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Special pages :
1. The Theory of Knowledge of Empirio-Criticism and of Dialectical Materialism - I
- Prefaces
- 1. The Theory of Knowledge of Empirio-Criticism and of Dialectical Materialism - I
- 2. The Theory of Knowledge of Empirio-Criticism and of Dialectical Materialism - II
- 3. The Theory of Knowledge of Dialectical Materialism and of Empirio-Criticism - III
- 4. The Philosophical Idealists as Comrades-In-Arms and Successors of Empirio-Criticism
- 5. The Recent Revolution in Natural Science and Philosophical Idealism
- 6. Empirio-Criticism and Historical Materialism
- Conclusion
- Supplement to 4.1: From What Angle Did N. G. Chernyshevsky Criticise Kantianism?
1. Sensations And Complexes Of Sensations[edit source]
The fundamental premises of the theory of knowledge of Mach and Avenarius are frankly, simply and clearly expounded by them in their early philosophical works. To these works we shall now turn, postponing for later treatment an examination of the corrections and emendations subsequently made by these writers.
Mach wrote in 1872:
âThe task of science can only be:
- To determine the laws of connection of ideas (Psychology).
- To discover the laws of connection of sensations (Physics).
- To explain the laws of connection between sensations and ideas (Psycho-physics).â[1]
This is quite clear.
The subject matter of physics is the connection between sensations and not between things or bodies, of which our sensations are the image. And in 1883, in his Mechanics, Mach repeats the same thought:
âSensations are not âsymbols of things.â The âthingâ is rather a mental symbol for a complex of sensations of relative stability. Not the things (bodies) but colours, sounds, pressures, spaces, times (what we usually call sensations) are the real elements of the world.â[2]
About this word âelements,â the fruit of twelve years of âreflection,â we shall speak later. At present let us note that Mach explicitly states here that things or bodies are complexes of sensations, and that he quite clearly sets up his own philosophical point of view against the opposite theory which holds that sensations are âsymbolsâ of things (it would be more correct to say images or reflections of things). The latter theory is philosophical materialism. For instance, the materialist Frederick Engelsâthe not unknown collaborator of Marx and a founder of Marxismâconstantly and without exception speaks in his works of things and their mental pictures or images (Gedanken-Abbilder), and it is obvious that these mental images arise exclusively from sensations. It would seem that this fundamental standpoint of the âphilosophy of Marxismâ ought to be known to everyone who speaks of it, and especially to anyone who comes out in print in the name of this philosophy. But because of the extraordinary confusion which our Machians have introduced, it becomes necessary to repeat what is generally known. We turn to the first section of Anti-DĂŒhring and read: â. . . things and their mental images . . .â;[3] or to the first section of the philosophical part, which reads:
âBut whence does thought obtain these principles [i.e., the fundamental principles of all knowledge]? From itself? No . . . these forms can never be created and derived by thought out of itself, but only from the external world . . . the principles are not the starting point of the investigation [as DĂŒhring who would be a materialist, but cannot consistently adhere to materialism, holds], but its final result; they are not applied to nature and human history, but abstracted from them; it is not nature and the realm of humanity which conform to these principles, but the principles are only valid in so far as they are in conformity with nature and history. That is the only materialistic conception of the matter, and Herr DĂŒhringâs contrary conception is idealistic, makes things stand completely on their heads, and fashions the real world out of ideasâ (ibid., p. 21).[4]
Engels, we repeat, applies this âonly materialistic conceptionâ everywhere and without exception, relentlessly attacking DĂŒhring for the least deviation from materialism to idealism. Anybody who reads Anti-DĂŒhring and Ludwig Feuerbach with the slightest care will find scores of instances when Engels speaks of things and their reflections in the human brain, in our consciousness, thought, etc. Engels does not say that sensations or ideas are âsymbolsâ of things, for consistent materialism must here use âimage,â picture, or reflection instead of âsymbol,â as we shall show in detail in the proper place. But the question here is not of this or that formulation of materialism, but of the opposition of materialism to idealism, of the difference between the two fundamental lines in philosophy. Are we to proceed from things to sensation and thought? Or are we to proceed from thought and sensation to things? The first line, i.e., the materialist line, is adopted by Engels. The second line, i.e., the idealist line, is adopted by Mach. No evasions, no sophisms (a multitude of which we shall yet encounter) can remove the clear and indisputable fact that Ernst Machâs doctrine that things are complexes of sensations is subjective idealism and a simple rehash of Berkeleianism. If bodies are âcomplexes of sensations,â as Mach says, or âcombinations of sensations,â as Berkeley said, it inevitably follows that the whole world is but my idea. Starting from such a premise it is impossible to arrive at the existence of other people besides oneself: it is the purest solipsism. Much as Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and the others may abjure solipsism, they cannot in fact escape solipsism without falling into howling logical absurdities. To make this fundamental element of the philosophy of Machism still clearer, we shall give a few additional quotations from Machâs works. Here is a sample from the Analyse der Empfindungen[5]; (I quote from Kotlyarâs Russian translation, published by Skirmunt, Moscow, 1907):
"We see a body with a point S. If we touch S, that is, bring it into contact with our body, we receive a prick. We can see S without feeling the prick. But as soon as we feel the prick we find S on the skin. Thus, the visible point is a permanent nucleus, to which, according to circumstances, the prick is attached as something accidental. By frequent repetitions of analogous occurrences we finally habituate ourselves to regard all properties of bodies as âeffectsâ which proceed from permanent nuclei and are conveyed to the self through the medium of the body; which effects we call sensations . . .â (p. 20).
In other words, people âhabituateâ themselves to adopt the standpoint of materialism, to regard sensations as the result of the action of bodies, things, nature on our sense organs. This âhabit,â so noxious to the philosophical idealists (a habit acquired by all mankind and all natural science!), is not at all to the liking of Mach, and he proceeds to destroy it:
â. . . Thereby, however, these nuclei are deprived of their entire sensible content and are converted into naked abstract symbols . . .â
An old song, most worthy Professor! This is a literal repetition of Berkeley who said that matter is a naked abstract symbol. But it is Ernst Mach, in fact, who goes naked, for if he does not admit that the âsensible contentâ is an objective reality, existing independently of us, there remains only a ânaked abstractâ I, an I infallibly written with a capital letter and italicised, equal to âthe insane piano, which imagined that it was the sole existing thing in this world.â If the âsensible contentâ of our sensations is not the external world then nothing exists save this naked I engaged in empty âphilosophicalâ acrobatics. A stupid and fruitless occupation!
â. . . It is then correct that the world consists only of our sensations. In which case we have knowledge only of sensations, and the assumption of those nuclei, and of their interaction, from which alone sensations proceed, turns out to be quite idle and superfluous. Such a view can only appeal to half-hearted realism or half-hearted criticism.â
We have quoted the sixth paragraph of Machâs âanti-metaphysical observationsâ in full. It is a sheer plagiarism on Berkeley. Not a single idea, not a glimmer of thought, except that âwe sense only our sensations.â From which there is only one possible inference, namely, that the âworld consists only of my sensations.â The word âourâ employed by Mach instead of âmyâ is employed illegitimately. By this word alone Mach betrays that âhalf-heartednessâ of which he accuses others. For if the âassumptionâ of the existence of the external world is âidle,â if the assumption that the needle exists independently of me and that an interaction takes place between my body and the point of the needle is really âidle and superfluous,â then primarily the âassumptionâ of the existence of other people is idle and superfluous. Only I exist, and all other people, as well as the external world, come under the category of idle ânuclei.â Holding this point of view one cannot speak of âourâ sensations; and when Mach does speak of them, it is only a betrayal of his own amazing half-heartedness. It only proves that his philosophy is a jumble of idle and empty words in which their author himself does not believe.
Here is a particularly graphic example of Machâs half heartedness and confusion. In § 6 of Chapter XI of the Analysis of Sensations we read:
âIf I imagine that while I am experiencing sensations, I or someone else could observe my brain with all possible physical and chemical appliances, it would be possible to ascertain with what processes of the organism particular sensations are connected . . . â (p. 197).
Very well! This means, then, that our sensations are connected with definite processes, which take place in the organism in general, and in our brain in particular? Yes, Mach very definitely makes this âassumption"âit would be quite a task not to make it from the standpoint of natural science! But is not this the very âassumptionâ of those very same ânuclei and their interactionâ which our philosopher declared to be idle and superfluous? We are told that bodies are complexes of sensations; to go beyond that, Mach assures us, to regard sensations as a product of the action of bodies upon our sense-organs, is metaphysics, an idle and superfluous assumption, etc., Ă la Berkeley. But the brain is a body. Consequently, the brain also is no more than a complex of sensations. It follows, then, that with the help of a complex of sensations I (and I also am nothing but a complex of sensations) sense complexes of sensations. A delightful philosophy! First sensations are declared to be âthe real elements of the world"; on this an âoriginalâ Berkeleianism is erectedâand then the very opposite view is smuggled in, viz., that sensations are connected with definite processes in the organism. Are not these âprocessesâ connected with an exchange of matter between the âorganismâ and the external world? Could this exchange of matter take place if the sensations of the particular organism did not give it an objectively correct idea of this external world?
Mach does not ask himself such embarrassing questions when he mechanically jumbles fragments of Berkeleianism with the views of natural science, which instinctively adheres to the materialist theory of knowledge. . . . In the same paragraph Mach writes: âIt is sometimes also asked whether (inorganic) âmatterâ experiences sensation....â Does this mean that there is no doubt that organic matter experiences sensation? Does this mean that sensation is not something primary but that it is one of the properties of matter? Mach skips over all the absurdities of Berkeleianism! . . . âThe question,â he avers, âis natural enough, if we proceed from the current widespread physical notions, according to which matter is the immediate and indisputably given reality, out of which everything, inorganic and organic, is constructed....â Let us bear in mind this truly valuable admission of Machâs that the current widespread physical notions regard matter as the immediate reality, and that only one variety of this reality (organic matter) possesses the well-defined property of sensation. . . . Mach continues:
âThen, indeed, sensation must suddenly arise somewhere in this structure consisting of matter, or else have previously been present in the foundation. From our standpoint the question is a false one. For us matter is not what is primarily given. Rather, what is primarily given are the elements (which in a certain familiar relation are designated as sensations). . . . â
What is primarily given, then, are sensations, although they are âconnectedâ only with definite processes in organic matter! And while uttering such absurdities Mach wants to blame materialism ("the current widespread physical notion") for leaving unanswered the question whence sensation âarises.â This is a sample of the ârefutationâ of materialism by the fideists and their hangers-on. Does any other philosophical standpoint âsolveâ a problem before enough data for its solution has been collected? Does not Mach himself say in the very same paragraph: âSo long as this problem (how far sensation extends in the organic world) has not been solved even in a single special case, no answer to the question is possible.â
The difference between materialism and âMachismâ in this particular question thus consists in the following. Materialism, in full agreement with natural science, takes matter as primary and regards consciousness, thought, sensation as secondary, because in its well-defined form sensation is associated only with the higher forms of matter (organic matter), while âin the foundation of the structure of matterâ one can only surmise the existence of a faculty akin to sensation. Such, for example, is the supposition of the well-known German scientist Ernst Haeckel, the English biologist Lloyd Morgan and others, not to speak of Diderotâs conjecture mentioned above. Machism holds to the opposite, the idealist point of view, and at once lands into an absurdity: since, in the first place, sensation is taken as primary, in spite of the fact that it is associated only with definite processes in matter organised in a definite way; and since, in the second place, the basic premise that bodies are complexes of sensations is violated by the assumption of the existence of other living beings and, in general, of other âcomplexesâ besides the given great I.
The word âelement,â which many naĂŻve people (as we shall see) take to be some sort of a new discovery, in reality only obscures the question, for it is a meaningless term which creates the false impression that a solution or a step forward has been achieved. This impression is a false one, because there still remains to be investigated and reinvestigated how matter, apparently entirely devoid of sensation, is related to matter which, though composed of the same atoms (or electrons), is yet endowed with a well-defined faculty of sensation. Materialism clearly formulates the as yet unsolved problem and thereby stimulates the attempt to solve it, to undertake further experimental investigation. Machism, which is a species of muddled idealism, befogs the issue and side tracks it by means of the futile verbal trick, âelement.â
Here is a passage from Machâs latest, comprehensive and conclusive philosophical work that clearly betrays the falsity of this idealist trick. In his Knowledge and Error we read:
âWhile there is no difficulty in constructing (aufzubauen) every physical experience out of sensations, i.e., psychical elements, it is impossible to imagine (ist keine Möglichkeit abzusehen) how any psychical experience can be composed (darstellen) of the elements employed in modern physics, i.e., mass and motion (in their rigidityâStarrheitâwhich is serviceable only for this special science).â[6]
Of the rigidity of the conceptions of many modern scientists and of their metaphysical (in the Marxist sense of the term, i.e., anti-dialectical) views, Engels speaks repeatedly and very precisely. We shall see later that it was just on this point that Mach went astray, because he did not understand or did not know the relation between relativism and dialectics. But this is not what concerns us here. It is important for us here to note how glaringly Machâs idealism emerges, in spite of the confusedâostensibly newâterminology. There is no difficulty, you see, in constructing any physical element out of sensations, i.e., psychical elements! Oh yes, such constructions, of course, are not difficult, for they are purely verbal constructions, shallow scholasticism, serving as a loophole for fideism. It is not surprising after this that Mach dedicates his works to the immanentists; it is not surprising that the immanentists, who profess the most reactionary kind of philosophical idealism, welcome Mach with open arms. The ârecent positivismâ of Ernst Mach was only about two hundred years too late. Berkeley had already sufficiently shown that âout of sensations, i.e., psychical elements,â nothing can be âbuiltâ except solipsism. As regards materialism, against which Mach here, too, sets up his own views, without frankly and explicitly naming the âenemy,â we have already seen in the case of Diderot what the real views of the materialists are. These views do not consist in deriving sensation from the movement of matter or in reducing sensation to the movement of matter, but in recognising sensation as one of the properties of matter in motion. On this question Engels shared the standpoint of Diderot. Engels dissociated himself from the âvulgarâ materialists, Vogt, BĂŒchner and Moleschott, for the very reason, among others, that they erred in believing that the brain secretes thought in the same way as the liver secretes bile. But Mach, who constantly sets up his views in opposition to materialism, ignores, of course, all the great materialistsâDiderot, Feuerbach, Marx and Engelsâjust as all other official professors of official philosophy do.
In order to characterise Avenariusâ earliest and basic view, let us take his first independent philosophical work, Philosophy as a Conception of the World According to the Principle of the Minimum Expenditure of Effort. Prolegomena to a Critique of Pure Experience, which appeared in 1876. Bogdanov in his Empirio-Monism (Bk. I, 2nd ed., 1905, p. 9, note) says that âin the development of Machâs views, the starting point was philosophical idealism, while a realistic tinge was characteristic of Avenarius from the very beginning.â Bogdanov said so because he believed what Mach said (see Analysis of Sensations, Russian translation, p. 288). Bogdanov should not have believed Mach, and his assertion is diametrically opposed to the truth. On the contrary, Avenariusâ idealism emerges so clearly in his work of 1876 that Avenarius himself in 1891 was obliged to admit it. In the introduction to The Human Concept of the World Avenarius says: âHe who has read my first systematic work, Philosophie, etc., will at once have presumed that I would have attempted to treat the problems of a criticism of pure experience from the âidealistâ standpointâ (Der menschliche Weltbegriff, 1891, Vorwort, S. ix [The Human Concept of the World, 1891, Foreword, p. ix]), but âthe sterility of philosophical idealism compelled me to doubt the correctness of my previous pathâ (p. x). This idealist starting point of Avenariusâ is universally acknowledged in philosophical literature. Of the French writers I shall refer to Cauwelaert, who says that Avenariusâ philosophical standpoint in the Prolegomena is âmonistic idealism.â[7] Of the German writers, I shall name Rudolf Willy, Avenariusâ disciple, who says that âAvenarius in his youthâand particularly in his work of 1876âwas totally under the spell (ganz im Banne) of so-called epistemological idealism.â[8]
And, indeed, it would be ridiculous to deny the idealism in Avenariusâ Prolegomena, where he explicitly states that âonly sensation can be thought of as the existingâ (pp. 10 and 65 of the second German edition; all italics in quotations are ours). This is how Avenarius himself presents the contents of § 116 of his work. Here is the paragraph in full:
âWe have recognised that the existing (das Seiende) is substance endowed with sensation; the substance falls away [it is âmore economical,â donât you see, there is âa lesser expenditure of effortâ in thinking that there is no âsubstanceâ and that no external world exists!], sensation remains; we must then regard the existing as sensation, at the basis of which there is nothing which does not possess sensation (nichts Empfindungsloses).â
Sensation, then, exists without âsubstance,â i.e., thought exists without brain! Are there really philosophers capable of defending this brainless philosophy? There are! Professor Richard Avenarius is one of them. And we must pause for a while to consider this defence, difficult though it be for a normal person to take it seriously. Here, in §§ 89 and 90 of this same work, is Avenariusâ argument:
â. . . The proposition that motion produces sensation is based on apparent experience only. This experience, which includes the act of perception, consists, presumably, in the fact that sensation is generated in a certain kind of substance (brain) as a result of transmitted motion (excitation) and with the help of other material conditions (e.g., blood). Howeverâapart from the fact that such generation has never itself (selbst) been observedâin order to construct the supposed experience, as an experience which is real in all its component parts, empirical proof, at least, is required to show that sensation, which assumedly is caused in a certain substance by transmitted motion, did not already exist in that substance in one way or another; so that the appearance of sensation cannot be conceived of in any other way than as a creative act on the part of the transmitted motion. Thus only by proving that where a sensation now appears there was none previously, not even a minimal one, would it be possible to establish a fact which, denoting as it does some act of creation, contradicts all the rest of experience and radically changes all the rest of our conception of nature (Naturanschauung). But such proof is not furnished by any experience, and cannot be furnished by any experience; on the contrary, the notion of a state of a substance totally devoid of sensation which subsequently begins to experience sensation is only a hypothesis. But this hypothesis merely complicates and obscures our understanding instead of simplifying and clarifying it.
Should the so-called experience, viz., that the sensation is caused by a transmitted motion in a substance that begins to perceive from this moment, prove upon closer examination to be only apparent, there still remains sufficient material in the content of the experience to ascertain at least the relative origin of sensation from conditions of motion, namely, to ascertain that the sensation which is present, although latent or minimal, or for some other reason not manifest to the consciousness, becomes, owing to transmitted motion, released or enhanced or made manifest to the consciousness. However, even this bit of the remaining content of experience is only an appearance. Were we even by an ideal observation to trace the motion proceeding from the moving substance A, transmitted through a series of intermediate centres and reaching the substance B, which is endowed with sensation, we should at best find that sensation in substance B is developed or becomes enhanced simultaneously with the reception of the incoming motionâbut we should not find that this occurred as a consequence of the motion. . . .â
We have purposely quoted this refutation of materialism by Avenarius in full, in order that the reader may see to what truly pitiful sophistries ârecentâ empirio-critical philosophy resorts. We shall compare with the argument of the idealist Avenarius the materialist argument ofâBogdanov, if only to punish Bogdanov for his betrayal of materialism!
In long bygone days, fully nine years ago, when Bogdanov was half âa natural-historical materialistâ (that is, an adherent of the materialist theory of knowledge, to which the overwhelming majority of contemporary scientists instinctively hold), when he was only half led astray by the muddled Ostwald, he wrote:
âFrom ancient times to the present day, descriptive psychology has adhered to the classification of the facts of consciousness into three categories: the domain of sensations and ideas, the domain of emotions and the domain of impulses. . . . To the first category belong the images of phenomena of the outer or inner world, as taken by themselves in consciousness. . . . Such an image is called a âsensationâ if it is directly produced through the sense-organs by its corresponding external phenomenon.â[9]
And a little farther on he says: âSensation . . . arises in consciousness as a result of a certain impulse from the external environment transmitted by the external sense-organsâ (p. 222). And further: âSensation is the foundation of mental life; it is its immediate connection with the external worldâ (p. 240). âAt each step in the process of sensation a transformation of the energy of external excitation into a state of consciousness takes placeâ (p. 133). And even in 1905 when with the gracious assistance of Ostwald and Mach Bogdanov had already abandoned the materialist standpoint in philosophy for the idealist standpoint, he wrote (from forgetfulness!) in his Empirio-Monism:
âAs is known, the energy of external excitation, transformed at the nerve-ends into a âtelegraphicâ form of nerve current (still insufficiently investigated but devoid of all mysticism), first reaches the neurons that are located in the so-called âlowerâ centresâganglial, cerebro-spinal, subcortical, etc.â (Bk. I, 2nd ed., 1905, p. 118.)
For every scientist who has not been led astray by professorial philosophy, as well as for every materialist, sensation is indeed the direct connection between consciousness and the external world; it is the transformation of the energy of external excitation into a state of consciousness. This transformation has been, and is, observed by each of us a million times on every hand. The sophism of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that it regards sensation as being not the connection between consciousness and the external world, but a fence, a wall, separating consciousness from the external worldânot an image of the external phenomenon corresponding to the sensation, but as the âsole entity.â Avenarius gave but a slightly changed form to this old sophism, which had been already worn threadbare by Bishop Berkeley. Since we do not yet know all the conditions of the connection we are constantly observing between sensation and matter organised in a definite way, let us therefore acknowledge the existence of sensation aloneâthat is what the sophism of Avenarius reduces itself to.
To conclude our description of the fundamental idealist premises of empirio-criticism, we shall briefly refer to the English and French representatives of this philosophical trend. Mach explicitly says of Karl Pearson, the Englishman, that he (Mach) is âin agreement with his epistemological (erkenntniskritischen) views on all essential pointsâ (Mechanik, ed. previously cited, p. ix). Pearson in turn agrees with Mach.[10] For Pearson âreal thingsâ are âsense-impressions.â He declares the recognition of things outside the boundaries of sense impressions to be metaphysics. Pearson fights materialism with great determination (although he does not know Feuerbach, or Marx and Engels); his arguments do not differ from those analysed above. However, the desire to masquerade as a materialist is so foreign to Pearson (that is a specialty of the Russian Machians), Pearson is soâincautious, that he invents no ânewâ names for his philosophy and simply declares that his views and those of Mach are âidealistâ (ibid., p. 326)! He traces his genealogy directly to Berkeley and Hume. The philosophy of Pearson, as we shall repeatedly find, is distinguished from that of Mach by its far greater integrity and consistency.
Mach explicitly declares his solidarity with the French physicists, Pierre Duhem and Henri PoincarĂ©[11]. We shall have occasion to deal with the particularly confused and inconsistent philosophical views of these writers in the chapter on the new physics. Here we shall content ourselves with noting that for PoincarĂ© things are âgroups of sensationsâ[12] and that a similar view is casually expressed by Duhem.[13]
We shall now proceed to examine how Mach and Avenarius, having admitted the idealist character of their original views, corrected them in their subsequent works.
2. âThe Discovery of the World-Elementsâ[edit source]
Such is the title under which Friedrich Adler, lecturer at the University of ZĂŒrich, probably the only German author also anxious to supplement Marx with Machism, writes of Mach.[14] And this naĂŻve university lecturer must be given his due: in his simplicity of heart he does Machism more harm than good. At least, he puts the question point-blankâdid Mach really âdiscover the world-elements"? If so, then, only very backward and ignorant people, of course, can still remain materialists. Or is this discovery a return on the part of Mach to the old philosophical errors?
We saw that Mach in 1872 and Avenarius in 1876 held a purely idealist view; for them the world is our sensation. In 1883 Machâs Mechanik appeared, and in the preface to the first edition Mach refers to Avenariusâ Prolegomena, and greets his ideas as being âvery closeâ (sehr verwandte) to his own philosophy. Here are the arguments in the Mechanik concerning the elements:
âAll natural science can only picture and represent (nachbilden und vorbilden) complexes of those elements which we ordinarily call sensations. It is a matter of the connection of these elements. . . The connection of A (heat) with B (flame) is a problem of physics, that of A and N (nerves) a problem of physiology. Neither exists separately; both exist in conjunction. Only temporarily can we neglect either. Even processes that are apparently purely mechanical, are thus always physiologicalâ (op. cit., German ed., p. 498).
We find the same in the Analysis of Sensations:
âWherever . . . the terms âsensation,â âcomplex of sensations,â are used alongside of or in place of the terms âelement,â âcomplex of elements,â it must be borne in mind that it is only in this connection [namely, in the connection of A, B, C with K, L, M, that is, in the connection of âcomplexes which we ordinarily call bodiesâ with âthe complex which we call our bodyâ] and relation, only in this functional dependence that the elements are sensations. In another functional dependence they are at the same time physical objectsâ (Russian translation, pp. 23 and 17).
âA colour is a physical object when we consider its dependence, for instance, upon the source of illumination (other colours, temperatures, spaces and so forth). When we, however, consider its dependence upon the retina (the elements K, L, M), it is a psychological object, a sensationâ (ibid., p. 24).
Thus the discovery of the world-elements amounts to this:
- all that exists is declared to be sensation,
- sensations are called elements,
- elements are divided into the physical and the psychical; the latter is that which depends on the human nerves and the human organism generally; the former does not depend on them;
- the connection of physical elements and the connection of psychical elements, it is declared, do not exist separately from each other; they exist only in conjunction;
- it is possible only temporarily to leave one or the other connection out of account;
- the ânewâ theory is declared to be free from âone-sidedness.â[15]
Indeed, it is not one-sidedness we have here, but an in coherent jumble of antithetical philosophical points of view. Since you base yourself only on sensations you do not correct the âone-sidednessâ of your idealism by the term âelement,â but only confuse the issue and cravenly hide from your own theory. In a word, you eliminate the antithesis between the physical and psychical,[16] between materialism (which regards nature, matter, as primary) and idealism (which regards spirit, mind, sensation as primary); indeed, you promptly restore this antithesis; you restore it surreptitiously, retreating from your own fundamental premise! For, if elements are sensations, you have no right even for a moment to accept the existence of âelementsâ independently of my nerves and my mind. But if you do admit physical objects that are independent of my nerves and my sensations and that cause sensation only by acting upon my retinaâyou are disgracefully abandoning your âone-sidedâ idealism and adopting the standpoint of âone-sidedâ materialism! If colour is a sensation only depending upon the retina (as natural science compels you to admit), then light rays, falling upon the retina, produce the sensation of colour. This means that outside us, independently of us and of our minds, there exists a movement of matter, let us say of ether waves of a definite length and of a definite velocity, which, acting upon the retina, produce in man the sensation of a particular colour. This is precisely how natural science regards it. It explains the sensations of various colours by the various lengths of light-waves existing outside the human retina, outside man and independently of him. This is materialism: matter acting upon our sense-organs produces sensation. Sensation depends on the brain, nerves, retina, etc., i.e., on matter organised in a definite way. The existence of matter does not depend on sensation. Matter is primary. Sensation, thought, consciousness are the supreme product of matter organised in a particular way. Such are the views of materialism in general, and of Marx and Engels in particular. Mach and Avenarius secretly smuggle in materialism by means of the word âelement,â which supposedly frees their theory of the âone-sidednessâ of subjective idealism, supposedly permits the assumption that the mental is dependent on the retina, nerves and so forth, and the assumption that the physical is independent of the human organism. In fact, of course, the trick with the word âelementâ is a wretched sophistry, for a materialist who reads Mach and Avenarius will immediately ask: what are the âelements"? It would, indeed, be childish to think that one can dispose of the fundamental philosophical trends by inventing a new word. Either the âelementâ is a sensation, as all empirio-criticists, Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt,[17] etc., maintainâin which case your philosophy, gentlemen, is idealism vainly seeking to hide the nakedness of its solipsism under the cloak of a more âobjectiveâ terminology; or the âelementâ is not a sensationâin which case absolutely no thought whatever is attached to the ânewâ term; it is merely an empty bauble.
Take Petzoldt, for instance, the last word in empirio-criticism, as V. Lesevich, the first and most outstanding Russian empirio-criticist describes him.[18] Having defined elements as sensations, he says in the second volume of the work mentioned:
âIn the statement that âsensations are the elements of the worldâ one must guard against taking the term âsensationâ as denoting something only subjective and therefore ethereal, transforming the ordinary picture of the world into an illusion (VerflĂŒchtigendes).â[19]
One speaks of what hurts one most! Petzoldt feels that the world âevaporatesâ (verflĂŒchtigt sich), or becomes transformed into an illusion, when sensations are regarded as world-elements. And the good Petzoldt imagines that he helps matters by the reservation that sensation must not be taken as something only subjective! Is this not a ridiculous sophistry? Does it make any difference whether we âtakeâ sensation as sensation or whether we try to stretch the meaning of the term? Does this do away with the fact that sensations in man are connected with normally functioning nerves, retina, brain, etc., that the external world exists independently of our sensations? If you are not trying to evade the issue by a subterfuge, if you are really in earnest in wanting to âguardâ against subjectivism and solipsism, you must above all guard against the fundamental idealist premises of your philosophy; you must replace the idealist line of your philosophy (from sensations to the external world) by the materialist line (from the external world to sensations); you must abandon that empty and muddled verbal embellishment, âelement,â and simply say that colour is the result of the action of a physical object on the retina, which is the same as saying that sensation is a result of the action of matter on our sense-organs.
Let us take Avenarius. The most valuable material on the question of the âelementsâ is to be found in his last work (and, it might be said, the most important for the comprehension of his philosophy), Notes on the Concept of the Subject of Psychology.[20] The author, by the way, here gives a very âgraphicâ table (Vol. XVIII, p. 410), the main part of which we reproduce here:
Things, or the substantial | Elements, complexes of elements: Corporeal things |
---|---|
Thoughts, or the mental | Incorporeal things, recollections and fantasies |
Compare this with what Mach says after all his elucidation of the âelementsâ (Analysis of Sensations, p. 33): âIt is not bodies that produce sensations, but complexes of elements (complexes of sensations) that make up bodies.â Here you have the âdiscovery of the world-elementsâ that overcomes the one-sidedness of idealism and materialism! At first we are assured that the âelementsâ are something new, both physical and psychical at the same time; then a little correction is surreptitiously inserted: instead of the crude, materialist differentiation of matter (bodies, things) and the psychical (sensations, recollections, fantasies) we are presented with the doctrine of ârecent positivismâ regarding elements substantial and elements mental. Adler (Fritz) did not gain very much from âthe discovery of the world-elements"!
Bogdanov, arguing against Plekhanov in 1906, wrote:
â. . . I cannot own myself a Machian in philosophy. In the general philosophical conception there is only one thing I borrowed from Machâthe idea of the neutrality of the elements of experience in relation to the âphysicalâ and âpsychicalâ and the dependence of these characteristics solely on the connection of experience.â (Empirio-Monism, Bk. III, St. Petersburg, 1906, p. xli.)
This is as though a religious man were to sayâI cannot own myself a believer in religion, for there is âonly one thingâ I have borrowed from the believersâthe belief in God. This âonly one thingâ which Bogdanov borrowed from Mach is the basic error of Machism, the basic falsity of its entire philosophy. Those deviations of Bogdanovâs from empirio-criticism to which he himself attaches great significance are in fact of entirely secondary importance and amount to nothing more than inconsiderable private and individual differences between the various empirio-criticists who are approved by Mach and who approve Mach (we shall speak of this in greater detail later). Hence when Bogdanov was annoyed at being confused with the Machians he only revealed his failure to understand what radically distinguishes materialism from what is common to Bogdanov and to all other Machians. How Bogdanov developed, improved or worsened Machism is not important What is important is that he has abandoned the materialist standpoint and has thereby inevitably condemned himself to confusion and idealist aberrations.
In 1899, as we saw, Bogdanov had the correct standpoint when he wrote: âThe image of the man before me, directly given to me by vision, is a sensation.â[21] Bogdanov did not trouble to give a criticism of this earlier position of his. He blindly believed Mach and began to repeat after him that the âelementsâ of experience are neutral in relation to the physical and psychical. âAs has been established by recent positivist philosophy,â wrote Bogdanov in Book I of Empirio-Monism (2nd ed., p. 90), âthe elements of psychical experience are identical with the elements of experience in general, as they are identical with the elements of physical experience.â Or in 1906 (Bk. III, p. xx): âas to âidealism,â can it be called idealism merely on the grounds that the elements of âphysical experienceâ are regarded as identical with the elements of âpsychical experience,â or with elementary sensationsâwhen this is simply an indubitable fact?â
Here we have the true source of all Bogdanovâs philosophical misadventures, a source which he shares with the rest of the Machians. We can and must call it idealism when âthe elements of physical experienceâ (i.e., the physical, the external world, matter) are regarded as identical with sensations, for this is sheer Berkeleianism. There is not a trace here of recent philosophy, or positivist philosophy, or of indubitable fact. It is merely an old, old idealist sophism. And were one to ask Bogdanov how he would prove the âindubitable factâ that the physical is identical with sensations, one would get no other argument save the eternal refrain of the idealists: I am aware only of my sensations; the âtestimony of self-consciousnessâ (die Aussage des Selbstbewusstseins) of Avenarius in his Prolegomena (2nd German ed., § 93, p. 56); or: âin our experience [which testifies that âwe are sentient substanceâ] sensation is given us with more certainty than is substantialityâ (ibid., § 91, p. 55), and so on and so forth. Bogdanov (trusting Mach) accepted a reactionary philosophical trick as an âindubitable fact.â For, indeed, not a single fact was or could be cited which would refute the view that sensation is an image of the external worldâa view which was shared by Bogdanov in 1899 and which is shared by natural science to this day. In his philosophical wanderings the physicist Mach has completely strayed from the path of âmodern science.â Regarding this important circumstance, which Bogdanov overlooked, we shall have much to say later.
One of the circumstances which helped Bogdanov to jump so quickly from the materialism of the natural scientists to the muddled idealism of Mach was (apart from the influence of Ostwald) Avenariusâ doctrine of the dependent and independent series of experience. Bogdanov himself expounds the matter in Book I of his Empirio-Monism thus:
âIn so far as the data of experience appear in dependence upon the state of the particular nervous system, they form the psychical world of the particular person, in so far as the data of experience are taken outside of such a dependence, we have before us the physical world. Avenarius therefore characterises these two realms of experience respectively as the dependent series and the independent series of experienceâ (p. 18).
That is just the whole trouble, the doctrine of the independent (i.e., independent of human sensation) âseriesâ is a surreptitious importation of materialism, which, from the standpoint of a philosophy that maintains that bodies are complexes of sensations, that sensations are âidenticalâ with physical âelements,â is illegitimate, arbitrary, and eclectic. For once you have recognised that the source of light and light-waves exists independently of man and the human consciousness, that colour is dependent on the action of these waves upon the retina, you have in fact adopted the materialist standpoint and have completely destroyed all the âindubitable factsâ of idealism, together with all âthe complexes of sensations,â the elements discovered by recent positivism, and similar nonsense.
That is just the whole trouble. Bogdanov (like the rest of the Russian Machians) has never looked into the idealist views originally held by Mach and Avenarius, has never understood their fundamental idealist premises, and has therefore failed to discover the illegitimacy and eclecticism of their subsequent attempts to smuggle in materialism surreptitiously. Yet, just as the initial idealism of Mach and Avenarius is generally acknowledged in philosophical literature, so is it generally acknowledged that subsequently empirio-criticism endeavoured to swing towards materialism. Cauwelaert, the French writer quoted above, asserts that Avenariusâ Prolegomena is âmonistic idealism,â The Critique of Pure Experience[22] (1888â90) is âabsolute realism,â while The Human Concept of the World (1891) is an attempt âto explainâ the change. Let us note that the term realism is here employed as the antithesis of idealism. Following Engels, I use only the term materialism in this sense, and consider it the sole correct terminology, especially since the term ârealismâ has been bedraggled by the positivists and the other muddleheads who oscillate between materialism and idealism. For the present it will suffice to note that Cauwelaert had the indisputable fact in mind that in the Prolegomena (1876) sensation, according to Avenarius, is the only entity, while âsubstance"âin accordance with the principle of âthe economy of thought"!âis eliminated, and that in the Critique of Pure Experience the physical is taken as the independent series, while the psychical and, consequently, sensations, are taken as the dependent series.
Avenariusâ disciple Rudolf Willy likewise admits that Avenarius was a âcompleteâ idealist in 1876, but subsequently âreconciledâ (Ausgleich) ânaĂŻve realismâ (i.e., the instinctive, unconscious materialist standpoint adopted by humanity, which regards the external world as existing independently of our minds) with this teaching (loc. cit.).
Oskar Ewald, the author of the book Avenarius as the Founder of Empirio-Criticism, says that this philosophy combines contradictory idealist and ârealistâ (he should have said materialist) elements (not in Machâs sense, but in the human sense of the term element). For example, âthe absolute [method of consideration] would perpetuate naĂŻve realism, the relative would declare exclusive idealism as permanent."[23] Avenarius calls the absolute method of consideration that which corresponds to Machâs connection of âelementsâ outside our body, and the relative that which corresponds to Machâs connection of âelementsâ dependent on our body.
But of particular interest to us in this respect is the opinion of Wundt, who himself, like the majority of the above mentioned writers, adheres to the confused idealist standpoint, but who has analysed empirio-criticism perhaps more attentively than all the others. p. Yushkevich has the following to say in this connection: âIt is interesting to note that Wundt regards empirio-criticism as the most scientific form of the latest type of materialism,â[24] i.e., the type of those materialists who regard the spiritual as a function of corporeal processes (and whomâwe would addâWundt defines as standing midway between Spinozism[25] and absolute materialism[26]).
True, this opinion of Wundtâs is extremely interesting. But what is even more âinterestingâ is Mr. Yushkevichâs attitude towards the books and articles on philosophy of which he treats. This is a typical example of the attitude of our Machians to such matters. Gogolâs Petrushka[27] used to read and find it interesting that letters always combined to make words. Mr. Yushkevich read Wundt and found it âinterestingâ that Wundt accused Avenarius of materialism. If Wundt is wrong, why not refute him? If he is right, why not explain the antithesis between materialism and empirio-criticism? Mr. Yushkevich finds what the idealist Wundt says âinteresting,â but this Machian regards it as a waste of effort to endeavour to go to the root of the matter (probably on the principle of âthe economy of thoughtâ). . .
The point is that by informing the reader that Wundt accuses Avenarius of materialism, and by not informing him that Wundt regards some aspects of empirio-criticism as materialism and others as idealism and holds that the connection between the two is artificial, Yushkevich entirely distorted the matter. Either this gentleman absolutely does not understand what he reads, or he was prompted by a desire to indulge in false self-praise with the help of Wundt, as if to say: you see, the official professors regard us, too, as materialists, and not as muddleheads.
The above-mentioned article by Wundt constitutes a large book (more than 300 pages), devoted to a detailed analysis first of the immanentist school, and then of the empirio-criticists. Why did Wundt connect these two schools? Because he considers them closely akin ; and this opinion, which is shared by Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and the immanentists is, as we shall see later, entirely correct. Wundt shows in the first part of this article that the immanentists are idealists, subjectivists and adherents of fideism. This, too, as we shall see later, is a perfectly correct opinion, although Wundt expounds it with a superfluous ballast of professorial erudition, with superfluous niceties and reservations, which is to be explained by the fact that Wundt himself is an idealist and fideist. He reproaches the immanentists not because they are idealists and adherents of fideism, but because, in his opinion, they arrive at these great principles by incorrect methods. Further, the second and third parts of Wundtâs article are devoted to empirio-criticism. There he quite definitely points out that very important theoretical propositions of empirio-criticism (e.g., the interpretation of âexperienceâ and the âprincipal co-ordination,â of which we shall speak later) are identical with those held by the immanentists (die empiriokritische in Uebereinstimmung mit der immanenten Philosophie annimmt, S. 382). Other of Avenariusâ theoretical propositions are borrowed from materialism, and in general empirio-criticism is a âmotleyâ (bunte Mischung, ibid., S. 57), in which the âvarious component elements are entirely heterogeneousâ (an sich einander völlig heterogen sind, S. 56).
Wundt regards Avenariusâ doctrine of the âindependent vital series,â in particular, as one of the materialist morsels of the Avenarius-Mach hotchpotch. If you start from the âsystem Câ (that is how Avenariusâwho was very fond of making erudite play of new termsâdesignates the human brain or the nervous system in general), and if the mental is for you a function of the brain, then this âsystem Câ is a âmetaphysical substance"âsays Wundt (ibid., p. 64), and your doctrine is materialism. It should be said that many idealists and all agnostics (Kantians and Humeans included) call the materialists metaphysicians, because it seems to them that to recognise the existence of an external world independent of the human mind is to transcend the bounds of experience. Of this terminology and its utter incorrectness from the point of view of Marxism, we shall speak in its proper place. Here it is important to note that the recognition of the âindependentâ series by Avenarius (and also by Mach, who expresses the same idea in different words) is, according to the general opinion of philosophers of various parties, i.e., of various trends in philosophy, an appropriation from materialism. If you assume that everything that exists is sensation, or that bodies are complexes of sensations, you cannot, without violating all your fundamental premises, all âyourâ philosophy, arrive at the conclusion that the physical exists independently of our minds, and that sensation is a function of matter organised in a definite way. Mach and Avenarius, in their philosophy, combine fundamental idealist premises with individual materialist deductions for the very reason that their theory is an example of that âpauperâs broth of eclecticismâ[28] of which Engels speaks with just contempt.[29]
This eclecticism is particularly marked in Machâs latest philosophical work, Knowledge and Error, 2nd edition, 1906. We have already seen that Mach there declared that âthere is no difficulty in constructing every physical element out of sensation, i.e., out of psychical elements,â and in the same book we read: âDependencies outside the boundary U [ = Umgrenzung, i.e., âthe spatial boundary of our body,â S. 8] are physics in the broadest senseâ (S. 323, § 4). âTo obtain those dependencies in a pure state (rein erhalten) it is necessary as much as possible to eliminate the influence of the observer, that is, of those elements that lie within Uâ (loc. cit.). Well, well, the titmouse first promised to set the sea on fire. . . i.e., to construct physical elements from psychical elements, and then it turns out that physical elements lie beyond the boundary of psychical elements, âwhich lie within our bodyâ! A remarkable philosophy!
Another example:
âA perfect (vollkommenes) gas, a perfect liquid, a perfect elastic body, does not exist; the physicist knows that his fictions only approximate to the facts and arbitrarily simplify them; he is aware of the divergence, which cannot be eliminatedâ (S. 418, § 30).
What divergence (Abweichung) is meant here? The divergence of what from what? Of thought (physical theory) from the facts. And what are thoughts, ideas? Ideas are the âtracks of sensationsâ (S. 9). And what are facts? Facts are âcomplexes of sensations.â And so, the divergence of the tracks of sensations from complexes of sensations cannot be eliminated.
What does this mean? It means that Mach forgets his own theory and, when treating of various problems of physics, speaks plainly, without idealist twists, i.e., materialistically. All the âcomplexes of sensationsâ and the entire stock of Berkeleian wisdom vanish. The physicistsâ theory proves to be a reflection of bodies, liquids, gases existing outside us and independently of us, a reflection which is, of course, approximate; but to call this approximation or simplification âarbitraryâ is wrong. In fact, sensation is here regarded by Mach just as it is regarded by all science which has not been âpurifiedâ by the disciples of Berkeley and Hume, viz., as an image of the external world. Machâs own theory is subjective idealism; but when the factor of objectivity is required, Mach unceremoniously inserts into his arguments the premises of the contrary, i.e., the materialist, theory of knowledge. Eduard von Hartmann, a consistent idealist and consistent reactionary in philosophy, who sympathises with the Machiansâ fight against materialism, comes very close to the truth when he says that Machâs philosophical position is a âmixture (Nichtunterscheidung) of naĂŻve realism and absolute illusionismâ.[30] That is true. The doctrine that bodies are complexes of sensations, etc., is absolute illusionism, i.e., solipsism; for from this standpoint the world is nothing but my illusion. On the other hand, Machâs afore-mentioned argument, as well as many other of his fragmentary arguments, is what is known as ânaĂŻve realism,â i.e., the materialist theory of knowledge unconsciously and instinctively taken over from the scientists.
Avenarius and the professors who follow in his footsteps attempt to disguise this mixture by the theory of the âprincipal co-ordination.â We shall proceed to examine this theory presently, but let us first finish with the charge that Avenarius is a materialist. Mr. Yushkevich, to whom Wundtâs opinion which he failed to understand seemed so interesting, was either himself not enough interested to learn, or else did not condescend to inform the reader, how Avenariusâ nearest disciples and successors reacted to this charge. Yet this is necessary to clarify the matter if we are interested in the relation of Marxâs philosophy, i.e., materialism, to the philosophy of empirio-criticism. Moreover, if Machism is a muddle, a mixture of materialism and idealism, it is important to know whither this current turnedâif we may so express itâafter the official idealists began to disown it because of its concessions to materialism.
Wundt was answered, among others, by two of Avenariusâ purest and most orthodox disciples, J. Petzoldt and Fr. Carstanjen. Petzoldt, with haughty resentment, repudiated the charge of materialism, which is so degrading to a German professor, and in support referred toâwhat do you think?âAvenariusâ Prolegomena, where, supposedly, the concept of substance has been annihilated! A convenient theory, indeed, that can be made to embrace both purely idealist works and arbitrarily assumed materialist premises! Avenariusâ Critique of Pure Experience, of course, does not contradict this teaching, i.e., materialism, writes Petzoldt, but neither does it contradict the directly opposite spiritualist doctrine.[31] An excellent defence! This is exactly what Engels called âa pauperâs broth of eclecticism.â Bogdanov, who refuses to own himself a Machian and who wants to be considered a Marxist (in philosophy), follows Petzoldt. He asserts that âempirio-criticism is not . . . concerned with materialism, or with spiritualism, or with metaphysics in general,â[32] that âtruth . . . does not lie in the âgolden meanâ between the conflicting trends [materialism and spiritualism], but lies out side of both".[33] What appeared to Bogdanov to be truth is, as a matter of fact, confusion, a wavering between materialism and idealism.
Carstanjen, rebutting Wundt, said that he absolutely repudiated this âimportation (Unterschiebung) of a materialist elementâ which is utterly foreign to the critique of pure experience.â.[34] âEmpirio-criticism is scepticism ÏαÎč ΔÏÎżÏηΜ (pre-eminently) in relation to the content of the concepts.â There is a grain of truth in this insistent emphasis on the neutrality of Machism; the amendment made by Mach and Avenarius to their original idealism amounts to partial concessions to materialism. Instead of the consistent standpoint of Berkeleyâthe external world is my sensationâwe some times get the Humean standpointâI exclude the question whether or not there is anything beyond my sensations. And this agnostic standpoint inevitably condemns one to vacillate between materialism and idealism.
3. The Theory of Knowledge of Empirio-Criticism and of Dialectical Materialism[edit source]
Avenariusâ doctrine of the principal co-ordination is expounded in The Human Concept of the World and in the Notes. The second was written later, and in it Avenarius emphasises that he is expounding, it is true in a somewhat altered form, something that is not different from the Critique of Pure Experience and The Human Concept of the World, but exactly the same (Notes, 1894, S. 137 in the journal quoted above). The essence of this doctrine is the thesis of âthe indissoluble (unauflösliche) co-ordination [i.e., the correlative connection] of the self and the environmentâ (p. 146). âExpressed philosophically,â Avenarius says here, one can say the âself and not-self.â We âalways find togetherâ (immer ein Zusammen-vorgefundenes) the one and the other, the self and the environment. âNo full description of what we find (des Vorgefundenem) can contain an âenvironmentâ without some self (ohne ein Ich) whose environment it is, even though it be only the self that is describing what is found (das Vorgefundene)â (p. 146). The self is called the central term of the co-ordination, the environment the counter-term (Gegenglied). (Cf. Der menschliche Weltbegriff, 2. Auflage, 1905, S. 83-84, § 148 ff.)
Avenarius claims that by this doctrine he recognises the full value of what is known as naĂŻve realism, that is, the ordinary, non-philosophical, naĂŻve view which is entertained by all people who do not trouble themselves as to whether they themselves exist and whether the environment, the external world, exists. Expressing his solidarity with Avenarius, Mach also tries to represent himself as a defender of ânaĂŻve realismâ (Analysis of Sensations, p. 39). The Russian Machians, without exception, believed Machâs and Avenariusâ claim that this was indeed a defence of ânaĂŻve realism": the self is acknowledged, the environment is acknowledgedâwhat more do you want?
In order to decide who actually possesses the greatest degree of naïveté, let us proceed from a somewhat remote starting point. Here is a popular dialogue between a certain philosopher and his reader:
Reader: The existence of a system of things [according to ordinary philosophy] is required and from them only is consciousness to be derived.
Author: Now you are speaking in the spirit of a professional philosopher . . . and not according to human common sense and actual consciousness. . . .
Tell me, and reflect well before you answer: Does a thing appear in you and become present in you and for you otherwise than simultaneously with and through your consciousness of the thing? . . .
Reader: Upon sufficient reflection, I must grant you this.
Author: Now you are speaking from yourself, from your heart. Take care, therefore, not to jump out of yourself and to apprehend anything otherwise than you are able to apprehend it, as consciousness and [the italics are the philosopherâs] the thing, the thing and consciousness; or, more precisely, neither the one nor the other, but that which only subsequently becomes resolved into the two, that which is the absolute subjective-objective and objective-subjective.
Here you have the whole essence of the empirio-critical principal co-ordination, the latest defence of ânaĂŻve realismâ by the latest positivism! The idea of âindissolubleâ co-ordination is here stated very clearly and as though it were a genuine defence of the point of view of the common man, undistorted by the subtleties of âthe professional philosophers.â But, as a matter of fact, this dialogue is taken from the work of a classical representative of subjective idealism, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, published in 1801.[35]
There is nothing but a paraphrase of subjective idealism in the teachings of Mach and Avenarius we are examining. The claim that they have risen above materialism and idealism, that they have eliminated the opposition between the point of view that proceeds from the thing to consciousness and the contrary point of viewâis but the empty claim of a renovated Fichteanism. Fichte too imagined that he had âindissolublyâ connected the âselfâ and the âenvironment,â the consciousness and the thing; that he had âsolvedâ the problem by the assertion that a man cannot jump out of himself. In other words, the Berkeleian argument is repeated: I perceive only my sensations, I have no right to assume âobjects in themselvesâ outside of my sensation. The different methods of expression used by Berkeley in 1710, by Fichte in 1801, and by Avenarius in 1891-94 do not in the least change the essence of the matter, viz., the fundamental philosophical line of subjective idealism. The world is my sensation; the non-self is âpostulatedâ (is created, produced) by the self; the thing is indissolubly connected with the consciousness; the indissoluble co-ordination of the self and the environment is the empirio-critical principal co-ordination;âthis is all one and the same proposition, the same old trash with a slightly refurbished, or repainted, signboard.
The reference to ânaĂŻve realism,â supposedly defended by this philosophy, is sophistry of the cheapest kind. The ânaĂŻve realismâ of any healthy person who has not been an inmate of a lunatic asylum or a pupil of the idealist philosophers consists in the view that things, the environment, the world, exist independently of our sensation, of our consciousness, of our self and of man in general. The same experience (not in the Machian sense, but in the human sense of the term) that has produced in us the firm conviction that independently of us there exist other people, and not mere complexes of my sensations of high, short, yellow, hard, etc.âthis same experience produces in us the conviction that things, the world, the environment exist independently of us. Our sensation, our consciousness is only an image of the external world, and it is obvious that an image cannot exist without the thing imaged, and that the latter exists independently of that which images it. Materialism deliberately makes the ânaĂŻveâ belief of mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge.
Is not the foregoing evaluation of the âprincipal co-ordinationâ a product of the materialist prejudice against Machism? Not at all. Specialists in philosophy who cannot be accused of partiality towards materialism, who even detest it and who accept one or other of the idealist systems, agree that the principal co-ordination of Avenarius and Co. is subjective idealism. Wundt, for instance, whose interesting opinion was not understood by Mr. Yushkevich, explicitly states that Avenariusâ theory, according to which a full description of the given or the found is impossible without some self, an observer or describer, is âa false confusion of the content of real experience with reflections about it.â Natural science, says Wundt, completely abstracts from every observer.
âSuch abstraction is possible only because the attribution (Hinzudenken) of an experiencing individual to every content of experience, which the empirio-critical philosophy, in agreement with the immanentist philosophy, assumes, is in general an empirically unfounded assumption arising from a false confusion of the content of real experience with reflections about itâ (loc. cit., p. 382).
For the immanentists (Schuppe, Rehmke, Leclair, Schubert-Soldern), who themselves voiceâas we shall see laterâtheir hearty sympathy with Avenarius, proceed from this very idea of the âindissolubleâ connection between subject and object. And W. Wundt, before analysing Avenarius, demonstrated in detail that the immanentist philosophy is only a âmodificationâ of Berkeleianism that however much the immanentists may deny their kinship with Berkeley we should not allow verbal differences to conceal from us the âdeeper content of these philosophical doctrines,â viz., Berkeleianism or Fichteanism.[36]
The English writer Norman Smith, analysing Avenariusâ Philosophy of Pure Experience, puts this criticism in an even more straightforward and emphatic form:
"Most readers of Avenariusâ The Human Concept of the World will probably agree that, however convincing as criticism [of idealism], it is tantalisingly illusive in its positive teaching. So long as we seek to interpret his theory of experience in the form in which it is avowedly presented, namely, as genuinely realistic, it eludes all clear comprehension: its whole meaning seems to be exhausted in negation of the subjectivism which it overthrows. It is only when we translate Avenariusâ technical terms into more familiar language that we discover where the real source of the mystification lies. Avenarius has diverted attention from the defects of his position by directing his main attack against the very weakness [i.e., of the idealist position] which is fatal to his own theory.â[37]
âThroughout the whole discussion the vagueness of the term experience stands him in good stead. Sometimes it means experiencing and at other times the experienced, the latter meaning being emphasised when the nature of the self is in question. These two meanings of the term experience practically coincide with his important distinction between the absolute and the relative standpoints [I have examined above what significance this distinction has for Avenarius]; and these two points of view are not in his philosophy really reconciled. For when he allows as legitimate the demand that experience be ideally completed in thought [the full description of the environment is ideally completed by thinking of an observing self], he makes an admission which he cannot successfully combine with his assertion that nothing exists save in relation to the self. The ideal completion of given reality which results from the analysis of material bodies into elements which no human senses can apprehend [here are meant the material elements discovered by natural science, the atoms, electrons, etc., and not the fictitious elements invented by Mach and Avenarius], or from following the earth back to a time when no human being existed upon it, is, strictly, not a completion of experience but only of what is experienced. It completes only one of the two aspects which Avenarius has asserted to be inseparable. It leads us not only to what has not been experienced but to what can never by any possibility be experienced by beings like ourselves. But here again the ambiguities of the term experience come to Avenariusâ rescue. He argues that thought is as genuine a form of experience as sense-perception, and so in the end falls back on the time-worn argument of subjective idealism, that thought and reality are inseparable, because reality can only be conceived in thought, and thought involves the presence of the thinker. Not, therefore, any original and profound re-establishment of realism, but only the restatement in its crudest form of the familiar position of subjective idealism is the final outcome of Avenariusâ positive speculationsâ (p. 29).
The mystification wrought by Avenarius, who completely duplicates Fichteâs error, is here excellently exposed. The much-vaunted elimination of the antithesis between materialism (Norman Smith should not have used the term realism) and idealism by means of the term âexperienceâ instantly proves to be a myth as soon as we proceed to definite and concrete problems. Such, for instance, is the problem of the existence of the earth prior to man, prior to any sentient being. We shall presently speak of this point in detail. Here we will note that not only Norman Smith, an opponent of his theory, but also W. Schuppe, the immanentist, who warmly greeted the appearance of The Human Concept of the World as a confirmation of naĂŻve realism[38] unmasks Avenarius and his fictitious ârealism.â The fact of the matter is that Schuppe fully agrees with such ârealism,â i.e., the mystification of materialism dished out by Avenarius. Such ârealism,â he wrote to Avenarius, I, the immanentist philosopher, who have been slandered as a subjective idealist, have always claimed with as much right as yourself, hochverehrter Herr Kollege. "My conception of thought . . . excellently harmonises (vertrĂ€gt sich vortrefflich) with your âTheory of pure experienceââ (p. 384). âThe connection and inseparability of the two terms of the co-ordinationâ are in fact provided only by the self (das Ich, the abstract, Fichtean self-consciousness, thought divorced from the brain). âThat which you desired to eliminate you have tacitly assumed"âso Schuppe wrote to Avenarius (p. 388). And it is difficult to say who more rudely unmasks Avenarius the mystifierâSmith by his straightforward and clear refutation, or Schuppe by his enthusiastic opinion of Avenariusâ crowning work. The kiss of Wilhelm Schuppe in philosophy is no better than the kiss of Peter Struve or Menshikov[39] in politics.
O. Ewald, who praises Mach for not succumbing to materialism, speaks of the principal co-ordination in a similar manner:
âIf one declares the correlation of central term and counter-term to be an epistemological necessity which cannot be avoided, then, even though the word âempirio-criticismâ be inscribed on the signboard in shrieking letters, one is adopting a standpoint that differs in no way from absolute idealism. [The term is incorrect; he should have said subjective idealism, for Hegelâs absolute idealism is reconcilable with the existence of the earth, nature, and the physical universe without man, since nature is regarded as the âothernessâ of the absolute idea.] On the other hand, if we do not hold fast to this co-ordination and grant the counter-terms their independence, then the way is at once opened for every metaphysical possibility, especially in the direction of transcendental realismâ (op. cit., pp. 56-57).
By metaphysics and transcendental realism, Herr FriedlĂ€nder, who is disguised under the pseudonym Ewald, means materialism. Himself professing one of the varieties of idealism, he fully agrees with the Machians and the Kantians that materialism is metaphysicsâ"from beginning to end the wildest metaphysicsâ (p. 134). On the question of the âtranscendenceâ and the metaphysical character of materialism he is in agreement with Bazarov and all our Machians, and of this we shall have occasion to say more later. Here again it is important to note how in fact the shallow and pedantic claim to have transcended idealism and materialism vanishes, and how the question arises inexorably and irreconcilably. âTo grant the counter-terms their independenceâ means (if one translates the pretentious language of the affected Avenarius into common parlance) to regard nature and the external world as independent of human consciousness and sensation. And that is materialism. To build a theory of knowledge on the hypothesis of the indissoluble connection between the object and human sensation ("complexes of sensationsâ as identical with bodies; âworld-elementsâ that are identical both psychically and physically; Avenariusâ co-ordination, and so forth) is to land inevitably into idealism. Such is the simple and unavoidable truth that with a little attention may be easily detected beneath the piles of affected quasi-erudite terminology of Avenarius, Schuppe, Ewald and the others, which deliberately obscures matters and frightens the general public away from philosophy.
The âreconciliationâ of Avenariusâ theory with ânaĂŻve realismâ in the end aroused misgivings even among his own disciples. For instance, R. Willy says that the common assertion that Avenarius came to adopt ânaĂŻve realismâ should be taken cum grano salis.â âAs a dogma, naĂŻve realism would be nothing but the belief in things-in-themselves existing outside man (ausserpersönliche) in their perceptible form."[40] In other words, the only theory of knowledge that is really created by an actual and not fictitious agreement with ânaĂŻve realismâ is, according to Willy, materialism! And Willy, of course, rejects materialism. But he is compelled to admit that Avenarius in The Human Concept of the World restores the unity of âexperience,â the unity of the âselfâ and the environment âby means of a series of complicated and extremely artificial subsidiary and intermediary conceptionsâ (p. 171). The Human Concept of the World, being a reaction against the original idealism of Avenarius, âentirely bears the character of a reconciliation (eines Ausgleiches) between the naĂŻve realism of common sense and the epistemological idealism of school philosophy. But that such a reconciliation could restore the unity and integrity of experience [Willy calls it Grunderfahrung, that is, basic experienceâanother new world!], I would not assertâ (p. 170).
A valuable admission! Avenariusâ âexperienceâ failed to reconcile idealism and materialism. Willy, it seems, repudiates the school philosophy of experience in order to replace it by a philosophy of âbasicâ experience, which is confusion thrice confounded....
4. Did Nature Exist Prior to Man?[edit source]
We have already seen that this question is particularly repugnant to the philosophy of Mach and Avenarius. Natural science positively asserts that the earth once existed in such a state that no man or any other creature existed or could have existed on it. Organic matter is a later phenomenon, the fruit of a long evolution. It follows that there was no sentient matter, no âcomplexes of sensations,â no self that was supposedly âindissolublyâ connected with the environment in accordance with Avenariusâ doctrine. Matter is primary, and thought, consciousness, sensation are products of a very high development. Such is the materialist theory of knowledge, to which natural science instinctively subscribes.
The question arises, have the eminent representatives of empirio-criticism observed this contradiction between their theory and natural science? They have observed it, and they have definitely asked themselves by what arguments this contradiction can be removed. Three attitudes to this question are of particular interest from the point of view of materialism, that of Avenarius himself and those of his disciples J. Petzoldt and R. Willy.
Avenarius tries to eliminate the contradiction to natural science by means of the theory of the âpotentialâ central term in the co-ordination. As we know, co-ordination is the âindissolubleâ connection between self and environment. In order to eliminate the obvious absurdity of this theory the concept of the âpotentialâ central term is introduced. For instance, what about manâs development from the embryo? Does the environment (the âcounter-term") exist if the âcentral termâ is represented by an embryo? The embryonic system CâAvenarius repliesâis the âpotential central term in relation to the future individual environmentâ . The potential central term is never equal to zero, even when there are as yet no parents (elterliche Bestandteile), but only the âintegral parts of the environmentâ capable of becoming parents (p. 141).
The co-ordination then is indissoluble. It is essential for the empirio-criticist to assert this in order to save the fundamentals of his philosophyâsensations and their complexes. Man is the central term of this co-ordination. But when there is no man, when he has not yet been born, the central term is nevertheless not equal to zero; it has only become a potential central term ! It is astonishing that there are people who can take seriously a philosopher who advances such arguments! Even Wundt, who stipulates that he is not an enemy of every form of metaphysics (i.e., of fideism), was compelled to admit âthe mystical obscuration of the concept experienceâ by the word âpotential,â which destroys coordination entirely (op. cit., p. 379).
And, indeed, how can one seriously speak of a co-ordination the indissolubility of which consists in one of its terms being potential?
Is this not mysticism, the very antechamber of fideism? If it is possible to think of the potential central term in relation to a future environment, why not think of it in relation to a past environment, that is, after manâs death ? You will say that Avenarius did not draw this conclusion from his theory? Granted, but that absurd and reactionary theory became the more cowardly but not any the better for that. Avenarius, in 1894, did not carry this theory to its logical conclusion, or perhaps feared to do so. But R. Schubert Soldern, as we shall see, resorted in 1896 to this very theory to arrive at theological conclusions, which in 1906 earned the approval of Mach, who said that Schubert-Soldern was following âvery close pathsâ (to Machism). (Analysis of Sensations, p. 4.) Engels was quite right in attacking DĂŒhring, an avowed atheist, for inconsistently leaving loopholes for fideism in his philosophy. Engels several times. and justly, brought this accusation against the materialist DĂŒhring, although the latter had not drawn any theological conclusions, in the âseventies at least. But we have among us people who would have us regard them as Marxists, yet who bring to the masses a philosophy which comes very close to fideism.
Avenarius wrote in the Bemerkungen:
â. . . It would seem that from the empirio-critical standpoint natural science is not entitled to enquire about periods of our present environment which in time preceded the existence of manâ (S. 144).
Avenarius answers:
âThe enquirer cannot avoid mentally projecting himself (sich hinzuzudenken, i.e., imagining one self to be present) . . . for what the scientist wants (although he may not be clearly aware of it) is essentially only this: how is the earth to be defined prior to the appearance of living beings or man if I were mentally to project myself in the role of a spectatorâin much the same way as though it were thinkable that we could from our earth follow the history of another star or of another solar system with the help of perfected instruments.â
An object cannot exist independently of our consciousness. âWe always mentally project ourselves as the intelligence endeavouring to apprehend the object.â
This theory of the necessity of âmentally projectingâ the human mind to every object and to nature prior to man is given by me in the first paragraph in the words of the ârecent positivist,â R. Avenarius, and in the second, in the words of the subjective idealist, J. G. Fichte.[41] The sophistry of this theory is so manifest that it is embarrassing to analyse it. If we âmentally projectâ ourselves, our presence will be imaginaryâbut the existence of the earth prior to man is real. Man could not in practice be an observer, for instance, of the earth in an incandescent state, and to âimagineâ his being present at the time is obscurantism, exactly as though I were to endeavour to prove the existence of hell by the argument that if I âmentally projectedâ myself thither as an observer I could observe hell. The âreconciliationâ of empirio-criticism and natural science amounts to this, that Avenarius graciously consents to âmentally projectâ something the possibility of admitting which is excluded by natural science. No man at all educated or sound-minded doubts that the earth existed at a time when there could not have been any life on it, any sensation or any âcentral term,â and consequently the whole theory of Mach and Avenarius, from which it follows that the earth is a complex of sensations ("bodies are complexes of sensations") or âcomplexes of elements in which the psychical and physical are identical,â or âa counter-term of which the central term can never be equal to zero,â is philosophical obscurantism, the carrying of subjective idealism to absurdity.
J. Petzoldt perceived the absurdity of the position into which Avenarius had fallen and felt ashamed. In his Introduction to the Philosophy of Pure Experience (Vol. II) he devotes a whole paragraph (§ 65) âto the question of the reality of earlier (frĂŒhere) periods of the earth.â Petzoldt says:
"In the teaching of Avenarius the self (das Ich) plays a role different from that which it plays with Schuppe [let us note that Petzoldt openly and repeatedly declares: our philosophy was founded by three menâAvenarius, Mach and Schuppe], yet it is a role which, perhaps, possesses too much importance for his theory [Petzoldt was evidently influenced by the fact that Schuppe had unmasked Avenarius by showing that with him too everything rests entirely on the self; and Petzoldt wishes to make a correction] . . . Avenarius said on one occasion that we can think of a âregionâ where no human foot has yet trodden, but to be able to think (italicised by Avenarius) of such an environment there is required what we designate by the term self (Ich-Bezeichnetes), whose (italicised by Avenarius) thought the thinking is (V. f. wiss. Ph., 18. Bd., 1894, S. 146, Anm.).â
Petzoldt replies:
"The epistemologically important question, however, is not whether we can think of such a region at all, but whether we are entitled to think of it as existing, or as having existed, independently of any individual mind.â
What is true, is true! People can think and âmentally projectâ for themselves any kind of hell and any kind of devil. Lunacharsky even âmentally projectedâ for himselfâwell, to use a mild expressionâreligious conceptions.[42] But it is precisely the purpose of the theory of knowledge to show the unreal, fantastic and reactionary character of such projections.
â. . . For, that the system C [i.e., the brain] is necessary for thought is obvious both for Avenarius and for the philosophy which is here presented. . . .â
That is not true. Avenariusâ theory of 1876 is a theory of thought without brain. And in his theory of 1891-94, as we shall presently see, there is a similar element of idealist nonsense.
â. . . But is this system C a condition of existence [italicised by Petzoldt] of, say, the Mesozoic period (SekundĂ€rzeit) of the earth?â
And Petzoldt, presenting the argument of Avenarius I have already cited on the subject of what science actually wants and how we can âmentally projectâ the spectator, objects:
âNo, we wish to know whether I have the right to think that the earth at that remote epoch existed in the same way as I think of it as having existed yesterday or a minute ago. Or must the existence of the earth be really made conditional, as Willy claimed, on our right at least to assume that at the given period there co-existed some system C, even though at the lowest stage of its development?â
Of this idea of Willyâs we shall speak presently.
âAvenarius evades Willyâs strange conclusion by the argument that the person who puts the question cannot mentally remove himself (sich wegdenken, i.e., think himself as absent), nor can he avoid mentally projecting himself (sich hinzuzudenken, see Avenarius, The Human Concept of the World, 1st Germ. ed., p. 130). But then Avenarius makes the individual self of the person who puts the question, or the thought of such a self, the condition not only of the act of thought regarding the uninhabitable earth, but also of the justification for believing in the existence of the earth at that time.
These false paths are easily avoided if we do not ascribe so much theoretical importance to the self. The only thing the theory of knowledge should demand of the various conceptions of that which is remote in space or time is that it be conceivable and uniquely (eindeutig) determined, the rest is the affair of the special sciencesâ (Vol. II, p. 325).
Petzoldt rechristened the law of causality the law of unique determination and imported into his theory, as we shall see later, the apriority of this law. This means that Petzoldt saves himself from Avenariusâ subjective idealism and solipsism (âhe attributes an exaggerated importance to the self,â as the professorial jargon has it) with the help of Kantian ideas. The absence of the objective factor in Avenariusâ doctrine, the impossibility of reconciling it with the demands of natural science, which declares the earth (object) to have existed long before the appearance of living beings (subject), compelled Petzoldt to resort to causality (unique determination). The earth existed, for its existence prior to man is causally connected with the present existence of the earth. Firstly, where does causality come from? A priori,â[34] says Petzoldt. Secondly, are not the ideas of hell, devils, and Lunacharskyâs âmental projectionsâ also connected by causality? Thirdly, the theory of the âcomplexes of sensationsâ in any case turns out to be destroyed by Petzoldt. Petzoldt failed to resolve the contradiction he observed in Avenarius, and only entangled himself still more, for only one solution is possible, viz., the recognition that the external world reflected by our mind exists independently of our mind. This materialist solution alone is really compatible with natural science, and it alone eliminates both Petzoldtâs and Machâs idealist solution of the question of causality, which we shall speak of separately.
The third empirio-criticist, R. Willy, first raised the question of this difficulty in Avenariusâ philosophy in 1896, in an article entitled âDer Empiriokritizismus als einzig wissenschaftlicher Standpunktâ ("Empirio-Criticism as the Only Scientific Standpoint"). What about the world prior to man?âWilly asks here,[43] and at first answers according to Avenarius: âwe project ourselves mentally into the past.â But then he goes on to say that we are not necessarily obliged to regard experience as human experience. âFor we must simply regard the animal kingdomâbe it the most insignificant wormâas primitive fellow-men (Mitmenschen) if we regard animal life in connection with general experienceâ (pp. 73-74). Thus, prior to man the earth was the âexperienceâ of a worm, which discharged the functions of the âcentral termâ in order to save Avenariusâ âco-ordinationâ and Avenariusâ philosophy! No wonder Petzoldt tried to dissociate himself from an argument which is not only the height of absurdity (ideas of the earth corresponding to the theories of the geologists attributed to a worm), but which does not in any way help our philosopher, for the earth existed not only before man but before any living being generally.
Willy returned to the question in 1905. The worm was now removed.[44] But Petzoldtâs âlaw of unique determinationâ could not, of course, satisfy Willy, who regarded it merely as âlogical formalism.â The author saysâwill not the question of the world prior to man, as Petzoldt puts it, lead us âback again to the things-in-themselves of common sense"? (i.e., to materialism! How terrible indeed!). What does millions of years without life mean?
âIs time perhaps a thing-in-itself? Of course not![45] And that means that things outside men are only impressions, bits of fantasy fabricated by men with the help of a few fragments we find about us. And why not? Need the philosopher fear the stream of life? . . . And so I say to myself: abandon all this love of systems and grasp the moment (ergreife den Augenblick), the moment you are living in, the moment which alone brings happinessâ (pp. 177-78).
Well, well! Either materialism or solipsismâthis, in spite of his vociferous phrases, is what Willy arrives at when he analyses the question of the existence of nature before man.
To summarise. Three augurs of empirio-criticism have appeared before us and have laboured in the sweat of their brow to reconcile their philosophy with natural science, to patch up the holes of solipsism. Avenarius repeated Fichteâs argument and substituted an imaginary world for the real world. Petzoldt withdrew from Fichtean idealism and moved towards Kantian idealism. Willy, having suffered a fiasco with the âworm,â threw up the sponge and inadvertently blurted out the truth: either materialism or solipsism, or even the recognition of nothing but the present moment.
It only remains for us to show the reader how this problem was understood and treated by our own native Machians. Here is Bazarov in the Studies âinâ the Philosophy of Marxism (p. 11):
âIt remains for us now, under the guidance of our faithful vademecum [35] i.e., Plekhanov], to descend into the last and most horrible circle of the solipsist inferno, into that circle where, as Plekhanov assures us, every subjective idealism is menaced with the necessity of conceiving the world as it was contemplated by the ichthyosauruses and archaeopteryxes. âLet us mentally transport ourselves,â writes Plekhanov, âto that epoch when only very remote ancestors of man existed on the earth, for instance, to the Mesozoic period. The question arises, what was the status of space, time and causality then? Whose subjective forms were they then? Were they the subjective forms of the ichthyosauruses? And whose intelligence at that time dictated its laws to nature? The intelligence of the archaeopteryx? To these queries the Kantian philosophy can give no answer. And it must be rejected as absolutely incompatible with modern scienceâ (L. Feuerbach, p. 117).â
Here Bazarov breaks the quotation from Plekhanov just before a very important passageâas we shall soon seeânamely:
âIdealism says that without subject there is no object. The history of the earth shows that the object existed long before the subject appeared, i.e., long before the appearance of organisms possessing a perceptible degree of consciousness. . . . The history of development reveals the truth of materialism.â
We continue the quotation from Bazarov:
â. . . But does Plekhanovâs thing-in-itself provide the desired solution? Let us remember that even according to Plekhanov we can have no idea of things as they are in themselves; we know only their manifestations, only the results of their action on our sense-organs. âApart from this action they possess no aspectâ (L. Feuerbach, p. 112). What sense-organs existed in the period of the ichthyosauruses? Evidently, only the sense-organs of the ichthyosauruses and their like. Only the ideas of the ichthyosauruses were then the actual, the real manifestations of things-in-themselves. Hence, according to Plekhanov also, if the paleontologist desires to remain on ârealâ ground he must write the story of the Mesozoic period in the light of the contemplations of the ichthyosaurus. And, consequently, not a single step forward is made in comparison with solipsism.â
Such is the complete argument (the reader must pardon the lengthy quotationâwe could not avoid it) of a Machian, an argument worthy of perpetuation as a first-class example of muddleheadedness.
Bazarov imagines that Plekhanov gave himself away. If things-in-themselves, apart from their action on our sense organs, have no aspect of their own, then in the Mesozoic period they did not exist except as the âaspectâ of the sense organs of the ichthyosaurus. And this is the argument of a materialist! If an âaspectâ is the result of the action of âthings-in-themselvesâ on sense-organsâdoes it follow that things do not exist independently of sense-organs of one kind or another??
Let us assume for a moment that Bazarov indeed âmisunderstoodâ Plekhanovâs words (improbable as such an assumption may seem), that they did appear obscure to him. Be it so. We ask: is Bazarov engaged in a fencing bout with Plekhanov (whom the Machians exalt to the position of the only representative of materialism!), or is he endeavouring to clear up the problem of materialism ? If Plekhanov seemed obscure to you, or contradictory, and so forth, why did you not turn to other materialists? Is it because you do not know them? But ignorance is no argument.
If Bazarov indeed does not know that the fundamental premise of materialism is the recognition of the external world, of the existence of things outside and independent of our mind, this is truly a striking case of crass ignorance. We would remind the reader of Berkeley, who in 1710 rebuked the materialists for their recognition of âobjects in themselvesâ existing independently of our mind and reflected by our mind. Of course, everybody is free to side with Berkeley or anyone else against the materialists; that is unquestionable. But it is equally unquestionable that to speak of the materialists and distort or ignore the fundamental premise of all materialism is to import preposterous confusion into the problem.
Was Plekhanov right when he said that for idealism there is no object without a subject, while for materialism the object exists independently of the subject and is reflected more or less adequately in the subjectâs mind? If this is wrong, then any man who has the slightest respect for Marxism should have pointed out this error of Plekhanovâs, and should have dealt not with him, but with someone else, with Marx, Engels, or Feuerbach, on the question of materialism and the existence of nature prior to man. But if this is right, or, at least, if you are unable to find an error here, then your attempt to shuffle the cards and to confuse in the readerâs mind the most elementary conception of materialism, as distinguished from idealism, is a literary indecency.
As for the Marxists who are interested in the question apart from every little word uttered by Plekhanov, we shall quote the opinion of L. Feuerbach, who, as is known (perhaps not to Bazarov?), was a materialist, and through whom Marx and Engels, as is well known, came from the idealism of Hegel to their materialist philosophy. In his rejoinder to R. Haym, Feuerbach wrote:
âNature, which is not an object of man or mind, is for speculative philosophy, or at least for idealism, a Kantian thing-in-itself [we shall speak later in detail of the fact that our Machians confuse the Kantian thing-in-itself with the materialist thing-in-itself], an abstraction without reality, but it is nature that causes the downfall of idealism. Natural science, at least in its present state, necessarily leads us back to a point when the conditions for human existence were still absent, when nature, i.e., the earth, was not yet an object of the human eye and mind, when, consequently, nature was an absolutely non-human entity (absolut unmenschliches Wesen). Idealism may retort: but nature also is something thought of by you (von dir gedachte). Certainly, but from this it does not follow that this nature did not at one time actually exist, just as from the fact that Socrates and Plato do not exist for me if I do not think of them, it does not follow that Socrates and Plato did not actually at one time exist without me.â[46]
This is how Feuerbach regarded materialism and idealism from the standpoint of the existence of nature prior to the appearance of man. Avenariusâ sophistry (the âmental projection of the observer") was refuted by Feuerbach, who did not know the ârecent positivismâ but who thoroughly knew the old idealist sophistries. And Bazarov offers us absolutely nothing new, but merely repeats this sophistry of the idealists: âHad I been there [on earth, prior to man], I would have seen the world so-and-soâ (Studies âinâ the Philosophy of Marxism, p. 29). In other words: if I make an assumption that is obviously absurd and contrary to natural science (that man can be an observer in an epoch before man existed), I shall be able to patch up the breach in my philosophy!
This gives us an idea of the extent of Bazarovâs knowledge of the subject and of his literary methods. Bazarov did not even hint at the âdifficultyâ with which Avenarius, Petzoldt and Willy wrestled; and, moreover, he made such a hash of the whole subject, placed before the reader such an incredible hotchpotch, that there ultimately appears to be no difference between materialism and solipsism! Idealism is represented as ârealism,â and to materialism is ascribed the denial of the existence of things outside of their action on the sense-organs! Truly, either Feuerbach did not know the elementary difference between materialism and idealism, or else Bazarov and Co. have completely altered the elementary truths of philosophy.
Or let us take Valentinov, a philosopher who, naturally, is delighted with Bazarov:
- âBerkeley is the founder of the correlativist theory of the relativity of subject and objectâ (p. 148). This is not Berkeleian idealism, oh, no! This is a âprofound analysis.â
- âIn the most realistic aspect, irrespective of the forms [!] of their usual idealist interpretation [only interpretation!], the fundamental premises of the theory are formulated by Avenariusâ (p. 148). Infants, as we see, are taken in by the mystification!
- âAvenariusâ conception of the starting point of knowledge is that each individual finds himself in a definite environment, in other words, the individual and the environment are represented as connected and inseparable [!] terms of one and the same co-ordinationâ (p. 148). Delightful! This is not idealismâBazarov and Valentinov have risen above materialism and idealismâthis âinseparabilityâ of the subject and object is ârealismâ itself.
- âIs the reverse assertion correct, namely, that there is no counter-term to which there is no corresponding central termâan individual? Naturally [!] not. . . . In the Archean period the woods were verdant . . . yet there was no manâ (p. 143). That means that the inseparable can be separated! Is that not ânatural"?
- âYet from the standpoint of the theory of knowledge, the question of the object in itself is absurdâ (p. 148). Of course! When there were no sentient organisms objects were nevertheless âcomplexes of elementsâ identical with sensations!
- âThe immanentist school, in the person of Schubert-Soldern and Schuppe, clad these [!] thoughts in an unsatisfactory form and found itself in the cul-de-sac of solipsismâ (p. 149). But âthese thoughtsâ themselves, of course, contain no solipsism, and empirio-criticism, of course, is not a paraphrase of the reactionary theories of the immanentists, who lie when they declare themselves to be in sympathy with Avenarius!
This, Messrs. Machians, is not philosophy, but an incoherent jumble of words.
5. Does Man Think With The Help of the Brain?[edit source]
Bazarov emphatically answers this question in the affirmative. He writes:
âIf Plekhanovâs thesis that âconsciousness is an internal [? Bazarov] state of matterâ be given a more satisfactory form, e.g., that âevery mental process is a function of the cerebral process,â then neither Mach nor Avenarius would dispute itâ (Studies âinâ the Philosophy of Marxism, p. 29).
To the mouse no beast is stronger than the cat. To the Russian Machians there is no materialist stronger than Plekhanov. Was Plekhanov really the only one, or the first, to advance the materialist thesis that consciousness is an internal state of matter? And if Bazarov did not like Plekhanovâs formulation of materialism, why did he take Plekhanov and not Engels or Feuerbach?
Because the Machians are afraid to admit the truth. They are fighting materialism, but pretend that it is only Plekhanov they are fighting. A cowardly and unprincipled method.
But let us turn to empirio-criticism. Avenarius âwould not disputeâ the statement that thought is a function of the brain. These words of Bazarovâs contain a direct untruth. Not only does Avenarius dispute the materialist thesis, but invents a whole âtheoryâ in order to refute it. âThe brain,â says Avenarius in The Human Concept of the World, âis not the habitation, the seat, the creator, it is not the instrument or organ, the supporter or substratum, etc., of thoughtâ (p. 76âapprovingly quoted by Mach in the Analysis of Sensations, p. 32). âThought is not an inhabitant, or commander, or the other half, or side, etc., nor is it a product or even a physiological function, or a state in general of the brainâ (ibid.). And Avenarius expresses himself no less emphatically in his Notes: âpresentationsâ are ânot functions (physiological, psychical, or psycho-physical) of the brainâ (op. cit., § 115, p. 419). Sensations are not âpsychical functions of the brainâ (§ 116).
Thus, according to Avenarius, the brain is not the organ of thought, and thought is not a function of the brain. Take Engels, and we immediately find directly contrary, frankly materialist formulations. âThought and consciousness,â says Engels in Anti-DĂŒhring, âare products of the human brainâ (5th Germ. ed., p. 22).[47] This idea is often repeated in that work. In Ludwig Feuerbach we have the following exposition of the views of Feuerbach and Engels: â. . . the material (stofflich), sensuously perceptible world to which we ourselves belong is the only reality . . . our consciousness and thinking, however suprasensuous they may seem, are the product (Erzeugnis) of a material, bodily organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is merely the highest product of matter. This is, of course, pure materialismâ (4th Germ. ed., p. 18). Or on p. 4, where he speaks of the reflection of the processes of nature in âthe thinking brain,â[48] etc., etc.
Avenarius rejects this materialist standpoint and says that âthe thinking brainâ is a âfetish of natural scienceâ (The Human Concept of the World, 2nd Germ. ed., p. 70). Hence, Avenarius cherishes no illusions concerning his absolute disagreement with natural science on this point. He admits, as do Mach and all the immanentists, that natural science holds an instinctive and unconscious materialist point of view. He admits and explicitly declares that he absolutely differs from the âprevailing psychologyâ (Notes, p. 150, etc.). This prevailing psychology is guilty of an inadmissible âintrojection"âsuch is the new term contrived by our philosopherâi.e., the insertion of thought into the brain, or of sensations into us. These âtwo wordsâ (into usâin uns), Avenarius goes on to say, contain the assumption (Annahme) that empirio-criticism disputes. âThis insertion (Hinein verlegung) of the visible, etc., into man is what we call introjectionâ (§ 45, p. 153).
Introjection deviates âin principleâ from the ânatural conception of the worldâ (natĂŒrlicher Weltbegriff) by substituting âin meâ for âbefore meâ (vor mir, p. 154) âby turning a component part of the (real) environment into a component part of (ideal) thoughtâ (ibid.). âOut of the amechanical [a new word in place of âmentalâ] which manifests itself freely and clearly in the experienced [or, in what is foundâim Vorgefundenen], introjection makes something which hides itself [Latitierendes, says Avenariusâanother new word] mysteriously in the central nervous systemâ (ibid.).
Here we have the same mystification that we encountered in the famous defence of ânaĂŻve realismâ by the empirio-criticists and immanentists. Avenarius here acts on the advice of the charlatan in Turgenev[49]: denounce most of all those vices which you yourself possess. Avenarius tries to pretend that he is combating idealism: philosophical idealism, you see, is usually deduced from introjection, the external world is converted into sensation, into idea, and so forth, while I defend ânaĂŻve realism,â the equal reality of everything presented, both âselfâ and environment, without inserting the external world into the human brain.
The sophistry here is the same as that which we observed in the case of the famous co-ordination. While distracting the attention of the reader by attacking idealism, Avenarius is in fact defending idealism, albeit in slightly different words: thought is not a function of the brain; the brain is not the organ of thought; sensations are not a function of the nervous system, oh, no! sensations areâ"elements,â psychical only in one connection, while in another connection (although the elements are âidenticalâ) they are physical. With his new and muddled terminology, with his new and pompous epithets, supposedly expressing a new âtheory,â Avenarius merely beat about the bush and returned to his fundamental idealist premise.
And if our Russian Machians (e. c., Bogdanov) failed to notice the âmystificationâ and discerned a refutation of idealism in the ânewâ defence of idealism, in the analysis of empirio-criticism given by the professional philosophers we find a sober estimate of the true nature of Avenariusâ ideas, which is laid bare when stripped of its pretentious terminology.
In 1903 Bogdanov wrote ("Authoritative Thinking,â an article in the symposium From the Psychology of Society, p. 119, et seq.):
âRichard Avenarius presented a most harmonious and complete philosophical picture of the development of the dualism of spirit and body. The gist of his âdoctrine of introjectionâ is the following: [we observe only physical bodies directly, and we infer the experiences of others, i.e., the mind of another person, only by hypothesis]. . . . The hypothesis is complicated by the fact that the experiences of the other person are assumed to be located in his body, are inserted (introjected) into his organism. This is already a superfluous hypothesis and even gives rise to numerous contradictions. Avenarius systematically draws attention to these contradictions by unfolding a series of successive historical facts in the development of dualism and of philosophical idealism. But here we need not follow Avenarius. . . . Introjection serves as an explanation of the dualism of mind and body.â
Bogdanov swallowed the bait of professorial philosophy in believing that âintrojectionâ was aimed against idealism. He accepted the evaluation of introjection given by Avenarius himself at its face value and failed to notice the barb directed against materialism. Introjection denies that thought is a function of the brain, that sensations are a function of manâs central nervous system: that is, it denies the- most elementary truth of physiology in order to destroy materialism. âDualism,â it appears, is refuted idealistically (notwithstanding all Avenariusâ diplomatic rage against idealism), for sensation and thought prove to be not secondary, not a product of matter, but primary. Dualism is here refuted by Avenarius only in so far as he ârefutesâ the existence of the object without the subject, matter without thought, the external world independent of our sensations; that is, it is refuted idealistically. The absurd denial of the fact that the visual image of a tree is a function of the retina, the nerves and the brain, was required by Avenarius in order to bolster up his theory of the âindissolubleâ connection of the âcompleteâ experience, which includes not only the self but also the tree, i.e., the environment.
The doctrine of introjection is a muddle, it smuggles in idealistic rubbish and is contradictory to natural science, which inflexibly holds that thought is a function of the brain, that sensations, i.e., the images of the external world, exist within us, produced by the action of things on our sense-organs. The materialist elimination of the âdualism of mind and bodyâ (i.e., materialist monism) consists in the assertion that the mind does not exist independently of the body, that mind is secondary, a function of the brain, a reflection of the external world. The idealist elimination of the âdualism of mind and bodyâ (i.e., idealist monism) consists in the assertion that mind is not a function of the body, that, consequently, mind is primary, that the âenvironmentâ and the âselfâ exist only in an inseparable connection of one and the same âcomplexes of elements.â Apart from these two diametrically opposed methods of eliminating âthe dualism of mind and body,â there can be no third method, unless it be eclecticism, which is a senseless jumble of materialism and idealism. And it was this jumble of Avenariusâ that seemed to Bogdanov and Co. âthe truth transcending materialism and idealism.â
But the professional philosophers are not as naĂŻve and credulous as are the Russian Machians. True, each of these professors-in-ordinary advocates his âownâ system of refuting materialism, or, at any rate, of âreconcilingâ materialism and idealism. But when it comes to a competitor they unceremoniously expose the unconnected fragments of materialism and idealism that are contained in all the ârecentâ and âoriginalâ systems. And if a few young intellectuals swallowed Avenariusâ bait, that old bird Wundt was not to be enticed so easily. The idealist Wundt tore the mask from the poseur Avenarius very unceremoniously when he praised him for the anti-materialist tendency of the theory of introjection. Wundt wrote:
âIf empirio-criticism reproaches vulgar materialism because by such expressions as the brain âhasâ thought, or the brain âproducesâ thought, it expresses a relation which generally cannot be established by factual observation and description [evidently, for Wundt it is a âfactâ that a person thinks without the help of a brain!]. . . this reproach, of course, is well foundedâ (op. cit., S pp. 47-48).
Well, of course! The idealists will always join the half-hearted Avenarius and Mach in attacking materialism! It is only a pity, Wundt goes on to say, that this theory of introjection âdoes not stand in any relation to the doctrine of the independent vital series, and was, to all appearances, only tacked on to it as an afterthought and in a rather artificial fashionâ (p. 365).
Introjection, says O. Ewald, âis to be regarded as nothing but a fiction of empirio-criticism, which the latter requires in order to shield its own fallaciesâ (op. cit., p. 44).
âWe observe a strange contradiction: on the one hand, the elimination of introjection and the restoration of the natural world conception is intended to restore to the world the character of living reality; on the other hand, in the principal co-ordination empirio-criticism is leading to a purely idealist theory of an absolute correlation of the counter-term and the central term. Avenarius is thus moving in a circle. He set out to do battle against idealism but laid down his arms before it came to an open skirmish. He wanted to liberate the world of objects from the yoke of the subject, but again bound that world to the subject. What he has actually destroyed by his criticism is a caricature of idealism rather than its genuine epistemological expressionâ (ibid., pp. 64-65).
"In his [Avenariusâ] frequently quoted statement,â Norman Smith says, âthat the brain is not the seat, organ or supporter of thought, he rejects the only terms which we possess for defining their connectionâ (op. cit., p. 30).
Nor is it surprising that the theory of introjection approved by Wundt excites the sympathy of the outspoken spiritualist, James Ward,[50] who wages systematic war on ânaturalism and agnosticism, and especially on Thomas Huxley (not because he was an insufficiently outspoken and determined materialist, for which Engels reproached him, but) because his agnosticism served in fact to conceal materialism.
Let us note that Karl Pearson, the English Machian, who avoid all philosophical artifices, and who recognises neither introjection, nor co-ordination, nor yet âthe discovery of the world-elements,â arrives at the inevitable outcome of Machism when it is stripped of such âdisguises,â namely, pure subjective idealism. Pearson knows no âelements"; âsense impressionsâ are his alpha and omega. He never doubts that man thinks with the help of the brain. And the contradiction between this thesis (which alone conforms with science) and the basis of his philosophy remains naked and obvious. Pearson spares no effort in combating the concept that matter exists independently of our sense-impressions (The Grammar of Science, Chap VII). Repeating all Berkeleyâs arguments, Pearson declare that matter is a nonentity. But when he comes to speak of the relation of the brain to thought, Pearson emphatically declares: âFrom will and consciousness associated with material machinery we can infer nothing whatever as to will and consciousness without that machinery.â[51] He even advances the following thesis as a summary of his investigations in this field:
âConsciousness has no meaning beyond nervous systems akin to our own; it is illogical to assert that all matter is conscious [but it is logical to assert that all matter possesses a property which is essentially akin to sensation, the property of reflection], still more that consciousness or will can exist outside matterâ (ibid., p. 75, 2nd thesis).
Pearsonâs muddle is glaring! Matter is nothing but groups of sense impressions. That is his premise, that is his philosophy. Hence, sensation and thought should be primary; matter, secondary. But no, consciousness without matter does not exist, and apparently not even without a nervous system! That is, consciousness and sensation are secondary. The waters rest on the earth, the earth rests on a whale, and the whale rests on the waters. Machâs âelementsâ and Avenariusâ co-ordination and introjection do not clear up this muddle, all they do is to obscure the matter, to cover up traces with the help of an erudite philosophical gibberish.
Just such gibberish, and of this a word or two will suffice, is the special terminology of Avenarius, who coined a plenitude of diverse ânotals,â âsecurals,â âfidentials,â etc., etc. Our Russian Machians for the most part shamefacedly avoid this professorial rigmarole, and only now and again bombard the reader (in order to stun him) with an âexistentialâ and such like. But if naĂŻve people take these words for a species of bio-mechanics, the German philosophers, who are themselves lovers of âeruditeâ words, laugh at Avenarius. To say ânotalâ (notus = known), or to say that this or the other thing is known to me, is absolutely one and the same, says Wundt in the section entitled âScholastic Character of the Empirio-Critical System.â And, indeed, it is the purest and most dreary scholasticism. One of Avenariusâ most faithful disciples, R. Willy, had the courage to admit it frankly. He says:
âAvenarius dreamed of a bio-mechanics but an understanding of the life of the brain can be arrived at only by actual discoveries, and not by the way in which Avenarius attempted to arrive at it. Avenariusâ bio-mechanics is not grounded on any new observations whatever; its characteristic feature is purely schematic constructions of concepts, and, indeed, constructions that do not even bear the nature of hypotheses that open up new vistas, but rather of stereotyped speculations (blosse Spekulierschablonen), which, like a wall, conceal our view.â[52]
The Russian Machians will soon be like fashion-lovers who are moved to ecstasy over a hat which has already been discarded by the bourgeois philosophers of Europe.
6. The Solipsism of Mach and Avenarius[edit source]
We have seen that the starting point and the fundamental premise of the philosophy of empirio-criticism is subjective idealism. The world is our sensationâthis is the fundamental premise, which is obscured but in no wise altered by the word âelementâ and by the theories of the âindependent series,â âco-ordination,â and âintrojection.â The absurdity of this philosophy lies in the fact that it leads to solipsism, to the recognition of the existence of the philosophising individual only. But our Russian Machians assure their readers that to âchargeâ Mach âwith idealism and even solipsismâ is âextreme subjectivism.â So says Bogdanov in the introduction to the Russian translation of Analysis of Sensations (p. xi), and the whole Machian troop repeat it in a great variety of keys.
Having examined the methods whereby Mach and Avenarius disguise their solipsism, we have now to add only one thing: the âextreme subjectivismâ of assertion lies entirely with Bogdanov and Co.; for in philosophical literature writers of the most varied trends have long since disclosed the fundamental sin of Machism beneath all its disguises. We shall confine ourselves to a mere summary of opinions which sufficiently indicate the âsubjectiveâ ignorance of our Machians. Let us note in passing that nearly every professional philosopher sympathises with one or another brand of idealism: in their eyes idealism is not a reproach, as it is with us Marxists; but they point out Machâs actual philosophical trend and oppose one system of idealism by another system, also idealist, but to them more consistent.
O. Ewald, in the book devoted to an analysis of Avenariusâ teachings, writes:
âThe creator of empirio-criticism commits himself volens nolens to solipsismâ (loc. cit., pp. 61-62).
Hans Kleinpeter, a disciple of Mach with whom Mach in his preface to Erkenntnis und Irrtum explicitly declares his solidarity, says:
âIt is precisely Mach who is an example of the compatibility of epistemological idealism with the demands of natural science [for the eclectic everything is âcompatible"!], and of the fact that the latter can very well start from solipsism without stopping thereâ (Archiv fĂŒr systematische Philosophie,[53] Bd. VI, 1900, S. 87).
E. Lucka, analysing Machâs Analysis of Sensations, says:
âApart from this . . . misunderstandings (MissverstĂ€ndnis) Mach adopts the ground of pure idealism. . . . It is incomprehensible that Mach denies that he is a Berkeleianâ (Kantstudien,[54] Bd. VIII, 1903, S. 416-17).
W. Jerusalem, a most reactionary Kantian with whom Mach in the above-mentioned preface expresses his solidarity ("a closer kinshipâ of thought than Mach had previously suspectedâVorwort zu âErkenntnis und Irrtum,â S. x, 1906) says: âConsistent phenomenalism leads to solipsism.â And therefore one must borrow a little from Kant! (See Der kritische Idealismus und die reine Logik [Critical Idealism and Pure Logic], 1905, S. 26.)
R. Hönigswald says:
â. . . the immanentists and the empirio-criticists face the alternative of solipsism or metaphysics in the spirit of Fichte, Schelling, or Hegelâ (Ueber die Lehre Humeâs von der RealitĂ€t der Aussendinge [Humeâs Doctrine of the Reality of the External World], 1904, S. 68).
The English physicist Oliver Lodge, in his book denouncing the materialist Haeckel, speaks in passing, as though of something generally known, of âsolipsists such as Mach and Karl Pearsonâ (Sir Oliver Lodge, La vie et la matiĂšre [Life and Matter], Paris, 1907, p. 15).
Nature,[55] the organ of the English scientists, through the mouth of the geometrician E. T. Dixon, pronounced a very definite opinion of the Machian Pearson, one worth quoting, not because it is new, but because the Russian Machians have naĂŻvely accepted Machâs philosophical muddle as the âphilosophy of natural scienceâ (A. Bogdanov, introduction to Analysis of Sensations, p. xii, et seq). Dixon writes:
âThe foundation of the whole book, is the proposition that since we cannot directly apprehend anything but sense-impressions, therefore the things we commonly speak of as objective, or external to ourselves, and their variations, are nothing but groups of sense-impressions and sequences of such groups. But Professor Pearson admits the existence of other consciousness than his own, not only by implication in addressing his book to them, but explicitly in many passages.â
Pearson infers the existence of the consciousness of others by analogy, by observing the bodily motions of other people; but since the consciousness of others is real, the existence of people outside myself must be granted!
âOf course it would be impossible thus to refute a consistent idealist, who maintained that not only external things but all other consciousness were unreal and existed only in his imagination, but to recognise the reality of other consciousness is to recognise the reality of the means by which we become aware of them, which . . . is the external aspect of menâs bodies.â
The way out of the difficulty is to recognise the âhypothesisâ that to our sense-impressions there corresponds an objective reality outside of us. This hypothesis satisfactorily explains our sense-impressions. âI cannot seriously doubt that Professor Pearson himself believes in them as much as anyone else. Only, if he were to acknowledge it explicitly, he would have to rewrite almost every page of The Grammar of Science.â[56]
Ridiculeâthat is the response of the thinking scientists to the idealist philosophy over which Mach waxes so enthusiastic.
And here, finally, is the opinion of a German physicist, L. Boltzmann. The Machians will perhaps say, as Friedrich Adler said, that he is a physicist of the old school. But we are concerned now not with theories of physics but with a fundamental philosophical problem. Writing against people who âhave been carried away by the new epistemological dogmas,â Boltzmann says:
âMistrust of conceptions which we can derive only from immediate sense-impressions has led to an extreme which is the direct opposite of former naĂŻve belief. Only sense-impressions are given us, and, therefore, it is said, we have no right to go a step beyond. But to be consistent, one must further ask: are our sense-impressions of yesterday also given? What is immediately given is only the one sense-impression, or only the one thought, namely, the one we are thinking at the present moment. Hence, to be consistent, one would have to deny not only the existence of other people outside oneâs self, but also all conceptions we ever had in the past.â[57]
This physicist rightly ridicules the supposedly ânewâ âphenomenalistâ view of Mach and Co. as the old absurdity of philosophical subjective idealism.
No, it is those who âfailed to noteâ that solipsism is Machâs fundamental error who are stricken with âsubjectiveâ blindness.
- â E. Mach, Die Geschichte und die Wurzel des Satzes von der Erhaltung der Arbeit. Vortrag, gehalten in der k. Böhm. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften am 15. Nov. 1871 [History and Roots of the Principle of the Conservation of Work. A Lecture Delivered at the Bohemian Royal Scientific Society on November 15, 1871], Prag, 1872, S. 57-58.] âLenin
- â E. Mach, Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung historisch-kritisch dargestellt [Mechanics, a Historical and Critical Account of Its Development], 3. Auflage, Leipzig, 1897, S. 473. âLenin
- â Fr. Engels, Herrn Eugen DĂŒhrings UmwĂ€lzung der Wissenschaft [Herr Eugen DĂŒhringâs Revolution in Science], 3, Auflage, Stuttgart, 1904, S. 6. âLenin
- â See F. Engels, Anti-DĂŒrhring, Moscow, 1959, pp. 34, 53-54.
- â Analysis of Sensations âLenin
- â E. Mach, Erkenntnis und Irrtum, 2. Auflage, 1906, S. 12, Anmerkung. 1 âLenin
- â F. Van Cauwelaert, âLâempiriocriticismeâ [âEmpirio-Criticismâ], in Revue nĂ©o-scolastique, Feb., p. 51. âLeninRevue nĂ©o-scolastique (Neo-scholastic Review) a theological- philosophical magazine founded by the Catholic philosophical society in Louvain (Belgium), published from 1894 o 1909 under the editorship of Cardinal Mercier. It is now issued under the title of Revue philosophique de Louvain (Philosophical Review of Louvain).
- â Rudolf Willy, Gegen die Schulweisheit. Eine Kritik der Philosophie [Against School Wisdom. A Critique of Philosophy], MĂŒnchen. 1905. S. 170. âLenin
- â A. Bogdanov, The Fundamental Elements of the Historical Outlook on Nature, St. Petersburg, 1899, p. 216. âLenin
- â Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science, 2nd ed., London, 1900, p. 326. âLenin
- â Analysis of Sensations, p. 4. Cf. Preface to Erkenntnis und Irrtum, 2nd ed. âLenin
- â Henri PoincarĂ©, La valeur de la science (The Value of Science), Paris, 1905 (There is a Russian translation), passim. âLenin
- â P. Duhem, La thĂ©orie physique, son objet et sa structure (The Physical Theory, Its Object and Structure), Paris, 1906. Cf. pp. 6 and 10. âLenin
- â Friedrich W. Adler, âDie Entdeckung der Weltelemente (zu E. Machs 70. Geburtstag)â [The Discovery of the World-Elements (On the Occasion of E. Machâs 70th Birthday)], Der Kampf, 1908, Nr. 5 (Februar). Translated in The International Socialist Review, 1908, No. 10 (April). One of Adlerâs articles has been translated into Russian in the symposium Historical Materialism. âLeninDer Kampf (The Struggle) âa monthly magazine, the organ of Austrian Social-Democracy, published in Vienna from 1907 to 1934. it took up an opportunist, Centrist position under the cover of Left phraseology. Among its editors were Otto Bauer, Adolf Braun, Karl Renner, Friedrich Adler and others.
The International Socialist Reviewâan American Socialist monthly magazine of a tendency inside the Socialist Party of America, published in Chicago from 1900 to 1918. - â Mach says in the Analysis of Sensations: âThese elements are usually called sensations. But as that term already implies a one-sided theory, we prefer to speak simply of elementsâ (pp. 27-28). âLenin
- â The antithesis between the self and the world, sensation or appearance and the thing, then vanishes, and it all reduces itself to a complex or elementsâ (ibid., p. 21). âLenin
- â Joseph Petzoldt, EinfĂŒhrung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung [Introduction to the Philosophy of Pure Experience], Bd. I, Leipzig, 1900, S. 113: âElements are sensations in the ordinary sense of simple, irreducible perceptions (Wahrnehmungen).â âLenin
- â V. Lesevich, What Is Scientific [read: fashionable, professorial, eclectic] Philosophy?, St. Petersburg, 1891, pp. 229, 247. Petzoldt, Bd. II, Leipzig, 1904, S. 329. âLenin
- â Petzoldt, Bd. II, Leipzig, 1904, S. 329. âLenin
- â R. Avenarius, âBemerkungen zum Begriff des Gegenstandes der Psychologie,â Vierteljahrsschrift fĂŒr wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Bd. XVIII (1894) und Bd. XIX (1895). âLeninVierteljahrsschrift fĂŒr wissenschaftliche Philosophie (Quarterly of Scientific Philosophy)âa magazine of the empirio-criticists (Machists), published in Leipzig from 1877 o 1916 (from 1902 its title was Vierteljahrsschrift fĂŒr wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie) (Quarterly of Scientific Philosophy and Sociology). It was founded by Richard Avenarius and published under his editorship until 1896;after 1896 it was edited by Ernst Mach. Contributors included Wilhelm Wundt, Alois Riehl, Wilhelm Schuppe and others.
Leninâs appraisal of the magazine is given on p.317 of this volume. - â The Fundamental Elements, etc., p. 216; cf. the quotations cited above. âLenin
- â Kritik der reinen Erfahrung.âEd.
- â Oskar Ewald, Richard Avenarius als BegrĂŒnder des Empiriokritizismus [Richard Avenarius as the Founder of Empirio-Criticism], Berlin, , S. 66. âLenin
- â p. Yushkevich, Materialism and Critical Realism, St. Petersburg, 1908, p. 15. âLenin
- â Spinozismâthe system of views of the Dutch seventeenth-century materialist philosopher Benedict Spinoza, according to whom all things are manifestations (modes) of a single, universal substance, which is its own cause and identical with âgod, or natureâ. The essence of substance is expressed in innumerable qualitiesâattributes, the most important of which are extension and thought. Spinoza regarded causality as a form of the interconnection of the separate phenomena of nature, understanding by it the immediate reciprocal action of bodies whose first cause is substance. The action of all modes of substance, including man, is strictly one of necessity; the notion of accident arises only in consequence of ignorance of the totality of all the acting causes. Since hought is one of the attributes of universal substance, the connection and order of ideas are in principle the same as the order and connection of things, and the possibility of human knowledge of the world is unlimited. For the same reason, of the hree forms of cognitionâsensuous, rational and rational-intuitiveâ-the last is regarded as the most rustworthy, in which âa thing is perceived singly through its essence or through knowledge of its immediate causeâ (B. Spinoza, ractatus de intellectus emendatione, et de via, qua optime veram, rerum cognitionem dirigitur). This method enables man both to know his own passions and to become master over them; manâs freedom consists in knowing the necessity of nature and of he passions of his soul.
- â W. Wundt, âUeber naiven und kritischen Realismusâ [On NaĂŻve and Critical Realism], in Philosophische Studien, Bd. XIII, 1897, S. 334. âLeninPhilosophische Studien (Philosophical Studies)âa magazine of an idealist tendency devoted primarily to questions of psychology, published by Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig from 1881 to 1904. From 1905 it was published under the title Psychologische Studien (Psychological Studies).
- â Petrushkaâa serf domestic servant, one of the characters in N. V. Gogolâs novel Dead Souls; he used to read books by syllables without paying any attention to the meaning, being interested only in the mechanical process of reading.
- â See F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (K. Marx and F, Engels, Selected Works, Volume II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 358-59).
- â The foreword to Ludwig Feuerbach, dated February 1888. These words of Engelsâ refer to German professorial philosophy in general. The Machians who would like to be Marxists, being unable to grasp the significance and meaning of this thought of Engelsâ, sometimes take refuge in a wretched evasion: âEngels did not yet know Machâ (Fritz Adler in Historical. Mat., p. 370). On what is this opinion based? On the fact that Engels does not cite Mach and Avenarius? There are no other grounds, and these grounds are worthless, for Engels does not mention any of the eclectics by name, and it is hardly likely that Engels did not know Avenarius, who had been editing a quarterly of âscientificâ philosophy ever since 1876. âLenin
- â Eduard von Hartmann, Die Weltanschauung der modernen Physik [The World Outlook of Modern Physics], Leipzig, 1902, S. 219. âLenin
- â J. Petzoldt, EinfĂŒhrung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung, Bd. I, S. 351, 352. âLenin
- â Empirio-Monism, Bk. I, 2nd ed., p. 21. âLenin
- â Ibid., p. 93. âLenin
- â Fr. Carstanjen, âDer Empiriokritizismus, zugleich eine Erwiderung auf W. Wundts AufsĂ€tzeâ [Empirio-Criticism, with a Reply to W. Wundtâs Articles], Vierteljahrsschrift fĂŒr wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Jahrg. 22 (1898), S. 73 und 213. âLenin
- â Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grössere Publikum ĂŒber das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie. Ein Versuch, die Leser zum Verstehen zu zwingen [A Clear Account to the Broad Public of the True Nature of Recent Philosophy. An Attempt to Get the Reader to Understand], Berlin, 1801, S. 178-80. âLenin
- â Loc. cit., § C: âThe Immanentist Philosophy and Berkeleian Idealism,â pp. 373 and 375; cf. pp. 386 and 407. âThe Unavoidability of Solipsism from This Standpoint,â p. 381. âLenin
- â Norman Smith, âAvenariusâ Philosophy of Pure Experience,â Mind, Vol. XV, 1906, pp. 27-28. âLeninMindâa magazine of an idealist tendency, devoted to questions of philosophy and sociology. It was published from 1876 in London, and is now issued in Edinburgh; the first editor was Professor Croom Robertson.
- â See W. Schuppeâs open letter to R. Avenarius in Vierteljahrsschrift fĂŒr wissenschaftliche Philosophie, Bd. XVII, 1893, S. 364-88. âLenin
- â Struve, P. Bâa former âlegal Marxistâ, one of the founders of the Cadet Party (see Note 67), a monarchist and counter-revolutionary.
- â R. Willy, Gegen die Schulweisheit, S. 170. âLenin
- â J. G. Fichte, Rezension des Aenesidemus [Review of Aenesidemus], 1794, SĂ€mtliche Werke, Bd. I, S. 19. âLenin
- â It can be seen from Leninâs letter to A. I. Ulyanova-Yelizarova, dated December 6 (19), 1908, that the original phrase in the manuscript, viz., âLunacharsky even âmentally projectedâ for himself a godâ, was toned down because of the censorship. Lenin wrote in his letter: ââMentally projected for himself a godâ should be altered to âmentally projected for himselfââwell to use a mild expressionââreligious conceptionsâ, or something of that sortâ (Collected Works, present edition, Vol. 37, p. 403).
- â Vierteljahrsschrift fĂŒr wissenschaftliche Philosophie. Band XX. 1896. âLenin
- â R. Willy, Gegen die Schulweisheit [Against School Wisdom], 1905, S. 173-78. âLenin
- â We shall discuss this point with the Machians later. âLenin
- â L. Feuerbach, SĂ€mtliche Werke [Collected Works], herausgegeben von Bolin und Jodl, Band VII, Stuttgart, 1903, S. 510; or Karl GrĂŒn, L. Feuerbach in seinem Briefwechsel und Nachlass, sowie in seiner philosophischen Charakterentwicklung [His Correspondence, Posthumous Works and Philosophical Development], I. Band, Leipzig, 1874, S. 423-35. âLenin
- â See F. Engels, Anti-DĂŒrhring, Moscow, 1959, p. 55.
- â See Karl Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 363, 372.
- â Lenin is referring to the literary portrait drawn by I. S. Turgenev in his prose poem âA Rule of Lifeâ.
- â James Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, 3rd ed., London, 1906, Vol. II, pp. 171-72. âLenin
- â The Grammar of Science, 2nd ed., London, 1900, p. 58. âLenin
- â R. Willy, Gegen die Schulweisheit, p. 169. Of course, the pedant Petzoldt will not make any such admissions. With the smug satisfaction of the philistine he chews the cud of Avenariusâ âbiologicalâ scholasticism (Vol. I, Chap. II). âLenin
- â Archiv fĂŒr systematische Philosophic (Archives of Systematic Philosophy)âa journal of an idealist tendency published in Berlin from 1895 to 1931, being the second, independent section of the journal Archiv fĂŒr Philosophie (see Note 83). Its first editor was Paul Natorp. From 1925 the journal was published under the title Archiv fĂŒr systematische Philosophic und Soziologie (Archives of Systematic Philosophy and Sociology).
- â Kantstudien (Kantian Studies)âa German philosophical journal of an idealist tendency, the organ of the neo-Kantians. It was founded by Hans Vaihinger and published, with interruptions, from 1897 to 1944 (Hamburg-Berlin-Cologne). Publication was resumed in 1954. The journal devotes considerable space to comments on Kantâs philosophy. Besides neo-Kantians, its contributors included representatives of other idealist trends.
- â Natureâa weekly journal of natural sciences, published in London from 1869.
- â Nature, July 21, 1892, p. 269. âLenin
- â Ludwig Boltzmann, PopulĂ€re Schriften [Popular Essays), Leipzig, 1905, S. 132. Cf. S. 168, 177, 187, etc. âLenin