Conspectus of Hegel’s Book Lectures On the History of Philosophy

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Introduction to the History of Philosophy

HEGEL. LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, WORKS, VOL. XIII

p. 37	...“If the truth is abstract it must be untrue. Healthy human rea- son goes out towards what is con- crete.... Philosophy is what is most an- tagonistic to abstraction, it leads back to the concrete....”
p. 40:	comparison of the history of philosophy with a circe—“a circle ... which, as periphery, has very many circles....”				A very pro- found correct comparison!! Every shade of thought = a circle on the great circle (a spi- ral) of the development of human thought in general
	conceptions of the systems appearing in the history of Philosophy be entirely di- vested of that which pertains to their outward form, their relation to the partic- ular and the like, the various stages in the determination of the Idea itself are found in its logical Notion.” “Conversely in the logical progression taken for itself, there is, so far as its prin- cipal elements are concerned, the progres- sion of historical manifestations; but it is necessary, of course, to be able to discern these pure Notions in what the historical form contains.” (43) P. 56—ridicule of the chasing after fash-
	...“I maintain that the sequence in the systems of philosophy in history is the same as the sequence in the logical deduc- tion of the Notion-determinations of the Idea. I maintain that if the fundamental				NB : Extremely lengthy, empty and tedious on the relation of philosophy to religion. In general, an introduction of almost 200 pages—impossible!!
	ion,—after those who are ready “auch jedes Geschwöge (?) für eine Philo- sophie auszuschreien.” Pp. 57-58— excellent for strict historicity in the history of philosophy, so that one should not ascribe to the ancients a “development” of their ideas, which is comprehensible to us but which in fact was not present in the ancients. Thales, for example, did not possess the conception άρχή(as a prin- ciple), did not possess the concept of cause... ...“Thus there are whole nations which have not this concept” (of cause) “at all; indeed it involves a great step forward in development....” (58)

Volume XIII. Volume I of The History of Philosophy. History of Greek Philosophy

IONIC PHILOSOPHY

“Anaximander (610-547 B. C.) supposes man to develop from a fish.” (213)

PYTHAGORAS AND PYTHAGOREANS

...“Hence the determinations are dry, destitute of process, undialectical, and sta- tionary....” (244)				negative de- termination of dialectics
This refers to the general ideas of the Pythagoreans;—“number” and its sig- nificance, etc. Ergo: it is said in regard to the primitive ideas of the Pythago- reans, their primitive philosophy; their “determinations” of substance, things, the world, are “dry, destitute of process (movement), undialectical.”
Tracing predominantly the dialectical in the history of philosophy, Hegel cites the
views of the Pythagoreans: ...“one, added to even, makes odd (2+1 = 3);—added to odd, it makes even (3+1 = 4);—it” (Eins) “has the property of making ge- rade (= even), and consequently it must itself be even. Thus unity contains in it- self different determinations.” (246)
Musical harmony and the philosophy of Pythagoras:				(“harmony of the world”)
“The subjective, and, in the case of hear- ing, simple feeling, which, however, exists inherently in relation, Pythagoras has at- tributed to the understanding, and he at- tained his object by means of fixed deter- minations.” (282)				relation of the subjec- tive to the objective

Pp. 265--266:
the movement of the heav- enly bodies—their harmony—the har- mony of the singing heavenly spheres inaudible to us (in the Pythago- reans): Aristotle, De coelo, II, 13 (and 9):
...“Fire was placed by the Pythagoreans in the middle, but the Earth was made a star that moved around this central body in a circle....” But for them this fire was not the sun.... “They thus rely, not on sensuous appearance, but on grounds.... These ten spheres”
ten spheres or orbits or movements of the ten planets: Mer- cury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Sun, Moon, Earth, the Milky Way and the Gegenerde (—antipode?) invented “for an even number,” for 10
“like all that is in motion, make a sound; but each makes a different tone, according to the difference in its size and velocity. This is determined by the different distances, which bear a harmonious relationship to one another, in accordance with musical intervals; by this means a harmonious sound (music) arises in the moving spheres (world)....”
Concerning the soul, the Pythagoreans thought “die Seele set: die Sonnenstäub- chen” (p. 268) (= dust particle, atom) (Aristotle, De anima, I, 2).”				An allusion to the struc- ture of matter! the role of dust (in the sunbeam) in ancient philosophy
In the soul—seven circles (elements) as in the heavens. Aristotle, De ani- ma, I, 3—p. 269.				Pythagore- ans: “guesses,” fantasies on the resem- blance of the macrocosm and the microcosm
And here immediately are recounted the fables that Pythagoras (who had taken from the Egyptians the doctrine of the im- mortality of the soul and the transmi- gration of souls) related about himself, that his soul had dwelt 207 years in other people, etc., etc. (271)
NB: the linking of the germs of scien- tific thought with fantasy à la religion, mythology. And nowadays! Likewise, the same linking but the proportions of science and mythology are different.
More on the theory of numbers of Pytha- goras. “Numbers, where are they? Dispersed through space, dwelling in independence in the heaven of ideas? They are not things immediately in themselves, for a thing, a substance, is something quite other than a number—a body bears no resemblance to it.” 254 Quotation |from Aristotle?—Met- aphysik, I, 9, is it not? From Sextus Empiricus? Unclear|.				NB

Pp. 279-280—the Pythagoreans accept the

ether (...“A ray penetrates from the sun through the dense and cold ether,” etc.)

Thus the conjecture about the ether has existed for thousands of years, re- maining until now a conjecture. But at the present time there are already a thousand times more subsurface chan- nels leading to a solution of the prob- lem, to a scientific determination of the ether.

THE ELEATIC SCHOOL

In speaking of the Eleatic school, Hegel says about dialectics:
...“We here” (in der eleatischen Schule) “find the beginning of dialectics, i.e., simply the pure movement of thought in Notions; likewise we see the opposition of thought to outward appearance or sen- suous Being, or of that which is implicit to the being-for-another of this implicit- ness, and in the objective existence we see the contradiction which it has in itself, or dialectics proper....” (280) See the next page.				what is dialectics? (α) (β)
Here are essentially two determinations (two characteristics, two typical features; Bestimmungen, keine Definitionen) of dialectics: α) “the pure movement of thought in Notions”; β) “in the (very) essence of objects (to elucidate) (to reveal) the con- tradiction which it (this essence) has in itself (dialectics proper).” In other words, this “fragment” of He- gel’s should be reproduced as follows: Dialectics in general is “the pure move- ment of thought in Notions“ (i.e., putting it without the mysticism of idealism: human concepts are not fixed but are eternally in movement, they pass into one another, they flow into one another, otherwise they do not reflect living life. The analysis of concepts, the study of them, the “art of operating with them” (Engels) always demands study of the movement of concepts, of their inter- connection, of their mutual transitions). In particular, dialectics is the study of the opposition of the Thing-in-itself (an sich), of the essence, substratum, sub- stance—from the appearance, from “Be- ing-for-Others.” (Here, too, we see a tran- sition, a flow from the one to the other: the essence appears. The appearance is essen- tial.) Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on without end. Dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects: not only are appearances tran- sitory, mobile, fluid, demarcated only by conventional boundaries, but the es- sence of things is so as well.				Hegel on dialectics (see the previous page
Sextus Empiricus presents the point of view of the Sceptics as follows:
...“Let us imagine that in a house in which there are many valuables, there were those who sought for gold by night; each would then think that he had found the gold, but would not know for certain whether he had actually found it. Thus philosophers come into this world as into a great house to seek the truth, but were they to reach it, they could not tell whether they had really attained it....” (288-289)				the compari- son is a tempting one...
Xenophanes (the Eleatic) said:
“Did beasts and lions only have hands, Works of art thereby to bring forth, as do men, They would, in creating divine forms, give to them What in image and size belongs to them-				Gods in the image of man
selves....” (289-290) “What especially characterises Zeno is dialectics, which ... begins with him....” (302) “We find in Zeno likewise true objective dialectics.” (309) (310: on the refutation of philosophic systems: “Falsity must not be demonstrat- ed as untrue because the opposite is true, but in itself....”)
“Dialectics is in general α) external dia- lectics, in which this movement is differ- ent from the comprehension of this move-				dialectics
ment; β) not a movement of our intelli- gence only, but what proceeds from the nature of the thing itself, i. e., from the pure Notion of the content. The former is a manner of regarding objects in such a way that reasons are revealed and aspects of them shown, by means of which all that was supposed to be firmly fixed, is made to totter. There may be reasons which are altogether external too, and we shall speak further of this dialectics when deal- ing with the Sophists. The other dialectics,
however, is the immanent contemplation of the object: it is taken for itself, without previous hypothesis, idea or obligation, not under any external conditions, laws, grounds. We have to put ourselves right into the thing, to consider the object in itself and to take it in the determina- tions which it has. In regarding it thus, it” (er) (sic!) “shows from itself that it con- tains opposed determinations, and thus transcends itself; this dialectics we more especially find in the ancients. Subjec-				objective dialectics
tive dialectics, which reasons from exter- nal grounds, does justice when it is granted that: ‘in the correct there is what is not correct, and in the false the true as well.’ True dialectics leaves nothing whatever to its object, as if the latter were defi- cient on one side only; but it disintegrates in the entirety of its nature....” (p. 311)
With the “principle of development” in the twentieth century (indeed, at the end of the nineteenth century also) “all are agreed.” Yes, but this superficial, not thought out, accidental, philistine “agree- ment” is an agreement of such a kind as stifles and vulgarises the truth.—If every- thing develops, then everything passes from one into another, for development as is well known is not a simple, universal and eternal growth, enlargement (respective dim- inution), etc.—If that is so, then, in the first place, evolution has to be under- stood more exactly, as the arising and passing away of everything, as mutual transitions.—And, in the second place, if everything develops, does not that apply also to the most general concepts and categories of thought? If not, it means that thinking is not connected with being. If it does, it means that there is a dialec- tics of concepts and a dialectics of cogni- tion which has objective significance. +				Regarding the question of dialec- tics and its objective significance...

NB

		I.II.	The principle of develop- ment... The principle of unity...	+ In addition, the uni- versal principle of de- velopment must be com- bined, linked, made to correspond with the uni- versal principle of the unity of the world, nature, motion, matter, etc.

“Zeno’s treatment of motion was above all objectively dialectical....” (p. 313)
...“Movement itself is the dialectic of all that is....” It did not occur to Zeno to deny movement as “sensuous certainty,” it was merely a question “nach ihrer (move- ment’s) Wahrheit” (of the truth of move- ment). (313) And on the next page, where he relates the anecdote how Diogenes the Cynic, of Sinope, refuted movement by walking, Hegel writes:				NB. This can and must be turnedround: the question is not whether there is movement, but how
				to express it in the logic of concepts
...“But the anecdote continues that, when a pupil was satisfied with this refutation, Diogenes beat him, on the ground that, since the teacher had disputed with reasons, the only valid refutation is one derived from reasons. Men have not merely to sat- isfy themselves by sensuous certainty, but also to understand....” (314)				Not bad! Where is this continuation of the anec- dote taken from? It is not to be found in Dio- genes Laerti- us, VI, § 39, or in Sextus Empiri- cus, III, 8(Hegel p. 314). Did He- gel invent it?
Zeno has four ways of refuting motion: 1. That which is moving to an end must
first cover half of the path. And of this half, again first its half, and so on ad infinitum. Aristotle replied: space and time are infinitely divisible (δννάμει) (p. 316), but not infinitely divided (ένεργεία), Bayle (Dictionnaire, Vol. IV, article Zeno) calls this reply of Aristotle’s pitoyable and says: ...“if one drew an infinite number of lines on a particle of matter, one would not thereby introduce a division that would reduce to an actual infin- ity that which according to him was only a potential infinity....” And Hegel writes (317): “Dies si ist gut!”
i.e., if one carried out the infinite division to the end!!
...“The essence of space and time is mo- tion, for it is universal; to understand it means to express its essence in the form				correct!
of the Notion. As unity of negativity and continuity, motion is expressed as the No- tion, as thought; but neither continuity nor discontinuity is to be posited as the essence....” (pp. 318--319)
“To understand means to express in the form of notions.” Motion is the essence of space and time. Two fundamental con- cepts express this essence: (infinite) con- tinuity (Kontinuitä) and “punctuality” (= denial of continuity, discontinu- ity). Motion is the unity of continuity (of time and space) and discontinuity (of time and space). Motion is a contra- diction, a unity of contradictions.
Überweg-Heinze, 10th edition, p. 63 (§ 20), is wrong when he says that Hegel “defends Aristotle against Bayle.” Hegel refutes both the sceptic (Bayle) and the anti-dialectician (Aristotle). Cf. Gomperz, Les penseurs de la Grèce, p ..., the forced recognition, under the lash, of the unity of contradictions, without recognising dialectics (owing to cowardice of thought)....
2. Achilles will not overtake the tortoise.
“First the half” and so on endlessly. Aristotle answers: he will overtake it if he be permitted “to overstep the limits.” (320) And Hegel: “This answer is cor- rect and contains all that can be said” (p. 321)—for actually the half here (at a certain stage) becomes the “limit”....
...“If we speak of motion in general, we say that the body is in one place and then it goes to another; because it moves it is no longer in the first, but yet not in the				cf. Chernov’s objections against Engels
second; were it in either it would be at rest. If we say that it is between both, this is to say nothing at all, for were it between both, it would be in a place, and
this presents the same difficulty. But move- ment means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time—and it is this which first makes motion possible.” (Pp. 321--322)				NB correct!
Movement is the presence of a body in a definite place at a given moment and in another place at another, subsequent moment—such is the objection which Cher- nov repeats (see his Philosophical Studies) in the wake of all the “metaphysical” opponents of Hegel. This objection is incorrect: (1) it de- scribes the result of motion, but not mo- tion itself; (2) it does not show, it does not contain in itself the possibility of mo- tion; (3) it depicts motion as a sum, as a concatenation of states of rest, that is to say, the (dialectical) contradiction is not removed by it, but only concealed, shifted, screened, covered over.
“What makes the difficulty is always thought alone, since it keeps apart the mo- ments of an object which in their separa- tion are really united.” (322)				correct!
We cannot imagine, express, measure, depict movement, without interrupting con- tinuity, without simplifying, coarsening, dismembering, strangling that which is liv-
ing. The representation of movement by means of thought always makes coarse, kills,—and not only by means of thought but also by sense-perception, and not only of movement, but every concept. And in that lies the essence of dialectics. And precisely this essence is ex- pressed by the formula: the unity, identity of opposites.
3. “The flying arrow rests.”
And Aristotle's answer: the error arises from the assumption that “time consists of the individual Nows” (έχ τών νϋν) p. 324. 4. Half is equal to the double: motion
measured in comparison with an un- moving body and in comparison with a body moving in the opposite direction. At the end of the § on Zeno, Hegel com- pares him to Kant (whose antinomies, he says, “do no more than Zeno did here”). The general conclusion of the dialectic of the Eleatics: “the truth is the one, all else is untrue”—“just as the Kantian phi- losophy resulted in “We know appearances only.” On the whole the principle is the same.” (p. 326) But there is also a difference.
“In Kant it is the spiritual that de- stroys the world; according to Zeno, the world of appearance in itself and for itself has no truth. According to Kant, it is our thought, our spiritual activity that is bad;— it shows excessive humility of mind to be- lieve that knowledge has no value....” (327)				Kant and his (subjectiv- ism, scep- ticism, etc.)
The continuation of the Eleatics in Leucippus and among the Sophists...

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS

After Zeno (? he lived after Heracli- tus?) Hegel passes on to Heraclitus and says: “It” (Zeno’s dialectics) “may, to that extent, also be called subjective dialec- tics, insofar as it rests in the contemplative subject, and the one, without this dialec- tics, without this movement, is one ab- stract identity....” (328)				NB
but it was previously said, see the passage quoted from p. 309, and others, that Zeno’s dialectics is ob- jective dialectics. Here is some kind of superfine “distinguo.” Cf. the following:
“Dialectics: (α) external dialectics, a reasoning which goes hither and thither, without reaching the soul of the				NB
thing itself; (β) the immanent dialectics of the object, but (NB) following within the contemplation of the subject; (γ) the objectivity of Heraclitus, i.e., dialectics itself taken as principle.” (328)				NB
α) β) γ) subjective dialectics. in the object there is dialectics, but I do not know, perhaps it is Schein, merely appearance, etc. fully objective dialectics, as the principle of all that is
(In Heraclitus): “Here we see land; there is
no proposition of Heraclitus which I would not have adopted in my Log- ic....” (328)
“Heraclitus says: Everything is be- coming; this becoming is the principle. This is contained in the expression: Being no more is than not-Being....” (p. 333)				NB
“The recognition of the fact that Being and not-Being are only abstractions de- void of truth, that the first truth is to be found only in Becoming, forms a great ad- vance. The understanding comprehends both as having truth and validity in isolation; reason on the other hand recognises the one in the other, and sees that in the one its other” (NB “its other”) “is contained— that is why the All, the Absolute is to be determined as Becoming.” (334) “Aristotle says (De mundo, Chapter 5)
that Heraclitus ‘joined together the complete whole and the incomplete’ (part)” ... “what coincides and what conflicts, what is harmonious and what discordant; and from out of them all (the opposite) comes one, and from one, all.” (335) Plato, in his Symposium, puts forward the views of Heraclitus (inter alia in their application to music: harmony consists of opposites), and the statement: “The art of the musician unites the different.” Hegel writes: this is no objection against Heraclitus (336), for difference is the es- sence of harmony:
“This harmony is precisely absolute Be- coming, change,—not becoming other, now this and then an other. The essential thing is that each different thing, each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....”				Quite right and impor- tant: the “other” as its other, development into its opposite
“So also in the case of tones; they must be different, but so that they can also be united....” (336) P. 337: incidentally Sextus Empiricus (and Aristotle) are reckon- ed among the ... “best witnesses”.... Heraclitus said: “die Zeit ist das erste körperliche Wesen” (Sextus Empiricus)— p. (338) körperliche—an “unfortunate” expres- sion (perhaps, Hegel says (NB), it was chosen by a sceptic (NB),—but time, he says, is “das erste sinnliche Wesen”.... ...“Time is pure Becoming, as per- ceived....” (338) In regard to the fact that Heraclitus considered fire as a process, Hegel says: “Fire is physical time, it is this absolute unrest” (340)—and further, in regard to the natural philosophy of Heraclitus:
...“It” (Natur) “is process in itself....” (344) “Nature is the never-resting, and the All is the transition out of the one into the other, from division into unity, and from unity into division....” (341) “To understand Nature means to rep- resent it as process....” (339) Here is what is said to be the narrow-
ness of natural scientists:
...“we listen to their account“ (Natur- forscher), “they only observe and say what they see; but this is not true, for un- consciously they transform what is im- mediately seen by means of the Notion.				NB
And the strife is not due to the opposi-
tion between observation and the absolute Notion, but between the limited rigid notion and the Absolute Notion. They show that changes are non-existent....” (344-345)				NB
...“Water in its decomposition re- veals hydrogen and oxygen: these have not arisen for they were already there as such, as the parts of which the water consists” (thus Hegel mimics the na- tural scientists)....
“As we find in all expression of per- ception and experience; as soon as men speak, there is a Notion present, it cannot be withheld, for in conscious- ness there is always a touch of univer- sality and truth.”
Quite right and important—it is pre- cisely this that Engels repeated in more popular form, when he wrote that natu- ral scientists ought to know that the re- sults of natural science are concepts, and that the art of operating with concepts is not inborn, but is the result of 2,000 years of the development of natural science and philosophy. The concept of transformation is taken narrowly by natural scientists and they lack understanding of dialectics.
...“He” (Heraclitus) “is the one who first expressed the nature of the infinite, and who first understood nature as infinite in itself, i.e., its essence as process....” (346) On the “concept of necessity”—cf. p.347. Heraclitus could not see truth in “sensuous certainty” (348), but in “necessity” (είμαρμένη)—((λόγοζ)).
NB || “Absolute mediation” (348)				(“absoluteconnec- tion”)
“The rational, the true, that which I know, is indeed a withdrawal from the objective as from what is sensuous, individ- ual, definite and existent; but what rea- son knows within itself is just as much necessity or the universal of being; it is the essence of thought as it is the essence of the world.” (352)				NB: Necessi- ty = “the universal of Being” (the universal in Being) (connection, “absolute mediation”)

LEUCIPPUS

368: “The development of philosophy in
history must correspond to the de- velopment of logical philosophy; but there will still be passages in the lat- ter which are absent in historical de- velopment.”				The develop-ment of phi- losophy in history “must correspond” (??) to the development of logical philosophy
Here there is a very profound and cor- rect, essentially materialist thought (ac- tual history is the basis, the foundation, the Being, which is followed by conscious- ness).
Leucippus says that atoms are invisible “because of the smallness of their body” (369)—Hegel, however, replies that this is “Ausrede” (ibid.), that “Eins” cannot be seen, that “das Princip des Eins” “ganz ideell” (370), and that Leucippus is no “empiricist”, but an idealist.
((stretching of a pointby the idealist Hegel, course, stretching a point.))
([Straining to make Leucippus conform to his Logic, Hegel expatiates on the impor- tance, the “greatness” of the principle (368) Fürsichsein, descrying it in Leucippus. It savours in part of stretching a point.]But there is also a grain of truth in it; the nuance (the “moment”) of separateness; the interruption of gradualness; the mo- ment of the smoothing out of contradic- tions; the interruption of continuity—the atom, the one. (Cf. 371 i.f.):—“The one and continuity are opposites....” Hegel’s logic cannot be applied in its given form, it cannot be taken as given. One must separate out from it the logical (epistemological) nuances, after purifying them from Ideenmystik: that is still a big job.)
“The Atomists are, therefore, generally speaking, opposed to the idea of the crea- tion and maintenance of the world by means of a foreign principle. It is in the theory of atoms that natural science first feels released from the need for demonstrat- ing a foundation for the world. For if nature is represented as created and held together by another, then it is conceived of as not existent in itself, and thus as having its Notion outside itself, i.e., its basis is foreign to it, it has no basis as such, it is only conceivable from the will of another— as it is, it is contingent, devoid of ne- cessity and Notion in itself. In the idea of the atomists, however, we have the con- ception of the inherency of nature, that is to say, thought finds itself in it....” (372-373)				materialism (Hegel is afraid of the word: keep away from me) versus atomism
In the presentation—according to Dio- genes Laertius, IX, § 31-33—of the atomism of Leucippus, the “vortex” (Wirbel— δίνην)of atoms, Hegel finds nothing of interest (“no interest,” ...“empty representation,” “dim, confused ideas”—p. 377 i.f.).				NB
Hegel’s blindness, the one-sidedness of the Idealist!!

DEMOCRITUS

Democritus is behandelt by Hegel in a very stiefmütterlich fashion, in all pp. 378-380! The spirit of materialism is intolerable to the idealist!! The words of Democritus are quoted (p. 379):
“Warmth exists according to opin- ion (νόμφ) and so do cold and colour, sweet and bitter; only the indivisible and the void are in accordance with truth (έτεή)” (Sextus Empiricus, Ad-versus Mathematicos, VII, § 135).
And the conclusion is drawn:
...“We see this much, that Demo- critus expressed the difference between the moments of Being-in-itself and Being-for-other more distinctly....” (380)
By this “the way is at once opened up” to “the bad idealism,” that ... “meine Emp- findung, mein....”				“bad ideal- ism” (my feeling) cf. Mach
...“A sensuously notionless manifold of feeling is established, in which there is no reason, and with which this idealism has no further concern.”				Hegel versus E. Mach...

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS

Anaxagoras. Noΰς “the cause of the world and of all order,” and Hegel elucidates this:
...“Objective thought ... reason in the world, also in nature—or as we speak of genera in nature, they are the universal. A dog is an animal, this is its genus, its substantial; the dog itself is this. This law, this understanding, this reason is itself immanent in nature, it is the essence of nature; the latter is not formed from without as men make a chair.” (381-382)				NB the concept of genus is “the essence of nature,” is law...
“Noΰς is the same as soul (Aristotle on Anaxagoras)—p. 394 and ... the elucidation of this leap from the general in nature to the soul; from objective to subjec- tive, from materialism to idealism. C’est ici que ces extrêmes se touchent (et se transforment!)
On the homoeomeriae of Anaxagoras (particles of the same kind as the whole body) Hegel writes: “Transformation is to be taken in a
double sense, according to existence and according to the Notion....” (403-404) Thus, for instance, it is said that water can be removed—the stones remain; blue colour can be removed, red, etc., will remain.				transforma- tion (its significance)
“This is only according to existence; according to the Notion, they only inter- penetrate, it is inner necessity.” Just as one cannot remove the heart by itself from the living body without the lungs perish- ing, etc. “Nature likewise exists only in unity, just as the brain exists only in unity with the other organs” (404) whereby some conceive transformation in the sense of the presence of small qualitatively determined particles and their growth (respective diminution) [combination and separation]. The other conception (Heraclitus)—the transformation of the one into an other. (403)
Existence and Notion—are to be distinguished in Hegel approximately as follows: fact (Being) taken separately, torn from its connection, and connection (the Notion), mutual relation, concat- enation, law, necessity.
415: ...“The Notion is that which things are in and for themselves....” Hegel speaks of grass being the end for animals, and the latter for men, etc., etc., and concludes: “It is a circle which is complete in itself, but whose completion is likewise a passing into another circle; a vortex whose mid- point, that into which it returns, is found directly in the periphery of a higher circle which swallows it up....” (414)
So far the ancients are said to have fur- nished little: “Universal is a meagre deter- mination; everyone knows of the univer- sal, but not of it as essence.” (416)				NB: the “univer- sal” as “es- sence”
“But here we have the beginning of a more distinct development of the relation- ship of consciousness to Being, the de- velopment of the nature of knowledge as a knowledge of the true.” (417) “The mind has gone forth to express essence as thought.“ (418)				“development of the nature of knowl- edge”

“We see this development of the univer-

sal, in which essence goes right over to the

side of consciousness, in the so much de-

cried worldly wisdom of the Sophists.”(418)

((End of the first volume)) [The second

volume begins with the Sophists.]

Volume XIV. Volume II Of the History Of Philosophy

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOPHISTS

Speaking of the Sophists, Hegel in ex- treme detail chews over the thought that sophistry contains an element common to all culture (Bildung) in general, our own included, namely, the adducing of proofs(Gründe) and Gegengründe —“reflecting reasoning”;—the finding of the most di- verse points of view in everything; ((sub- jectivity—lack of objectivity)). In discuss- ing Protagoras and his famous thesis (man is the measure of all things) Hegel places Kant close to him:
...“Man is the measure of everything,— man, therefore, is the subject in general; the existent, consequently, is not in iso- lation, but is for my knowledge—conscious- ness is essentially the producer of the con- tent in what is objective, and subjective thinking is thereby essentially active. And this view extends even to the most modern Philosophy, as when, for instance, Kant says that we only know phenomena, i.e., that what seems to us to be objective, to be reality, is only to be considered in its relation to consciousness, and does not exist without this relation....” (31)				Protagoras and Kant
The second “moment” is objectivity (das Allgemeine), “it is posited by me, but is likewise in itself objec- tively universal, not posited by me....” (32)
Diese “Relativität” (32) “Every- thing has a relative truth only” (33), according to Protagoras.				the relativ- ism of the Sophist...
...“Kant’s phenomenon is no more than an external impulse, an x, an unknown, which first receives these determinations through our feeling, through us. Even if there were an objective ground for our calling one thing cold and another warm, we could indeed say that they must have diversity in themselves, but warmth and cold first become what they are in our feeling. Similarly ... things are, etc. ... thus experience was called a phenome- non....“ (34)				Kant and the Sophists and Phenomenol- ogism à la Mach NB
“The world is consequently not only phenomenal in that it is for consciousness, and thus that its Being is only one rela- tive to consciousness, but it is likewise phenomenal in itself.” (35)				not only relativism
...“This scepticism reached a much deep- er point in Gorgias....” (35)				scepticism
...“His dialectic” ... that of Gor- gias, the Sophist [many times: p. 36, idem p. 37].				NB
Tiedemann said that Gorgias went fur- ther than the “common sense” of man. And Hegel makes fun of this: every philosophy goes further than “common sense” for common sense is not philosophy. Prior to Copernicus it was contrary to common sense to say that the earth goes round the sun. (36)				Hegel on “common sense”
“It” (der gesunde Menschenverstand) “is the mode of thought of its time, con- (36)				common sense = the prejudices of its time
Gorgias (p. 37): 1) 2) 3) Nothing exists. Nothing is Assuming that Being is, it cannot be known. Even if it is knowable, no communication of what is known is pos- sible.
...“Gorgias is conscious that they” (Be- ing and not-Being, their mutual sublation) “are vanishing moments; the unconscious conception has this truth also, but knows nothing about it....” (40)
“Vanishing moments” = Being and not-Being. That is a magnifi- cent definition of dialectics!!
...“Gorgias α) justly argues against abso- lute realism, which, because it has a no- tion, thinks it possesses the very thing itself, when actually it possesses only some- thing relative; β) falls into the bad ideal- ism of modern times: ‘what is thought is always subjective, and thus not the existent, since through thought an existent is transformed into what is thought....’” (41)				Gorgias, “absolute realism” (and Kant)
(and further below (p. 41 i.f.) Kant is again mentioned).

To be added on Gorgias: He puts “either—
or” to the fundamental questions. “But that is not true dialectics; it would be necessary to prove that the object must be necessarily in one or another determi- nation, not in and for itself. The object resolves itself only into those determi- nations; but from that nothing follows regarding the nature of the object it- self.” (39)				dialectics in the object itself

To be added further on Gorgias:
In the exposition of his view that the existent cannot be imparted, communi- cated:
“Speech, by which the existent has to be expressed, is not the existent, what is imparted is thus not the existent, but only				NB
words.” (Sextus Empiricus, AdversusMathematicos. VII. § 83-84)—p. 41— Hegel writes: “The existent is also compre- hended as non-existent, but the comprehen- sion of it is to make it universal.” (42)				cf. Feuerbach
“This individual cannot be ex- pressed....” (42)

Every word (speech) already universalises cf. Feuerbach.

The senses show reality; thought and word — the universal.

Final words of the section on the Soph- ists: “The Sophists thus also made dia- lectic, universal Philosophy, their object, and they were profound thinkers....” (42)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES

Socrates is a “world-famed personage” (42), the “most interesting” (ibid.) in the philosophy of antiquity—“subjectivity of thought”(42) [“freedom of self-conscious- ness” (44)]. “Herein lies the ambiguity of dia- lectics and sophistry; the objective disappears”: is the subjective contin- gent or is there in it (“an ihm selbst”) the objective and universal? (43) “True thought thinks in such a way that its content is as truly objective as subjec- tive” (44)—and in Socrates and Plato we see, Hegel says, not only subjectivity (“the reference of any judgment to conscious- ness is held by him”—Socrates—”in common with the Sophists”)—but also objectivity.
“Objectivity has here” (in Socrates) “the sense of the universal, existent in and for itself, and not external objectivity” (45)—
idem 46: “not external objectivity but the spiritual universal.”				NB
And two lines further down:
“Kant’s ideal is the phenomenon, not objective in itself....” (46) Socrates called his method Hebammen-kunst—(p. 64) (derived from his mother, he said) ((Socrates’ mother = midwife))— to help in bringing thoughts to birth.				Kant shrewd!
Hegel’s example: everyone knows, he says, what Werden is, but it surprises us if we analyse (reflektierend) and find that it is “the identity of Being and not-Being”— “so great a distinction.” (67)				Werden = Nichtsein und Sein.
Meno (Plato’s “Meno”) compared Socra- tes to an electric eel (Zitteraal), which makes anyone who touches it “narkotisch”(69): and I, too, am “narkotisch” and Icannot answer you.
...“That which is held by me as truth and right is spirit of my spirit. But what the spirit derives thus from itself, what it so holds, must come from it as the uni- versal, as from the spirit which acts in a universal manner, and not from its pas- sions, interests, likings, whims, aims, in- clinations, etc. These, too, certainly come from something inward which is ‘implanted in us by nature,’ but they are only in a natural way our own....” (74-75)				très bien dit!!

Intelligent idealism is closer to intelligent ma- terialism than stupid materialism. Dialectical idealism instead of intelligent; metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, crude, rigid instead of stupid.

To be elaborated: Plekhanov wrote on philosophy (dialec- tics) probably about 1,000 pages (Beltov + against Bogdanov + against the Kantians +				NB
fundamental questions, etc., etc.). Among them, about the large Logic, in con- nection with it, its thought (i.e., dialectics proper, as philosophical sci- ence) nil!!

Protagoras: “man is the measure of all things.” Socrates: “man, as thinking, is the measure of all things.” (75)					Nuance!
Xenophon in his Memorabilien described Socrates better, more accurately and more faithfully than Plato. (Pp. 80-81)

THE SOCRATICS

In connection with the sophisms about the “heap” and “bald,” Hegel repeats the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa: dialectics. (Pp. 139-140) 143-144: At length about the fact that
“language in essence expresses only the universal; what is meant, however, is the special, the particular. Hence what is meant cannot be said in speech.” (“It”? The most universal word of all.)						NB in language there is only the universal
Who is it? I. Every person is an I. Das Sinnliche? It is a univer- sal, etc., etc. “This”?? Everyone is “this.”
Why can the particular not be named? One of the objects of a given kind (tables) is distinguished by some- thing from the rest.
“That the universal should in philosophy be given a place of such importance that only the universal can be expressed, and the ‘it’ which is meant, cannot, indicates a state of consciousness and thought which the philosophical culture of our time has not yet reached.” Hegel includes here “the scepticism of our times” (143)— [Kant’s?] and those who assert that “sensuous certainty is the truth.” (143) For das Sinnliche “is a universal.” (143)
Thereby Hegel hits every materialism except dialectical materialism. NB						NB
To call by name?—but the name is a contingent symbol and does not express Sache selbst (how can the partic- ular be expressed?) (144)
Hegel seriously “believed,” thought, that materialism as a philosophy was impossible, for philosophy is the science of thinking, of the universal, but the universal is a thought. Here he repeated the error of the same subjective ideal- ism that he always called “bad” ideal- ism. Objective (and still more, abso- lute) idealism came very close to ma- terialism by a zig-zag (and a somersault), even partially became transformed into it.						Hegel and dialectical materialism
The Cyrenaics held sensation for the truth, “the truth is not what is in sensation, the content, but is itself sensation.” (151)						sensation in the theory of knowledge of the Cyrenaics...
“The main principle of the Cyrenaic school, therefore, is sensation, which should form the real criterion of the true and the good....” (153) “Sensation is the indeterminate unit” (154), but if thinking is added, then the universal appears and “simple subjectivity” disappears.
(Phenomenologists à la Mach & Co. inevitably become idealists on the question of the universal, “law,” “ne- cessity,” etc.)						NBthe Cyrenaics and Mach and Co.
Another Cyrenaic, Hegesias, “recognised” “this incongruity between sensation and universality....” (155)
They confuse sensation as a principle of the theory of knowledge and a prin- ciple of ethics. This NB. But Hegel separated the theory of knowledge.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO

In regard to Plato’s plan by which philosophers ought to rule the state:
...“The territory of history is different from that of philosophy....” ...“We must recognise that action repre- sents at the same time the endeavours of the subject as such for particular ends....All those particular ends are really only means for bringing forth the Idea, because it is the absolute power.” (193)					Particular ends in history create the “Idea” (the law of history)
Concerning Plato’s doctrine on ideas:
...“because sensuous perception shows nothing purely, or as it is in itself” (Pha-edo)—p. 213—therefore the body is a hindrance to the soul.					“purity” (= lifeless- ness?) of universal conceptions
The significance of the universal is contradictory: it is dead, impure, in- complete, etc., etc., but it alone is a stage towards knowledge of the concrete, for we can never know the concrete completely. The infinite sum of general conceptions, laws, etc., gives the concrete in its completeness.					NB the dialec- tics of cognition NB ↓
The movement of cognition to the object can always only proceed dia- lectically: to retreat in order to hit					←
more surely—reculer pour mieux sauter (savoir?). Converging and diverging lines: circles which touch one another. Knotenpunkt = the practice of man- kind and of human history. (Practice = the criterion of the coin- cidence of one of the infinite aspects of the real.)					NB
These Knotenpunkte represent a unity of contradictions, when Be- ing and not-Being, as vanishing moments, coincide for a moment, in the given moments of the move- ment (= of technique, of history, etc.)
In analysing Plato’s dialectics, Hegel once again tries to show the difference between subjective, sophistic dialectics and objective dialectics: “That everything is one, we say of each thing: ‘it is one and at the same time we show also that it is many, its many parts					“empty dialectics” in Hegel
and properties’—but it is thereby said:
‘it is one in quite another respect from that in which it is many’—we do not bring these thoughts together. Thus the conception and the words merely go back-					NB
wards and forwards from the one to the
other. If this passing to and fro is performed with consciousness, it is empty dialectics, which does not unite the opposites and does not come to unity.” (232)					“empty dialectics”
P l a t o in the “Sophistes”: “The point of difficulty, and what we ought to aim at, is to show that what is other is the same, and what is the same is other, and indeed in the same regard and from the same point of view.” (233)					NB
“But we must be conscious of the fact that the Notion is neither merely the im- mediate in truth, although it is the sim ple—but it is of spiritual simplicity, essentially the thought which has re- turned into itself (immediately is only this red, etc.); nor that it is only that which reflects itself in itself, the thing of consciousness; but is also in itself, i.e., it is objective essence....” (245)					NB objectivism
The concept is not something imme- diate (although the concept is a “simple” thing, but this simplicity is “spiritual,” the simplicity of the Idea)—what is im- mediate is only the sensation of “red” (“this is red”), etc. The concept is not “merely the thing of consciousness”; but is the essence of the object (ge- genständliches Wesen), it is something an sich, “in itself.”

...“This conviction of the nature of the Notion, Plato did not ixpress so defi- nitely....” (245)
Hegel dilates at length on Plato’s “Philosophy of Nature,” the ultra-non- sensical mysticism of ideas, such as that “triangles form the essence of sensuous things” (265), and such mystical non- sense. That is highly characteristic! The mystic-idealist-spiritualist Hegel (like all official, clerical-idealist philosophy of our day) extols and expatiates on mysticism, idealism in the history of philosophy, while ignoring and slight- ing materialism. Cf. Hegel on Democ- ritus—nil!! On Plato a huge mass of mystical slush.					idealism and mysticism in Hegel (and in Plato)
Speaking of Plato’s republic and of the current opinion that it is a chimera, Hegel repeats his favourite saying:
...“What is real is rational. But one must know, distinguish, exactly what is real; in common life all is real, but there is a difference between the phenomenal world and reality....” (274)					what is real is rational

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

Incorrect, says Hegel, is the generally held opinion that the philosophy of Aristotle is “realism” (299), (id. p. 311 “empiricism”) in contrast to the idealism of Plato. ((Here again, Hegel clearly squeezes in a great deal under idealism.))
In presenting Aristotle’s polemic against Plato’s doctrine on ideas, Hegel sup-presses its materialistic features. (Cf. 322-323 and others.)						NB NB
He has let the cat out of the bag: “The elevation of Alexander” (Alexander of Mac-						((merely
edon, Aristotle’s pupil) “... into ... a god is ... not matter for surprise ... God and						invert it)) precisely!
man are not at all so very wide asunder....” (305) Hegel perceives the idealism of Aris- totle in his idea of god. (326) ((Of course, it is idealism, but more ob- jective and further removed, more general than the idealism of Plato, hence in the philosophy of nature more frequently = materialism.))						Hegel has made a com- plete mess of the critic- ism of Plato’s “ideas” in Aristotle

	Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s “ideas” is a criticism of idealism as ideal- ism in general: for whence concepts, abstrac- tions, are derived, thence come also “law” and “ne- cessity,” etc. The idealist Hegel in cowardly fashion fought shy of the under- mining of the foundations of idealism by Aristotle (in his criticism of Plato’s ideas).		NB	When one idealist criticises the founda- tions of idealism of another idealist, ma- terialism is always the gainer thereby. Cf. Aristotle versus Plato, etc., Hegel versus Kant, etc.
	“Leucippus and Plato accordingly say that motion has always existed, but they give no reason for the assertion.” (Aristot- le, Metaphysik, XII, 6 and 7.) p. 328
	Aristotle thus pitifully brings forward god against the material- ist Leucippus and the idealist Plato. There is eclecticism in Aristotle here. But Hegel conceals the weakness for the sake of mysticism!
	Hegel, the supporter of dialectics, could not understand the dialec- tical transition from matter to motion, from matter to con- sciousness—especially the second. Marx corrected the error (or weak- ness?) of the mystic.		NB	Not only is the transition from matter to conscious- ness dialecti- cal, but also that from sensation to thought, etc.

What distinguishes the dialectical tran- sition from the undialectical transition? The leap. The contradiction. The inter- ruption of gradualness. The unity (iden- tity) of Being and not-Being.

The following passage shows especially clearly how Hegel conceals the weakness of Aristotle’s idealism: “Aristotle makes objects into thoughts; hence, in being thoughts, they exist in truth; that is their ούσία. “The meaning of this is not, however, that natural objects have themselves the power of thinking, but as they are subjec- tively thought by me, my thought is thus also the Notion of the thing, which there-
fore constitutes its substance. But in na- ture the Notion does not exist as thought in this freedom, but has flesh and blood; yet it has a soul, and this is its Notion. Aristotle recognises what things in and					naïve!!
for themselves are; and that is their ούσία. The Notion does not exist for itself, but it is stunted by externality. The ordinary def inition of truth is: ‘truth is the harmony of the conception with the object.’ But the conception itself is only a conception, I am still not at all in harmony with my conception (with its content); for when I represent to myself a house, a beam, and so on, I am by no means this content— ‘I’ is something other than the conception of house. It is only in thought that there is present a true harmony between objective and subjective; that constitutes me (Hegel’s italics). Aristotle therefore finds himself at the most advanced standpoint; nothing more profound can one desire to know.” (332-333)
“In nature” concepts do not exist “in this freedom” (in the freedom of thought and the fantasy of man!!). “In nature” they (concepts) have “flesh and blood.”— That is excellent! But it is materialism. Human concepts are the soul of nature —this is only a mystical way of saying that in human concepts nature is reflect- ed in a distinctive way (this NB: in a distinctive and dialectical way!!).
Pp. 318-337 solely on the Meta- physics of Aristotle!! Everything essen- tial that he has to say against Plato’s idealism is suppressed!! In particu- lar, there is suppressed the question of existence outside man and humani- ty!!! = the question of materialism!
Aristotle is an empiricist, but a think-ing one. (340) “The empirical, comprehend-ed in its synthesis, is the speculative No-tion....” (341) (Hegel’s italics.)					cf. Feuer-bach: To read the gospel of senses in interconnec- tion = to think
The coincidence of concepts with “synthesis,” with the sum, summing up of empiricism, sensations, the senses, is indubitable for the philosophers ofall trends. Whence this coincidence? From God (I, the idea, thought, etc., etc.) or from (out of) nature? Engels was right in his formulation of the question.					NB
...“The subjective form constitutes the essence of the Kantian philosophy....” (341)					Kant
On the teleology of Aristotle. ...“Nature has its means in itself and these means are also end. This end in nature is its λόγοζ, the truly rational.” (349)					“end” and cause, law, connection, reason
...“Understanding is not only thinking with consciousness. There is contained in it also the whole, true, profound Notion of nature, of life....” (348)
Reason (understanding), thought, consciousness, without nature, not in correspondence with nature is falsity = materialism!

It is repulsive to read how Hegel extols Aristotle for his “true speculative notions” (373 of the “soul,” and much more besides), clearly spinning a tale of idealistic (= mys- tical) nonsense. Suppressed are all the points on which Aristotle wavers between idealism and ma- terialism!!!
Regarding Aristotle’s views on the “soul,” Hegel writes:
“All that is universal is in fact real, as particular, individual, existing for anoth- er” (375)—in other words, the soul.					lets the cat out of the bag in regard to “realism”
Aristotle. De anima, II, 5:
“The difference” (between Empfinden and Erkennen) “is: that which causes the sensation is external. The cause of this is that perceptive activity is directed on the particular, while knowledge has as its object the universal; but the universal is, to a certain extent, in the soul itself as substance. Everyone can therefore think if he wishes but sense-perception does not depend on him, since the necessary con- dition is that the object perceived be pres- ent.” (377)					sense-percep- tion and cognition Aristotle comes very close to materialism
The crux here—“außen ist”— outside man, independent of him. That is materialism. And this founda- tion, basis, kernel of materialism, Hegel begins wegschwatzen:
“This is an entirely correct view of sense- perception,” writes Hegel, and he goes on to explain that there is undoubtedly “pas-
sivity” in sense—perception: “it is a matter of indifference whether subjectively or objectively; in both there is contained the moment of passivity.... With this mo- ment of passivity, Aristotle does not fall					NB!!
short of idealism, sense-perception is al-
ways in one aspect passive. That is, how- ever, a bad idealism which thinks that the passivity and spontaneity of the mind depend on whether the determination given is from within or from without, as if there					the idealist is caught!
were freedom in sense-perception; the lat- ter is a sphere of limitation”!!... (377-378)
((The idealist stops up the gap leading to materialism. No, it is not gleich- gültig whether from without or from within. This is precisely the point! “From without”—that is mat- terialism. “From within” = idealism. And with the word “passivity,” while keeping silent about the term (“from without”) in Aristotle, Hegel descri- bed in a different way the same from without. Passivity means precisely from without!! Hegel re- places the idealism of sense-percep- tion by the idealism of thought, but equally by idealism.))					NB
...“Subjective idealism declares that there are no external things, they are a determi- nation of our Self. This must be admitted in respect to sense-perception. I am passive
in sense-perception, sense-perception is subjective; it is existence, a state, a deter- mination in me, not freedom. Whether the sense-perception is external or in me, is a matter of indifference, it exists....”(378)					NB an evasion of mate-rialism
Then follows the famous analogy of the soul with wax, causing Hegel to twist and turn like the devil confronted with holy water, and to cry out about it having “so often occasioned misapprehension.” (378- 379) Aristotle says (De anima, II, 12):
"Sense-perception is the receiving of sen- sible forms without matter” ... “as wax receives only the impress of the golden signet ring, not the gold itself, but merely its form.”					NB Soul = Wax NB
Hegel writes: ...“In sense-perception
only the form reaches us, without matter. It is otherwise in practical life—in eating and drinking. In the practical sphere in general we behave as single individuals,					“otherwise” in practice
and as single individuals in a determinate Being, even a material determinate Being, we behave towards matter in a material way. Only insofar as we are of a material					a cowardly evasion of materialism
nature, are we able to behave in such a
way; the point is that our material exist- ence comes into play:” (379)
((A close approach to materialism—and equivocation.)) Hegel gets angry and scolds on account of the “wax,” saying: “everyone can under- stand it” (380), “we do not get beyond the crude aspect of the analogy,” (379) etc.
“The soul should by no means be pas- sive wax or receive determinations from without....” (380)					ha-ha!
...“It” (die Seele) “changes the form of the external body into its own....” (381) Aristotle, De anima, III, 2:
...“The effect of being perceived and of sense-perception is exactly one and the same; but their existence is not the same....” (381)					Aristotle
And Hegel comments:
...“There is a body which sounds and a subject which hears: their existence is twofold....” (382)					Hegel con- ceals the weaknesses of idealism
But he leaves aside the question of Being outside man!!! A sophistical dodge from materialism!

Speaking about thinking, and about rea- son (νουζ), Aristotle (De anima, III, 4) says: ...“There is no sense-perception inde-
pendent of the body, but νουζ is separable from it....” (385) “νουζ is like a book upon whose pages nothing is actually written”					tabula rasa
(386)—and Hegel again becomes irate:
“another much-decried illustration” (386), the very opposite of what he means is ascribed to Aristotle, etc., etc. ((and the					ha-ha!
question of Being independent of
mind and of man is suppressed!!))—all that for the sake of proving “Aristotle is there- fore not a realist.” (389)					ha-ha! he’s afraid!!
Aristotle:
“In this way he who perceives nothing
by his senses learns nothing and under- stands nothing when he discerns anything (ΰεωρή) he must necessarily discern it as a pictorial conception, for such con- ceptions are like sense-perceptions, only					Aristotle and material-ism
without matter....” (389)
...“Whether the understanding thinks actual objects when it is abs- tracted from all matter requires spe- cial investigation....” (389) And Hegel
scrapes out of Aristotle that ostens- ibly “νουζ and νοητόν are one and the same” (390), etc. A model
example of the idealistic misrepresen- tations of an idealist!! Distorting Aris- totle into an idealist of the eighteenth- nineteenth century!!					distortion of Aristotle

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE STOICS

In regard to the “criterion of truth” of the Stoics—“the conception that is laid hold of” (444-446)—Hegel says that con- sciousness only compares conception with conception (not with the object—(446): “truth ... is the harmony of object and consciousness” = “the celebrated definition of the truth”) and, consequently, the whole question is one of the “objective logos, the rationality of the world.” (446)
“Thought yields nothing but the form of universality and identity with itself; ...hence everything may harmonise with my thought.” (449)				Hegel against the Stoics and their criterion
“Reasons, however, prove to be a hum-
bug; for there are good reasons for every- thing....” (469) “Which reasons should be esteemed as good thereby depends on the end and interest....” (ibidem)				there are “reasons” for everything

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICURUS

Speaking of Epicurus (342-271 B. C.), Hegel immediately (before describ- ing his views) adopts a hostile attitude to materialism and declares:
“It is already (!!) self-evident (!!) that if sense-perceived Being is regarded as the truth, the necessity for the Notion is altogether abrogated, in the absence of						Slander against materialism Why??
speculative interest everything falls apart,
and, on the contrary, the vulgar view of things prevails; in point of fact it does not go beyond the view of ordinary human understanding, or rather, everything is lowered to the level of ordinary human understanding”!! (473-474)
Slander against materialism!! “Ne- cessity for the Notion” is not in the slightest “abrogated” by the theory of the source of cognition and the concept!! Disagreement with “common sense” is the foul quirk of an idealist.						NB
Epicurus gave the name of Canonicto the theory of knowledge and the crite- rion of truth. After a brief exposition of it, Hegel writes: “It is so simple that nothing can well be simpler—it is abstract, but also very trivial; more or less on the level of ordi- nary consciousness that begins to reflect. It consists of ordinary psychological con- ceptions; they are quite correct. Out of
sense-perceptions we make conceptions as the universal; thanks to which it becomes lasting. The conceptions themselves (bei						!!!!
der δόξα, Meinung) are tested by means
of sensations, as to whether they are last- ing, whether they repeat themselves. That is quite correct on the whole, but quite superficial; it is the first beginning, the						!!!
mechanics of conception with respect to the first sense-perceptions....” (483)
The “first beginning” is forgotten and distorted by idealism. Dia- lectical materialism alone linked the “beginning” with the continuation and the end.
NB: p. 481—on the significance of words according to Epicurus:
“Everything has its evidence, energy, distinctness, in the name first conferred on it” (Epicurus: Diogenes Laertius, X,
§ 33). And Hegel: “The name is something universal, belongs to thinking, makes the manifold simple.” (481) “On the objective manner in general
in which the images of external things enter into us, and on our relation to exter- nal things, by which conceptions arise—						Epicurus: objects outside us
Epicurus has evolved the following met- aphysical explanation:
“From the surfaces of things there passes off a constant stream, which cannot be detected by our senses ... and this be- cause, by reason of the counteracting re- plenishment, the thing itself in its solid- ity long preserves the same arrangement and disposition of the atoms; and the mo- tion through the air of these surfaces which detach themselves is of the utmost rapidity, because it is not necessary that what is detached should have any thickness.” “The sensation does not contradict such an idea, when we consider” (zusehe) “how images produce their effects; they bring us a cor- respondence, a sympathetic link with ex- ternal things. Therefore something passes out from them which within us is like something external.” “And since the ema- nation passes into us, we know of the def- initeness of a sensation; the definite lies in the object and thus flows into us” (pp. 484-485, Diogenes Laertius, X, § 48-49).						NBtheory of knowledge of Epicurus...
The genius of Epicurus’ conjecture (300 B.C., i.e., more than 2,000 years before Hegel), e.g., on light and its velocity.
Hegel completely concealed (NB) the main thing: (NB) the existence of things outside the consciousness of man and independent of it
—all that Hegel suppresses and merely says:
...“This is a very trivial way of repre- senting sense-perception. Epicurus elected to take the easiest criterion of the truth—a criterion still in use—inasmuch as it is not apprehended by sight, namely: that it does not contradict what we see or hear. For in truth such matters of thought as atoms, the detachment of surfaces, and so forth, are beyond our powers of sight and hearing; [cer- tainly we manage to see and to hear some- thing different] but there is abundance of room for what is seen and what is conceived or imagined to exist alongside of one anoth- er. If the two are allowed to fall apart, they do not contradict each other; for it is not until we relate them that the contradic- tion becomes apparent....” (485-486)						A model of distortion and slander against materialism by an ideal- ist
Hegel has avoided Epicurus’ theory of cognition and begun to speak of some- thing else, which Epicurus does not touch on here and which is com-patible with materialism!!
P. (486): Error, according to Epicurus, proceeds from an interruption in movement (in the movement from the object to us, to sense-perception or to conception?). “It is impossible,” Hegel writes, “to have a more meagre (theory of knowledge).” (486)
Everything becomes dürftig,if it is distorted and despoiled.

The soul, according to Epicurus, is a “certain” arrangement of atoms. “This is what Locke also (!!!) said.... These are empty words ...“ (489) ((no, they are the guess-work of genius and signposts forscience, but not for clericalism)).						This, auch, is wonderful!!!! Epicurus (341- 270 BC), Locke (1632-1704). Dif- ferenz = 2,000 years
NB. NB. (489), id. (490):
Epicurus ascribes to the atoms a “krummlinigte” Bewegung, this according to Hegel is “most arbitrary						and electrons?
and wearisome” (489) in Epicurus.— ((and the “God” of the idealists???)).
“Or else Epicurus altogether denies No- tion and the Universal as the essential...” (490) although his atoms “themselves have this very nature of thought”... “the incon- sistency ... which all empiricists are guil- ty of....” (491)						nonsense! lies! slander! NB
This avoids the essence of materialism and material- ist dialectics.
“In Epicurus there is no ... final end in the world, wisdom of a Creator; everything consists of events, which are determined by the chance (??) external (??) coming together of configurations of atoms....” (491)						he pities God!! the idealistic scoundrel!!
And Hegel simply hurls abuse at Epicurus: “His thoughts on particular as- pects of Nature are, however, in them- selves feeble....” (492)						!!
And immediately afterwards is a polemicagainst the “Naturwissenschaft” heute, which, like Epicurus, allegedly judges “by analogy,” and “explains” (492)—e.g., light as “vibrations of the ether....” “This is an analogy quite in the manner of Epicu- rus....” (493)						and the “manner” of natural science! and its successes!!
((Modern natural science ver- sus Epicurus,—against (NB) Hegel.))
In Epicurus, “the kernel of the matter, the principle, is nothing else than the principle of our usual natural science....” (495) ... “it is still the manner which lies at the basis of our natural science....” (496)						Epicurus and modern na- tural science
Correct is only the reference to the ignorance of dialectics in gen- eral and of the dialectics of con- cepts. But the criticism of ma-terialism is schwach.
“Of this method (of Epicurean philosophy) we may say in general that it likewise has a side on which it possesses value.						!NB!
Aristotle and the more ancient philosophers took their start in natural philosophy from universal thought a priori, and from this
developed the Notion. This is the one side. The other side is the necessary one that experience should be worked up into uni- versality, that laws should be determined; that is to say, that the result which fol- lows from the abstract Idea should coin- cide with the general conception to which experience and observation have led. The						NB!!NBNB
a priori is with Aristotle, for instance, most excellent, but not sufficient, because it lacks connection with and relation to experience and observation. This develop-						NB
ment of the particular to the general is the discovery of laws, natural forces and
so on. It may be said that Epicurus is the inventor of empirical natural science, of empirical psychology. In contrast to the						NB
Stoic ends, conceptions of the understand- ing, is experience, the sensuous present. There we have abstract, limited understand-
ing, without truth in itself, and therefore without the presence and reality of nature; here we have this sense of nature, which is more true than these other hypotheses.” (496-497)						NB
(THIS ALMOST COMPLETELY AP-PROACHES DIALECTICAL MAT-ERIALISM.)						NB
The importance of Epicurus—the strug- gle against Aberglauben of the Greeks and Romans (498)—and modern priests?? all this nonsense about whether a hare ran across the path, etc. (and the good Lord?).						Hegel on the pros of materialism
“And from it” (the philosophy of Epi- curus), “more than anything, those con- ceptions which have altogether denied the supersensuous have proceeded.” (498)						NB
|| But this is good only for “end- lichen” .... “With superstition there also passed away self-dependent Con-nection and the world of the Ideal.” (499)						for what did they (the classics) val- ue idealism??
This NOTA BENE.
P. 499: Epicurus on the soul: the finer (NB) atoms, their more rapid (NB) motion, their connection (NB) etc., etc., with the body (Diogenes Laertius, X, § 66; 63-64)—very naïve and good!—but Hegel becomes irate, he hurls abuse: “meaningless talk,” “empty words,” “no thoughts.” (500)						for Hegel the “soul” is also a prejudice
The Gods, according to Epicurus, are “das Allgemeine” (506) in general—“they consist partly in number” as number, i.e., abstraction from the sensuous....
“In part, they” (the gods) “are the perfect- ed type of man, which, owing to the simi- larity of the images, arises from the con- tinuous confluence of like images on one and the same subject.” (507)						NBGods = the perfected type of man, cf. Feuer-bach

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCEPTICS

Speaking of Scepticism, Hegel points to its apparent “invincibility” (Unbezwing- lichkeit) (538):				NB
“If anyone actually desires to be a Scep- tic, he cannot be convinced, or be brought to a positive philosophy, any more than he who is paralysed can be made to stand.” (539)				Bien dit!!
“Positive philosophy in relation to it” (den denkenden Skeptizismus) “may have this consciousness: it contains in itself the negative of Scepticism; Scepticism is not opposed to it, nor outside it, but is a moment of it; but it contains the negative in its truth, as it is not present in Scepti- cism.” (539) (The relation of philosophy to Scepti- cism:) “Philosophy is dialectical, this dialectic is change; the Idea, as abstract Idea, is the inert and existent, but it is only true insofar as it grasps itself as living; this is that it is dialectical in itself, in order to transcend that quiescence and inertness. Hence the philosophic idea is dialectical in itself and not contingent; Scepticism,
on the contrary, exercises its dialectic contingently—for just as the material, the content comes before it, it shows that it is negative in itself....” (540)				NB dialectics of Scepticism is “contingent”
The old (ancient) Sciepticism has to be distinguished from the new (only Schulze of Göttingen is named). (540) Ataraxie (imperturbability?) as the ideal of the Sceptics:
“Pyrrho once pointed out to his fellow- passengers on board a ship, who were fright- ened during a storm, a pig, which remained quite indifferent and peaceably ate on, saying to them: in such imperturbahility the wise man must also abide” (Diogenes Laertius, IX, 68)—pp. 551-552.				not a bad anecdote about the Sceptics
“Scepticism is not doubt. Doubt is just the opposite of the tranquillity that is the result of scepticism.” (552)				NB Scepticism is not doubt
...“Scepticism, on the contrary, is indif- ferent to the one as well as to the other....” (553)
Schulze-Aenesidemus passes off for Scep- ticism the statement that everything sen- suous is truth (557), but the Sceptics did not say so: one must sich danach richten,
orientate oneself by the sensuous, but that is not the truth. The new Scepticism does not doubt the reality of things. The old Scepticism does doubt the reality of things.				NB
Tropes (turns of speech, arguments, etc.) of the Sceptics:				everything in Sextus Empiricus (second cen- tury A. D.)

	a.	The diversity of animal organisation. (558) Differences in sensations: the jaun- diced (dem Gelbsiichtigen) sees as yellow what to others appears white, etc.
	b.	The diversity of mankind. “Idiosyn- crasies.” (559) Whom to believe? The majority? Fool- ish, for all men cannot be interro- gated. (560)
		Diversity of philosophies: Stupid re- ference, Hegel waxes indignant: ... “such men see everything in a phi- losophy excepting Philosophy itself,				NB
		and this is overlooked....” “However different the philosophic systems may
		be, they are not as different as white and sweet, green and rough, for they agree in the fact that they are philos- ophies and this is what is overlooked.” (561)				NB
		...“All tropes proceed against the ‘is,’ but the truth is all the same not this dry ‘is,’ but essentially proc- ess....” (562)				NB
	c.	The diversity in the constitution of the organs of sense: the various sense organs perceive differently (on a paint- ed panel something appears erha- ben to the eye but not to the touch).
	d.	The diversity of circumstances in the subject (rest, passion, etc.).
	e.	The diversity of distances, etc. the earth going round the sun or vice versa, etc.
	f.	Intermixture (scents in strong sun- shine and without it, etc.).
	g.	The composition of things (pounded glass is not transparent, etc.).
	h.	The “relativity of things.”
	i.	The frequency, rarity of happenings, etc.; habit.
	k.	Customs, laws, etc., their diversity....
		|These (10) are all old tropes| and He- gel: this is all “empirical”—“do not have to do with the Notion....” (566) This is “trivial”..., but .... “In fact, as against the dogmatism of the common human understanding they are quite valid....” (567) The five new tropes (are said by Hegel to he much more advanced, they contain dialectics, concern concepts)—also accord- ing to Sextus:
	a. b. c. d. e.	The diversity of the opinions ... of philosophers... The falling into an infinite pro- gression (one thing depends on an- other and so on without end). Relativity (of premises). Presupposition. The dogmatists put forward unprovable presupposi- tions. Reciprocity. Circle (vicious)...

“These sceptical tropes, in fact, concernthat which is called a dogmatic philosophy (and in accordance with its nature such a philosophy must display itself in all these forms) not in the sense of its having a positive content, but as asserting some- thing determinate as the absolute.” (575)				NB
Hegel against the absolute! Here we have the germ of dialectical mat- erialism.				NB
“To the criticism which knows nothing in itself, nothing (not nichts) (sic!!) ab- solute, all knowledge of Being-in-itself, as such, is held to be dogmatism, while it is the worst dogmatism of all, because it maintains that the ‘I,’ the unity of self- consciousness, opposed to Being, is in and for itself, and that what is ‘in itself’ in the outside world is likewise so, and there- fore that the two absolutely cannot come together.” (576)				“Criticism” is the “worst dogmatism”
“These tropes hit dogmatic philosophy, which has this manner of representing one principle in a determinate proposition as determinateness. Such a principle is always conditioned; and consequently contains dia- lectics, the destruction within it of itself.” (577) “These tropes are a powerful weapon against the philosophy of reason.” (ib.)				Bien dit!!! Dialectics = “destruction of itself”
Sextus, for example, reveals the dialec- tics of the concept of a point (der Punkt). A point has no dimensions? That means that it is outside space! It is the limit of space in space, a negation of space, and
at the same time “it touches space”—“but at the same time it is also in itself some- thing dialectical.” (579)				NB
“These tropes ... are powerless against speculative ideas, because the latter contain within themselves a dialectical moment and the abrogation of the finite.” (580)				NB
End of Volume XIV (p. 586).

Volume XV. Volume III Of The History Of Philosophy (The End Of Greek Philosophy, Medieval and Modern Philosophy up to Schelling, pp. 1-692)

BERLIN, 1836

THE NEO-PLATONISTS

...“The return to God....” (5), “self- consciousness is absolute Essence”..., “the world-spirit”... (7), “Christian religion”.... (8)And a mass of thin porridge ladled out about God.... (8-18)
But this philosophical idealism, open- ly, “seriously” leading to God, is more honest than modern agnosticism with its hypocrisy and cowardice.
A. Philo—(about the time of the birth
of Christ), a Jewish savant, a mystic, “finds Plato present in Moses” (19), etc. The main point is “the knowl- edge of God” (21), etc. God is λόγοζ, “the epitome of all Ideas,” “pure Be- ing” (22) (“according to Plato”).... (22) Ideas are “angels” (messengers of God).... (24) The sensuous world, however, “as with Plato” = ούχ όν = = not-Being. (25)				Ideas (of Plato) and the good Lord
B. Cabbala, the Gnostics——————
idem...
C. Alexandrian philosophy—(= eclectic
ism) (=Platonists, Pythagoreans, Ari- stotelians). (33, 35) Eclectics are either uncultured men, or cunning (die klugen Leute —they take the good from every system, but...
—they collect every good but do not have “consistency of thought, and consequently thought itself.” (33)				on the eclectics...
They developed Plato....
“The Platonic universal, which is in thought, accordingly receives the significa- tion of being as such absolute essence”(33)....				Plato’s ideas and the good Lord

HEGEL ON PLATO’S DIALOGUES

(Timaeus)

p. (230) (238) (240) (248)

Sophistes Philebus Parmenides