, attitude. This war will have [mass] discontent as a by-product, like every other war. The CP must ready itself for the seizure of power, but the immediate tactical approach will be different from the first case.

Solow: Should strikes be renounced in general?

Trotsky: Of course the class struggle does not stop. We will do all we can to raise wages, etc., including strikes — although in those plants that do work for the Soviet Union we shall try to settle matters without a strike. But all those are tactical questions, which will be settled according to the concrete situation. The main thing is the strategy — whether the policy of the CP is to be the same if America fights the Soviet Union or if it fights an enemy of the Soviet Union. The strategic line remains the same — the struggle to prepare the seizure of power by the proletariat. What changes, however, is the tactical line, and these changes can go quite far. One thing remains certain: we must undertake nothing that can make us responsible for the American bourgeoisie, for the motives, goals, and methods of their policies.

Solow: Some American comrades say the German revolution must now be sacrificed for the sake of the Russian Revolution.

Trotsky: The Stalinists say that too, but they sacrifice it not for the sake of the Russian Revolution, but rather for the sake of the bureaucracy.

Solow: What criterion do we use to judge when we no longer have a dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia?

(Trotsky answers with an exposition of the thoughts that are presented fully in his pamphlet against Urbahns, “Defense of the Soviet Republic and the Opposition [ Writings 29].” He continues:)

The question of the Third or the Fourth International is indeed bound closely to the destiny of the proletarian state together with which the Third International is closely entwined — through tradition, through cadres, through moral and material influence. The collapse of the Soviet Union would be the simultaneous collapse of the Communist International and would place the founding of a new International on the agenda. Should the Soviet Union find the road to the international revolution (which would mean the replacement of the Stalin bureaucracy and a regroupment in the [Soviet] party), then the external and internal dangers for the Soviet Union would be swept aside and the Third International would remain intact. Perhaps with such internal regroupments there would also be very important splits in the various parties.

The Second and the Third Internationals are divided from one another by a deep chasm. In that sense the continuity has really been broken. Nevertheless, we have already seen how after the split in France, for example, the followers of the Third International did not immediately carry the split through, but instead fought to win the majority and the newspapers, etc., inside the old party. So we see that no prophecies of any kind can be made as regards organizational matters.

One result of the fact that there is still a Second International is that as yet only the most revolutionary elements are assembled in the Third International, although they are confused and partly corrupted. So then, in order to counterpose a Fourth to the Third International one would have to be sure that it can do better than the Third. But do we really have the necessary cadres for that? Have there already occurred sufficiently crucial events in which to test our cadres and to win over broad layers? The Third International was formally founded following the October Revolution, and even then Eberlein (at the First World Congress) opposed founding it immediately.

The cadres for a Fourth International must first prove themselves, steel themselves, and gain experience within the Third International. We have already had a fourth international under Gorter.¹⁹³ It was a miscarriage. We must have the great historical perspective of a linkup of the Soviet Union with the revolution, but we must also see the possibility of the demise of the Soviet Union. If we count ourselves as belonging to the Third International it is not out of organizational cretinism, but because millions of workers still see their salvation in the Third International. A “new founding” now would be absolutely wrong. It would make us look foolish in the eyes of the most serious workers, and to look foolish is fatal, especially in revolutionary politics.

Concerning this business of Münzenberg’s antics it is necessary to expose the entire history of the Anglo-Russian Committee, which became a prop for English imperialism.

Since you have a small group of intellectuals, I would like to say the following to you: The kind of interest that is engendered by a historical work is of a rather platonic-contemplative nature. But in order to make a selection [of cadre], I think you should suggest the reading of a “dry work,” for example, the documents on the Chinese revolution that were assembled and published by the American Left Opposition. They are concerned with disputed questions. Do try to initiate such a discussion.