"With Both Hands"

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The Stalin Bureaucracy and the USA

The internal condition of the Soviet Union is making a new political turn inevitable and increasingly urgent, a turn that must be more extreme than all those that preceded it Everybody feels it Many see it clearly. The bureaucratic leadership, at the focal point of the difficulties and dissatisfaction, maintains an obdurate silence. Perhaps because it does not yet know what road to tread? Or perhaps because it prefers to keep still about the already-trodden road until it has become an irrevocable fact?

To "drive" the duped, lulled, and half-stifled party, unnoticed by it, upon a path it does not want to take — that is the tactical method of Stalin. The transition from the "dry" system to "wet" in alcoholic beverages was never decided by the party; the bureaucracy simply continued to raise the alcoholic content of light beverages in order to increase state revenues and in this way took the country from 4 to 40 percent The same method is applied by Stalin in every field. All the more necessary is it now to pay sharp attention to the maneuvers of the bureaucracy, which is silently preparing a new "surprise" for the working masses. Symptoms even of a secondary order must be checked on attentively and distrustfully; by taking everything into consideration, it may help to block the bureaucratic leaders long before they have carried the new turn up to 40 percent, after which it may no longer be possible to reverse it

The eminent American specialist in agricultural-machinery construction, Thomas Campbell, worked for a period of time as a technical adviser of the Soviet Union. After his return to the United States he published a book, Russia: Market or Menace ?The high point of this book, at least politically speaking, is its report of an extended conversation of the author with Stalin. This conversation, about whose authenticity there can be no doubt, as we shall see, deserves not only to be reprinted but also to be submitted to a careful examination.

"As soon as we were seated I explained to Mr. Stalin through the interpreter that before we entered into any business negotiations I wanted to speak to him frankly and without offense in regard to my trip to Russia and several other matters which were on my mind. He immediately agreed to this and with one motion of his arm pointed towards the door, upon which his secretary left the room in about three steps. I then said to Mr. Stalin, 'I am very anxious, Mr. Stalin, that you should know that I am here without any intent of giving you any false impressions. I am not a Communist, I do not believe in the Soviet form of government; I am not a disciple of Bill Haywood or Emma Goldman, and I resent many of the things which I hear about your government Nevertheless, I am much interested in your agricultural development as I am an agricultural mechanical engineer and have spent most of my life trying to develop mechanized agriculture in the United States. We had a poor crop in Montana this year, and the work which your government has offered me is interesting. I will not, however, make any kind of working agreement with your government if it cannot be done absolutely independently of my political beliefs and strictly on a business basis.' Whereupon Stalin arose alertly from his chair, crossed to my side of the table, took my hand in both of his, looked me straight in the eye, and said, 'Thank you for that, Mr. Campbell. Now I know that I can believe you. Now I know that we can respect each other and perhaps we can be friends. ’

"He then motioned me to sit down and asked me to continue. I went on to explain that we in the United States resented many things which we had heard about the Soviet government, such as the confiscation of property, elimination of personal rights, nationalization of women and children, repudiation of debts and religion, and above all what we thought was an attempt to interfere with our own government I told him that neither he nor his government could expect the friendship, cooperation, and recognition of our government if they ever did try to interfere with our affairs.

"Mr. Stalin immediately replied that he realized this and he too wanted to speak with the same frankness and without offense. He said that he knew there were such unfavorable reports in our country, and took considerable time to explain the true conditions in Russia. He unhesitatingly admitted, with disarming frankness, that under Trotsky there had been an attempt to spread communism throughout the world. He said that was the primary cause of the break between himself and Trotsky. That Trotsky believed in universal communism while he wanted to confine his efforts to his own country. He explained that they had neither the time nor the money to try to communize the world, even should they wish to do so, and that his own chief interest was to improve the conditions of the people in Russia, without any interference whatsoever in the government of other countries.

"We discussed the Third International® and other reports of Soviet propaganda, and I must admit that Mr. Stalin convinced me that there is no attempt now on his part, or on the part of officials of the Soviet government, to interfere with the government of the United States. We discussed politics, economics, banking, business, trade with the United States, transportation, agriculture, and education. I was amazed at Mr. Stalin's knowledge of general affairs. He reminded me of many of our big industrial leaders who must have a general knowledge of practically all affairs to hold their positions. His words, as they were transferred to me through the interpreter, were carefully chosen, and I was particularly surprised at his knowledge of the Constitution of the United States. In fact, my own lack of knowledge of this same Constitution caused me considerable embarrassment, and the first thing I did, upon reaching London, was to find a bookstore and buy a copy.

"The conference lasted until well after dark, as the sun sets early in the northern country. Upon leaving, he told me that the interpreter would prepare a typewritten copy of our conversation, which I received two weeks later in London, signed 'J. Stalin,' and with this note — 'Keep this record, it may be a very historical document some day. ’"

The authenticity of the interview, as is clear from the circumstances described, is beyond any doubt Campbell is no light-minded journalist seeking sensationalism, but an energetic Yankee businessman, an important American man of wealth and builder of machinery. He is quite kindly disposed towards Stalin. In reporting the interview, Campbell relied not only on his memory but also on the official report supplied to him. Finally, Campbell's report has nowhere and never been denied. These facts sufficiently confirm the authenticity of the interview from the formal side But much more important is the inner political logic of the conversation, its accordance with the spirit of the participants and the circumstances. No journalist, moreover, could have thought up that double handshake or that excellent description of the true essence of the differences of opinion between Stalin and Trotsky.

The Yankee remains true to himself to the very end in this conversation. The solid bourgeois, who has had a bad harvest this year and is therefore all the more inclined to do a stroke of business with the godless nationalizers of women, sticks his leg upon the Soviet table and slaps the leader of the Bolsheviks on the shoulder half-patronizingly, half-warningly.

No one will reproach Stalin for attempting to utilize the meeting with Campbell to facilitate an agreement with the American government and market. But why this "sudden" rise to his feet, this gripping of Campbell's hand with both of his, and this proposal not only of "mutual respect" but also of "friendship"? Does this resemble the conduct of a representative of the workers' state who is carrying on business negotiations with a representative of the capitalist world? Alas, no resemblance at all! But it does resemble the crawling conduct of a petty bourgeois before a big bourgeois. This little occurrence, which, frankly, it nauseates one to read, is very characteristic. It makes it possible to discern the true political consciousness of Stalin, who is so resolute and relentless in struggle against Opposition Communists and dissatisfied workers.

Fifteen years after the October Revolution, Stalin speaks with the American capitalist in virtually the same tone in which Miliukov and Kerensky once spoke with Buchanan in the not-very-glorious days of the impotent coalition. The resemblance lies not only in tone but also in content "The necessity is openly preached amongst you in the press and in public for concluding the war," Buchanan cuttingly reproached the February powers-that-be. "Not us," Miliukov, Tereshchenko, and Kerensky defended themselves, "only the Bolsheviks. But we'll finish them off right enough." "Just look," Kerensky then assured Buchanan, holding his hand with both his own because he did not have a third hand — "just look, Lenin is already driven into illegality again and Trotsky is in Kresty prison."

Stalin's position, of course, is essentially different, for the October Revolution is a historical fact and the "apparatus" bases itself on its social consequences. But the political task of the bureaucracy does not consist in spreading the October Revolution throughout the world; it is for this program that Trotsky was exiled from the USSR, Stalin respectfully reports to the American bourgeois. His, Stalin's, task consists in improving the position of the Russian people by means of "friendship" with American capital. Unfortunately, it is precisely Stalin's policy in the field of "improving the position of the people" that leads to constantly sadder results.

Perhaps a pundit will be found to contend that by his assertions about international revolution, etc., Stalin simply aimed at deceiving the American as to his real opinions. What's wrong with that? Is it worth making a point of it? Only a completely hopeless idiot could possibly believe such an explanation.

To begin with, is it permissible to seek to deceive an adversary by such declarations which must inevitably confuse and demoralize friends? For what Stalin plainly declared to the whole world was that, in contradistinction to the Left Opposition, his faction has renounced the theory and practice of the international revolution. May one play with such things in the interests of diplomacy? Even within the limits of diplomacy such a game would be doomed to a miserable fiasco. A private conversation, even if it lasts till sunrise, is not enough to exercise any influence upon the ruling class of the USA. The Yankees are serious businessmen. They will not buy a pig in a poke. Assertions must stand on facts and lead to facts. The declaration of Stalin is no maneuver and no trick; basically it flows from the theory of socialism in one country.It was prepared by the entire policy of recent years. In the near future, too, it may become the doctrine of the new course on which the bureaucracy is entering more directly every day, thanks to its blindness and its failures.

Can it really be forgotten that the Soviet government, to everyone's surprise, supported the Kellogg Pact? The motivation, dictated by Stalin and intended only for home consumption, stated: even if the Kellogg Pact does not go far enough, it is nevertheless a step forward. Soviet diplomacy, of course, is under no obligation to say out loud everything it is thinking. It must not, however, without undermining the ground beneath its feet, make any declarations or moves which help the enemy deceive the workers and weaken their vigilance.

The Kellogg Pact is not a step forward to peace, but a diplomatic cover for the mightiest and most dangerous of all the imperialist bandits. The matter is not merely confined to the pact Litvinov recently supported the American proposal for "partial disarmament." In this connection the Soviet press did not expose Hoover's demand, but only those imperialists who did not want to go along with it Hoover's proposal, just like the Kellogg Pact, has as its aim neither disarmament nor prevention of war, but the concentration of control over war and peace in the hands of the USA. The preparation of favorable moral and material points of departure for the coming war — that is the one task of the American imperialists.

If it is assumed that Soviet diplomacy could not express itself openly — that is not our opinion — then the press should have spoken for it But when Stalin-inspired diplomacy clings to the proposals of Hoover and Kellogg "with both hands," it is deceiving the world proletariat and weakening the Soviet state. Whereas the centrists in Amsterdam based themselves entirely on petty-bourgeois pacifism, which is honestly meant for the most part and is at all events still rooted in the masses, in Geneva they joined hands on the "left" with imperialist pseudo-pacifism, whose roots are to be found in the banks and trusts. On the question of war, the epigones openly and demonstratively with the revolutionary tradition of Leninism. Their immediate objective is to win the trust of American capital. The nocturnal conversation in the Kremlin constitutes irreplaceable commentary on the speeches of the Soviet delegates at Geneva.

Yet diplomacy does not exhaust the question, and in this field it cannot claim first place. Where does the Communist International fit in? For four and a half years now no congress of the Comintern has been called and nobody knows when it will be called, if ever. Stalin does not so much as find time to appear at the plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International and leaves the leadership to people who for the most part need leading themselves. Is it not a deliberate demonstration of contempt for the Comintern? Does it not signify that in actuality, and not only in conversation with the American bourgeois, Stalin has completely given up the policy of international revolution? No, he did not deceive Campbell. He only described, with rare frankness, the situation as it really is.

Still another question, and the most essential of all, was clearly illuminated in the Stalin-Campbell dialogue: the question of socialism in one country. In spite of all the half-baked prophecies, the five-year plan did not increase the economic "independence" of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the advances in industrialization have extended and deepened the connections of Soviet economy with world economy and consequently have increased their mutual dependency. The double handshake of Stalin and his deferential reassurance to American capital of his differences with the Left Opposition are, in the last analysis, nothing but the political expression of the economic dependency of the Soviet Union on the world market The humiliating character of this "expression" is determined by the psychology of a very highly situated but nonetheless petty-bourgeois bureaucrat, whom great events always find unprepared.

The more the Stalin faction turns its back on the international revolution, the more it will feel its dependency on world capital, the more it will cling to it convulsively "with both hands." Stalin's handshake is not only a symbolical act — it is almost a program. While he thoughtlessly and flatly accuses the Opposition of aiming to turn over Soviet industry to foreign capital, Stalin is obviously preparing for a change in the international as well as the internal political course.

Caught in a vise, the bureaucracy is capable of engaging in any adventure, including treacherous ones. To trust it blindly is to be an accessory to treason. Today more than ever we are duty-bound to watch Stalin's conduct in the field of foreign political relations not only with tireless attention but also with sharp distrust

On guard! Be prepared!