Note on Page 29 of the Histoire de la Commune

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In 1876 Prosper Olivier Lissagaray, a French republican journalist and member of the Paris Commune, published a book in Brussels entitled Histoire de la Commune de 1871. The author, who drew on extensive factual material, exposed the anti-national policies of the French ruling circles and showed the part played by the people in the history of the Paris Commune. In a letter to Wilhelm Bracke written on September 23, 1876, Marx said that this book was “the first authentic history of the Commune” (see present edition, Vol. 45). Believing this work important for the proletarian party, Marx did a great deal to have a German translation of it published {Geschichte der Commune von 1871. Autorisirte deutsche Ausgabe nach dem vom Verfasser vervollständigten französischen Original, Brunswick, 1877).

Engels’ “Note on Page 29 of the Histoire de la Commune” provides, as it were, comments on the events that unfolded in France after the capitulation of Bazaine’s army in Metz on October 27 and until the complete encirclement of Paris in mid-November 1870. Engels, who had earlier written a series of articles (“Notes on the War”) for The Pall Mall Gazette (London), which appeared between July 1870 and June 1871 (see present edition, Vol. 22), had a good knowledge of the course of events and their underlying causes. He sent a copy of his comments to Lissagaray who on February 9, 1877 thanked the author for “a brilliant commentary” on the military events. Lissagaray included Engels’ text in the second French edition of his book, part changed and part verbatim.

Engels’ “Note” was first published, in Russian, in 1933. It now appears in English for the first time.

(M. THIERS' CEASEFIRE OF OCTOBER 30, 1870)

It took all the stupidity and deceitfulness of the men of September 4 to call the news of this ceasefire “good news”. Good indeed—for the Prussians.

The capitulation of Metz had just restored freedom of action to 6 Prussian army corps—120,000 men. Nobody but Trochu and Jules Favre could have failed to see that the imminent arrival of this new army in the centre of France would make any attempt to relieve Paris almost impossible, that this was not the moment for concluding ceasefires but for mounting a supreme military effort. Only a fortnight remained to do this; but this fortnight was precious, it was the critical phase of the war.

This was the situation.

In order to effect the blockade of Paris, the Germans had had to employ all their troops, with the exception of 3 divisions of infantry. They had no reserves, for these 3 divisions had, by occupying Orléans and Châteaudun forfeited this capacity, being held in check by the army of the Loire. To the west, north and east there was nothing but cavalry which, despite observing and covering a wide expanse of country, was incapable of holding it against infantry.

By the end of October the German line encircling Paris was already very heavily fortified towards the city; but any attack coming from outside would of necessity encounter the Prussians in open country. The appearance of 50,000 men, even young troops such as those which France then had at its disposal, would have been sufficient to break the blockade and restore communications between Paris and the rest of the country. But we have seen that it was necessary to act swiftly, and this is what happened:

The Paris government accepted a ceasefire which, although of short duration, gave relief to the German troops exhausted by the labours and sleepless nights of the blockade (October 30).

For his part, d’Aurelle de Paladines concentrated his army on November 2 at Vierzon with the intention of marching on Beaugency, of crossing the Loire there and advancing between the Prussians (22nd Division) occupying Châteaudun and the Bavarians who were holding Orléans. The march from Vierzon to Beaugency was about 45 kilometres and could easily be accomplished in two days. But if we are to believe a German source (Militärische Gedanken und Betrachtungen etc.), Gambetta was simple enough to believe that an army of 40,000 men could travel by railway at the same speed as an ordinary person. So he ordered the general—instead of making his army march—to transport it by railway from Vierzon to Tours and from there to Beaugency. The general protested; Gambetta insisted. So instead of a march of two days and 45 kilometres, the army of the Loire made a railway journey of 180 kilometres which took it five days and which, moreover, could not remain hidden from enemy reconnaissance. Not until the 7th was it once again concentrated at Beaugency and ready for action. But three precious days had been lost, and the enemy had knowledge of the movement carried out.

And what days! November 3 was the most critical day: the Prussian cavalry, a whole brigade, was forced to abandon Mantes and to retire to Vert in the face of numerous francs-tireurs; on the other hand, considerable French forces of all the arms were observed marching from Courville in the direction of Chartres. If the army of the Loire, instead of riding around in railway carriages, had attacked on the 4th, which it could have done; if it had pushed on between the Bavarians and the 22nd Prussian Division, which was an easy matter; if it had used its great numerical superiority to inflict a comprehensive defeat on them in turn and then to advance on Paris—then Paris would almost certainly have been liberated.

Moltke was by no means oblivious to the danger and had decided, if need be, to act as Napoleon had acted at Mantua: to lift the blockade, to sacrifice the siege park under formation at Villacoublay, to concentrate his army for action in open country and not to restore the blockade until victory was won, that is, after the arrival of the Metz army. The baggage of the Versailles headquarters had already been loaded on to waggons; all was ready for departure, all that remained was to harness the horses (according to the Swiss colonel von Erlach, an eye-witness).

If the Prussians had been forced to lift the blockade of Paris, this might have given rise to pressure from the rest of Europe and an honourable peace. In any event, the moral effect of such a feat would have been immense, first on Europe and then particularly on France and finally, in the opposite sense, on the Germans. And the material effects of such a feat! Paris would have had fifteen to twenty days at least to take in fresh supplies by all the railway lines from the south and the west, which would have enabled it to prolong its defence by one or two months. Moreover, an equivalent respite would have been obtained to organise the armies of the provinces; it would then no longer have been necessary to send them into battle without discipline, without training, without equipment, almost without arms. To give France a chance of success all that was needed was time; the opportunity to obtain it occurred on November 3 and 4; we have seen how this opportunity was missed.

Let us, however, follow the course of events.

Paris did not even make a sortie.

For a week the forces approaching Paris from the west made no attempt to attack. This is not surprising. These forces must have been rather weak; Gambetta’s decree instructing M. de Kératry to organise the army of the west is dated October 22!

There remained the army of the Loire, which had come into the line on November 7 at Beaugency. Not until the 9th did d’Aurelle attack the Bavarians at Coulmiers; as soon as the latter saw that the retreat of the 22nd Prussian Division, which was marching towards them from the direction of Chartres, was assured, they retired to Tours, where this division joined them the following day, November 10. D’Aurelle moved no more. Meanwhile, three corps, 60,000 men, of the Metz army were approaching from the Seine by forced marches. Two more Prussian divisions (the 3rd and the 4th), which had been sent by rail from Metz, had already arrived outside Paris. Moltke could therefore afford to direct the 17th Prussian Division to Tours, where it arrived on the 12th. There were thus 4 German divisions, about 35,000 men, in the line against the army of the Loire, which henceforth ceased to cause them any anxiety.

However, on November 14 considerable French forces moved from Dreux towards Houblon, two days’ march from Versailles. Moltke, who still had nothing but his cavalry in this direction, was unable to conduct sufficient reconnaissance to discover what forces might lie behind this advance guard. On that day he was once again about to abandon Versailles and to lift the blockade (Blume). This time, however, it was not a matter of days but of hours only. The first corps of the Metz army (IXth) reached Fontainebleau the same day; the Illrd was due at Nemours between the 16th and the 18th; and the Xth on the 19th at Joigny sur Yonne. Moltke directed the 17th Division to Rambouillet, the 22nd to Chartres, the Bavarians to Auneau, that is between the army of the Loire, to which he left open the road to Paris, and the troops who were threatening Versailles from the west. This time d’Aurelle’s inactivity was his salvation; if he had advanced into the gap that had opened up in front of him he would have been crushed between the two German forces ready to fall on his flanks. On November 19 the three corps of the 2nd Prussian army occupied Fontainebleau and Nemours, with their reserves on the Yonne; on November 20 the 1st army under Manteuffel had assembled on the line of the Oise from Compiègne to Noyon; the Metz army was protecting the blockade of Paris to the north and the south; the last chance of lifting the blockade had been lost, thanks to Trochu, Gambetta and d’Aurelle, whose mutual failings complemented one another, one might say, with the muchvaunted precision of the Prussian battalions.