Semi-Official War-Cries

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Engels wrote this article at the moment when, in the spring of 1875, relations between the German Empire and France sharply deteriorated after the French National Assembly approved the Projet de loi relatif à la constitution des cadres et des effectifs de l'armée active et de l'armée territoriale. Resolute Russian diplomatie interference prevented a war in Europe. Attaching great importance to Engels' article, which contained a critique of German militarism from the proletarian internationalist stand, the Volksstaat editorial board intended to publish it as a separate pamphlet. However, this intention was not carried out.

Once again the press reptiles of the German Empire have received orders to sound the war-trumpets. That godless and degenerate country France will simply not, at any price, leave Germany in peace, that god-fearing country bursting out in glorious bloom under the rule of stock-exchange swindles, floatation and the crash. France is re-arming on the most colossal scale, and the high-pressure velocity at which these armaments are being carried out is the best proof that it intends, if possible next year, to attack the innocent, peace-loving Bismarckian Empire, which, as we all know, has never done anything to offend anyone, which is tirelessly disarming and about which only the subversive press has spread the slander that it has just turned two million citizens into reserve soldiers by a Landsturm Law.

The press reptiles are in a difficult position. While in the service of the Foreign Office they have to portray the Empire as a lamb of infinite meekness, the Ministry of War finds it in its interest to make it clear to the German bourgeois that something is actually happening in return for their heavy taxes, that the armaments decided on are really being produced, the fortifications really being built, the cadres and mobilisation plans for the large number of soldiers “on leave” are being completed, that the combat readiness of the army is increasing with every day that passes. And as the announcements made in this connection are authentic and, moreover, originate from experts, we are perfectly able to judge the war-cries of the press toads.

The new French Cadre Law provides the pretext for all the noise. Let us then compare the institutions thus created in France—for the time being still on paper—with those actually existing in Germany, restricting ourselves for brevity’s sake to the decisive branch of the service, the infantry.

On the whole, the new French law turns out to be a considerably worsened version of the Prussian one.

The French infantry of the line is supposed to consist of 144 regiments of the line, 4 Zouave and 3 Turco regiments of 4 battalions each, 30 rifle battalions, 4 foreign and 5 penal battalions, in all 643 battalions, while the German army of the line admittedly only amounts to 468 battalions. This superiority of the French line is, however, purely apparent.

Firstly, the French battalion, like the Prussian, does indeed have four companies, but each company has only four officers instead of five; and of these four, one is a reserve officer, which is a species that simply does not yet exist in France. In France they have hitherto had one officer to every 35-40 men, and on account of the outdated and cumbersome French drill regulations this is necessary, while Prussia has managed quite well with one officer to 50 men. But this is also the maximum, and the committee of the National Assembly that dealt with this law was agreed that no more than 200 men might be placed in each company. The French company is thus 25 per cent weaker numerically than the Prussian, and as the reserve officer does not exist at present, and will not exist for many years to come, it is also far from being its equal organisationally. But as the company—because of the breechloader—has now become the tactical unit in battle and the action of the company columns and of the skirmishers based on them requires strong companies, the National Assembly has hereby inflicted the greatest harm on the French Army that it could have inflicted.

The French line on a war-footing therefore comprises

606 battalions of the line with 800 men each 484,800 men

Zouaves, Turcos, Foreign Legion, Penal Battalions 46,000 “ total 530,800 men.

From this number, though, at least 40,000 men must be subtracted for Algeria, who only become available when new formations are capable of relieving them. This leaves, then, 490,800 infantrymen at the outbreak of war. The 468 battalions of the German infantry each comprise 1,050 men on a war-footing, a total of 490,480 men according to official figures, almost exactly as many as the French line.

So far, then, equality of numbers, with Germany having a better and stronger organisation. But now comes the difference.

As far as France is concerned, the above 643 weak battalions comprise all the infantry for which there exists any war organisation at all. Certainly, the 318 depot companies of the line and of the riflemen are said to contain a total of 249,480 extra reserves (including 50 or 40 officers and non-commissioned officers per company), but of these only the men actually exist up to now, and these are for the greater part quite untrained, and those who are trained have mostly had only six months’ service. As for the officers and non-commissioned officers, a quarter are available, at the most. By the time these 318 depot companies are turned into 318 mobile battalions, the entire campaign may have been decided, and those who do go into action will not exceed the quality of the mobile guards of 1870. Then there is the Territorial Army, which is composed of the men between 30 and 40 years old, and is to be organised in 144 regiments of 3 battalions each, making 432 battalions. All this exists only on paper. In order to put such a scheme really into effect, 10,000 officers and 20,000 non-commissioned officers are needed, of which almost literally not a single one is yet available. And where are these officers to come from? It took almost two generations before the one-year volunteers provided serviceable reserve and Landwehr officers in Prussia; right up to the forties, they were regarded as a liability in nearly all regiments and treated accordingly. And in France, where such an institution infringes all traditions of revolutionary equality, where those serving one year are despised by the officers and hated by the men, there is quite simply no chance of getting anywhere. Yet no other source of reserve officers exists.

As far as the non-commissioned officers and men are concerned, it will be remembered that the victors of Sadowa in 1866 boasted that the long existence of the Landxvehr system in Prussia gave them a lead of 20 years over any other country that might adopt the same system; not until the oldest annual intakes consisted of trained men would equality with Prussia be attained. This appears to have been forgotten now, as does the fact that in France only half of the annual contingent actually serves, the other half being released after six months’ service (which is totally inadequate in view of the present pedantic regulations). The reserves and militia in France thus chiefly consist of recruits, in contrast to their Prussian counterparts. And they pretend to be frightened of the present French Territorial Army, which consists of the same untrained cannon-fodder that in 1870 and 1871 could not hold its ground on the Loire and at Le Mans against German units which were only half as strong, but disciplined!

But there is more to tell yet. In Prussia, after bitter experience, they have finally learnt how to mobilise. In eleven days the whole army is ready for combat, the infantry much sooner. But this requires that everything is organised in the simplest way and, in particular, that every individual soldier on leave is assigned in advance to the unit he is to join. The basis for this is that every regiment has its own permanent recruitment district, from which the corresponding Landwehr regiment also draws most of its recruits. The new French law, on the contrary, assigns the recruits and reservists to the regiment that happens to be in the district at the time of mobilisation. This was done out of attachment to a tradition handed down from the days of Napoleon whereby the individual regiments are garrisoned in all parts of France in turn and are supposed to be recruited as far as possible from the whole of France. Being obliged to drop the latter, they stuck all the more determinedly to the former, thus rendering impossible that permanent organic link between regiment command and territorial district command which ensures rapid mobilisation in Prussia. Even if this senseless change, which is bound to cause much more trouble for the specialised branches than for the infantry, only delays the mobilisation of the latter for three days, in the face of an active adversary they will be the most important three days of the entire campaign.

So what do all the immense French armaments come to? An infantry of the line equal to the German in numbers but more poorly organised, which, moreover, has to call up a number of men with only six months’ training in order to get on a war-footing; a first reserve which is dominated by men with only six months’ training for which at best a quarter of the necessary officers and non-commissioned officers are available; a second reserve of predominantly untrained men without any officers whatsoever, and for both reserves, of course, a total lack of regular cadres. In addition, the certain prospect of never being able to procure the officers that are lacking under the present system, so that in the case of war neither of the reserves will be able to perform better than the battalions hurriedly established in the autumn and winter of 1870.

Now let us take a look at the German Empire, which is gentle like a lamb and which supposedly does not even have any teeth, even less baring them. We have already shown the existence of an infantry of the line of 468 battalions, with 490,480 men on a war-footing. But to this must be added the following new formations.

Since the beginning of 1872 each battalion has been allocated another 36 recruits, making 17,000 men per year in round figures. Furthermore, a full quarter of the men have been released after two years’ service, this, however, being compensated by an equal number of new recruits, making about 28,000 men. Thus a total of 45,000 more men are being recruited and trained every year than hitherto, making by the end of 1875, in three years, 135,000 men, to which must be added 12,000 one-year volunteers (at 4,000 per year); all in all 147,000 men, or just enough to form a fourth battalion in each of the 148 regiments. The surplus reserve companies for this purpose have already been “organisationally prepared” in all the regiments of the line since the same time, i.e. the officers and non-commissioned officers of the line and of the reserves due to enter these battalions have already been selected. The fourth battalions can thus be on the march at the most two or three days after the first three, reinforcing the army by 148 battalions of 1,050 men = 155,400 men. But these figures do not by any means express the full addition to its strength that the field army thereby receives. Anyone who saw the Prussian fourth battalions in 1866 knows that, consisting chiefly of strong, physically mature men of 24-27 years, they are the vital core of the army.

Alongside the formation of the fourth battalions, the organisation of the reserve battalions—148 in number, not to mention the reserve companies of the riflemen—is going ahead. They are composed of the surplus trained reservists and the untrained men of the second reserve. Their strength was officially given as 188,690 men in 1871. By this it should be understood, however, that the cadres of officers and non-commissioned officers already appointed in peacetime are capable of training this number of men, for the second reserve alone, whose first class now has an annual intake of about 45,000 men, supplies in seven annual contingents far more than the above figure. The reserve battalions are, in fact, the reservoirs from which the battalions in the field, weakened by combat and even more by hardship, obtain the necessary re-inforcements of more or less trained men, and which then go on bringing themselves up to strength again from the second reserves.

At the same time as the line and the reserve troops, the Landwehr is mobilised. The cadres of the Landwehr, likewise already appointed in peacetime, comprise 287 battalions (to be brought up to 301). In the two last wars the Landwehr battalions were only brought up to 800 men; accepting this very low envisaged strength, we find that the German Empire can muster a Landwehr infantry of 229,600 organised troops, while an annually increasing surplus still remains available for subsequent use.

As if this were not enough, the Landsturm has also been revived. According to semi-official reports, by the end of 1874 the war-strength of the German infantry had already been increased by 234 Landsturm battalions (at 800 men = 187,200 men) excluding the rifle companies; which can only mean that the cadres for these battalions have at least been appointed after a fashion. But this is far from exhausting the Landsturm for according to Voigts-Rhetz’s triumphant announcement in Reichstag it embraces “five per cent of the population, two million men”.

So what does the balance-sheet look like?

France has an infantry of the line, including the troops serving in Algeria, of 530,800 men, and that is its total organised infantry. Even if we include the whole of the first reserve, insofar as it possesses any apparent organisation at all, 254,600 men (288 depot companies of 800 men, 30 rifle depots of 540 men and 8,000 surplus convicts), it still only makes 785,400 men on foot.

As for the German Empire, eleven days after the mobilisation order it can muster:

an infantry of the line of Two or three days later	490,480 men
another 148 battalions In another fortnight In another fortnight	155,400 "
287 Landwehr battalions of 800 men And after another fortnight	229,600 "
234 Landsturm battalions of 800 men	187,200 "
making a total infantry of	1,062,680 men

which already in peace-time is completely organised and supplied in advance with all necessities, backed up by 148 reserve battalions with a strength of 188,690 (see above) for filling the gaps caused by the campaign. All in all, an organised infantry body of 1,251,370 men.

Does anyone think we are exaggerating? By no means. We are still lagging behind the truth by neglecting various small factors which all the same amount to quite a respectable total when added up. Here is the evidence.

The Kölnische Zeitung of December 27, 1874 contains a “military announcement” emanating from the War Ministry from which we gather the following. At the end of 1873 the German Army on a war-footing amounted to:

1,361,400 men, of which infantry	994,900 men.
In 1874 were added the fourth battalions	155,400 "
and 234 battalions of the Landsturm	187,200 "
a total infantry of	1,337,500 men,

in other words, almost 100,000 men more than in our estimate. The same article puts the strength of the entire war capability of all arms at 1,723,148 men, of whom 39,948 are officers; while the French, on the other hand, have at the most 950,000 troops organised in advance, of which 785,000 are infantrymen!

As regards the quality of the troops—assuming the average warlike tendencies of each nation to be the same—that of the French army has certainly not improved since the war. The government has done everything to demoralise the troops, particularly by placing them in barracks, where in winter a soldier can neidier drill nor do anything else and is reduced exclusively, as it were, to drinking absinth. There is a lack of noncommissioned officers, the companies are weak, the cavalry regiments are seriously short of horses. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung emphasised this fact as late as January 15; at the time it was still preaching peace!

But the new army legislation places at the disposal of the French minister of war: 704,714 men of the line, 510,294 reserves, a territorial army of 582,523 men and its reserves of 625,633 men, making 2,423,164 men in all, which in an emergency can be brought up to 2,600,000! Certainly—although after careful scrutiny of the relevant documents, General Lewal announces that this total must be reduced to 2,377,000. And even this is enough to drive the best war minister mad. What on earth is he supposed to do with this host of men, almost two-thirds of whom are untrained? Where is he to obtain the officers and noncommissioned officers without whom he cannot train, much less organise, them?

In Germany the position is quite different. The strength of the army on a war-footing is already assumed to be 1,500,000 men in the motives of the Imperial Military Law. But as a result of this law, these are supplemented by five annual contingents of the second reserve, whose liability to service has been extended from their 27th year to the end of their 31st—45,000 men every year—making about 200,000 men. At least 200,000 surplus men over and above the war capability had already been on the registers. And in addition, there is the Landsturm with fully two million men; so that the German war minister has 3,900,000 men, if not four million, at his disposal. This army, as the semi-official quoted above says,

“even with conscription up to 1,800,000 men and more, will, with the exception of the recruits conscripted into the reserve army, consist throughout of experienced soldiers with a complete military training, a state which is not likely to be reached in France, including the Territorial Reserve, for another twenty years”.

We can see that it is not France but the German Empire of the Prussian Nation that is the true representative of militarism. Four million soldiers, ten per cent of the population! Let them go on. It suits us perfectly that the system is being taken to the furthest extremes. This system cannot be ultimately broken from without by another victorious military state, only from within, by its own inevitable consequences. And the more it is exaggerated, the sooner it will collapse. Four million soldiers! Social-Democracy will also be indebted to Bismarck when he raises the figure to five or six million and then as soon as possible starts calling up girls too.